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VOL. III.



RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN  
ENGLAND

FROM THE REFORMATION TO THE END OF LAST CENTURY

A Contribution to the History of Theology

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## PREFACE.

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AT the end of a work so extensive as this, an author, I suppose, always feels how much better it would be done if he had it to do again. When I began I had but a partial knowledge of the ground to be traversed, and of a few important parts I knew nothing. This is the cause of one or two irregularities which otherwise would have been avoided. Some writers, for instance, are noticed at more length than others who are perhaps of greater importance.

In the preface to my essay on Pantheism I have recorded the circumstances which determined me to devote some years to the special study of theology. When I came to London, in 1859, I began a course of reading with the object of inquiring into the nature of revelation and the evidences by which it is supported. At the end of four years I had formed a plan of something like a complete history of theology, which would set forth the special character of Christianity and its relation to other religions. In the spring of 1863 I showed the outlines of my work to the late Professor Maurice, who had gone over large portions of the same field, and whose writings had been of great service to me. The Professor looked over the paper, and returning it, said, with an incredulous smile, 'You have twenty years'

work before you.' He advised me to try one part first, and to go on with the rest if that succeeded. I took his advice, and in 1866 the first chapter, which was on Pantheism, had become a large volume. Ten years have passed since that conversation with Professor Maurice. The present work is only the completion of the second chapter, and the first will have to be re-written.

The second chapter in the original plan was on Deism. This will account for the prominence given to the Deists, and also for some peculiarities in the stand-point from which the whole subject is treated. The papers on the English Deists were submitted to the late Dean Alford for insertion in the *Contemporary Review*, of which he was at that time the Editor. The Dean at once saw their value to the history of English theology, and wrote a noble defence of them when he was charged by some writers in the clerical newspapers with reviving the forgotten literature of the Deists. It was a field which Dr. Alford himself had never touched, and, with all the frankness of his ingenuous nature, he confessed that he had learned a great deal from reading my papers.\* It was intended to collect the articles on the Deists into a volume, but the publisher suggested extending them so as to make a history of the theology of the eighteenth century. I expected to get a beginning about the time of the Revolution or dating from the influence of Locke; but I found at last that I must go back to the Reformation.

The spirit in which this work is written is, I trust, alto-

\* The Dean wrote to me after the publication of the paper on Anthony Collins, that he had been stormed with letters of remonstrance, chiefly from the clergy. The paper on Woolston he rejected after it was in type,

because of Woolston's language. But in spite of the storm that had been raised, he completed the series, which consisted of two more, Tindal and Hume.



gether different from the ordinary spirit in which histories of the Church or of theology are generally written. I have not abused those from whom I differ, and I have not exalted those with whom I agree. I have had beside me for general reference Dean Hook's 'Ecclesiastical Biography,' and have tried to fight against the spirit which pervades it. When the Dean comes to a Nonjuror or a Scotch Episcopalian, he is sure to find a saint, a confessor, or a martyr, to whom many pages of eulogy are to be devoted. When he comes to a Nonconformist, even if it be a Calamy, a Howe, or a Watts, they are served with a few dates and, perhaps, a list of their publications. A liberal Churchman is generally described as 'this unprincipled man,' or 'this Arian heretic,' while for the leaders of Presbyterianism in Scotland, the Dean opens the floodgates of his wrath, and pours forth an overwhelming torrent of hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness. My wish has been to write a history of theology on the rigid principles of natural science; to feel as if I were of no party, no country, and no creed; to appeal to no man's partialities or prejudices, but to state the naked truth, however cold the form in which it might appear. I have remembered a wise saying of John Stuart Mill, that 'a doctrine is not judged at all till it is judged in its best form;' and I have tried to write as if the time predicted by Hooker were come, when 'three words written with charity and meekness shall receive a more blessed reward than three thousand volumes written with a disdainful sharpness of wit.'

The objection has been made that under the name of religious thought I have been writing, not of religion but of theology. I cannot undertake at present to determine the difference between religion and theology. But I use the

words 'religious thought' as meaning theology rather than religion. I have written a history of opinions concerning religion. A history of religious life in England has been suggested as the complement of this work. This will probably be my next occupation. I shall then exhibit the Catholicism of religion rather than the Sectarianism of theology. Instead of doctrines and opinions, the subject will be the Christian life. I hope in that work to be able to do more justice to the lives and works of the Puritans and the Evangelicals, as well as to all that was really good and Christian in High Churchmen and Nonjurors.

I have to thank several reviewers and some private correspondents for suggestions, which have received, or in future editions will receive, due attention.\*

LOWER TOOTING,  
*April, 1873.*

\* Some *corrigenda* will be found on p. 416.

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RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN  
ENGLAND.



## CHAPTER XII.

CONVOCAATION. — SACHEVERELL. — ARIANISM. — WHISTON. —  
CLARKE. — WATERLAND. — HOADLY CONTROVERSY. — SYKES. —  
CONYERS MIDDLETON. — ARCHBISHOP WAKE. — POTTER. —  
BISHOP FLEETWOOD. — ATTERBURY. — GIBSON. — SHERLOCK. —  
HARE. — WILSON. — SAMUEL WESLEY. — JOHN BALGUY. —  
BRETT. — WILLIAM LAW. — SWIFT. — JOHN HUTCHINSON. —  
ADDISON.

THE relations between the State and the Church of Eng-  
land were never defined. Sometimes the Church had a  
semblance of liberty and independence, but at other times  
its laws have proceeded direct from the State. The  
eighteenth century began with claims, at least on the  
part of the inferior clergy, for greater ecclesiastical power.  
We have already seen how King William's scheme of Com-  
prehension was frustrated unexpectedly by the Lower  
House of Convocation. Tillotson thought that the clergy  
might be entrusted with measures necessary for the wel-  
fare of the Church; but experience taught him that he  
was wrong. Soon after the defeat of the scheme of Com-  
prehension, he was raised to the primacy. For eleven  
years the Convocation was not allowed to meet, and was  
thus kept, as Burnet says, 'from doing mischief.'

The Lower House of Convocation, in the session of 1689,  
had given many signs of dissatisfaction with the proceed-  
ings of King William and the bishops. Besides the  
effort to conciliate the moderate Nonconformists by changes  
in the Liturgy, they had seen Episcopacy overthrown in  
Scotland, and a general toleration granted to the most  
extreme Dissenters in England. These were serious matters

*Relations of  
Church and  
State.*

*Differences  
between the  
two Houses of  
Convocation.*

CHAP. XII. for a generation of Churchmen who sympathised with the measures of Sheldon, after the Restoration of Charles. When the bishops voted an address to King William, they commended his Majesty's zeal 'for the Protestant religion in general, and the Church of England in particular.' It was expected that the Lower House would adopt the same address, but they claimed the right to approach the throne as a separate and independent body. This claim was resisted. They then objected to the words 'Protestant religion.' They could not recognise religion in this general, and, to their minds, vague sense. They were willing to substitute 'Protestant Churches.' The bishops then proposed to amend the address by saying, 'The interest of the Protestant religion in this and all other Protestant Churches.' The Lower House still objected, that this put the Church of England on the same level with the foreign Protestant and Presbyterian Churches. They were not satisfied till the words 'this' and 'and' were omitted. After thanking his Majesty for his care for the Church of England, there followed 'the interest of the Protestant religion in all other Protestant Churches.'

The two parties represented by the two Houses of Convocation, in 1689, continued, with various modifications, the two leading parties throughout the eighteenth century. Their first great warfare began during the years that Convocation was suppressed. The subject of controversy was the rights of the clergy and the constitution of Convocation. In 1697, a zealous High Churchman published a pamphlet called 'A Letter to a Convocation Man.'\* The writer argued for Convocation as the only means of curing all the distempers to which the Church is liable. Its restoration was demanded by the prevalence of immorality, heresy, scepticism, deism, atheism, and 'contempt of the priesthood.' The picture of the unbelief of the age was certainly appalling. Some of the clergy had even ceased to believe the Mosaic history: some of them denied the doctrine of the Trinity, and others, that of the Divine Unity. Mysteries were excluded from Christianity; and such was the general indifference to religion, that there were even

\* Letter to a Convocation Man.'

\* This was ascribed by some to Dr. Binkes; by others to Sir B. Shower.



pleas put forth for a 'universal unlimited toleration.' The promoters of all these impieties were plainly intimated. They were such men as Thomas Burnet, John Locke, John Toland, and William Sherlock. In addition to these heretics, some of the French ministers in London had been convicted of Socinianism by their own synod. The land, moreover, had been deluged with Socinian pamphlets. Lords and Commons, the writer said, can do nothing. They cannot discern truth from heresy. Convocation must arise and stem the torrent. We must demand from the State the rights of the Church. It was declared free by Magna Charta, and yet it is denied the power of self-government, which is possessed by every sect in the kingdom.

The writer maintained that Convocation ought to be summoned with every Parliament. He proved this from a statute of Henry VIII., which gives the same protection to the two Houses of Convocation which older statutes give to the House of Commons. He argued from the writ 'Premonentes,' by which the clergy were formerly summoned to Convocation, that they were to meet at the same time as Parliament; and when they met they were to debate and decide, and these decisions were to have the same validity as Acts of Parliament. Nothing is required to make them law but the sanction of the king. Convocation, the writer adds, was once part of Parliament. It afterwards separated, and carried with it its peculiar functions into the Convocation House. The 'Letter' concludes with a high encomium on the clergy. Their character would secure respect for any canons they might make. In no other profession is there 'such a number of men who are so great an honour to their vocation.'

The 'Letter to a Convocation Man' was answered in 'A Letter to a Member of Parliament.' The writer of this showed that Convocation had performed no judicial act since the time of Henry VIII., when, in compliance with the will of the king, it declared his marriage with Anne of Cleves null and void. Even in the time of Queen Mary, Convocation was silent. There was no necessity for its restoration. The bishops by their ordinary jurisdiction could do all that

## CHAP. XII

was required. The cases of heresy and immorality mentioned in the 'Letter to a Convocation Man' were all punishable in the ordinary courts. The articles declare the doctrine of the Church, and if men like Locke and Sherlock depart from the doctrine of the Church, refutation by argument is better than Convocation censures. The writer says, that the furious spirit and violent temper of the clergy are sufficient reasons for not allowing Convocation to meet. We could expect nothing from them but factions and tumults. The conduct of the last Convocation was enough to convince all reasonable men of the truth of Archbishop Tillotson's words, that no good ever came from such meetings. To the arguments for the necessity of Convocation, the answer was that the king is 'Custos utriusque tabulæ.' He ought, therefore, to maintain religion and to keep all persons, both civil and ecclesiastical, within the bounds of their duty. To be under the State is no dishonour to the Church. The 'blessed martyrs who sealed the Reformation with their blood did not think the Church dishonoured by being parliamentary.' Hooker says, that altering religion and making ecclesiastical laws are among the duties that belong to a king. Even the pope was satisfied to have his supremacy and all his dispensations ratified by Parliament. It was shown from a statute of Edward I., that the English Parliaments had always regarded the bishops as created by the Crown. The Reformation proceeded on this principle. The king claimed the prerogative to call synods and make laws for the Church. This prerogative was openly acknowledged by Convocation in the time of Henry VIII. The former relations of the clergy to Parliament is admitted to be a difficult question, on which nothing can be said with certainty. They may have been represented there by proctors, but these were certainly not allowed to vote. The whole history of Convocation shows that its existence depends entirely on the will of the State.

The 'Letter to a Convocation Man' was also answered in an elaborate work by Dr. Wake, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury. This work was called 'The Authority of Christian Princes over their Ecclesiastical Synods.' Dr. Wake went back to the first relations of the Christian Church with the Roman empire on its conversion to Chris-

tianity. showing that princes had always exercised authority in all matters ecclesiastical. In this he says they only followed the example of the Jewish kings. According to Socrates the historian, the greatest synods were always assembled by command of the emperors. The supremacy of the State over the Church was further confirmed by quotations from the Roman laws, as they are found in the code of Theodosius, the code and novels of Justinian, and the collections of Basilius, Leo, and Constantine. Our kings have always claimed the same authority over the Church as was claimed by the emperors. They have always determined the time and place when and where Synods were to be held, and they have nominated the persons who were to attend them. It had been a custom to summon Convocation at the same time as Parliament, but Convocation never had power to make laws without the licence and sanction of the king. The Convocation of 1640 is mentioned as a case which ought to satisfy all who advocate the independence of the clergy. It met by special commission from the king. In the commission was quoted the statute made in the time of Henry VIII., which acknowledged the necessity of the royal licence. The king prescribed the very subjects which the Convocation was to discuss. He also commanded that nothing was to be changed in the liturgy, rubrics, or articles of the Church. Other princes have even gone beyond this. They have determined beforehand the decisions which the Convocation was to make. When James I., in 1622, sent the articles to Convocation for the approbation of the clergy, he sent his letters with them. Afterwards, without in any way consulting Convocation, he signified his pleasure to have singing and organ service in the cathedral churches. Dr. Wake said that there were two assemblages of the clergy: one was by the 'Premonentes,' to give consent to their annual subsidies; the other was by the archbishop's writ, and this was properly Convocation. Its business was only occasional, and subject to the will of the king. There was no necessity for the clergy again meeting in the arena. The account of scepticism and immorality in the 'Letter to a Convocation Man' was described as very 'tragical,' and a hope was expressed that it was more tragical than true; but in any

CHAP. XII.

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Ecclesiastical  
synods  
summoned  
only by  
princes.

CHAP. XII. case Convocation would be a 'remedy worse than the disease.'

'Municipium  
Ecclesiasticum.'

Dr. Wake was answered by a violent advocate of Convocation, in a book called 'Municipium Ecclesiasticum; or the Rights, Liberties, and Authorities of the Christian Church against all Oppressive Doctrines and Constitutions.\*' The writer repeated the lamentations of the 'Letter to a Convocation Man,' on the contempt of mysteries and the authority of the Church, which he called the suppression of Christianity. The synods of the Church assembled by divine right. They were not, as Dr. Wake made them, mere prudential clubs under heathen princes, or servile conventions under nominally Christian rulers. The hierarchy was divine, and it was absurd to think of its powers being limited by any State. The king might be a Jew or a Socinian, a Presbyterian or a Muggletonian, and how could such a being control a divinely-instituted body like the Convocation of the clergy? Ecclesiastical society is anterior to civil power, and the duty of a king is to protect it, not to seek its destruction. This was proved from Jewish and Pagan history, from common reason, and especially from the constitution of the Christian Society. The apostles, and under them the College of Elders in Jerusalem, were Houses of Convocation, charged with the management of the affairs of the Church.

Dr. Atterbury  
on 'The  
Rights of Con-  
vocation.'

Dr. Wake met a more powerful antagonist in Francis Atterbury, afterwards the unfortunate Bishop of Rochester. Atterbury's book was called 'The Right and Privileges of an English Convocation Stated and Vindicated.' He said that Wake, in reserving for the king the right to ratify or reject the decrees both of Parliament and Convocation, had given the king an absolute power over the Church and the State. This was a principle worthy of Parker or Cartwright, and would have been of great service in the time of James II. It would have helped all the pious designs then upon the anvil; and if the assertor of it had not been a bishop, to be sure he would 'have been made one.†' This doctrine under James II. would have ruined the established

\* This book is ascribed to a clergyman named Hill.

† Preface, p. vi.

religion; and it is surely strange if it can be of service to the government of King William. Atterbury repeated the assertion of the author of the 'Letter to a Convocation Man,' that a Convocation or provincial synod of the clergy was always summoned with the Parliament. This, he said, could be clearly traced back to the time when they became two distinct assemblies. In Saxon times, and even after the Norman Conquest, clergy and laity deliberated in one assembly. The members of Convocation had 'parliamentary wages' and 'parliamentary privileges.\*' The Lower House joined the laity in attendance on the king at the opening or the dissolution of Parliament. In the time of Henry VI. they are described as the 'Commons Spiritual.' In the proclamation of Henry VIII., it is said, 'the nobles and commons, both spiritual and temporal,' decree that the king shall be, under God, Supreme Head of the Church of England. It is certain, Atterbury says, that for the last hundred and fifty years Convocation has been accustomed to meet and rise within a day of the Parliament. After asserting the right of the clergy to meet in Convocation as often as Parliament meets, he vindicates their claim not only to deliberate, but to pass resolutions without the royal licence. The act under Henry VIII. does not allow them to promulge and execute canons, but it does not forbid them to prepare resolutions to be submitted to the king. The act, moreover, was repealed under Mary. It was revived again under Elizabeth, but not with the consent of the clergy. In the original statute, made in the time of Henry, the clergy were not only forbidden to make new canons, but they were not allowed to act upon old ones. In all subsequent acts in which this statute is recited, the latter prohibition is omitted. When James I. sent prescriptions to the Houses of Convocation, he only prescribed subscription to Articles which had been agreed on by a former Convocation. When he wished to have organs in the cathedrals, he only suggested matter for a canon. The Reformation, Atterbury says, was not the work of the king, but of the Convocation. The king gave his sanction to what Convocation decreed. The records are lost, and this misled Burnet, who represents the Reforma-

CHAP. XII.  
 Convocation  
 called 'The  
 Commons  
 Spiritual.'

\* Preface, p. 58.

CHAP. XII. tion as mainly the work of the king. Dr. Wake followed Burnet.

Answers to Atterbury.

Atterbury's book was the occasion of several learned works on the history of Convocation. The most important of these were by Dr. Kennet, afterwards Bishop of Peterborough, by Dr. Hody, and by Dr. Wake. They were all against Atterbury, and maintain that the writ 'Premonentes,' and the archbishop's writ, did not summon the same Convocation. In virtue of the first the bishops still sit in the House of Lords. When it included the inferior clergy, they were only summoned to be taxed. The archbishop's writ, on the other hand, is a summons for an ecclesiastical synod. This is properly Convocation, which began in 1382, under Archbishop Courtnay. The inferior clergy were then admitted to sit in council with the bishops. Kennet's account is that the clergy at first came to Parliament to be taxed, and the Convocation to attend the bishops; but latterly the men who were summoned to Parliament were summoned at the same time to a provincial synod concurrent with Parliament.

Meeting of Convocation.

In 1700, the king granted a licence for the assembling of Convocation. The bishops and clergy met in St. Paul's on the 10th of February. After service and a sermon, they proceeded to the Chapter House. The archbishop admonished the inferior clergy to choose a prolocutor. Their choice fell on Dr. Hooper, Dean of Canterbury, afterwards Bishop of Bath and Wells. The bishops did not wish a Convocation, but the Lower House had the true spirit of the clergy militant. They were determined to show their independence, not only of the State but of the bishops. They were High Churchmen, deeply learned in the Epistles of St. Ignatius, but they inverted the Ignatian maxim to do nothing without the bishop. If reason is against a man, he is sure to be against reason; and if bishops are against High Churchmen, why should not High Churchmen be against bishops? The dissatisfaction which the inferior clergy had manifested at the Convocation of 1689 had been gathering strength in the years that had intervened. The ruling spirit of this ardent contest was the fiery Atterbury. His cause was the rights of the clergy against the State

bishops. The second meeting of Convocation was on the 21st of February, in Henry VII.'s Chapel in Westminster Abbey. The bishops retired to the Jerusalem Chamber, and soon after sent their commissary to prorogue the Lower House till the 25th, and to the room called the Jerusalem Chamber. The Lower House, regarding the emigration of the bishops as a recognition of their independence, were proceeding with business. They obeyed the archbishop's prorogation so far that they did not meet again till the 25th, and then it was, as before, in the Chapel of Henry VII. The archbishop again prorogued the Lower House till the 28th, and '*in hunc locum.*' The Lower House continued their sitting, and when they met on the 28th, it was still in the Chapel of Henry VII. The archbishop sent for the prolocutor, and demanded why the Lower House had continued to sit after his prorogation, and why they had not come '*in hunc locum*'—that is, to the Jerusalem Chamber. Both Houses were again prorogued until the 6th of March. This time the archbishop said distinctly in the schedule that the Lower House was to meet '*in hunc locum vulgo vocat. Jerusalem Chamber.*' The prolocutor at this meeting presented a paper containing reasons drawn from the records of Convocation, why the Lower House had sat after the archbishop's prorogation, and explaining that by '*in hunc locum,*' they understood the place where they had been used to meet. The paper ended—'We find no footsteps of evidence to conclude that it was ever the practice of this House to attend their lordships before the House did meet, and sit pursuant to their former adjournment. But when this House hath first met and sat, it hath been the constant practice to attend their lordships with business of their own, at their own motion, or when they were called up to their lordships by a special messenger.' This paper was answered by the bishops, and the Lower House, after the example of the House of Commons, demanded a free conference, which was refused. The bishops answered that as they had begun the controversy in writing, so in writing it must be continued.

The Lower House asserts its independence.

The Lower House continued to meet in the Chapel of Henry VII., and, despite of all the archbishop's prorogations,



CHAP. XII. to do business on its own account. To suppress heresy was the great plea for the revival of Convocation. The Lower House immediately encountered the great heretic of the age, John Toland. His 'Christianity not Mysterious,' had been published about five years, and was still a popular book. Extracts from it were submitted to the Upper House, with a petition praying their lordships to agree in the condemnatory resolutions passed by the Lower House. But the bishops answered that they could censure no book without the licence of the king. The contest between the two Houses was the sole business of Convocation this year. The archbishop reprimanded the Lower House for their irregularities, and refused to acknowledge them till they conformed to the orders of the Upper House. But the Lower House were determined to make complete work of the expurgation of heresy. There was one man among the bishops whom the High Church party could never forgive. That man was Gilbert Burnet, whom King William had made Bishop of Sarum. The Lower House, after their efforts to annihilate Toland, proceeded to censure Burnet's 'Exposition of the Articles of Religion.' Under pretence of presenting something concerning the irregularity of the Lower House, this censure was presented to the bishops by the prolocutor. The Upper House had decided to receive nothing from the Lower House till their irregularities were rectified. At the special request, however, of Burnet himself, who was too honest a man to understand policy, the censure was received. A committee of bishops appointed to examine the representations, reported to the Upper House that the Lower House had not the power to censure books, that they ought not of their own accord to have entered on the examination of a book by a bishop of the Church, that 'their censure was defamatory and scandalous, and that the Bishop of Sarum, by his excellent history of the Reformation, had done great service to the Church of England.'

Condemns  
John Toland

And Bishop  
Burnet.

At the next meeting the prolocutor again appeared before the Upper House, but the archbishop refused to receive any paper except the one that had been promised containing the special charges against Burnet's exposition of the Articles. The prolocutor had two papers. He was not at liberty to



present the one without the other. He went to the Lower House for instructions, but did not return. The special charges against Burnet's book were never produced. After one or two more sessions, with the repetition of similar contentions, Convocation ended with the dissolution of Parliament. Several members of the Lower House, among whom were Sherlock, Beveridge, and Bull, disowned all responsibility for the later irregularities of the Lower House. At the next meeting the moderate party in the Lower House apparently had gained some strength. They proposed Beveridge for prolocutor, but the majority voted for Dr. Woodward, Dean of Sarum. Woodward owed all his promotions to Burnet, but he was now Burnet's enemy. Under his leadership the Lower House proceeded to yet greater extremes. They invested the prolocutor with the power to prorogue, instead of, as formerly, intimating the prorogation. The necessity of the archbishop's schedule was superseded. The sudden death, however, of the prolocutor gave the archbishop an opportunity of keeping the Lower House in subjection. He gave the inferior clergy the best of advice, and begged time to consider about the election of another prolocutor. After two or three prorogations the king died, and Convocation was thereby dissolved. The Lower House wished to continue their sittings as part of Parliament in virtue of the 'Premonentes,' but the attorney-general gave it as his opinion that this would be against the royal supremacy.\*

The High Church party had its hour of triumph during the reign of Queen Anne. The Lower House of Convocation succeeded to some extent in having its position recognised as a distinct and independent House. A tide of loyalty and High Churchism flowed in upon the ignorant multitude, and the moderate bishops were no longer in favour. In the Convocation disputes, popular sympathy was on the side of the Lower House. Efforts were made to pass the bill against Occasional Conformity, and when this failed a cry was raised against all Dissenters, Whigs, and Moderate Church-

\* Dr. Hooper wrote a 'Narrative of the Proceedings of the Lower House of Convocation, from Monday, Feb. 10, 1700, to June 25, 1701.' This was in favour of the Lower House.

It was answered by Dr. Kennet in 'The History of the Convocation of the Prelates and Clergy of the Province of Canterbury.'

CHAP. XII. men. In a pamphlet called a 'Memorial of the Church of England,' said to have been written by Dr. Drake, a physician, the bishops were charged with betraying the interests of the Church by their toleration of Dissenters. The Church, the writer said, was in great danger, notwithstanding its outward prosperity. The sectaries were strong, and were allowed to assail it with impunity. Scotland had been given up to the Presbyterians, and no one could tell what would be the next act of the Whig ministers. The sectaries would destroy the Church as soon as they had the power, and this power the bishops were every day putting into their hands.

Sacheverell's  
Sermon at St.  
Paul's.

The fanaticism of the High Church party reached its highest expression in Sacheverell's sermon at St. Paul's, on the 5th of November, 1709. Sacheverell reproduced the exhausted figure of the Church of England being between two thieves, the Papist and the Dissenter. The latter 'thief,' however, was evidently regarded as the more incorrigible, and with him were included all who within the Church did not believe as Sacheverell did. The text was, 'In perils among false brethren,' and the argument was founded on the old assumptions that the Church of England agrees with antiquity, and that antiquity has given us a reliable interpretation of the Scriptures. The language of the sermon was very intemperate. Every clergyman was denounced as an apostate who was not ready to say that separation from the Church of England is schism. Occasional Conformity was called hypocrisy, and ecclesiastical authority a part of morality necessary to salvation. Resistance to the sovereign under any pretence whatever was declared illegal. The Dissenters, the preacher said, were allowed to establish seminaries wherein 'Atheism, Deism, Tritheism, Socinianism, with all the hellish principles of fanaticism, regicide, and anarchy, are openly professed.' Those who wished to comprehend the Dissenters were trying to introduce the Trojan horse into the Holy City, and to convert the House of God into a den of thieves. Archbishop Grindal was pronounced a false son of the Church because he was the first that tolerated the Puritans, those 'miscreants begot in rebellion, born in sedition, and nursed in faction.'

The great heresy in the first half of the eighteenth century was Arianism. The charge of tending to the Arian heresy was generally made by High Churchmen against all the latitudinarian bishops and the moderate clergy. General charges of this kind have but little meaning. It is, however, probable that many of the leading divines of that time were inclined to the Arian hypothesis of the Trinity, though they may have written nothing definitely on that subject. We can only deal with what men taught openly, and not with what they were supposed to have believed. The name Arian covers many shades of belief. We must not, therefore, confound one man's opinions with those of another, merely because they are classed under the same name. The first of the Arians of this era was William Whiston, whose character and views must be considered by themselves. It is not to be denied that he had an influence over other men, and that he represented in an exaggerated form the tendencies of his time, yet his opinions are not to be charged on any of his contemporaries.

CHAP. XII.  
Revival of the  
Arian heresy.

William Whiston was the son of Josiah Whiston, Rector of Norton, in Leicestershire. His grandfather, by his mother's side, had been rector of the same parish from 1609 to 1659. His father had been ordained by the Presbyterians, but had continued to hold the living apparently without re-ordination after the Restoration. The grandfather had refused to read Charles's Book of Sports, and probably rejoiced in the downfall of the bishops. Josiah Whiston, though ordained a Presbyterian, had, like his father-in-law, a mixture of the Puritan and the loyalist. He continued the Puritan custom of catechising all his parishioners once in the year at their own houses. At the same time, he always kept the 30th of January as a religious fast, his son says, 'more solemnly than any clergyman in England.' William Whiston inherited some of the peculiarities as well as much of the piety of his ancestors. At Cambridge he devoted himself mainly to the study of mathematics. Before he took orders he had some scruples about subscription to the Articles, but they were for a time overcome. He had also scruples about receiving orders from any bishop who had come into the place of a nonjuring

William  
Whiston.

CHAP. XII. bishop. He found a prelate properly qualified to give him ordination in William Lloyd of Lichfield, one of the seven bishops that were sent to the Tower. The next year after his ordination, that great patron of learning, Bishop Moore of Norwich, made Whiston his examining chaplain, and soon after he succeeded Sir Isaac Newton as professor of mathematics.

Cambridge in  
Whiston's  
time.

Henry More, the last of the Platonists at Cambridge, died when Whiston was a student. The study of natural philosophy had taken the place of metaphysics, and the discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton had re-opened many questions in theology. Whiston was ready for them all with a sincerity that had no parallel. It was only, however, at intervals that he manifested the grasp of a really liberal theologian. He had many eccentricities, both before and after his conversion to Arianism. He described the leading Cambridge divines of the period as sceptics. These were such men as Bentley, Hare, Trimmell, and Cannon. They were not, he said, positive unbelievers, but they raised doubts which they could not answer. Whiston always wished to be on the very orthodox side, and in matters of faith he had a very scrupulous conscience. He wrote 'A New Theory of the Earth,' in which he reconciled the Bible with Newton's philosophy. He wrote on the chronology of the Old Testament, on the harmony of the Gospels, and, like his predecessor in the chair of mathematics, and with equal success, he expounded the Revelation of St. John.

Whiston,  
Boyle Lec-  
turer.

In 1707, Whiston was Boyle lecturer. He took prophecy for his subject, and maintained the extraordinary thesis that all prophecies had but one meaning. They might be obscure, enigmatical, and perhaps not understood by the prophets themselves; but their meaning was direct, and they could only be capable of one fulfilment. This was specially maintained of the passages quoted in the New Testament, and introduced with the words, 'that it might be fulfilled.' Even the historical statement in Hosea, 'When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt,' was held to be a prophecy referring directly to the Messiah. Nearly all the Psalms, with many other parts of Scripture whose meaning is manifest to any one, were interpreted

as direct and literal prophecies of the Messiah. Whiston's Boyle Lectures may be regarded as the beginning of the great controversy on prophecy, which, twenty years later, was brought to a final issue by Anthony Collins. Nobody but Whiston could hold only to the literal interpretation; and the typical or secondary, Collins said, was insufficient to make the fulfilment of prophecy a proof of Christianity. To these lectures was added a short treatise, in which it was maintained that Jesus ascended into heaven on the day of His resurrection. This was proved from St. Luke's Gospel, and a passage in St. Barnabas, where it is expressly said that Jesus, having risen from the dead, ascended into the heavens. There were two ascensions: one on the day of the resurrection, and the other after the forty days as recorded in the Acts of the Apostles; the one was from Bethany, the other was from Mount Olivet. Jesus did not spend the forty days on earth, but appeared at intervals to His disciples after His resurrection.

Whiston about this time devoted himself to the study of antiquity. He came to the conclusion that the earliest Christian authors were Arians; and, like a good English Churchman, he considered it his duty to follow the Fathers, and become an Arian too. He preached Arianism in his sermons, and omitted the Nicene parts of the Liturgy, for which he was suspended by the Bishop of Ely. He was also deprived of his professorship in the university. The result of his studies in Christian antiquity was published in a book called 'Primitive Christianity Revived.' This work was mainly a collection of patristic and apocryphal writings, which were defended, not merely as genuine, but as having at least equal authority with the writings of the New Testament. The work was preceded by a long historical preface, in which it was maintained by passages from the New Testament and the early Fathers that the doctrine of Arius was the original doctrine of Christianity. This doctrine was, 'that Christ had no human or rational soul distinct from the Logos, but that at the incarnation the Logos supplied the place of a human soul.' Whiston found all the Fathers agree to this, till he came to Justin Martyr. That Father says that Christ had a soul, the Logos, and a body,

Becomes an  
Arian.

CHAP. XII. which seemed not to agree with what the other Fathers said. But the difference was only in appearance. The old philosophers ascribed a body and a soul to brutes, while to man they added a spirit which was not generated from within, but came from without. The soul then was merely the sensitive part. In Christ, the Logos took the place of the spirit, not of the soul. This, Whiston says, was the doctrine of Athanasius himself before the Arian controversy.

All antiquity  
proved Arian.

After discovering that all antiquity was Arian, Whiston went to London to converse, as he says, with some whom he knew to have doubts about the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity. At their request, he transcribed about a thousand texts and testimonies in favour of the Arians, adding notes to obviate the 'false reasonings of Bishop Bull.' The eternity which some of the philosophical Fathers ascribed to the Son was not, Whiston said, a real existence, as of a Son properly co-eternal with the Father. It was rather a metaphysical existence in the stage of potentiality. The Son was in the Father as His Word or Wisdom, before His real creation or generation, and this creation as the Son was a little before the creation of the world. In fact, the Council of Nice itself maintained no other eternity but this. After he was convinced that Arianism was the doctrine of antiquity, Whiston met the work on the Trinity, ascribed to Novatian, which confirmed him in his conclusion. But the greatest confirmation of all was derived from the 'Apostolical Constitutions.' These had long been rejected by the learned world, and Whiston was therefore, at first, not disposed to give them any consideration. But a careful study convinced him they were the genuine work of Christ and His apostles, and that they were intended as the charter and constitution of the Christian Church. He applied to the two archbishops for their advice as to the best way of making known his discoveries to the world. Archbishop Sharp was unable to give any advice on the subject, but invited him to a friendly conference in London. Archbishop Tenison could not give him advice till he had seen the work which contained the evidence, and he wished rather 'to see it in writing than in print.'

Novatian on  
the Trinity.



The first of the documents in 'Primitive Christianity Revived,' was the Epistles of St. Ignatius. A dissertation was prefixed to them, proving that the larger Epistles were genuine and the smaller merely an epitome of the larger. Ignatius was followed by the 'Apologetic' of Eunomius, an Arian treatise, which was answered by St. Basil. Then came the 'Constitutions,' on which the Church, according to Whiston, was to rest for ever. If we are to judge the Constitutions by other writings of early Christians, they certainly lose nothing by comparison. The morality is exalted, but the tone is not that of the New Testament era. The exaltation of the bishops and the priesthood is that of the Ignatian Epistles. The bishop is said to take the place of God. He rules over kings and priests. The bishop in fact is God, and the deacon is His prophet. The 'Constitutions' inculcate the use of oil in baptism, trine immersion, abstinence from blood, and they forbid the bishops or clergy a second marriage.

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Primitive  
Christianity  
Revived.

Whiston proved in a long essay that the 'Apostolical Constitutions' were the most sacred of the canonical books. They professed to be the work of Christ and His apostles, and as such they had been received till the rise of the Anti-Christian power of Rome. Many divines of the Church of England had vindicated the genuineness of the apostolical canons which are part of the Constitutions. The same arguments will apply to the whole. The Constitutions were given by Christ to the apostles during the forty days between the resurrection and the ascension, and they were given from Mount Zion, in fulfilment of the ancient prophecy that from hence the Messiah was to give the law of the new and better covenant. They were accepted by the first Council at Jerusalem as the code of the Christian Church. At this Council all the apostles were present except St. Paul, and he received the Constitutions direct from heaven when he was made an apostle, by revelation from Jesus Christ.

The Aposto-  
lical Constitu-  
tions.

The reception of the Constitutions as canonical, led to a reconsideration of the question of the canon. Besides the Constitutions, Whiston added to the canon the Doctrine of the Apostles, the Epistles of Clement, Barnabas, Ignatius, and Polycarp, with the second book of Esdras, and the

Apoeryphal  
books not in  
the Canon.

CHAP. XII. Shepherd of Hermas. The original canon he found in a small number of books mentioned by Clement at the end of the Constitutions. This was a list of the sacred books then written; but it does not exclude other books written later, which were of equal authority. The arguments for the canonicity of these books are defended by testimonies from the Fathers. Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Tertullian quote, for instance, the Shepherd of Hermas as Scripture. The same is the case with the other books. Augustine says that different churches had different catalogues, but those which were received by all had most authority. Among these were the Apostolical Constitutions. The Council of Jerusalem employed Clement to write down the laws received from Jesus Christ, and to send a copy of them to all churches. They are the deposit of the faith committed to apostolic sees. They are the traditions to which St. Basil constantly appeals. They are called 'unwritten,' which means that they were not intended for ordinary Christians, but as original autographs to be preserved in the archives of the churches. They were entrusted to the bishops of the sees founded in the lifetime of the apostles. This explains the often quoted passage in Tertullian where he tells the heretics to try their doctrine by that of the apostolical sees. The Constitutions were set aside by the Athanasians because they did not confirm the Athanasian heresy.

Unwritten  
traditions.

The object of collecting these ancient writings, and defending their genuineness, was to demonstrate the Arianism of the primitive Church. Texts of Scripture now quoted to support the Athanasian doctrine were used in the early centuries to support the orthodox doctrine of Arius. St. Paul, for instance, is made to speak of Jesus as God over all, blessed for ever. But this expression is never applied in the Fathers to God the Son. Ignatius says that it is a heresy to speak of Christ as God over all. The Constitutions say that 'some suppose Jesus Himself is God over all, and glorify Him as His own Father, and suppose Him to be both the Son and the Comforter, than which doctrines what can be more detestable?' Origen, too, whom even Bishop Bull allows to be orthodox, calls it 'rashness' to suppose that 'our Saviour

Athanasian  
Texts for-  
merly Arian.



is God over all.' The words, 'the true God,' according to Whiston, are always in Scripture applied to God the Father, and never to Christ. The Son is never called the Supreme God. The learned Gataker observes concerning the text in the Old Testament, where the Messiah is supposed to be called the Mighty God, that the original at the utmost will warrant no more than a Mighty God. We have become accustomed to speak of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but the ancient creeds know of but one God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. The tri-personal Deity came into the Roman Church from the Valentinians, who had it from Hermes Trismegistus, who made the Logos consubstantial with the Demiurgus. Lactantius says Jesus taught that there was but one God, and that He only is to be worshipped. His mission was to teach the Divine unity as against the polytheism of the pagan world. To have called Himself God would have been to betray His trust. Origen says that prayer is to be offered to the supreme God by that High Priest who is superior to all the angels. It is to be addressed to no derived being, not even to Christ, but only to the God and Father of the universe. To the text quoted on the other side,—'Let all the angels of God worship Him,'—Origen answers by distinguishing between the adoration given to great persons, and that given to God only. The text about Christ being equal with God, Whiston interprets that Christ was in great power and authority with His Father, but instead of making Himself equal with God, humbled Himself to die for men. For this interpretation he claims the authority of Tillotson, Bull, and Whitby. The same interpretation he finds in the Greek Fathers, and ascribes the commonly received sense to the Latin Vulgate. The term 'consubstantial' was first introduced into the Catholic Church by the Council of Nice, which also denied that the Son was a creature. This was contrary to all antiquity. The consubstantiality of the Logos was unknown to the Ante-Nicene Fathers, who all think of the Son as a creature, and the Wisdom of God as created.

The prosecution of William Whiston was an episode in the history of Convocation. In 1711, the Upper House, advised by the Crown lawyers that they had jurisdiction in

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cases of heresy, subject to an appeal to the Queen, censured the Arianism of the 'Historical Preface.' The judgment of the Convocation was sent to the Queen, but Her Majesty lost the document, and when the bishops applied for it, it could never be found. A prosecution in the spiritual court also failed on technical grounds. Whiston wished to continue a member of the Church of England, but he was refused the sacrament at his parish church. He then established worship with a reformed liturgy in his own house. He also formed a society for the study of primitive Christianity. In this he was joined by a zealous Quaker; by Gale, the leader of the General Baptists; by young Talbot, son of the Bishop of Durham; and by Rundle, afterwards Bishop of Derry. Clarke and Hoadly had also some connection with the society, but the latter ultimately departed sadly from primitive Christianity by entering on a second marriage. Whiston finally united himself to the General Baptists. They were not entirely framed on the primitive model, but they came nearest to it. The ancient Christians baptized those who had been previously instructed, and they were baptized in running water. This was the washing away of sin—regeneration and illumination. Without baptism there was no salvation. The modern Baptists, however, depart from antiquity in many things. They do not employ deaconesses in the baptism of women. They do not use oil, nor the sign of the cross, nor the laying on of hands. They do not practise trine immersion, and their form of baptism is not that preserved in the 'Apostolical Constitutions.' They have the three orders of the ministry—bishops, presbyters, and deacons—nearly after the manner Christ Himself appointed by His apostles.\* Contrary, however, to all antiquity, like the Church of England, they do not reckon the sub-deacons, deaconesses, readers, and singers, to be offices of the ministry. Among Whiston's discoveries was a copy of the Sibylline Oracles, in which he found all history predicted from the siege of Troy to the destruction of Gog and Magog.

He becomes  
General Bap-  
tist.

Samuel  
Clarke an  
Arian.

The next great representative of the Arianism of this era was Dr. Samuel Clarke. Like William Whiston, Clarke

\* 'Jarrell Address to the Baptists,' p. 6.

had been chaplain to Bishop Moore, to whose influence he owed all his preferments in the Church. He had become famous by his celebrated Boyle Lectures, and other learned writings, before he appeared as an Arian. Clarke had many things in common with Whiston, but the two men were intellectually altogether unlike each other. Their doctrine, too, was really different. Whiston turned to authority, and avowed himself an Arian because Arianism was the doctrine of the primitive Church. Clarke, on the other hand, followed Scripture and reason, refusing to be called an Arian, because he differed in some points from the ancient Arians. His treatise called 'The Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity,' was published in 1712. It consisted of texts of Scripture, with passages from the Fathers, so arranged and interpreted as to establish the doctrines which Clarke reckoned orthodox. The principle on which he proceeded was to take the Scriptures as the sole rule of faith. He did not despise the Fathers. Their testimony had some value, but they had no authority. This belongs only to Scripture. The creed of the first Christians consisted of a few propositions which depended on the Scriptures, but it claimed no authority in itself. As contentions multiplied among Christians, creeds multiplied. The definitions in these creeds became at last unintelligible, and earnest men longed to return to the words of Christ. Clarke makes a marked distinction between revelation and human knowledge. The first is perfect in its beginning. The second reaches perfection by degrees. In the first three centuries, the creeds had no matters of speculation and philosophy. But in the fourth century metaphysics were mixed up with religion. The Ante-Nicene Fathers were for the most part Arian; but as they could not give an infallible interpretation of the Scriptures, they are not to be quoted as authorities.

The first collection of passages from the New Testament consists of those in which the Father is called the one or the only God. Such are the words of Jesus, 'There is none good but One.' The 'One' here is masculine, which is equivalent to saying in English, that there is but one 'person' who is good and really God, that is, the Father. Where Jesus says that He and His Father are one, the

The Father is  
the one God.

CHAP. XII. 'one' is neuter. They are one thing, one in the exercise of power. Tertullian says, that God and Christ are not *unus*, but *unum*. Athanasius says, that the Father is the only true God, and that the Son is divine, being the Wisdom or Word of the Father. Origen says that God is self-existent; but whatsoever is God by participation in divinity, is not properly God, but a god. Many passages are quoted to prove that the Father is God absolutely, and that He has titles and attributes which are not applied to any but the Father.

The Son is  
the Word, or  
Oracle, of  
God.

The real point of the controversy is the sense in which the Son is divine. There are passages in Scripture where He is called God. These must be explained. The most important is the beginning of John's Gospel, 'The Word was God.' The explanation of this is found in Philo and other early writers, which is, that the Word was the oracle of God: the revealer, the faithful and true witness. Justin says, that Christ is called the Word because He brings messages from the Father to men. Irenæus says that God reveals Himself to all by His Word, which is His Son. St. John does not say that the Word was in God but 'with God.' He was not in the divine mind like reason or understanding. He was a distinct person. It is not said that He is God, but that He was God. He was that divine person who appeared in the form of God, and in the last days was made flesh. Clarke says, that to make this Word an underived self-existent Being is polytheism. He speaks of some who make the Word to be merely the Reason of God, and explain St. John as meaning only that God was never without His reason. This, of course, is true in itself, but if John meant no more than this, the incarnation would simply be the Wisdom of the Father dwelling in the man Christ Jesus. The passage in which creation is ascribed to the Son, Clarke explains that the Son is not the efficient, but only the instrumental cause of creation. The Father made all things through the agency of the Son. This was the unanimous sense of the primitive Church. All the theophanies of the Old Testament are appearances of Christ in the name of the Father. Hence the words to Philip, 'He that hath seen me hath seen the Father.' Novatian showed the impossibility of the

Father descending as an angel, because He cannot be contained in one place. The Synod of Antioch, to the same effect, declared it impious to call God an angel. The messenger of the covenant was the Son. Many passages are quoted to prove the subordination of the Son and the Holy Ghost to the Father. The Son, it is said, is begotten by an act of will, and not by a mere necessity in the nature of Deity. Clarke, however, admits freely that many of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, and even Athanasius himself, made the Word the internal Reason of the Father. They suppose, also, that the Son was generated, or in some way became a real person. It was this mixture of two opinions which complicated the question of the divinity of Christ.

CHAP. XII.

Subordinate  
to the Father.

The Lower House of Convocation did not sleep. Its zeal against heresy received a new impulse. The bishops were made acquainted with the heresies of Samuel Clarke. They commended the zeal of the sound divines who constituted the Lower House, and were prepared to consider any representations of heresy. The chief of the charges turned on the meaning of consubstantiality, which Clarke said did not mean one individual substance, which would be one substance or person, but a substance of which several persons might be partakers. The Council of Chalcedon, for instance, said that Christ was 'consubstantial to His Father according to His Godhead, and consubstantial to us according to His manhood.' While the case was before the bishops, Dr. Clarke sent them a paper in which he declared his belief 'that the Son of God was eternally begotten by the eternal incomprehensible power and will of the Father, and that the Holy Spirit was likewise eternally derived from the Father by or through the Son, according to the eternal incomprehensible power and will of the Father.' This explanation was accepted by the Upper House, but the Lower House declared it unsatisfactory. It was not what they wished—a retraction; and Clarke said that it was not intended for a retraction. He had never adopted the Arian doctrine that the Son was a creature made out of nothing just before the creation of the world, but rather he believed that 'He was begotten eternally, that is, without any limitation of time in the incomprehensible duration of the Father's eternity.'

Dr. Clarke  
charged with  
heresy.

## CHAP. XII.

Answered by  
Dr. Water-  
land.

Clarke's book was answered by many writers, the most eminent of whom was Dr. Waterland, who came into the controversy by a kind of accident. He wrote some queries concerning Clarke's doctrine for the benefit of 'A Country Clergyman,' who had been converted to Clarke's views. The 'Queries' were circulated in manuscript through the diocese of York before they came into the hands of the clergyman for whom they were intended. The clergyman was John Jackson, Vicar of Rossington, who wrote an answer to them, and on the recommendation of Clarke, printed both the queries and the answer. Waterland then wrote his 'Vindication of Christ's Divinity' as a defence of the queries. The controversy might have been a very small one if the word 'person' had been either abandoned or defined. Clarke was clear for three persons in the Godhead, only they must not be co-eternal or independent, for that would be tritheism. Waterland was clear for the co-eternity of the persons, for without this he could not defend the supreme Divinity of the Son. It did not concern him if his argument ended in a contradiction. He had to keep to what was revealed. If that was incomprehensible, it could be classed with the mysteries of revelation. In the Old Testament he found express declarations that there was but one God. All beings were excluded from the Godhead, except the supreme Deity. In the New Testament there were passages equally decisive that Christ was God. It must therefore be concluded that Christ is the supreme God. Jackson's answer was that the Old Testament texts referred to speak of the one person, who is the Father; and therefore all other beings or persons, including Jesus Christ, are excluded from the supreme Godhead. To which Waterland answered that if Jesus Christ is excluded from being the supreme God, He is also excluded from being God in any sense. When God said to Moses 'There is no God besides me,' He forbade worship or divine honour to be given to any other being. He did not say there is no other supreme God, but absolutely there is no other God.

Waterland's  
personal Deity  
tri-personal.

Waterland interpreted the Divine Unity by a human unity. He wished to defend a personal Deity, and then to make the same Deity tri-personal. Jackson and Clarke also



defended a personal supreme Deity, but they added two other deities, who were also persons. Waterland said that there were no inferior or created gods. They are excluded from Deity by the words of Jehovah in Isaiah: 'Before me there was no God formed, nor shall there be after me.' This brought the Arian to the dilemma that either Christ was Jehovah, or it was idolatry to call Christ, God. Waterland admitted that many of the Fathers seem to make the Son simply the Divine Reason or the Mind of the Father. But some of them, he adds, guard against this inference by calling the first and second persons in the Trinity 'two things;' Methodius said 'two powers.' The orthodox Fathers had to maintain against the Arians that the Word was eternal, and then against the Sabellians to make the Word another 'thing,' 'power,' or 'person,' besides God. In such passages as the beginning of John's Gospel, where the name God is applied both to the Father and the Son, there is, Waterland said, no ambiguity in its use. The right distinction was not of a supreme God and subordinate deities, but of the use of the word God into its proper and its improper sense. There are no subordinate deities. Christ is either a mere creature, and not God in any proper sense, or He is an eternal person, one God with the Father. Antiquity was not unanimous in declaring the Word an eternal person. All the Fathers supposed that the Word was also generated before the creation of the world, whereby He became the first-born of every creature. Some of them, however, as Justin Martyr, said that the Word was not a person until this generation before the world. The proper Arian said that the created Word was not the eternal Word.

Clarke's 'Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity' was answered at the same time by Dr. Thomas Bennet, Vicar of St. Giles's, Cripplegate. Another of Clarke's friends, Arthur Ashley Sykes, came forward in his defence against Bennet. Sykes wrote under the name of 'A Clergyman in the Country,' and called his book 'A Modest Plea for the Baptismal and Scriptural Doctrine of the Trinity.' His object, Sykes said in the preface, was not so much to show the weakness of Dr. Bennet's scheme, or to vindicate Dr. Clarke, as to persuade the Christian world not to make speculative doctrines the

Dr. Bennet  
and Dr. Sykes  
on the Tri-  
nity.

CHAP. XII. occasion of division and separation. He quoted the words of Hales and Stillingfleet, in which they recommended removing from public liturgies everything which gave offence to any party. He saw clearly that the whole controversy turned on the word 'person.' Dr. Bennet went so far as to admit that this was a word which we could not define. We could not say what a person is, but only what it is not. He made the Father and the Son as distinct as soul and body, yet one and the same Being, though not one and the same person. Sykes said that while person was left in this obscurity it was impossible to say who or what had been incarnate. Clarke's scheme had the merit of being intelligible. He made the Trinity three intelligent agents. This, Sykes argued, was plainly the sense of the Litany, where three distinct beings are invoked. The logical ultimate of the other hypothesis is to make the Trinity three modes. The Logos really becomes not a person, but the abstract wisdom of the Deity.

Clarke's  
answer to  
Waterland.

Clarke returned to the controversy answering Waterland in the 'Modest Plea Continued.' The Old Testament texts, he said, expressly exclude from supreme Divinity all but the first person. When Jehovah says 'There is no God besides me,' He does not merely exclude all 'beings,' as Waterland put it, but all persons as well as beings. The New Testament texts equally declare that this one God, of whom are all things, is the Father. He is *personally* the one God, and not *essentially* as including the Son. Clarke quotes Bishop Pearson, who calls it a vain distinction to make the Father personally the first person, and essentially as comprehending the whole Trinity. The creed teaches us to believe in 'God the Father and in His Son.' The word God in the beginning of John's Gospel is used in different senses, and these senses are not ambiguous. God who was with God is evidently not the same God with whom He was. God, by whom all things were made, is not the same as the one God the Father, of whom are all things. Clarke is not sure if the Trinity be really a difficulty at all. It certainly, he says, is not the difficulty which Waterland makes it to be. It is not 'how three persons can be one God;' for Scripture never says that they are. The only difficulty in the Trinity is to understand how all that is said in Scripture



concerning Father, Son, and Holy Ghost is consistent with what St. Paul says of the one God the Father, of whom are all things; and the one God the Son, through whom are all things. It is not, as Waterland said, a question above our comprehension. The real point is whether we are to follow the Scriptures in their plain sense, or lose ourselves in metaphysical speculations. CHAP. XII.  
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In 1720, Waterland was appointed by Bishop Robinson to preach the first course of lectures on Lady Moyer's foundation. He pursued in them the subject of this controversy, specially replying to Clarke in the preface. There are, Waterland says, three suppositions possible concerning God the Son as a real person. The first is that of the Socinians, that Christ is a mere man. The second that He is more than a man, but still a creature depending on the will of God. The third, the 'Catholic' view, that the Son exists necessarily, is uncreated and properly divine. Clarke, Waterland says, does not admit that he is an Arian, but certainly he is not a 'Catholic.' He does not speak of the Son as a creature, and when pressed to say whether the Son is finite or infinite he does not answer. He does not deny the consubstantiality and co-eternity of the Son with the Father, and yet all his arguments go to support a scheme that seems to deny them. He claims to hold the substantiality of the Son in the sense of the Ante-Nicene Fathers; but what that sense is, is itself the question at issue. Clarke contended for a real subordination of the Son to the Father, and Waterland adds that he also maintains a real subordination, but he denies an inferiority.

The 'Country Clergyman' wrote a reply to Waterland's defence, which led to 'A Second Defence of the Queries.' The controversy had now branched out in different directions. A great deal of the replies is merely repetition and personal recrimination. The only portion of further interest concerned the doctrine and authority of the Fathers. Clarke started with the principle that the Scripture was the rule of faith. Waterland added that when Scripture was very obscure we ought to take the interpretation which is found in the Fathers. Clarke objected altogether to the Fathers as an authority; yet he maintained that the Fathers were on his

Waterland  
refutes Clarke  
in Lady  
Moyer's Lec-  
tures.

John Jackson  
and Dr.  
Whitby de-  
fend Dr.  
Clarke.

CHAP. XII. side. Dr. Whitby came to his help on this subject, and in a treatise called 'Disquisitiones Modestæ in clarissimi Bulli defensionem Fidei Nicenæ,' disputed Bishop Bull's interpretation of the Fathers. The controversies about the Trinity, Whitby maintained, could not be determined from Fathers, Councils, or Catholic traditions. This subject was of itself the cause of a bitter and obstinate controversy between Whitby and Waterland. The patristic question had been taken up by Robert Nelson in his life of Bishop Bull, where forty texts were interpreted by the Fathers, as Nelson supposed, against Clarke. Whitby, however, maintained that their interpretations were more in favour of Clarke's doctrine than of the other side. Dr. Wells, another writer of Waterland's school, told Clarke that the want of deference to the ancient Fathers was the cause of all the divisions among Christians. Clarke answered that he believed he agreed with the Fathers, but he opposed altogether the idea of submission to them. The revelation in the Scriptures was not like a heathen oracle, a single dark sentence. The Bible consisted of a number of books, the general meaning of which was within the comprehension of ordinary reason. If this were not the case, the Roman Catholic principle would be the legitimate one. But instead of the Fathers being received as infallible interpreters of Scripture, we stood in need of infallible interpreters of the Fathers.

Whitby's  
'Last  
Thoughts.'

Dr. Whitby added a final contribution to the controversy in a little book which he did not live to see published. This was called his 'Last Thoughts,' and consists of retractations of what he had written in his commentary in defence of the doctrine of Athanasius. He had too hastily followed the common road of reputed orthodoxy, but he was not now ashamed to confess that he had been wrong. This was the result of a long life spent in the study of theology. It was impossible, Whitby said, that three persons could be one God by virtue of the same individual essence commuted from the Father. Dr. South had shown that the difference of the three hypostases could only be a difference of modes. This had been the orthodox doctrine since the fourth century. Bishop Bull positively calls it Sabellianism, and Cudworth

says that the modal Trinity was condemned as Sabellianism by all the anti-Arian Fathers. It is, however, the doctrine of the orthodox, who say that the Father and the Son are numerically one and the same God. Person, as Clarke and Jackson have shown, could only mean an intelligent agent, and in this sense the same God could not be one and yet three. CHAP. XII.

The case of subscription to the Articles was a little episode in the Arian controversy. Dr. Clarke said, in the introduction to his 'Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity,' that we only subscribe articles of faith in the sense in which we can reconcile them with Scripture, and not as they were understood by the compilers. Waterland said that such a subscription was dishonest. The Church requires us to take the Articles in 'her own sense of Holy Scripture.' If the sense of the compilers or composers is evident, it is our duty religiously to follow it. The end of subscription is that the clergy may be sound in the faith. This object would certainly be defeated if every one took the Articles in his own sense. Clarke answered that Bishop Bull was generally condemned for opposing the Articles on the doctrine of justification; but that now his doctrine is generally received. He said further that he was at a loss to know the doctrine of the Articles. The first Article might be interpreted as Sabellianism, Tritheism, or Arianism. The descent into hell was now generally understood in a sense different from that of the compilers of the Articles. The same was true of the damnatory clauses in the Athanasian Creed, of predestination, original sin, and the clause in the Nicene Creed which says the Son is 'of one substance with the Father.' This controversy was continued by Sykes and Waterland. The latter maintained that the sense of the Articles was so clear that they were not capable of an Arian interpretation. Sykes answered that by the same arguments they are incapable of an Arminian interpretation. The Arian only took the same liberty with Articles compiled by Athanasians which Dr. Waterland and his party took with Articles compiled by Calvinists. If the Arian subscriber was dishonest, so also was the Arminian. And that they were both guilty was so evident to William Whiston, that he cried, The case of Arian subscription.

CHAP. XII. 'O my soul, come not thou into their secret! To their assembly mine honour be not thou united!'

Bishop  
Hoadly.

If we were to judge by the hatred which High Churchmen have always shown towards Bishop Hoadly, we should reckon him the greatest heretic of his age. His memory has been pursued with the same malice that has chafed around the reputations of Tillotson and Burnet. Hoadly is for us a very important person. He followed a course of his own, and showed great independence both in his conduct and in his opinions. We may seem to miss in him at times the fervour of deep religious feeling, but he is always genuine. His intellect may have been cold, but it had health and vigour. Hoadly's ancestors were Puritans, but his father, who was a clergyman, had conformed. He began his public life as an advocate of the moderate principles of the Church of England, on the one hand against the High Churchmen, and on the other against the Nonconformists. He lived to a great age, and saw the complete triumph of the doctrines in the advocacy of which his life had been spent. In the words of his biographer, 'He was so happy as to live long enough to reap the full earthly reward of his labours; to see his Christian and moderate opinions prevail over the kingdom in Church and State; to see the Nonconformists at a very low ebb, for want of the opposition and persecution they were too much used to experience from both, many of their ministers desiring to receive re-ordination from his hands; to see the general temper of the clergy entirely changed, the bishops preferring few or none of intolerant principles, and the clergy claiming no inherent authority but what is the natural result of their own good behaviour as individuals, in the discharge of their duty; to see the absurd tenet of indefeasible hereditary right, and its genuine offspring, an unlimited non-resistance absolutely exploded, and the Protestant succession in the present royal

\* The Arian controversy led to the establishment of Lady Moyer's Lectures, in which the Arians were refuted every year from 1719 to 1774. Not much more than one-half of these lectures were printed, and some of them are very scarce. The best of them, after Waterland's, are those by

Berriman, Felton, Seed, Wheatley, and Gloucester Ridley. But they contain nothing that was not said by Waterland. The lectureship ceased in 1774 through the expiration of the lease of the property left by Lady Moyer.

family as firmly fixed in the hearts and persuasions of the people as in the laws of God and the land.\*

Hoadly's first work was on 'The Reasonableness of Conformity.' It was an answer to some remarks made by Dr. Calamy in the tenth chapter of his life of Richard Baxter. This was scarcely even a new phase of an old controversy. It only repeated the views which might be taken by a moderate Churchman on one side, and a moderate Nonconformist on the other. Calamy said that ordination by bishops, assent to the Book of Common Prayer, or canonical obedience were not reasonable things for the Church to require. Hoadly, on the other hand, thought they were all very reasonable. The constitution of the Church of England was Episcopal, and, so far as we can learn from history, this was also the constitution of the primitive Church. Baxter himself said that the bishops were appointed in the Church to prevent abuses, and that therefore we should seek an orderly admission, suffering others to be judges of our qualifications. The force of Calamy's objection was, that men already ordained were required to be ordained again. Hoadly admitted that circumstances might have justified their irregular ordination, but now that the times were changed he did not see any hardship in their having to conform to the established order. When persons gave assent and consent to the Book of Common Prayer, it did not mean more than that they were to agree to the use of the book. As Calamy had admitted there was nothing in the Church of England that is not really unlawful, Hoadly argued that then the love of peace, order, and unity ought to overcome all scruples.

Hoadly's next performance was a sermon, in 1705, before the Lord Mayor, on the duties of subjects and rulers. This was a defence of resistance to civil rulers when they do not promote the good of their subjects. The divine right of kings was set forth as a mere figment. The Lower House of Convocation condemned the sermon as contradicting the Homilies against wilful rebellion. The sermon was defended, and, soon after, Hoadly was in a controversy with Offspring Blackall, Bishop of Exeter, on the same subject of the rights of princes.

On 'The Reasonableness of Conformity.'

Against passive obedience.

\* Works, vol. i., p. xiii.

## CHAP. XII.

His 'Preservative against the Principles of the Nonjurors.'

In 1715 he was made Bishop of Bangor. Next year he wrote 'A Preservative against the Principles and Practices of the Nonjurors,' and in the following year he preached his famous sermon before George I., on 'The Kingdom of Christ.' This sermon gave new work to the Lower House of Convocation. They immediately made a presentation to the Upper House concerning the dangerous doctrines of the Bishop of Bangor. Tenison was dead, and Dr. Wake had succeeded to the primacy. It was commonly supposed that the Upper House would have agreed to the censure of this sermon. But this is only supposition. The king interfered and prorogued the Convocation.

His sermon on 'The Kingdom of Christ.'

Hoadly's sermon began with some remarks on the changeableness of the meaning of words. He instances the word religion, which, in the time of St. James, meant virtue and integrity in ourselves, with charity and beneficence to others. The word has now come to mean the practice of everything but virtue and charity. It is chiefly concerned with times and places, modes and ceremonies. It has become something external, and the very expression external religion is a joining together what God has put asunder. Another instance is the word worship. In Christ's life it meant worshipping the Father in spirit and in truth. But in most Christian countries, the Father is not the chief object of worship, while spirit and truth seem to be entirely banished. Again, there is the word prayer. Christ taught men to address God as their Father, with minds calm and composed. But now, though a man be in the best frame of mind, he is not reckoned devout enough to pray, if he has not the fever of excitement. Another instance is in the words, the love of God or Christ. In early times, this meant doing the will of God and keeping His commandments. It now means inward enthusiasm venting itself in ecstatic language, so that ordinary sincere Christians are made to doubt 'if they have any such thing as love to God at all.'

Christ's kingdom not of this world.

The object of these preliminary remarks was to show the necessity of going direct to the New Testament for the meaning of the words used by Christ and His apostles. The kingdom of Christ is there identical with the Church of Christ, and the Church of Christ consisted of those w!



believed Jesus to be the Messiah. It is a kingdom, but not at all a kingdom of this world, nor is it like the kingdoms of this world. It is a kingdom in which Christ is King, Lawgiver, and Judge, in all that concerns conscience and eternal salvation. It is a kingdom not of this world, because it has no visible human authority. Christ left no vicegerents, either to make new laws or to interpret old ones. If there had been absolute authority given to men to rule the Church, it would have been the kingdom of these men, and not of Christ. Whoever has authority to make laws is so far king. Whoever has authority to interpret laws, is virtually the lawgiver. In human society, the interpretation of laws may be deputed to others, but the legislators can always resume the interpretation into their own hands, so that the interpreters are not absolute. But, as Christ does not in this way interfere, authority given to men to interpret His laws would be to make these men the legislators of His kingdom.

The argument is further applied to the case of temporal rewards or punishments, in matters that relate to conscience. To add to the sanctions of Christ's laws, or in any way to change their nature, is to usurp Christ's dominion. Those who do this, set up a kingdom of their own, which is not Christ's kingdom. To erect tribunals that exercise judgment over men's consciences, or to determine the condition of Christ's subjects with regard to the favour of God, is to take Christ's kingdom out of His hands. It may be said that the rulers of the Church are Christ's vicegerents, but if Christ does not interpose to prevent or remedy their mistakes, they rule the kingdom, and not Christ. The very idea of the Church being Christ's kingdom, excludes all other legislators or judges. No one, therefore, has a right to censure or punish another in matters of conscience or salvation. The Church is now what it was in the beginning; the aggregate of those who believe in Christ, and are subject to Him as their king.

The very nature of the laws which Christ established in His kingdom show that it is not of the world. They have nothing to do with worldly pomp or dignity, or with an absolute dominion of some over the faith of others. They forbid the

Does not allow  
civil sanctions  
in religion.

Christ's re-  
wards not of  
this world.

CHAP. XII. erection of a temporal kingdom, under the covert name of a spiritual one. Christ's rewards are not the rewards of this world, nor His chastisements the chastisements of this world. The sanctions of His laws are all future. St. Paul knew this so well, that he spoke of the terrors of the Lord. But now, in many Christian countries, an outward profession of religion contrary to inward conviction is forced by the terror of men. This is making the Church a kingdom of this world. The rewards are the world's honours and offices; the punishments, prisons and fines, the galleys, and the rack.

Not a visible kingdom.

The sermon ends with some observations. It is shown that men have made great mistakes about Christ's kingdom or Church. They have argued from other visible societies to what the Church ought to be, forgetting the most essential part, that the Church is a kingdom in which Christ Himself is king. They have set up lawgivers in His place, supposing that the Church must be like any other kingdom. Christ has declared to His subjects the conditions of salvation, and to these no man has a right to add anything, nor from them to take anything away. We should receive the words of eternal life from Christ Himself, and be guided in all our actions by what He has prescribed. They mistake the meaning both of unity and peace who suppose that to submit to a visible authority contrary to their own judgments is to further the unity and peace of the Church. It is in reality to throw off our relation to Christ, and to obey those who have usurped His authority. Christ's words are plain, and come home to the conscience. The Christian should obey them alone, and not lose himself in the infinite contradictions, the numberless perplexities, and the endless disputes of the weak and fallible men who have pretended to have dominion over the visible Church.

Hoadly's sermon raises the indignation of the Lower House of Convocation.

This sermon was a terrible blow to the members of the Lower House of Convocation, who regarded their own authority in the Church as the essence of the Gospel dispensation. Since the Revolution, they had received many salutary lessons from the bishops, but had refused to profit by them. In this state of mind, it was not likely that they were patiently to receive from Hoadly an exposition of the constitution of the Church of Christ so opposed to their own



claims. The subject required guarded language. The word Church has itself a multitude of meanings. It was not at all difficult to see what Hoadly intended. Yet there were passages in the sermon which, taken by themselves, or out of relation to the whole argument, might be easily misunderstood. The incidental allusions and remarks by the way, raised so many collateral questions besides the main argument, that the great controversy which followed was complicated and discursive. Even Hallam confessed that he could never precisely say what it was all about.

The first answer to the sermon was by Dr. Andrew Snape, provost of Eton College. He thought that Hoadly was unnecessarily severe against external religion. This, however, he could have forgiven if Hoadly had shown more than ordinary anxiety for that part of religion which is seated in the heart. But he even depreciates prayer by separating it from devotion. And, as if piety were too abundant, he prescribes for it as a physician for a fever. Snape says that, according to the New Testament, prayer is no such calm undisturbed address to the Deity as Bishop Hoadly supposes. Jesus condemned the long prayers of the Pharisees, but He never condemned fervour or vehemence. He spoke a parable of an importunate widow; another, of a man who borrowed three loaves from his friend at midnight; and another of a publican that smote on his breast, all to show the necessity of fervour and earnestness in prayer. It is recorded of Jesus Himself that He prayed, 'being in an agony.' It is admitted that the bishop may only have been referring to some books of devotion which inculcate an enthusiastic ecstasy as absolutely necessary to devotion. His readers, however, would think that he was preaching against fervent prayer. He might, therefore, have added a line, to say that he did not wish to extinguish all sparks of devotion.

On the main question, Snape argued that if Christ does not interpose in the government of His Church, the plain inference would be that He has left deputies. And this is what He really did. He appointed vicegerents to act in His stead, to bear rule over His subjects, and to perpetuate a succession of guides for the Church in all ages. They

Answered  
by Dr. Snape.

Christ did  
establish  
governors in  
His Church.

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were not, indeed, infallible, yet they were to be obeyed. Unless Christ had appointed deputies, His Church would have been a Babel, and His kingdom a realm of confusion. But instead of this, Christ's Church is like a natural body 'fitly joined together, and compacted by that which every joint supplieth.' It is not a heap of uncemented stones, but a house built upon the foundation of apostles and prophets. 'But what,' Dr. Snape exclaims, 'am I doing? Am I labouring to convince one of the governors of Christ's Church, that Christ has left a power of governing?' If none but Christ can interpret the laws of His Church, the clergy had better at once resign their orders. The Church has no need of them—they are usurpers. But Bishop Hoadly had qualified the word authority with the epithet 'absolute.' Dr. Snape could not fairly overlook this, and so he admitted that no earthly governors were to be obeyed, if their commands were contrary to the laws of Christ. The Scriptures were above kings, ministers, articles, and canons. Dr. Snape also noticed, that Hoadly's doctrine overturned the right of civil magistrates to interfere in religion. It was, therefore, opposed to all the penal laws against Roman Catholics and Dissenters.

Hoadly answers Snape.

Bishop Hoadly made answer to Dr. Snape. The remarks on prayer were easily disposed of. The cases quoted by Dr. Snape inculcate frequency and importunity in prayer, which are quite compatible with a calm and undisturbed mind. It is true that Jesus once prayed, 'being in an agony,' but this was in a time of suffering. It was not His practice. The prayer He taught His disciples is in every respect a calm address to His Father. Hoadly repeats that the authority which he denied to be in the Church, was an 'absolute' authority to make or interpret laws which were to bind the conscience. He did not argue that because Christ Himself did not interfere, therefore He had left no deputy. He simply stated the fact that no infallible guides had been given to the Church. To pretend, therefore, to this authority was to transfer Christ's kingdom to the legislature of men. Christ governed the Church through His Apostles. They were guided by an infallible Spirit. If this is maintained for the successors of the apostles, it supposes them infallible

too. If the governors of the Church have not absolute authority to rule, it is not to be expected that they should be absolutely obeyed. CHAP. XII.

Dr. Snape wrote a second letter. He repeated his arguments, and refused the explanations which Hoadly had made of some passages in the sermon. He knew that Hoadly was an unmitigated heretic, and that every attempt to give his heresy an orthodox appearance was only an attempt to deceive. He charged Hoadly in a most solemn manner with inserting such words as 'absolute' and 'proper' after the sermon was written, and with making use of them to give the sermon a double meaning. This charge was the occasion of a series of letters in the daily papers. It turned out that Dr. Snape had this information from the Bishop of Carlisle, and the bishop had it from somebody else who had it from a person who was said to have read the sermon in manuscript and suggested the changes. Hoadly denied that any one had read his sermon before it was preached, or that any such changes had ever been made. Another passage in Dr. Snape's letter was the cause of another little controversy. M. de la Pillonière, a converted Jesuit, was employed by Bishop Hoadly as a tutor in his family, and Dr. Snape reproached him with harbouring persons 'Popishly affected.' The Jesuit wrote a pamphlet giving a history of his conversion to Protestantism, and clearing the bishop from the charges of Dr. Snape. Snape's second letter.

The next answer to Hoadly in order of time was the 'Representation' of the Lower House of Convocation, which included with the 'Sermon' the 'Preservative against the Principles of the Nonjurors.' Hoadly was here charged with subverting all government and discipline in the Church of Christ, and with impugning the authority of the Legislature to enforce by civil sanctions obedience in matters of religion. The first charge was supposed to be proved by the passages in the sermon, which say that Christ alone is King in His kingdom, and that He has left no vicegerents or interpreters of His laws. These passages were also understood to imply that even the apostles had no authority in the Church without interfering with the supremacy of Christ. The result of these doctrines, the Representation The Representation of the Lower House of Convocation.

CHAP. XII. said, was 'to breed in the minds of the people a disregard to those who had the rule over them.' The proof was taken from the passage in which the bishop says that we are subject to Christ alone in all matters of conscience and eternal salvation. The Church, the Representation says, is so far from being unlike other societies, that in Scripture it is frequently compared to them. One of the Articles of Religion calls it a 'visible congregation,' where the word of God is preached and the sacraments rightly administered. But the bishop's definition of a Church is independent both of the word and the sacraments. At his consecration he promised to exercise the authority committed to him, but the object of his sermon is to cast all authority out of the Church. The same doctrine is found in the Preservative. It makes bishops and successions mere 'trifles, niceties, dreams, and inventions of men.' It puts all commissions on an equal footing, and makes every man his own judge in religious matters. The bishop even said that 'Human benedictions, human absolutions, human denunciations, and human excommunications, have nothing to do with the favour or the anger of God.' On the second head, it is shown that by the law of England the king has jurisdiction over the Church and can give civil sanctions to religion. The sermon, on the contrary, said that all laws for the encouragement of religion and the discouragement of irreligion are decisions against Christ. This implies the condemnation of the civil authority for trying to secure the unity of the Church by Articles of Religion and Acts of Uniformity. Art XXXIV. says that they are to be rebuked openly who offend against the common order of the Church and hurt the authority of the civil magistrate.

The Representation was answered in a long treatise. Hoody denies that the Representation was approved by the Lower House. This was only an artifice in the title-page. The first charge, he said, might be taken in different ways according to the sense of the Church of Christ. It might refer to the Church universal and invisible, to the Church universal and visible, or the Church in the sense of a particular local Church. He supposed it must refer generally to the universal visible Church, and specially to the particular

Hoody answers the Representation.

Protestant Church of England. The inferences of the Representation were at once set aside. Hoadly denied that he had ever opposed authority in the Church. He only maintained that, as that authority was in the hands of fallible men, it could not be absolute. From Christ's authority in His kingdom he had argued against the undue authority of men. His arguments referred only to the ordinary state of the Church, and not to its extraordinary state under the Apostles. He allowed a human authority for the necessities of order—but not in matters of conscience and eternal salvation. The Church of which he spoke was the Church invisible. It was not *a* Church in our modern way of speaking, but the universal Church, which consists of all true Christians. Hoadly admits that the Church in Scripture is often set forth by figures taken from things visible. It is a body, but, he adds, Christ is the head. It is a building, but Christ is the foundation stone. It is a family, but Christ is the master. It is an army, but Christ is the captain. The chief General is absent and invisible. Instead of leaving officers whom His soldiers are obliged to obey, 'He has left orders in writing to be considered and consulted by every soldier in His army.' The sermon is on the Church invisible, but the Representation quotes Article XIX., which defines a particular visible Church. 'The Article,' Hoadly says, 'declares what it is that makes every such congregation the visible Church of Christ; and I describe what it is that makes every particular man a member of Christ's invisible, universal Church.' The bishop reminds the authors of the Representation that Article VI. supposes all persons to whom Articles of Religion are proposed to be judges whether or not the proposed Articles agree with Scripture.

To the second charge, Hoadly answered that in writing his sermon he never so much as thought of the king's supremacy. He was declaring the independence of Christ's kingdom as he found it in the Gospel. If that independence is inconsistent with the claims of earthly rulers, the charge is against the Gospel, and not against him. He was quite conscious of the necessity of civil rulers securing their rights; for, under cover of the ecclesiastical or spiritual, many things might be

Never thought of denying the king's supremacy.

CHAP. XII. done that affect the civil powers. He explained, too, that he opposed civil sanctions in religion, because they could not promote religion in the essentials of it. Every effort to do this does injury to religion. The only true and acceptable worship is that which is free, which comes from the heart and is done in spirit and in truth. The business of the civil magistrate concerns the interests of men as members of society. The Articles of Religion and the Act of Uniformity only bind those whose consciences approve them. The principles of the Representation are consistent only with those of Roman Catholics, whose Church claims absolute authority over the conduct of men in matters of conscience. Hoadly lamented that a body of divines should regard the kingdom of Christ as in a state of anarchy and confusion, because it was maintained that Christ alone is king in His own kingdom.

William Law  
answers  
Hoadly.

William Law also replied to Hoadly, objecting to several things both in the sermon and the Preservative. The bishop, like all the liberal theologians of his time, attached great importance to sincerity. This in their judgment condoned for many shortcomings as to right belief. But this view of sincerity was a great heresy with those who made eternal life to depend on an orthodox creed. At this time William Law held the rigid Church theory of the Non-jurors, which connected grace and salvation with the external mechanism of a Church. He was indignant with the idea that a Quaker or a Ranter had the same chance of salvation as a Churchman. He repeated, too, the familiar objection that a persecutor may be sincere as well as a martyr. The doctrine, he said, is plainly against the Church of England, for it gives Churchmen no advantage over Deists or Presbyterians. But this quite agreed with the rest of Hoadly's doctrine. He set no value on the succession of bishops. He supposed the Church of England ordination to be no better than the Presbyterian, and that any Dissenting preacher could bestow grace as well as a clergyman.

Denies that  
there is an  
invisible  
Church.

Hoadly did not answer Law's objections. He reckoned that they had all been answered in what he wrote against other opponents. After the publication of the defence in



answer to the Representation, Law wrote again, and specially set forth his view of the Church. He objected to the description of the Church as universal and invisible. As well, he said, might we speak of the company of pre-Adamites. The aggregate of Christians might as well be called the Church of the Seraphim as the Church invisible. The profession of a Christian is visible like any other profession. The Church which Christ established was an external kingdom, consisting of men of different characters, some good and some bad. He never spoke of a Church invisible. The Church was not of this world, but that does not mean that it had no external government or visible organization. The apostles had authority over the presbyters and the deacons. The rulers of the Church may not have authority over men's consciences, but they have a commission to rule the Church. Law's arguments suppose that Hoadly denied authority in every sense, and not merely an 'absolute' authority.

Thomas Sherlock, at this time Dean of Chichester, was the chief of those appointed by Convocation to draw up the Representation concerning Hoadly's doctrines. The Representation was scarcely published when Dr. Sykes accused Sherlock of having already preached the same doctrine which he condemned in Hoadly. This referred to a sermon preached in 1712 before the Lord Mayor. The subject was the disciples wishing to command fire from heaven to consume the Samaritans. The answer of Jesus rebuked their zeal for religion, when that zeal went so far as to violate the spirit of religion. He forbade them to inflict bodily suffering on those who held a different faith. Sherlock applies the rebuke first to the Church. It has no power to use temporal punishments. Its jurisdiction extends only to the spiritual, and the punishment is of that nature that it has no effect till the offender comes to another world. The rebuke does not, however, absolutely forbid the interference of the civil magistrate. He may use the sword in matters proper to his jurisdiction, however much it may be pretended that they are allied to religion. The principle on which the State has acted in England since the Reformation is explained and defended. 'The civil magistrate,'

Sherlock and  
Hoadly.

CHAP. XII. Sherlock says, 'has a temporal power, and the peace and order of the world are his care and concern.' It is his proper business to consider the actions of men with regard to public peace and order, without respecting from what internal principles they flow. If the actions of men are such as tend 'to disturb the peace, and to destroy the frame of government over which he presides, whether they proceed from conscience or not, he is not bound to consider—nor, indeed, can he—but it is his duty to punish and to restrain them. Whenever men's religion or conscience come to show themselves in practice, they fall under the cognizance of the civil power; or, whenever they branch out into principles destructive of the civil government, they are then ripe for the civil sword, and may justly be rooted out.' If it were possible to keep religion separate from civil affairs, it would be possible for the magistrate not to interfere in religion. But the 'passions of men work themselves into their religious concerns,' and cause 'convulsions that shake the very constitution of the civil government.' In this case it is the duty of the civil magistrate to drive conscience out of the State to its proper seat, 'the heart of man, whither his power neither can nor ought to pursue it.' The magistrate's duty is not to be suspended by the plea of conscience, but he has nothing to do with conscience if it does not interfere with the order of civil society.

On the duty  
of the civil  
magistrate.

Dr. Sykes  
against Sher-  
lock.

Sykes's argument was that Sherlock had denied the royal supremacy in the same sense as Sherlock had charged Hoadly with denying it. They had both said that the civil magistrate was not to interfere with religion so as to enforce it by civil sanctions. They had both maintained that Christ's kingdom was spiritual, and that its rewards and punishments were in another life. To the charge of agreeing with Hoadly, Sherlock answered that what he condemned was the exercise of the civil power in religion as practised in the Church of Rome. He approved it in matters which disturb civil government, and he quoted from other sermons where he had taught that it was the duty of the civil magistrate 'to preserve true religion and the honour of God in the world.' The moral laws, he said, are the 'main constituent parts of the Christian religion,' and, therefore,



whoever excludes the magistrate from adding civil sanctions to these laws, must exclude him from adding civil sanctions to the laws of reason and nature. Sherlock adds, that if the other parts of religion, such as the mode of worship and the method of reconciliation, were as little disputed as the moral laws, the duty and right of the magistrate would be undeniable. No man's conscience would be hurt, for no man could plead conscience against what is plain. CHAP. XII.

Sykes continued his letters, still endeavouring to prove that Sherlock's view of the civil magistrate's duty was essentially the same as Hoadly's. He denies that religion is identical with moral duties. The magistrate may punish a man for stealing, but he has no right to compel a man to pray, or to punish him for not praying. It is even doubted if the magistrate can compel a man to pray; for prayer which is compulsory is not really prayer. If that part of Christianity which does not consist of merely moral duties is not plain and undisputed, and, as Sherlock says, cannot be enforced by the magistrate, it follows that Christ alone is King in the Church, and that He has left no vicegerent. If He had, there would have been no disputes about the doctrines of Christianity. The hierarchy, the magistrates, or whoever were the vicegerents, would have settled them. But even if the doctrines of Christianity were as plain and undisputed as moral duties, Sykes still denies the right of the civil magistrate to enforce them by civil sanctions. In this he differed from what Sherlock had said in his other sermons. But he maintained that the doctrine of the sermon before the Lord Mayor, legitimately interpreted, agreed with what Hoadly had taught. This was, that the magistrate was not to allow disturbances in the commonwealth under pretence of religion. The fact of this necessity of State interference constituted the original ground of the Church and State connection in England. Hoadly, therefore, was not against a State Church and the regal supremacy. Sykes said that it was difficult always to reconcile Sherlock with himself, and therefore more difficult to reconcile him in everything with Hoadly.

Sherlock thought he found out at last that the real object of the Bishop of Bangor's sermon was to make way for the Test Acts. Maintains the identity of Sherlock's and Hoadly's views on the duty of the civil magistrate.

CHAP. XII. repeal of the Test Acts. It was necessary, therefore, to write in their defence. He called them the security of the Established Church, and said that they had been adopted by the nation after due experience of the temper of the sectaries. Hoadly, in his answer to the Representation, called the Test Acts persecution. He said, also, that they perverted a sacred institution of the Gospel to a political end. This referred to the use made of the sacrament by occasional Conformists. Sherlock answered, that the object of the Test Acts was not to encourage occasional conformity, but rather to exclude Dissenters altogether from public offices of every kind. The law that every candidate for a public office was to take the sacrament within a year of election was not a qualification for office, but a test of permanent adherence to the Established Church. The Legislature had resolved that places of power and trust should only be in the hands of those who were well affected to the Ecclesiastical Constitution. Occasional conformity was a device of the Dissenters to escape the tests. It is on them, and not on the law, that the charge must be laid of profaning the sacrament. At the end of the tract, Sherlock said that Hoadly, in his zeal against passive obedience, had condemned the forbearance of Christ, calling it an example for slaves and not for subjects. This was the occasion of a new turn to the controversy. Atterbury had quoted St. Peter's recommending the long-suffering of Christ as an example for subjects not to contend for their civil rights. Hoadly said that Peter was addressing slaves, and, therefore, his advice was not applicable to subjects.

Dr. Whitby  
defends  
Hoadly.

Daniel Whitby, now past his eightieth year, and in the midst of the Arian disputes, found time and strength to come to the help of Bishop Hoadly. He undertook to defend the doctrine of the Sermon on the Kingdom of Christ by 'Scripture, reason, and the concurring suffrages of our best divines.' The arguments from Scripture and reason were the same that had already been used. The chief authority quoted for Christ alone being lawgiver, and for the impossibility of civil sanctions producing true religion, was Bishop Taylor. The argument, which Hoadly elaborated, that the interpretation of a law becomes the law,

and the interpreter the lawgiver, was traced to Chillingworth. Whitby noticed incidentally William Law's argument against the innocency of sincere error. If, he said, Quakers, Ranters, and Presbyterians have been sincere in their inquiries, it only shows that they had evidence for their belief equal to what we have for ours. As to Deists, the proofs of Christianity are so convincing, that there is a presumption against the sincerity of those who reject it. For Hoadly's view of sincerity, the judgment of divines of different schools was quoted. Kettlewell, for instance, says that 'where our ignorance of any of Christ's laws is joined with an honest heart, and remains after our sincere industry to know the truth, we may take comfort to ourselves that it is involuntary and innocent.' Chillingworth is quoted, saying that 'to ask pardon of simple and involuntary errors is tacitly to imply that God is angry with us for them, and that were to impute to Him this strange tyranny of requiring back where He gives no straw; of expecting to gather where He strewed not; of being offended with us for not doing what He knows we cannot do.'

It was, of course, true, as Sherlock intimated, that the Corporation and Test Acts were among the civil sanctions to religion which Hoadly condemned. He immediately answered Sherlock, vindicating the right of Dissenters to be admitted to civil offices, and explaining the nature of the sacramental test. Sherlock construed the Corporation Act as intended to exclude the Nonconformists, on the ground that they were enemies to the public peace. To this Hoadly answered, that the Corporation Act was passed when many of the ministers, who afterwards dissented, were in possession of the livings, and were declared by Charles himself to be persons full of zeal for the peace of the Church and the State. The Test Act was entirely a measure against Roman Catholics. Its object was not the security of the Ecclesiastical Constitution, but of the State. It was a mere accident that this Act touched the Dissenters at all. The great body of them, ministers and people, had never objected to receive the sacrament at Church. It was therefore impossible that this could be a test of their being well affected to the Ecclesiastical Constitution. Some, even of the

CHAP. XII. founders of the Church of England, inveighed bitterly against many of the very things which are still distasteful to the Nonconformists.

Dr. Hare  
answers  
Hoadly.

The controversy had nearly run its course, when Hoadly had to encounter a new opponent, who might have been expected to have taken Hoadly's side. This was Francis Hare, at that time Dean of Worcester. Hare had himself, by his satirical pamphlet against High Churchism, earned the reputation of a heretic. He published a sermon on Church authority, in the preface to which he spoke of 'some' who declared against all authority in the Church, and all establishments of religion in the State. By establishments of religion, Hare seems to have meant the civil sanctions, which Hoadly condemned. Those, he said, who opposed state religion, not only contradict the sense of mankind in all ages, but reflect on the wisdom of God, who established a state religion among the Jews. Our establishment is necessary for the defence of Protestantism. Without it, we should have no united strength to withstand the well-disciplined armies of the Church of Rome. The sermon is mainly devoted to proving that Christ established authority in His Church. In the recent disputes on Church authority, Hare says that the text 'Obey them that have the rule over you' ought not to have been forgotten. The power to bind and loose committed to the apostles was to continue with their successors. The Church is a society, and, like any other society, it must have governors. The kingdom of which Jesus said that it is not of this world, was not the Church. It was not the people whom Christ governed, but rather the glory and happiness that would be finally conferred on them that believe. An invisible Church is an abstraction—a mere fiction. Christ's Church is a visible society, governed either by Church officers themselves, or with the help of the civil magistrate.

Hoadly again  
explains his  
doctrine.

Hoadly answered, as he had done many times before, that he never denied authority in the visible Church. His object had rather been to determine its nature and extent. Hare said a great deal about ecclesiastical guides, and Hoadly answered that this very word 'guides' implied that the persons guided were to judge for themselves. He would

not deny that the apostles had great authority committed to them when they received the power of the keys. But how much of that authority remained with their successors is the question to be settled. In the Corinthian Church, St. Paul rested the power of excommunication with the body of the laity, as well as with their spiritual overseers. Hare admitted, after all his reasoning, that modern Church governors have not the power to forgive sin. The invisibility of the Church was no invention of that century. Every writer against the Church of Rome is, Hoadly says, logically driven to maintain it. If the Church of Rome is not in itself exclusively the Catholic Church, there is no Catholic visible Church; that is, no one visible society, as Hare describes the Church, with that order and government which he says belong to it.\*

\* Hoadly wrote a characteristic piece of satire, which he called a 'Dedication to Pope Clement XI.' It was anonymous, and prefixed to what was called 'Sir Richard Steele's Account of the State of the Roman Catholic Religion throughout the World.' The Pope, Hoadly said, claims infallibility, but Protestants claimed all the benefits of infallibility without the absurdity of maintaining it. 'The Synod of Dort, the Councils of the Reformed in France, the Assembly of the Kirk in Scotland, and the Convocation in England have all the same unquestionable authority which the Church of Rome claims solely on the ground of infallibility. We need not set up for infallibility; we can do without it. The popes indeed have long reproached us with heresy and schism. We have been persecuted, hanged, burnt, massacred, for heretics and schismatics, but we are never sick of these two words. We throw them upon the next brethren that come in our way, and they throw them upon others. We persecuted the Nonconformists, and in Ireland they are now persecuting the Unitarians. In Scotland let a man depart an inch from the Confession of Faith, and, cold as that country is, it will soon be too hot for him.' In England the greatest excellences in the world cannot guard a man against the fatal consequences of heresy.

'The case of one (William Whiston) is very remarkable; for, not to mention his good life, which is looked upon as a trifle common to all heretics; though his religion is mixed up with a good deal of calendar and rubrical piety; though he hath his stated fasts and feasts which he observes with the greatest devotion; though he is zealous for building of churches in the apostolical form of a ship, with all accommodations for order and decency; though he is for the use of oil, and the trine immersion in baptism, and for water mixed with wine in the other sacrament; though he is very warm in believing in Christ towards the East, and renouncing the devil towards the West; though he resigns to them all the preferments in the land from Dover to Berwick-upon-Tweed;—yet all will not do: he holds the Son to be inferior to the Father, and created by Him, though a Being of most glorious perfections, and upon this account he must not enjoy even the poverty which he hath chosen in quiet.'

We protest against all the doings of the Church of Rome, yet we continue to imitate them. We maintain the right of the people to search the Scriptures for themselves, yet we tell them they must understand the Scriptures as the Church understands them. 'They must follow their guides who have an interpretative

## CHAP. XII.

Sykes on the  
kingdom of  
Christ.

Dr. Sykes, who was Hoadly's chief helper in the Bangorian controversy, had already written on many of the subjects of the controversy before the publication of Hoadly's sermon. In the preceding year, 1716, he had himself preached a sermon in Cambridge, at the archdeacon's visitation, on the same text, and taking the same view of the Church as Hoadly had done. He defined the Church as embracing all those who profess Christ's name, and are sincerely endeavouring to do His will. This being all that is necessary for membership of the Church in heaven, it must be enough for membership of the Church on earth. Christ's kingdom is not a kingdom of pomp and ceremony, but a living power in the souls of men. Its subjects may not be always visibly discerned. Their titles and advantages do not depend on any external relations. It is admitted there is great ambiguity in the use of the word Church. It sometimes includes those who are true Christians, but it is also used to embrace all who call themselves by the name of Christ. The subjects of Christ's kingdom stand or fall by their own actions. They are neither condemned for other men's faults, nor saved by other men's virtues. Christ knew better what was in man than to trust any 'vicegerents' with the power of anathemas. Neither the rulers of the Church nor the civil magistrates have a commission to force men to embrace Christianity. This is contrary to its spirit, and is really the great hindrance to its progress in the world. God requires sincerity and uprightness. For the want of these, He only can punish who searches the hearts of men. If Christ had appointed in His Church persons who were to exercise authority in matters of faith, He would have left no uncertainty as to the persons in whom the authority was vested. The unity of the spirit is to be

authority to explain the Scriptures. The clergy of the Church of England have very good intentions towards the pope, but his holiness will be wise not to trust them. They may have great respect for bishops, but only so long as bishops agree with them. Certainly, at present, they are drawing near his holiness both in doctrine and ceremony. They find themselves

invested with prerogatives, and naturally reason that the Church must be excellent through which these prerogatives have come. Hence the zeal of many for the multiplying of ceremoniousness, and bowings in public worship, for the cathedral pronouncement of prayer, over-altars, and the never-lighted candles upon them.'



preserved by love and charity in the bond of peace, and not by all Christians being compelled to be of one opinion. CHAP. XII.

This sermon was not the beginning of Sykes's public life. He had already defended against Dr. Brett, the Nonjuror, the validity of baptism administered by laymen or Dissenters. He had also written a tract on 'The Innocency of Error,' which, together with what Hoadly afterwards said on the same subject, was the occasion of a good part of the Bangorian controversy. Sykes wrote this pamphlet to vindicate the position that 'no heresy is so destructive as a wicked life—no schism so damnable as a course of sin.' This was a saying as old as St. Bernard, and had been repeated in a sermon by John Colet, who called the wicked lives of the priests the most pestilent and pernicious of all heresies. Error, Sykes said, was innocent in those who had not the means of knowing truth. Heretical notions may be quite consistent with a Christian life. If all error were damnable, no Christian could be safe. Sin may be repented of, but a man cannot repent of error so long as he believes it to be truth. It is contrary to divine justice that men should suffer for errors which they could not avoid. The doctrine of this pamphlet was noticed by Dr. Potter, the Bishop of Oxford, in a Charge to his clergy. This was answered by Hoadly, in a postscript to his answer to Dr. Hare. The bishop replied, and stated expressly that he had Sykes's tract before him when he wrote his Charge. Sykes vindicated himself against the bishop's inferences. The great design, he said, which he had in writing on the subject, was to promote love and charity, and to prevent Christians being fined or imprisoned for opinions which other people might reckon heterodox. On lay baptism.

Dr. Sykes wrote an elaborate work on the 'Nature, Design, and Origin of Sacrifices.' This work has a special interest, from its setting forth a view of sacrifice which was not generally received, even by the most latitudinarian of his contemporaries. Clarke and Hoadly did not apparently differ from the orthodox on the nature and efficacy of the atonement. But Sykes may be said to have entirely set aside the popular or orthodox doctrine of satisfaction for sin. The meaning of the New Testament words about Christ's sacrifice, On sacrifice.

CHAP. XII. he said, must be gathered from what we know of sacrifice in general, and especially of the sacrifices of the Jewish Church. The sacrificing of animals is called the oldest religious custom in the world, and, at the same time, the least explicable to reason. The first reproach of the Pagans against the Christians was that of impiety or atheism, because Christian worship had no sacrifices. The Christians answered by showing the absurdity of Paganism, and quoting the wise men of antiquity as agreeing with them. Eusebius showed that Porphyry contradicted himself by defending the old deities, and yet saying that they were no gods that took pleasure in sacrifices. Christians and philosophers were agreed that sacrifice was not a rational worship. And yet the religion of the Jews, which all Christians regard as divine, consisted mainly in the sacrifice of animals. It is not, indeed, expressly said in Scripture that sacrifices were originally instituted by God. On the contrary, it is continually repeated that the only acceptable sacrifice is spiritual worship. And yet, if they were the inventions of men, it is strange that God should command them, or even permit them to His chosen people. Arnobius, making sport of the Pagan sacrifices, asked if they were the food of the deities, if the gods took pleasure in smoke, or if the sacrifices caused the deities to lay aside their anger and become more merciful? What is the connection between burning an animal and removing the divine displeasure? If a man sin, is an innocent sheep to be offered as a substitute? Is its blood an equivalent or satisfaction for the act of the real criminal? These questions are regarded as equally applicable to the sacrifices of the Jews and of the Pagans.

Not instituted  
by God.

Sacrifice de-  
fined.

Sykes's next inquiry is to discover the ground or reason of this mode of worship. He defines sacrifice in the proper sense, as that which is immediately offered to God, so that a part or the whole is consumed. There must be, to constitute sacrifice, a gift and the consumption of that gift. The word sacrifice is, however, used with great vagueness by old writers. The Latins sometimes applied it to the mere ceremony of offering, as well as to the thing offered. Light-foot divides the Jewish sacrifices into bloody and unbloody,



including both under the name Corban—that is, a sacred gift. CHAP. XII.  
 But corban, in ordinary language, meant every kind of gift. Sykes, therefore, prefers the division of offerings consumed and offerings not consumed. The former are, alone, truly and properly sacrifices. All sacrifices are offerings, but all offerings are not sacrifices. The Levites, for instance, and the sacred vessels, were offered to God, but they were not sacrifices. The scapegoat was offered to God before the altar, but not sacrificed. The oldest word for sacrifice is *Mincha*, which was used to describe both the bloody sacrifice of Abel and the unbloody sacrifice of Cain. In later times this word was used only for an oblation of flour or meal.

The proper sacrifice, Sykes says, was always a gift consumed. But to give it any value, it was necessary that he who offered the sacrifice should have an upright mind. This was necessary with the Pagans, as well as with the Jews. Plato says, ‘It would be a terrible thing if the gods were to have regard to our gifts, and not to the mind, whether a man be holy or righteous, or not.’ The rites and ceremonies attending the sacrifices were so ordered as to imply or to raise a right disposition in the worshipper. The priests were to wash their hands and their feet when they came near to the altar. They that bare the vessels of the Lord were to be clean. The purifyings were symbols of purification from sin, and at the sacrifices the people confessed their iniquities. The Pagans had the same ideas in this respect as the Jews. The profane were warned not to come near. The public crier told all the people to take care of their words; and Lucian says that no one with impure hands was to be within the place where the holy vessels were.

The sacrifices were not only accompanied with repentance, confession, and prayer, but they were federal rites by which the worshippers entered into friendship with God. In old times, when men made covenants, or engaged each other in friendship, they did it by eating and drinking together. This custom naturally passed into religion. When the children of Israel departed from the worship of the true God, they were said to join themselves to Baal-Peor, and eat the offerings of the dead; that is, of sacrifices offered to men

CHAP. XII. who had been deified. St. Paul tells the Corinthians that they cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils. Nothing but what was clean was to be offered to God, and by clean was meant what was eaten by man. Every sacrifice was to be seasoned with salt. This was true of all sacrifices, Pagan as well as Jewish. Homer and Virgil often speak of the salt in the sacrifices. It was the type of friendship. A covenant of salt meant an enduring covenant. The animals burnt on the altar were all tame animals. The meat offerings were of bread and flour, such as is in common use. The Pagans had the same custom of offering cakes to their deities. To their meat offering was always added a drink offering. Wine was poured upon the altar of God.

Sacrifice is not substitution.

This entering into covenant was the chief meaning of sacrifice; yet Sykes finds that the idea of substitution was very common in the Pagan world. The life of the animal was given for the life of the criminal. In Ovid's words—

‘Cor pro corde precor, pro fibris sumite fibras  
Hanc animam vobis pro meliore damus.’

Here we have fibre instead of fibre—the innocent beast for the guilty man. The idea of substitution certainly existed among the Pagans, but Sykes thinks that it did not exist among the Jews. The giving of life was not absolutely necessary to make atonement. The sacrifice of fine flour purchased atonement as well as the offering of an animal. Had life been given as a substitute for life, the slaughter of the animal would have been enough. But much more was necessary. The flesh, or at least a part of it, had to be consumed upon the altar. There was also to accompany it an oblation of bread and wine, and an offering of salt. The real reason for slaying the animal was to give the blood to God. It was to be poured out on the altar to make atonement—that is, to make God propitious. Sacrifices in the Old Testament are never ‘equivalents, compensations, exchanges, or substitutes.’ There were sacrifices under the law that had no connection with crime. The Nazarite who came near a dead body was to offer a lamb. The leper was to make an offering for his leprosy. A woman after childbirth was to sacrifice a lamb, or, if too poor, a pair of turtle-doves and two young pigeons. The case most frequently urged

for substitution, is that of the head of the heifer being struck off instead of the head of the murderer. But Sykes says that this was not a sacrifice. The heifer was not offered to God. The act was merely symbolical of what was due to the murderer. The 'sin-offering' is also sometimes quoted, but that took away sin only by repentance and obedience, and not by the transfer of guilt to the animal sacrifices. The strongest case is that of the scapegoat, which had the transgressions and iniquities of the children of Israel put upon its head. But the scapegoat was not sacrificed at all. It expiated or atoned for the sins of the people by carrying them away into a land not inhabited.

Sykes comes to the conclusion that sacrifice being a universal custom, God permitted the Jews to follow it. At the same time it is evident that sacrifice availed nothing in the judgment both of Jews and Pagans without a right disposition in the worshipper. But where the chief act of worship was the shedding of blood, it was natural to ascribe atonement to the blood of the victim, and to say that without shedding of blood there is no remission. But all such expressions must be taken with the proper limitations, which are suggested by what we know of the history and meaning of sacrifice. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews could not mean literally that without shedding of blood there was no remission. He had really made a distinct limitation in the first part of the verse—'Almost all things are by the law purged with blood.' There were sacrifices and sin offerings which made atonement, though there was in them no blood-shedding. In popular language, the blood was the atonement, but in reality it was only the external symbol, and required the obedience of the person offering the sacrifice. The implied inference of the whole argument is that Christ's death was not a substitution, and that He did not literally make atonement with His blood.

Sacrifice re-  
mitted to the  
Jews.

Dr. Sykes had also a considerable share in an important controversy on the Eucharist. Samuel Clarke died in 1729, and left ready for publication an exposition of the Church Catechism, which consisted of lectures that he had read to his congregation at Westminster. His views of the sacraments were entirely those of a rational theologian. The ancient

Dr. Clarke on  
the Eucharist.

CHAP. XII. Christian writers, he said, had called the Lord's Supper a 'sacrifice,' and an 'unbloody sacrifice.' This, however, was not because 'they imagined it to be at all literally a sacrifice, but because it was an act of Christian worship, which came in the place of Jewish sacrifices.' It was so called by a figure of speech in the same way as we speak of the sacrifices of praise and prayer, and of offering our bodies a living sacrifice. After the example of Cranmer and the English Reformers, Clarke described the sacraments as means of grace, the same in kind as other acts of worship. Like all other positive institutions, 'they have the nature only of means to an end, and are never to be compared with moral virtues, nor can be of any use or benefit without these, nor can be in any degree equivalents for the want of them.' The benefits of Christ's death were received in the sacrament of the Supper, but not alone in this ordinance. We have here the communion of the body of Christ, that is, 'the communion of all the members of Christ's body one with another.'

Answered by  
Dr. Water-  
land.

Dr. Waterland soon discovered in this exposition of the Catechism the whole of Dr. Clarke's heresies. To Arianism was now added, he said, a contempt for Christ's sacraments, and the elevation of moral duties over the positive commands of revelation. This was the very foundation of Deism, and the cause of all the unbelief that had overspread the world. The Eucharist was a sacrifice, because we there offer to God bread and wine, and bring before Him the remembrance of Christ's sacrifice on the cross. Waterland agreed with Clarke that there was no grace or virtue annexed to the material elements, and that the words 'verily and indeed' did not mean corporeally, but effectually. Yet he thought Clarke had failed to show that to the worthy receiver there was 'a life-giving virtue annexed to the sacrament.' The grace accompanying sacraments does not come in a natural way as in other acts of worship. Sacraments are not means to promote moral virtue, but rather 'additional improvements on virtuous practices.' It is by the sacraments and not by moral virtues that we come to Christ. Moral virtues are means to the sacraments by which we have justification and salvation. The first commandment is love to God.

Obedience, therefore, to His positive institutions is the best sign of resignation to His will. There can be no moral virtue but in obeying His laws, and the less we know of the reasons of these laws the greater is the evidence of our humility. Adam was driven from Paradise for disobeying a positive precept, and Abraham's obedience to a positive command 'has made his name more famous both in heaven and on earth than all his moral virtues put together.' Contempt of the sacrament of the Eucharist will be as much a bar to salvation as contempt of moral virtues. Those who neglect communion will find their moral virtues of 'no use or benefit without this sacrament, nor in any degree equivalents for the want of it.' Christian law is the foundation of Christian morality, and this cannot exist where the sacraments are neglected.

Sykes replied to Waterland, defending Clarke's doctrine, and especially what concerned moral and positive duties. He appealed to the general tenor of the whole of the Scriptures, that the merely positive was as nothing compared with the moral. The prophets set but little value on the laws of Moses, but a great deal on doing justly, loving mercy, and walking humbly with God. Christ confirmed the principles on which the prophets acted when He said, 'I will have mercy and not sacrifice.' The prophets represent God as saying, 'To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? I delight not in the blood of bullocks.' God required moral virtues. He said to the people, 'Wash ye, make ye clean.' St. James defined pure and undefiled religion as visiting the fatherless and the widows in their affliction; and St. Paul says, 'If thou be a breaker of the law, thy circumcision is become uncircumcision.' Moral virtues are in themselves acceptable to God. A holy, good, and just Being cannot but approve the man who is governed by them. They are the exact imitation of God, and therefore need no aid to relieve them, nor anything to improve them.

Clarke defended by Sykes.

In answer to Sykes, Waterland wrote his treatise on 'The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy of the Christian Sacraments.' He rejected the ordinary distribution of duties into the two classes of moral and positive. Our duties to God as

Waterland on moral and positive duties.

CHAP. XII. Father, Son, and Holy Ghost revealed in Scripture were as much of fixed and eternal obligation as any duties known only by reason. Many Christian precepts are referred to the law of nature, though without revelation we should never have heard of them. The proper distinction then ought to be of duties natural and supernatural. Of the latter kind are the two sacraments. Dr. Clarke's mistake, according to Waterland, is the confounding of positive with external duties. He contrasts the merely external with the internal. But a positive duty has both an internal and an external part. The mere performance of the latter may be worthless, but internal obedience to a positive precept is of as great and sometimes of greater value than to a moral precept. The ground of this is that all obligation is resolved into the will of God. Disobedience to positive commands is often in Scripture more severely punished than neglect of moral duties. Examples are given in the penalties annexed to the neglect of circumcision, and to breaking the Sabbath, as in the case of the man that gathered sticks on the Sabbath day. Waterland says expressly that the entire neglect of religious duties, such as attending public prayers at church, is a greater sin than neglecting to do works of charity and mercy. He denies that positive duties are merely instrumental parts of religion. 'They may be as direct religion or even more direct religion than any moral performances.' The error of Clarke, Tillotson, and all the divines of that school, is in putting the second table of the law before the first—making our duty to our neighbour of more importance than our duty to God. The use of the sacraments is in itself a virtue, and in some cases to be preferred even to such moral duties as feeding the hungry and clothing the naked. The reason is that by the sacraments God confers grace and pardon, and makes men partakers of the benefits of Christ's death and passion.

O. the Eu-  
ch. rist.

The Eucharist controversy, in the hands of Sykes and Waterland, passed into the question of the sufficiency of reason. It received a new turn by the publication of Hoadly's 'Plain Account of the Nature and End of the Lord's Supper.' Hoadly's views were the same as Clarke's. He was answered by Waterland and some other writers, who

believed that there was a mysterious and supernatural conveyance of grace in the use of the sacraments. Waterland returned to the controversy in 1737, when he published his great work called 'A Review of the Doctrine of the Eucharist, as laid down in Scripture and Antiquity.' The object of this treatise was not only to defend Waterland's own view of the Eucharist against the rational theologians, but also against John Johnson and Dr. Thomas Brett, who, with great pretence of antiquity, had set forth some extreme views on the other side.

John Johnson was Vicar of Cranbrook, in Kent. In 1714 he published a work called 'The Unbloody Sacrifice and Altar Unveiled and Supported.' It raised some controversy at the time, and was censured in a Charge by Dr. Trimmer, Bishop of Norwich. The bishop said that it contained a doctrine of the Eucharist that had never been taught in the Church of England since the Reformation. It was a great grief for Johnson to be condemned by a bishop. He consoled himself, however, with the reflection that Trimmer was the first Christian bishop that had ever opposed the sacrifice of the Eucharist. Johnson kept quite clear of the mass, which he called an 'abominable corruption.' The sacrifice in the Eucharist was not the body and blood of Christ, but the elements of bread and wine. In one sense Johnson's view was very harmless. Like all doctrinal monomaniacs, he built his entire theory on the indefinite interpretation of indefinite words. The prophet Malachi had said something about a pure offering, and what could that be but the bread and wine in the Eucharist? All the Fathers said that this was Malachi's meaning, and how can we know the meaning of Scripture but by the unanimous consent of the Fathers? It is true that they often speak of the Eucharist as a spiritual or rational sacrifice. But this does not mean that there is no material offering. They call it 'unbloody,' as distinguished from the bloody sacrifices of the Jews and Pagans. At the institution of the Supper, Christ offered in sacrifice bread and wine, but on the cross His body and His blood. When He said to His disciples, 'This is My body given,' He meant 'This is My body sacrificed.' He offered in sacrifice His sacramental body. The same material

John Johnson's 'Unbloody Sacrifice.'



CHAP. XII. sacrifice we repeat in the Eucharist. Christ made a sacrifice for sin, and the priesthood makes the same sacrifice in the Church. The efficacy is derived from the sacrifice on the cross, but the offering of the priesthood is for the sins committed since Christ was crucified. Sins cannot be forgiven before they are committed. By, and in, the Eucharistic oblation we receive the application of the benefits of Christ's atonement.

Dr. Brett on  
the Eucha-  
rist.

Dr. Thomas Brett was a bishop among the Nonjurors. He expressed his entire agreement with Johnson on this subject. To his mind Johnson was the only man in the Church of England who had dared, in those days of Arianism and unbelief, to set forth the whole truth. Brett examines three views which are to be rejected—the Roman, the Lutheran, and the Calvinist. The first supposes the substance of the bread and wine to be changed into the very body and blood, soul and divinity, of Jesus Christ. The second supposes the body and blood of Christ to be truly and substantially present, and distributed with the bread and wine. The union, however, of the body with the elements is not permanent, but continues only during the celebration. The Calvinist view is even more absurd than the other two. Calvin's words are, that though Christ is now in heaven, yet, by 'the secret and incomparable virtue of His Spirit, He nourishes and quickens us with the substance of His body and blood. They who bring pure faith as a clean vessel unto the Holy Supper of the Lord, verily and indeed receive that which the signs there witness, that is, the body and blood of Jesus Christ, which are no less the meat and drink of the soul, than bread and wine are the meat of the body.' It is true that both Roman Catholics and Lutherans say that the eating and drinking in the Eucharist is spiritual, though the body which is eaten is the substantial body of Jesus Christ, which was born of the Virgin Mary. The Calvinists say that they only eat and drink bread and wine, yet by faith they feed on that natural body which is in heaven.

Bread and  
wine are  
Christ's body  
and blood.

After rejecting these three views of the Eucharist as 'direct jargon and nonsense,' Dr. Brett explains his own theory. The bread and wine mixed with water are, he says,



that body and blood which our Lord requires us to eat and drink, and which whoso eateth and drinketh as he ought to do hath eternal life; and this bread and wine are made the body and blood by the Holy Ghost. It is maintained that this was the doctrine of Ponet, the Bishop of Winchester, and of the first Liturgy of the reign of King Edward. In that Liturgy the Holy Ghost was invoked to bless and sanctify the bread and the cup, that they might be unto us the body and blood of Christ. This was changed through the influence of Bucer and Peter Martyr, two zealous Calvinists, who were sent to England 'to spoil the English Reformation.' The doctrine of Calvin was then introduced into the Communion Office, in the words as they now stand. Instead of an invocation to the Holy Ghost to make the bread and wine the body and blood of Christ, we are taught to pray, 'that we receiving these Thy creatures of bread and wine, according to Thy Son our Saviour Jesus Christ's institution, may be partakers of His body and blood.' Here we have the elements as a sign of the absent natural body. But Christ called the bread His body. It was that which He gave for the sins of the world. His sacrifice was not the offering up of His natural body on the cross. That was not His act, but the act of His executioners. His sacrifice was the sacramental or Eucharistic body, the same which the priest continually offers in the celebration of the Holy Communion.

In refuting, on the one hand, Johnson and Brett, and on the other Clarke and Hoadly, Dr. Waterland adopts the views of Calvin, which are really those of the Church of England. He indorses the Calvinistic words of Hooker, that 'the real presence of Christ is not to be sought in the sacrament, but in the worthy receiver of the sacrament,' and that 'though God gives grace with the sacrament, it is not contained in the sacrament.' Many Fathers are quoted to prove that the sacrifice in the Eucharist is not a material or proper sacrifice. Joseph Mede had taught something like the doctrine of Johnson and Brett, but it was never the doctrine of any number of theologians of the Church of England. Waterland, on the authority of many Fathers, as well as of his own judgment, entirely sets aside the

Johnson and  
Brett refuted  
by Water-  
land.

CHAP. XII. sixth chapter of John's Gospel as having no reference to the sacrament of the Supper. As the Eucharist was not then instituted, those who heard Christ could have had, according to the argument, no life in them.

Conyers  
Middleton.

Another leader among the latitudinarian divines was Dr. Conyers Middleton. It has long been the custom to describe Middleton as an unbeliever in Christianity. It is impossible to make good this charge, and therefore difficult to acquit his enemies of hatred, malice, and uncharitableness. He is said not to have been a man of an amiable disposition, and not to have manifested a Christian spirit in controversy. This is probably true, but it is true also of the majority of his contemporaries, to whatever party they belonged. Middleton had some of the vices that distinguished the chief men at Cambridge during the reign of the influence of Bentley. But he had also some of their greatest virtues. He had the inquiring spirit of a true philosopher, and the object of his inquiries was always truth and duty. He repined at his being neglected in the Church. He was conscious of his great capacity, and he knew that his own mental honesty was the cause of his missing preferment. Most of the points for which he contended are now conceded by all educated people, but the maintenance of them nearly deprived him both of his offices in the university and of the name Christian.

His letter  
from Rome.

Middleton's first religious work was his 'Letter from Rome: showing an exact conformity between Popery and Paganism; or the Religion of the Present Romans derived from that of their Heathen Ancestors.' The argument of this work is expressed in the title. It was severe against the Roman Catholic religion, and did not leave untouched, at least by inference, superstition of every kind. Middleton's next appearance as an author was in a 'Letter to Dr. Waterland.' This concerned the Deist controversy. Waterland had written a 'Vindication of Scripture,' in answer to Tindal's 'Christianity as old as Creation.' He undertook to defend the infallibility of the Scriptures in every statement, and Middleton told him that this was a method 'more calculated to raise new scruples than to quiet old ones; to expose the Scriptures to fresh ridicule, than to convince any

that were sceptical or unsettled in their minds.' It was possible to defend Christianity without maintaining anything so untenable as the infallibility of the Scriptures. Middleton wished to treat Deists as reasonable beings, and he was called a Deist himself for his pains. He saw that a great deal of what was reckoned Deism had its origin in the insuperable difficulty of receiving the thesis defended by Dr. Waterland. Tindal was also charged with hypocrisy and dissimulation. He had taken his stand on natural religion as being anterior to revealed, and on moral precepts as more certain and more important than positive precepts. Waterland could not credit the sincerity of a man who took up such a position. It was, he said, impossible to separate natural religion from revealed. Middleton demonstrated that natural religion, as it is called, existed before what is called revelation, and that under it men reached exalted degrees of virtue. It was orthodox to assail the character of the Deists when their arguments could not be answered, and so Waterland painted Tindal as a monster of iniquity. Middleton recommended charity. To take away a man's good name because of his religious opinions was not, he said, the spirit of the Christian religion. For anything that could be shown to the contrary, Tindal might be a pattern of goodness. He professed in all his writings to believe in God, in providence, and in a life to come. He worshipped reason, truth, and virtue.

CHAP. XII.

Defence of  
Tindal.

Middleton gives his view of the passages which Waterland had vindicated. Of the history of the fall of man, in its literal sense, Tindal said that all Christians were now ashamed. Waterland answered bluntly, that this was a 'calumny.' Middleton avowed his disbelief in the literal story, and added that all commentators were forced in some measure to desert the latter in order to make the story rational and credible. The difficulty is not removed by supposing that the serpent was the devil, for this is a supposition that has no authority in the text. And, if admitted, it only gives more force to Tindal's objection, that the justice of God is in question by not interposing in so unequal a conflict. Middleton explains the whole story as an allegory. Adam was the mind or reason of man. Eve was the flesh, or out-

On the Mosaic  
history.

CHAP. XII. ward sense. The serpent is lust or pleasure. The mind was seduced by the senses. It was enfeebled by the allurements of pleasure, and so man was driven from the paradise of God. Tindal had also objected to the divine institution of circumcision. It was, he said, borrowed from the Egyptians. Waterland denied that this could be proved, and Middleton produced as witnesses Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus, and Strabo. Tindal could not regard as 'a religious duty acceptable to a good and gracious God,' a custom accompanied with great pain and hazard. Waterland denied that it was either painful or dangerous. Middleton quoted Maimonides, who calls it 'a most dangerous thing,' and Lightfoot, who says that the frequent mortality which it occasioned was the cause of a standing law that when any parent had lost three children successively by the operation he was to be excused from circumcising the rest. A similar battle was fought over the story of the confusion of tongues. Waterland took it as literal and true history. Middleton supported Tindal in finding the origin of language in reason; its history in the rise and fall of empires, and in the changes of modes and customs. Waterland was deeply moved by the profanity which in this way exercised reason upon infallible Scripture. He charged his adversaries with shooting up arrows against heaven, and 'bidding defiance to the undoubted truths of God.' He risked the whole of Christianity on the literal truth of some old Jewish histories. He called them 'revelations,' and then he said that revelation was not to be examined by the internal value of what was taught, but by the evidence of the fact. Middleton answered that 'it was allowed on all hands, if any narration can be shown to be false, any doctrine irrational or immoral, it is not all the external evidence in the world that can or ought to convince us that such a doctrine came from God.'

Answers the  
Deists.

The 'Letter' concludes with some hints how Deists like Tindal are to be answered. They are to be shown the insufficiency of mere natural religion. Middleton says that this may have force with individual men, but that it is not enough for the multitude. This is proved by the fact that all legislators in the heathen world invented or established a public religion, not founded on mere principles of reason,

but under pretence of a revelation with divine authority from heaven. Tindal himself admits that there never was a time or place without a traditional religion. That mere reason is insufficient seems to be the universal voice of nature. If we demolish Christianity, some other traditional religion will immediately take its place. It is therefore immoral to seek to overturn Christianity, even supposing it were not divine. Socrates, Cicero, and many others who clearly saw the falsehood of the established religion, upheld it for the sake of government. But Christianity, as Tindal himself confesses, being a republication of the religion of nature, to seek its destruction is criminal. This was Middleton's answer to Tindal; but Christianity, so far as it is a republication of natural religion, Tindal never sought to destroy.

The greatest service which Dr. Middleton did to Christianity was by the publication of his 'Free Inquiry' into the miraculous powers supposed to be continued in the Church after the days of the apostles. At the Reformation most Protestants ceased to believe in ecclesiastical miracles, but they had never determined the time when miracles had ceased. The Church of Rome, with perfect consistency, maintained that miracles were still wrought in the Church. The High Church party in the Church of England believed that miracles were continued in the Church for the first three, four, or even five centuries. This early period was reckoned to be the golden age of the Church, when it was pure in morals, uncorrupt in doctrines, and still endowed with the supernatural gifts which it had under the apostles. It was not till the beginning of the eighteenth century that scholars began to examine impartially the facts concerning the primitive Church, and so to be able to dispel the halo of glory with which it had been surrounded.

Dr. Middleton put an end to the illusion about pure and uncorrupt centuries of Christianity. The belief, he said, of post-apostolic miracles was not only false in itself, but mischievous in its tendency. It disposed men to believe Roman Catholic miracles, and when the imposture of these was discovered, doubts were raised about the miracles of the apostles. Before the Reformation no attempt was made to fix the age in which miracles ceased. A supernatural Church

On the miraculous powers.

No miracles after the apostles' times.

CHAP. XII. existed, as Cicero says of the Pythian oracle, till men began to be less credulous. Some Protestant divines have tried to fix the time when imposture took the place of real miracles. Tillotson, for instance, thought that miracles continued till Christianity was fairly established; that is, till Paganism was overturned. Christians could cast out devils so long as the devil reigned. Dr. Marshall, the translator of Cyprian, said that miracles existed in Cyprian's day, and were not discontinued until Christianity was supported by the civil authorities. Dodwell believed that miracles existed during the first three centuries, but he could say nothing for the fourth century because of its 'fabulous genius and manifest impostures.' Whiston found miracles in the early Church till the Athanasian heresy was established by the second Council of Constantinople. The devil then took possession of the Church. It became 'Athanasian, Antichristian, Popish.' Waterland, on the other hand, says that the Athanasian doctrines were preserved in the first three centuries because miracles had not then ceased. On the authority of Paulinus, he afterwards extended the continuance of miracles to the fourth century. Other divines say that even in the fifth century miracles were wrought to refute the Arians.

Errors of the  
Church of  
Rome in the  
Fathers.

Middleton regards all these writers as betraying the cause of Protestantism. So far from these centuries being uncorrupt in faith, the errors of the Church of Rome had already appeared. The Fathers of these centuries followed many customs which, as Protestants, we have renounced. Athanasius introduced monasteries into Italy, where, as St. Jerome says, they had before been held in utter contempt. St. Basil calls the monastic life 'an angelical institution.' By the influence of Jerome, Chrysostom, and Augustine, monasteries were established in Syria, Palestine, and Egypt. The same Fathers are quoted as advocating the worship of the reliques of the martyrs. Chrysostom speaks of daily miracles wrought by them, and exhorts his hearers to join themselves to their coffins, for their very bones and tombs overflowed with blessings. Basil says that whoever touches the reliques of the martyrs acquires some share of their sanctity; and Jerome says that in their 'vile dust and



ashes' there is a great manifestation of signs and wonders. CHAP. XII.  
 In the time of Justin Martyr, only fifty years after the apostles, the consecrated elements in the Eucharist were carried to the absent, and soon became the source of much superstition. In the time of Tertullian and Cyprian, the communicants took the consecrated bread to their houses, and locked it in boxes as a divine treasure, sometimes to expel ghosts from haunted houses, or as an amulet to protect travellers from all dangers both by sea and land. Anointing with oil, worshipping images, praying for the dead, and many other superstitions still existing in the Church of Rome, are advocated by these Fathers. It may seem an advantage to the Church of Rome to find its customs allowed to be of so great antiquity. But Middleton answers that the question raised is not antiquity, but truth. If these customs are not found in Holy Scripture, not appointed by Christ or His apostles, it matters nothing to Protestants from what century they were derived. If, on the authority of the Fathers, we are to receive the miracles of the fourth century, on the same authority we must receive their superstitions, which, as Protestants, we have rejected.

Middleton shows, from a picture of the Christianity of the third century drawn by St. Cyprian, that the supposition of the Church of the first three centuries being either pure or perfect is altogether a delusion. He cannot understand the anxiety of some divines to join the authority of the primitive Church to that of the Holy Scriptures. He calls it an impertinence to add the authority of later writers to that of inspired apostles. Dr Waterland, for instance, never mentions the Scriptures without joining with them antiquity. He calls the first three centuries the golden age of Christianity, and supposes it impossible that the writers of that time could have misunderstood the Scriptures. Middleton says that this ascribing authority to antiquity is in flat contradiction to the principles of the Reformation, and dangerous to the interests of the Protestant religion. In the Church of England, the semblance of this principle was maintained, but not the reality. In the time of Henry VIII., the Reformers had not the power to make all the changes that they wished to make. They went further in the next reign, but they

Scripture and  
antiquity.

CHAP. XII. had to satisfy the prejudices of the clergy by trying to find a sanction for all their proceedings in the ancient Fathers. In the reign of Mary, when these Reformers had to be martyrs, they still strove to reconcile their doctrines with those of Chrysostom, Ambrose, Hilary, and Augustine. Under Elizabeth, the bishops were disposed for a more thorough Reformation; but the Queen, wishing to moderate the prejudices of the Roman Catholic party, kept up a semblance of the old religion. Both parties appealed to the Fathers, but the Reformation was a thorough departure from antiquity. In the next two reigns, the principles of the Church of Rome found more favour at court; and some Churchmen, partly out of hatred to the Puritans, began to talk of a reconciliation with Rome. They made such a representation of Protestant doctrines as might induce moderate Roman Catholics to join in the communion of the Church of England. This failed; yet many Churchmen have entertained the delusive hope that, by following the Fathers, they might find a ground for the unity of the Christian Church. The legitimate result has been conversion to the Church of Rome. The Reformation cannot stand, if any authority is to be added to that of the Holy Scriptures. These principles were mainly set forth in the 'Introductory Discourse,' which was published by itself, and raised a controversy before the rest of the work appeared.

Church of  
England does  
not follow an-  
tiquity.

The 'Free  
Inquiry.'

The 'Free Inquiry' was published in 1749, two years after the 'Introductory Discourse.' Middleton says that, in the first fifty years after the apostles, there is no trace of any pretence to the power of working miracles. The extraordinary gifts of the apostolic age seem to have been withdrawn. We read of extraordinary illuminations and visions, but these were personal. They were not miracles openly performed in the Church for the conviction of unbelievers. Before the end, however, of the second century, miracles again begin. Justin Martyr knew many persons in Rome out of whom devils had been exorcised by the name of Jesus. Irenæus speaks of it as a thing quite common that persons were raised from the dead. Theophilus of Antioch says that many devils cast out by Christians were the same devils that inspired the heathen poets. Tertullian chal-



lenges the heathen magistrates to bring before their tribunals any demoniac, and the Christians would exorcise the devil and make him confess that he was the devil. Minutius Felix says that the devils, when cast out by Christians, confess that they are Saturn, Serapis, Jupiter, and other deities worshipped by the Pagans. Origen says that Christians could drive away devils, perform cures, and foresee future events. To the same facts Cyprian, Arnobius, Lactantius, and indeed all the Fathers of the first three centuries, bear witness.

All this seems evidence against Middleton's theory; but, he says, we are to take notice that none of these Fathers profess that they themselves had the power to work miracles. They only say, generally, that the power was possessed by others—by women, boys, and simple Christians. Origen says that the casting out of devils was generally performed by laymen. William Whiston inferred from this, that it was appropriated to the meaner sort of Christians, and not practised by the clergy. But to whatever condition the miracle-workers belonged, it is certain, Middleton says, that they were always charged with fraud. According to Lucian, any crafty juggler that went over to the Christians was sure to grow rich by making a prey of their simplicity. Celsus calls the Christian wonder-workers 'mere vagabonds and common cheats, who played tricks at fairs and markets, or wherever they saw a set of raw fellows, slaves, or fools.'

Simple Christians could cast out devils.

The Fathers, Middleton says, on whose testimony we have these records, were certainly men of piety, but this is all that can be said for them. One of the extraordinary gifts bestowed on the primitive Church, according to Justin Martyr, was that of expounding the Holy Scriptures. Some of Justin's own expositions are given as the first specimens of the fruits of this gift. Among these is quoted the fantastical passage about all things in the world being made in the form of the cross, and about Christ's cross being adumbrated by all the bits of wood mentioned in the Old Testament, including the sticks that Jacob used to separate Laban's sheep. Irenæus says that Jesus lived till He was fifty years old, and told His disciples many wonderful things about the millennium, when there would be wonder-

The piety of the Fathers greater than their wisdom.

## CHAP. XII.

ful vines and grapes, and an unspeakable quantity of wine made from the grapes. Clement of Rome, and nearly all the Fathers after him, allege the history of the phoenix as a proof of the Resurrection—saying, that this bird was created expressly by God to refute the unbelief of the Gentiles. The learned Dodwell, one of the greatest admirers of the Fathers, describes their reasoning as ‘loose, sophistical, and declamatory, far short of the solidity of the moderns, who excel them not only in philosophy and learning, but in the knowledge of antiquity, and even of their own language.’

No real miracles in the post-Apostolic Church.

The miracles said to have been wrought in the first centuries, are reckoned to have been mere pretences. The Fathers, on whose authority they rest, were too credulous to be received as proper witnesses. The miracles were the same in kind as were wrought by the Pagans. According to Irenæus, it was quite common for persons to be raised from the dead. According to Jerome, Hilarion the monk used to heal the wounds of husbandmen and shepherds with consecrated oil. The same things were done publicly in the temples of Esculapius, where columns of brass were erected to express the gratitude of the persons cured. Irenæus says that in his time the gift of tongues was still in the Church; yet, according to Dr. Cave’s rendering of the words, Irenæus himself had to learn the rude and barbarous dialect of the Gauls before he could do any good among them.

Answers to the ‘Free Inquiry.’

There were many answers to the ‘Free Inquiry,’ but it was difficult to prove anything concerning the miracles of the primitive Church. Dr. John Chapman, Archdeacon of Sudbury, made Middleton’s book the subject of a Charge to the clergy of his archdeaconry. From the nature of Christianity, and the state of the Pagan world, he thought it highly probable that miracles continued during the second and third centuries. Paganism was still strong, and the miracles said to be wrought by the deities were believed by the people. Christianity, therefore, required the support of miracles as evidence of its divine authority. The Christians challenged the Pagans to examine their miracles, and yet no one could ever prove that there was any deception.

Thomas Church, Vicar of Battersea, devoted a large treatise to the refutation of Middleton. His arguments were, that the Fathers were worthy of credit, and that all educated men believe there were miracles in the first three centuries. If miracles had ceased after the apostles, some notice would have been taken of such a fact by the primitive Fathers. Had the Christian miracle-workers been common jugglers, they would not have imposed on so many wise men. William Dodwell, Rector of Shottesbrook, in Berkshire, wrote a large treatise against Middleton's 'Free Inquiry.' He argued that the Church required the continuance of miracles till it was properly established, and therefore miracles must have existed for at least three centuries. The silence of many of the Fathers respecting miracles is accounted for by the consideration that they wrote for their brethren and their converts, who did not require to be told of miracles. The great object with the multitude who wrote against Middleton was to prove the primitive miracles by arguments which would not avail to prove the modern miracles of the Church of Rome. William Parker, a fellow of Balliol, in a sermon preached before the University of Oxford, rested the distinction on the difference of time and circumstances. In the primitive Church, the Christians were persecuted and their apologies not read, therefore they required miracles. But now, Christianity depends on rational arguments, and as God does nothing in vain, miracles are not necessary.\*

Middleton wrote many other tracts, the scope of which was to prove that the Scriptures are not infallibly inspired. Against Sherlock, on prophecy, he maintained that the prophecies quoted by the evangelists in the New Testament as single prophecies, were understood to be so by the evangelists. The real answer to Collins is, therefore, to admit that the writers of the New Testament were not infallible. This is shown by many other cases, where the apostles made

The Scriptures not infallible.

\* This sermon was also preached at Whitehall in the Chapel Royal. The same argument was used by Alexander Jephson, Rector of Craike, Durham, in a sermon preached in Camberwell Church. Dr. Middleton's book seems to have created a panic

among the clergy similar to what Bishop Colenso's writings have done in our day. Among his opponents were not merely orthodox Churchmen like Stebbing and Wesley, but even such heretics as Dr. Sykes and John Jackson.

CHAP. XII. mistakes, and where the evangelists contradict each other. They were not infallible in their life, their conduct, or sermons, and we have no ground for assuming that any infallibility was given them when they wrote the Scriptures.

In the controversies reviewed in this chapter we have met the names of nearly all the chief theological writers of the first half of the eighteenth century. Several of them, however, require further notice, either as representing some particular opinions, or as taking part in other controversies. Among the bishops we have some familiar names, as Wake, Potter, Fleetwood, Atterbury, Gibson, Sherlock, Hare, and Wilson.

Archbishop  
Wake.

In 1716, William Wake, Bishop of Lincoln, succeeded Tenison as Archbishop of Canterbury. Wake's first appearance as a writer was in the Roman Catholic controversy, in the time of the second James. 'While still a young man he encountered the famous Bossuet, Bishop of Condom, afterwards of Meaux. Bossuet's 'Exposition of the Doctrine of the Catholic Church' was written to convert Protestants, and was supposed to represent the more repulsive doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church in a milder form than was agreeable to truth. It had the sanction of the Archbishop of Rheims, and of nine other French bishops, but it did not meet the approbation of the Sorbonne, and the University of Louvain pronounced it scandalous and pernicious. Wake called his answer 'An Exposition of the Doctrine of the Church of England.' He did not believe that Bossuet had fairly represented the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church. Whatever might be the interpretation of the decrees of Trent, he held it for certain that the doctrines of some of the chief Roman doctors, as well as of the missals and breviaries, were not those set forth by Bossuet as the doctrine of the Church. Wake, however, was not to complain if the doctrine of the Church of Rome could be shown to be essentially the same as that of the Reformed Churches. The first inference would be that they were all agreed in essentials, and that what the Church of Rome had in addition was unnecessary, if not positively injurious. For instance, both Protestants and Catholics admit that God alone is to be worshipped, and yet in the Church of Rome there is

also the worship of saints. Both acknowledge that there is but one mediator, and yet the Church of Rome introduces many mediators. Both admit one propitiatory sacrifice, and yet the mass is reckoned a daily propitiation. Even supposing that Bossuet is right in his interpretation of the authorised doctrine, there is the whole life and practice of the actual Church against him. Many Catholic doctors differ from Bossuet in those very doctrines to which Protestants object, but we do not find their books in the 'Index.' On the authority of the Church, which is really the primary question, Wake thought that the Church of England escaped the objections that fell heavy on other Protestants. He quoted our Article about the Church having authority in controversies of faith. He admitted that we take the canon of Scripture solely on the authority of the Church; and though he maintained that any particular Church might err, yet he believed that the Church universal would never fall from the faith. The voice of this Church universal was to be found in a General Council in which all Christians would be represented. Those who answered Wake showed that the authority he claimed for the Church had evaporated before he reached the end of his explanations.

Against  
Bossuet.

In the rest of Dr. Wake's writings there is nothing remarkable, excepting of course his great work on Convocation, in answer to Atterbury. In a 'Commentary on the Church Catechism,' and a volume of sermons, he adopts a moderate theology, saying a great deal of reason and faith, but never trying to determine where the one should end and the other begin. On the Church and the sacraments he repeats some familiar commonplaces, which if subjected to examination would fail to maintain their consistency. In an essay on the use of the Fathers, prefixed to a translation of some of their epistles, he puts forth the usual platitudes about the primitive Church and the value of antiquity.

On the  
Church Cate-  
chism.

In his early years, and especially in the Convocation controversy, Archbishop Wake had given promise of being a pillar on the side of the more rational divines. This hope, however, was never realised. In the House of Lords he opposed all measures for toleration and the repeal of the

Becomes an  
illiberal di-  
vine.

CHAP. XII. Corporation and Test Acts. He even tried to introduce a bill for the 'Suppression of Blasphemy and Prophaneness,' which was really aimed at his old friends Clarke and Whiston. The great public act of Wake's life was his correspondence with the doctors of the Sorbonne for the union of the Gallican Church with the Church of England. The French doctors were to make several concessions, none of which touched doctrine. The movement was mainly supported by the Jansenists, who could have but little fault to find with our Articles. It was frustrated by the Jesuits. To join England was to separate from Rome.

Archbishop  
Potter.

John Potter, who succeeded Wake in the primacy, had no tendency to anything like originality. He was industrious and prudent—a fair representative of the men who have generally been made bishops in the Church of England. He had distinguished himself in his youth as a scholar, and under the patronage of Tenison had found his first preferment. For twenty-seven years he had presided over the see of Oxford, and for ten years he was Archbishop of Canterbury. Potter's theological works belong mostly to the time when he was Regius Professor of Divinity in Oxford, and they scarcely touch on any other subject but that of the authority of the Church and the Fathers. He was a High Churchman of a moderate type. He took the Scripture as the only rule of faith, and the Fathers of the first centuries as the best interpreters of Scripture. He did not ascribe to Fathers or Councils any authority, but he reckoned that those which were nearest the apostolic times were most likely to be the best judges of apostolic doctrine. The principle was carefully laid down, with the limitations that had been marked out by the Reformers. Its special application was in the controversy with the Church of Rome. On all questions in which the Church of England differed from the Roman Catholics, our Reformers said that antiquity was on their side. Even this has been disputed by liberal divines, as for instance by Conyers Middleton. But whether right or wrong, this was the whole extent of the Anglican appeal to antiquity. The Bible alone has authority, and the Fathers are helps to understand its meaning.

On Episco-  
pacy.

One volume of Archbishop Potter's works contains his



Latin prelections in Divinity. He defends with the ordinary arguments the ordinary doctrine of the plenary inspiration of the sacred writings. Another volume contains a treatise on Church Government. In this we have nothing but a repetition of the doctrine of Episcopacy as it was taught by Hall and Bilson, without any consciousness of the importance of what had been said against it both by the Puritans and the Roman Catholics. The Church is defined as a visible society. To this it is added immediately that the name Church does often signify all Christians, wheresoever dispersed throughout the world.\* This society, Potter says, being appointed by God, there is an obligation on all men to become members of it. How this visible society, which has the divinely appointed government, is identical with the dispersed Christians who belong to many different societies, is never explained. It is, however, proved from St. Cyprian and from Tertullian that a man must be in the Church in order to be saved. Augustine, too, is quoted, declaring that whosoever is separated from the Catholic Church—that is, the one visible society—is separated from Christ, and has the wrath of God abiding upon him. Potter afterwards admits that a man may be saved though not in the visible Church.† The Church is a visible society because Christ appointed governors in it; yet the Church of Rome, through which we receive these governors, is not that society. It is never explained how the Church of Rome can be excluded from the Catholic Church, or if included how the Catholic Church remains one visible society.

Potter's sermons and charges are all of a plain and practical character, touching only occasionally even on the questions that were agitated in his day. In one sermon he alludes to Shaftesbury's doctrine of disinterested virtue. He says, it is vain to ask self-denial without regard to our present or future interest. We cannot seek the glory of God at the expense of self-annihilation. God has planted in us a desire for happiness and perfection. To follow what is contrary to these is to aim at something which is contrary to our very nature. On the subject of reason, Potter could never get out of the circle in which the chief divines of his

Against  
Shaftesbury  
on virtue.

\* Vol. ii., p. 4.

† *Ib.*, p. 21.

CHAP. XII. time continually revolved. They were to use their understanding, and yet renounce their understanding. The Christian religion was declared to be a reasonable religion, but where it did not commend itself to reason we were simply to believe.\*

Gives a dark picture of his times.

In his Charges, Potter draws one of those awful pictures of the prevalence of scepticism and infidelity which are frequent among Church writers of his time. The scepticism generally included a great deal of what would now be reckoned healthy inquiry. The doctrines of Christianity, he said, had been demonstrated to the meanest capacity with such eloquence and perspicuity as no age or nation could parallel; and yet vice and profaneness, scepticism and irreligion, were becoming 'more insolent and barefaced than ever.'† He marked, too, another sign of the degeneracy of the times. Men holding Arian or semi-Arian views were trying to unite all Christians into one visible Church. We are now to be united with heretics instead of avoiding them. We are to tolerate their heresies instead of casting them out. 'Some,' he adds, 'have so far proceeded in the general scheme of comprehension, or rather confusion, as to assert that all sorts of error except those which relate to practice are innocent and unblamable.'‡ Further on, in evident reference to Hoadly, Clarke, and Sykes, Potter continues: 'We must not, therefore, wonder to hear it affirmed that, in order to be justified before God, there is no need of anything more than to act agreeably to our present inward persuasion, or in other terms, sincerity.' To bring about this union, men are to subscribe all Articles so far as they are agreeable to Scripture, 'even when the sense is notoriously repugnant both to the natural signification of the words and to the manifest intention of those who wrote them.' Potter's orthodoxy reached its climax in a subsequent Charge, in which he declared the impossibility of any distinction being made between virtue and vice without an external revelation.

Bishop Fleetwood.

William Fleetwood, Bishop of St. Asaph and afterwards of Ely, is now chiefly known for his 'Essay on Miracles.' He belonged to the order of Whig bishops, but he was not chargeable with any special heresy. He defended the Revo-

\* Vol. i., p. 24.

† Ib., p. 268.

‡ Ib., p. 284.



lution, and, like Hoadly, was a zealous advocate of the right of the subject to resist evil rulers. 'Christianity,' he said, 'did not teach any servile submission to injustice, or put men in any worse condition as to civil government than they were in before.' These principles were advocated in a preface to four sermons,\* which was condemned by the House of Commons in 1712, as 'malicious and factious,' and ordered to be burned by the hands of the common hangman. Bishop Fleetwood defended Hoadly's 'Preservative,' in that part where it is maintained that a Roman Catholic is not excluded from the throne of England simply on account of his religion, but because his religion involves principles that are dangerous to the liberties of the people. In a treatise called 'The Reasonable Communicant,' he advocates a moderate and for the most part a rational view of the Eucharist. He also had a share in the controversy begun by the Nonjurors about the validity of lay baptism. This was a question of considerable interest to those who believed there was a special virtue in baptism, and that this virtue could only be communicated by the regular clergy. There were persons still living who had been baptized by Presbyterians before the restoration of the bishops. The Nonjurors re-baptized them, but without any authority from the Church. Bishop Fleetwood showed that the Church of England never denied the validity of lay baptism. The subject was discussed in the Conference at Hampton Court, when King James wished to pass an ordinance that none but the lawful minister should baptize. The bishops, however, maintained that baptism by laymen had always been valid in the Christian Church. A change was made in the rubric directing that private baptism should be administered by the 'lawful minister,' but nothing was decided concerning lay baptism. There is no service in the Prayer Book for a second baptism of those baptized by laymen, and every writer on the subject from 1660 to 1700 is against it. The argument rests on the supposed necessity of ordination by a bishop to constitute a valid ministry, and that to it alone was given the commission to baptize all nations. Fleetwood's answer is that baptism

CHAP. XII.

On Civil  
Liberty.On Lay Bap-  
tism.

\* The sermons were on the deaths of Mary, the Duke of Gloucester, and William, and the Accession of Queen Anne.

CHAP. XII. by laymen was always reckoned valid, and that the Church of England never even by the Act of Uniformity denied the validity of ministerial acts in non-episcopal churches.

On Miracles.

The 'Essay on Miracles' is in the form of a dialogue, and, like dialogues generally, it is rather tedious. A miracle is defined as 'An extraordinary operation of God against the known course and settled laws of nature, appealing to the senses.' The definition of Hobbes is also accepted — 'A work of God, beside His operation by the way of nature, ordained in the creation.' To be properly miraculous, a thing must not only be new, strange, or prodigious; it must also be out of, against, or beside the common course of nature. It is supposed that this distinction will keep the discussion clear. Fleetwood's point is that every true miracle is wrought by God, or by those delegated by Him. The order of nature being God's work, He alone can change it. A man, therefore, who says he has a divine commission, and works miracles to prove it, is to be believed. It is objected that Pharaoh's magicians wrought miracles, which were equally out of the course of nature with those of Moses, and like them could be tested by the senses. The answer is that the first three miracles of the magicians were really wrought by God. They failed in the fourth, and by this God taught them that miracles were not done by magic, but by divine power. Jesus wrought miracles to prove His commission, and therefore His doctrine must be true. Fleetwood calls it a begging of the question to say that the miracles must be tested by the doctrine, and not the doctrine by the miracles. False Christs may show signs and wonders, but they can only deceive the unwary. Pretended miracles can be detected. It can always be shown whether 'the known course of nature and its laws be not subverted and suspended.'

Hoadly writes against the 'Essay on Miracles.'

One of Hoadly's first efforts was an answer to the 'Essay on Miracles.' He disputed Fleetwood's position that none but God could work miracles. Angels, for instance, might have power to do what to us was essentially a miracle. Hoadly did not give any abstract definition of a miracle, but asked at once that we understand by miracles such works as those of Moses and Jesus. He thought it quite possible that such works might be done by the power or wisdom of beings

superior to man, and yet no law of nature be either subverted or suspended. Miracles, therefore, though they may be one argument for the truth of Christianity, cannot be the sole argument. The doctrine must be such as approves itself to the human conscience. Many years after this was written, Hoadly took occasion in another work to commend 'the excellent spirit of Bishop Fleetwood,' who instead of taking offence at his criticism did him a 'very considerable piece of service.'

Francis Atterbury was made Bishop of Rochester in 1713. We have already spoken of the part he took in the Convocation controversy. He was for many years the active leader of the High Church party. It was chiefly under his guidance that the Lower House carried on its long warfare against the latitudinarian bishops. He is generally described as vain and ambitious. The history of his life shows him to have been a fiery, restless, but determined man. Before his appearance in the Convocation business, he had written against Bentley in the great Phalaris controversy; and had also defended the Lutheran Reformation against a Roman Catholic controversialist.

Atterbury's theology is purely that of his party, and therefore destitute of originality. The arguments of his sermons will not bear criticism. He neither relies on authority nor on private judgment, but turns to the one when the other fails. It was the fashion at this time for every party to preach up reason; but after reason was exalted, they only went with it so far as it suited them. Atterbury says, 'The Church of England deals openly, and fairly brings all her doctrines to the light, and invites all her members to search and inquire into them. She desires nothing more than to be tried at the bar of unbiassed reason, and to be concluded by its sentence.\*' Against the Church of Rome, the Church of England had no alternative but to take this position. No sooner, however, does reason begin to exercise itself than it is told to retire. Christianity is a mystery, and God never designed to explain mysteries. 'This had been to rob us of the reward due to believing, and to take away the proper test and trial of sincere and ingenuous minds.†' Another instance of this want of insight into

\* Sermons, vol. iii., p. 29. Ed. 1734.

† *Ib.*, p. 268.

CHAP. XII. principles is in a sermon on 'The Miraculous Propagation of the Gospel.' The argument is, that the apostles must have been endowed with miracles because Christianity is opposed to the interests and the wishes of men. But for the external evidence, no man would have become a Christian.

His Sermon on the disadvantage of virtue.

The doctrine of one of Atterbury's sermons was the cause of considerable controversy. Something may have been due to an unguarded or exaggerated mode of statement. But coming from a High Churchman, at a time when most divines were eloquent on the natural rewards of virtue and religion, Atterbury's doctrine was startling. The text of the sermon was, 'If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable.' The preacher said that if this life be the only one, men are more miserable than beasts, and the best men are often the most miserable. He admitted that the letter of the text did not warrant the whole of this conclusion. But he applied it generally to the Christian life. The beasts follow nature, and are under no checks from reason or reflection. They feel no inward reproaches for transgressing the bounds of their duty and the laws of their nature. They have not that fear of death to mar their enjoyment, which makes the mere natural man all his lifetime subject to bondage. The best men fear most to taste fully and freely the pleasures of life. To mortify the deeds of the body is no small part of virtue. A virtuous man must even avoid many innocent pleasures lest he fall into temptation. He must often become a byword among men of wit and pleasure. Some Christian virtues, as humility and meekness, invite injuries. Good and pious persons are most exposed to the troubles of life. If, therefore, in this life only they have hope, they are of all men most miserable. This is the great argument for a future life. There must be a compensation for the sufferings of this.

Opposed by Hoadly.

Hoadly addressed a letter to Atterbury on the doctrine of this sermon. The sense of the text, he said, was missed, and the argument founded on it altogether false. The apostle was speaking of the martyrs who had sacrificed this life for truth. If there was no future life, then were they of all men most miserable. But in ordinary times, and in

normal circumstances, the Christian life is blessed. Wisdom has length of days in her right hand, and in her left riches and honour. Virtue is the imitation of God, but vice ruins the health, takes away all peace of mind, and does injury to the temporal estate. It is one of the best arguments for Christianity that it inculcates what is good for man in the highest sense, both in the life that now is and in that which is to come.

Atterbury answered with some sharpness that the apostle was arguing for a future state. His argument was that all suffering for righteousness, all struggles after goodness, are lost if there be no future life. The happiness of beasts over men, and of bad men over good men, was maintained only on the supposition of there being no future state. It is not said that the best men would always be, but that they often are, the most miserable; and the chief proof of this is taken from times of persecution. Atterbury said that he had never denied that the tendency of virtue was to present happiness, and of vice to misery. In the sermon he had made this limit to the comparison—‘as far as happiness or misery are to be measured from pleasing or painful sensations.’ If there were no future life, these would be esteemed the measure of happiness or misery.

Atterbury's  
Defence.

When Wake succeeded to the primacy, Thomas Gibson was made Bishop of Lincoln. In 1723 he was transferred to London. Over this see he presided for a quarter of a century. Gibson's early works were all connected with antiquities. After he was raised to the episcopate, he devoted his time almost exclusively to the immediate duties of his office. He had taken part in the controversy between the two Houses of Convocation, defending the side of the bishops, which recommended him to the patronage of Tenison. He bore through life the character of a conscientious, industrious man, but he made no further progress in the direction of liberalism. He displeased the latitudinarians by preventing the amiable Thomas Rundle from being made Bishop of Gloucester; and he lost the primacy by his opposition to Walpole's efforts to repeal the Test and Corporation Acts, and to relieve the Quakers from the payment of tithes and ecclesiastical dues.

Bishop Gib-  
son.

CHAP. XII. Bishop Gibson's life and character belong more to the history of the Church than to the history of ideas. He was a moderate Churchman, and claimed to be a rational theologian. He took a part in the Deist controversy, but did not profess to contribute anything original. His 'Pastoral Letters' were meant for the general public, and were an effort to make popular the chief arguments that had been urged by other writers in defence of the Christian evidences. He repeated the common arguments for the necessity of reason and against the sufficiency of reason; and he connected, as most of the evidence writers did, the depravity of the times with the prevalence of a spirit of inquiry.

His 'Pastoral Letters.'

Answered by Matthew Tindal.

The 'Pastoral Letters' were answered by Matthew Tindal in 'Two Addresses to the Inhabitants of the Great Cities of London and Westminster.' Tindal rejoiced in the freedom of speech, which Gibson called licentiousness. Through this freedom, many doctrines, he said, once eagerly upheld, were now abandoned by all parties. He thought it too great a compliment to unbelief to say that its progress was due to liberty of speech. As to immorality, Tindal retorted that the vices then prevalent were the vices of orthodox Christians. There were but few of the inmates of Newgate who were not ready to cry 'High Church for ever!' Tindal repudiated the inference that the advocates of reason wished to set aside revealed religion; adding, that what Gibson called revealed religion, set aside reason. Christians, he said, as well as Pagans, forsake the light of reason, and run into superstition. He quoted Gibson as saying, that if to embrace revelation men were to quit their reason, that would be a strong prejudice against revelation; and yet Gibson ascribed the errors of all religions to the insufficiency of reason.

Bishop Sherlock.

Thomas Sherlock, son of the famous William Sherlock, succeeded Gibson in the see of London. He was, in many respects, the representative Churchman of his day. It might be difficult to harmonize all his positions, but it is just this which makes him represent in himself the spirit which then reigned in the Church of England. He was a High Churchman, and yet an advocate of reason; an enemy to the Dissenters, and yet a friend to comprehension. There



were great thoughts in Sherlock's mind ; but his writings leave the sense that his intellect was impeded by conditions and circumstances. He made suggestions which were fruitful in other men's hands, while his own ingenuity in avoiding the conclusions to which they led is often perverse.

We have already noticed the part which Sherlock took, both against Hoadly and the Deists. His doctrine of the civil magistrate's duty in religion often ran parallel with Hoadly's ; and yet he was Hoadly's chief opponent. He wrote against Collins on Prophecy, but he gave up the direct application of single prophecies to single events ; which was, in the main, the ground on which Collins rested his arguments. He wrote against Woolston on Miracles, but his work had so much of a lawyer's special pleading, that it was probably the work which suggested Dr. Johnson's famous remark, that the apostles were once a year tried for forgery and acquitted. It was a remark of Sherlock's, which furnished Tindal with the text for his great work on natural religion, in which he was supposed to be undermining revelation. It is in his connection with the Deist controversy that Sherlock most reflects the spirit of the theology of his day. He defended Christianity, because it was a republication of natural religion. So far, the Deists were willing to be considered Christians ; but no sooner has Sherlock said that Christianity is a republication of natural religion, than he adds, that it also reveals doctrines unknown to the religion of nature or reason. It is maintained, in the sermon from which Tindal quoted, that man, being a sinner, requires to know something of deliverance from sin beyond what can be learned from nature. The same subject is again discussed in another sermon on the words of Simon — 'To whom shall we go but unto Thee : Thou hast the words of eternal life ?' If nature had been sufficient, there would have been no necessity for the revelation of Christ. As a matter of fact, the heathen, who had only natural light, were in great darkness. They had idolatry and superstition in abundance, but no just ideas or principles of religion. St. Paul showed that the heathen had just knowledge enough to make them without excuse. When they knew

CHAP. XII. God, they glorified Him not as God. Whatever theories we may have about the sufficiency of natural light, it is certain that in the Pagan world nature wanted help 'to disentangle herself from the bonds and fetters in which she was held.' A religion for a sinner must contain something more than natural duties. It must say something of deliverance. Here we see the necessity and fitness of the scheme of satisfaction by the death of Christ. As to how this satisfaction was made, Sherlock admits a mystery; but it was not necessary for reconciliation that the mode of it be within the reach of our understanding. The connection between the sufferings of Christ and the sins of the world is beyond our finite capacities. There were doubtless reasons why Christ should suffer, but they are not revealed. Because of these reasons Christianity is said to be founded on natural religion.\*

Bishop Hare. Francis Hare, Bishop of Chichester, had given more promise of a liberal tendency than any of the bishops who were not openly on the side of the Latitudinarians. In the controversy with Hoadly, he had taken the High Church ground as to the constitution of the visible Church; but in the tract for which he was best known, he exposes, in good-natured irony, the feebleness of the foundation of High Church theology. This tract was called 'The Difficulties and Discouragements which attend the Study of the Scriptures.' Its real object was to vindicate free inquiry into the history and meaning of the sacred writings. It incurred the censure of the Lower House of Convocation, and was classed with the sceptical works that were supposed to be under-

\* In a letter to the clergy and people of London, on the occasion of the great earthquake, Sherlock gives the following dark picture of the times, tracing the immorality to infidelity, and finding the whole to end in popery. 'Blasphemy, and horrid imprecations domineer in our streets, and poor wretches are every hour wantonly and wickedly calling for damnation on themselves and others, which may be (it is much to be feared) too near them already. Add to this the lewdness and debauchery that prevail amongst the lowest people, which keeps them idle, poor, and miserable, and renders them incapable of getting an honest livelihood for themselves and families: the number of lewd houses which trade in these vices, and which must, at any rate, be paid for, making sin convenient to them, and it will account for villanies of another kind, which are growing so fast as to be insupportable and incurable; for where is the wonder that persons so abandoned should be ready to commit all sorts of outrage and violence? A city without religion can never be a safe place to dwell in.'



mining the foundation of Christianity. The tract was in the form of a letter to 'A Young Clergyman.' It is necessary, Dr. Hare says, to study the Scriptures in the original languages; but when this is done, we have made only small progress. There comes then the uncertainty of versions, and the difficulty of knowing when language is to be understood figuratively or literally. It is not enough to read the Old Testament in Hebrew—we must also be able to read it in Greek. The Greek version is known to be very incorrect, but it is always from it that the quotations are made in the New Testament. It is more difficult to understand the writings of the Apostles than the works of Plato or Demosthenes. The idioms are very strange. We are ignorant of many Jewish customs, and of many traditions, opinions, and sects that existed when the apostles lived.

Hare said, that there was little hope of the most persevering man overcoming the difficulties in the way of the study of the Scriptures; and after the most earnest labours, there is really nothing gained. The orthodox faith does not depend on a critical knowledge of the Scriptures. The old Fathers had very little of this kind of knowledge. They knew that figurative and mystical meanings were of far more importance than the literal sense. All the articles of the orthodox faith were settled during the first six centuries, when scarcely any of the clergy could read Hebrew. They depended entirely on the Greek versions. In fact, those who knew Hebrew were very rarely orthodox. If, like them, we strive to get the real meaning of the Scriptures by the help of learning, we are sure to fall into heresy. Catholic truth relies on tradition, and not on the Bible. It is altogether independent of any proofs that may be drawn from Scripture. It rests on the authority of the Fathers, who understood the Scriptures figuratively and mystically; and on the authority of orthodox bishops, who were ignorant of the original languages, but who transmitted the Catholic faith to each other in an unbroken succession. It is very unorthodox, and for a young clergyman not at all 'safe,' to study the Scriptures critically. It is much wiser to keep to the traditions of the Church. We have the whole Catholic faith in the Articles and Liturgy of the

On the difficulties which attend the study of the Scriptures.

CHAP. XII. Church of England. With these we ought to be content, and not trouble ourselves about the meaning of the Scriptures. In fact, Biblical studies do a great deal of harm. They engender disputes, and so disturb the peace of the Church. It is the character of all heretics that they set up for 'a free and impartial search into the literal sense of the Scriptures.' They raise questions about the origin of the canon, and then they conclude some passages to be interpolations. They set aside arguments for the Trinity from the Old Testament as trifling; and they take literally prophecies which were only intended to be taken mystically. There is no chance but heresy for any man who studies the Bible and forsakes the traditions of the Church. And as a heretic, too, he will be treated. Against such a one, all the rules of charity are to be violated. If Samuel Clarke and William Whiston were condemned without mercy, how much sorer punishment awaits him who makes the Scriptures his study? William Whiston is 'a madman, and a rank Arian;' and Samuel Clarke, notwithstanding 'his piety and learning, his sweet, modest, inoffensive, and obliging behaviour,' is regarded as a dangerous heretic.

Bishop Wilson.

The writings of Thomas Wilson, Bishop of Sodor and Man, are all of a practical character. In an age of strife, his days were spent in works of charity and piety. Wilson was clearly a High Churchman; but in his tracts and sermons there is a remarkable absence of any special or definite theology. The commonly received doctrines are always assumed as a basis, but they are never in the foreground. Practical piety is always supreme. Bishop Wilson made good works of such great importance that he sometimes appears, as his Evangelical biographer\* says, to contradict 'the Article of a standing or a falling Church.' There was noticed, too, in his conduct towards those who differed from him, a spirit of toleration that did not accord with any rigid views of doctrine. He recognised good men, both in the Church of Rome and among Dissenters, and in his own diocese he cultivated a friendly intercourse with all religious parties.

His piety and orthodoxy.

The limit to Bishop Wilson's comprehensive charity was

\* Rev. Hugh Stowell.

not in his heart, which was capable of infinite goodness, but in his intellect. He had no capacity to enter into sympathy with men whose thoughts were deep, and who felt the eternal impulse to make inquiry into causes and principles. He lived in his little world of Sodor and Man, governed and governing by rubrics and canons, as if they were the ultimate of all wisdom. The Clarkes and the Hoadlys were to him, what tradition says Cerinthus was to St. John at the bath. The Church system which he established in his diocese was to him as much the centre of the universe as this earth surrounded with cycles and epicycles in the astronomy of Ptolemy. But Copernicus came to the Isle of Man, and the 'good Bishop Wilson' was in duty bound to put his works in the Index of books forbidden. CHA P. XII

The example which Bishop Wilson gave of saintly devotion is not more complete than the example he gave of how to treat what we regard as error. 'The Independent Whig,' a series of papers after the fashion of the Spectator and the Guardian, had found its way into the Isle of Man. The papers were written clearly in the interest of the Latitudinarian party in the Church. They were confessedly, in the words of the title, 'A Defence of Primitive Christianity, and of our Ecclesiastical Establishment, against the exorbitant claims of Fanatical and Disaffected Clergymen.' Nobody in the present day, who has read the papers, would think of calling them infidel or unchristian. They were very liberal for that age, and showed more logic than was common. The Lower House of Convocation were told that their claims for authority were contrary to the principles of the Reformation, and could only be consistently made by going back to the Church of Rome. Hoadly's scheme was shown to be the legitimate outcome of the English Reformation, which subjected the clergy to the authority of the civil ruler. We cannot take just so much of Popery as we like, and pass by the rest. Machiavel has shown that no government can subsist long but upon its original foundation. The clergy must either have all power or none. There is no middle way. It was shown that the Church of England was reformed and reconstituted by the State, and this against the will of the clergy. It is, therefore, pre-eminently a

'The Independent Whig.'

CHAP. XII. State Church, in which the ecclesiastical order have no authority whatever. Religion was defined as doing good. Revelation was that in the Scripture which was clear. Whatever was doubtful was not revealed. Creeds were described as useless when the appeal was to Scripture alone. It was maintained that in the Primitive Church the sacraments were administered by all Christians, whether clergy or laity. It was argued, that if ordination conferred any grace there would be some visible fruits of it. The persons ordained ought, at least, to show capacity for their work. Waterland's doctrine of the Trinity was found to be that, logically, three individual agents are one individual agent.

Condemned  
by Bishop  
Wilson.

Bishop Wilson, in the fulness of his power, issued a brief against 'The Independent Whig,' describing it as 'a most pestilent book, intended to undermine the Christian religion.' It was the beginning of that Antichrist which, St. John said, should come into the world. A copy of the book was deposited in the public library in the island. The bishop sent a messenger to seize it, and the governor imprisoned the messenger for theft. This 'primitive' zeal against heresy was about as amusing to the authors of 'The Independent Whig' as it now is to us. In a subsequent edition they repudiated the charge of seeking to undermine Christianity, which, they said, was a religion, 'not contrived by priests, but altogether founded in reason, dispensed by the All-wise God, and perfectly agreeable to the divine goodness.'

Samuel Wes-  
ley.

Samuel Wesley, rector of Epworth, in Lincolnshire, was a writer of some reputation in the beginning of the eighteenth century. But his reputation is eclipsed by the celebrity of his sons. His works are mostly in verse, and are not marked by any special theology. His life, however, belongs to history, and shows the facility with which in his day extreme Dissenters could become extreme Churchmen. His father and grandfather were both ejected in 1662, and he received his early education in a Dissenters' academy. He wrote in favour of the Revolution after he had conformed to the Established Church, and at one time he advocated Tillotson's scheme of Comprehension. But there is evidence that at least afterwards his sympathies were more with the High Church party. He wrote with some severity against

the Dissenters' academies, representing them as nurseries not merely of schism, but of disloyalty and sedition. The letter containing this representation was written after a visit to the Calves' Head Club, a society of wild political Dissenters. It was not intended for publication, and was published surreptitiously unknown to the author; but it shows that Wesley had separated from the Dissenters on political as well as on religious grounds. At the revival of Convocation, he was proctor for the diocese of Lincoln, and probably acted a part in the rebellious proceedings of the Lower House. He wrote some bitter things against the Baptists and the Quakers, and he is said, on good authority, to have been the author of the speech which the notorious Sacheverell delivered at his trial. This is sufficient evidence with what party his sympathies were, but his agreement may have been in spirit rather than in principle. He says in one place, for instance, that those who agree with the Church of England in doctrine are not schismatics.\*

John Balguy, vicar of Northallerton, has already been noticed as writing answers to Shaftesbury and Tindal. He had also a share in the Bangorian controversy. Under the name of Silvius, he took the side of Hoadly and Sykes on the innocency of error against Sherlock and Stebbing. He also published several tracts and sermons, chiefly on moral subjects. In a tract on 'The Foundation of Moral Goodness,' Balguy commends Shaftesbury for denying that the only motive to virtue is self-interest. He then condemns Shaftesbury for placing the origin of goodness in a natural instinct or moral sense. Right, he says, is something eternal. It has its foundation in reason, and is antecedent both to our instincts and to positive laws. Another tract is on 'Divine Rectitude,' particularly in respect of 'Creation and Providence.' The same morality which ought to be the guide of man is shown to be the foundation of the works of God. He does not act from caprice or arbitrary will, but according to eternal reason. We need not presume on God's mercy, for He must be just. Nor need we have any

John Balguy.  
On the 'Founda-  
tion of  
Moral Good-  
ness.'

\* It has been traditionally received by all Methodist historians, that the Rector of Epworth was a High Churchman, but Mr. Tyerman, in his 'Life of Samuel Wesley,' maintains the contrary.

CHAP. XII. superstitious fears of His justice, for it is according to right reason, and what is required by eternal fitness. Goodness in the Deity is not a mere disposition to benevolence, but a rational principle by which He is guided. In man's departure from reason is found the origin of moral evil. Consequent on this was the introduction of natural evil, which was necessary for our present probation. This eternal reason, which obliges the Deity as well as His rational creatures, is made an argument to support both natural and revealed religion. They both rest on it as their foundation, and by their agreement with it their perfect harmony is demonstrated. If Christianity depended only on authority, it might be overthrown, but while it rests on eternal reason it stands fast for ever. Concerning Shaftesbury's doctrine, Balguy said that in our present condition we require the sanctions of rewards and punishments. In reference to Tindal, he maintained that, having gone so far with reason, it was impossible to stop short without embracing revelation.

A second part of the tract on 'Divine Rectitude' was called an 'Essay on Redemption.' Balguy understood Tindal's objection to revelation to be the unreasonableness of the doctrine of redemption. He undertakes in this treatise to prove that it is in harmony with eternal reason and the fitness of things. The doctrine of redemption is maintained to be a reality. It is not explained as Sykes explained it, merely as a Jewish mode of expressing the divine forgiveness. On the other hand, the doctrine is not admitted in the popular form. Passages of Scripture, Balguy says, have been interpreted too literally, and the doctrine thereby entangled and perplexed. It is this which has given a handle to the adversaries of revelation. Redemption is defined as 'deliverance from the power and punishment of sin by the meritorious sufferings of Jesus Christ.' The ideas of satisfaction and substitution are carefully excluded. It is noticed, too, that the definition says from 'sin,' not from the 'penalty of sin.' The sufferings of Christ were 'meritorious.' He procured 'the favour of God and the indemnity of sinners.' But this was not done by vicarious punishment, or by a transfer of guilt. These ideas are not implied in that of sacrifice. The passages in Scripture

On redemption.



which seem to say this must be interpreted figuratively. Stillingfleet said that the guilt of sinful actions and the desert of punishment could not be transferred from one person to another. He added, however, that the obligation to punishment may be transferred. In this sense, the guilt of our sin was charged upon Christ, who bore the punishment. Balguy said that he was unable to understand Stillingfleet's distinction. Christ merited man's salvation by vicarious suffering, but He did not endure vicarious punishment. His death was not 'penal,' but 'premier.' The necessity of redemption is found in the fact of sin. God never acts without reasons, and His justice required an atonement. Repentance was not sufficient, for there was still sin to be forgiven. Balguy was conscious that the validity of some of his distinctions might be denied. His object was only to use such language concerning redemption as would not interfere with any of our ideas of absolute justice. We fell in Adam, yet we do not bear the punishment of Adam's sin. We only suffer the consequences, which is a 'natural grievance.' We rise in Christ, not through His bearing the punishment, but through His obtaining forgiveness by the merit of His sufferings.

Two writers, who had a part in most of the controversies of their day, Dr. Thomas Brett and William Law, belonged to the Nonjurors. Brett owed some of his preferences to Archbishop Tenison, but being convinced by Dr. Hickes that the Established Church was in schism, he retired from its communion. He was soon after promoted to the office of a bishop among the Nonjurors. Brett's publications were nearly all on the subjects that divided the High Church and the Low Church parties. He claimed for the clergy the power to forgive sins in virtue of the commission given by Christ to the apostles, and by them transmitted to their successors in the Church. The necessity of absolution by a priest for the remission of sins was proved by quotations from many ancient Fathers as well as from some writers of the Church of England. In the lay baptism controversy, Brett wrote specially against the statements of Bingham, denying that baptism by a layman was reckoned valid in the Primitive Church. Hooker, Whitgift, and

Dr. Thomas  
Brett.

CHAP. XII. many others had maintained the same position as Bingham, but Brett proves that they were all wrong. They were involved in the same darkness which had come over Lutherans, Greeks, and Roman Catholics, whose canons recognise the validity of lay baptism. Christ appointed ordinary ministers to perform the offices of His Church, but He said nothing of extraordinary ministers or cases of necessity. Brett proves also that the Lord's Supper is a proper sacrifice, and the Communion Table a proper altar. He refutes Hoadly, and shows from many English divines, including even Frith, Latimer, and Baxter, that there is a proper sacrifice in the Eucharist. He reviews Waterland without agreeing with him, but tries to suppose that the difference is rather apparent than real.

On the  
Church.

Several of Brett's tracts are on the constitution of the Church. Bishops, of course, he regarded as absolutely necessary. The Church was a visible society, consisting of governors and governed. The governors have authority to declare what is, and is not, agreeable to the laws of God. When Christ was on earth He was Bishop. The apostles were His priests, and the seventy disciples His deacons. After His ascension, the apostles were bishops, and they ordained others to the offices of priest and deacon. It is the duty of civil rulers to protect and defend the bishops and clergy in the exercise of their divinely appointed functions. Brett had also a share in the Trinitarian controversy. He found Arianism to be the root of Deism, and Deism the high road to Atheism; and he proved that all Arians and Deists were among the fools who said in their heart that there was no God. Brett, in the thickest darkness, could diagnose the smallest speck of heresy. He saw at a sale of old books the progress that Atheism had made in London. A copy of Giordano Bruno's 'Spaccio della Bestia Triomphante,' was sold for twenty-eight pounds to 'a gentleman of the Temple.' The next highest bidder was poor John Toland, who was ready to give his last penny to get the work of the Italian atheist.\*

Proposed  
union of the  
Nonjurors

Dr. Brett had a distinguished part in two important events in the history of the nonjuring sect. The first was a

\* See 'Discourses on the Trinity,' p. 9.



proposal for union with the Oriental Church, which was sent to the Patriarch of Alexandria. It was proposed that a primacy should be acknowledged in the Bishop of Jerusalem, that the primitive discipline should be restored, and that the worship of the Nonjurors should be more approximated to that of the Greek Church. Several other concessions of the same kind were proposed, and there was added a declaration of their belief wherein they agreed or did not agree with the Greek Church. The orthodox Eastern Church, which knows nothing of novelties, and has always kept the Catholic faith whole and undefiled, refused to acknowledge the nonjuring bishops as being any fragment of the Catholic Church. The other event in which Brett had a share was the schism among the Nonjurors. He introduced a new Communion Office, by which the priest could mix water with the wine, offer the sacrifice of Christ's body, invoke the Holy Ghost upon the elements, and pray for the dead in the service of the Eucharist.

CHAP. XII.

with the  
Greek  
Church.

William Law has been greatly praised by those who agree with him for the part he took in the Bangorian controversy. He also encountered the heretical bishop on the question of the Lord's Supper, describing his errors as 'gross and fundamental.' In his early years, Law was a strong High Churchman and an ardent polemic. But later in life, coming under the influence of Jacob Böhme's writings, he adopted more rational views of religion. On the accession of George I., he refused the oath of allegiance, but he remained in lay communion with the Church of England.

William Law.

The most valuable of Law's controversial writings is his answer to Mandeville's 'Fable of the Bees.' John Sterling described the first section of it as the most remarkable philosophical essay he had seen in the English language.\* Moral virtue, Law maintained, came to man in the same way that seeing or hearing comes. It is a sense with which we are endowed. The first principles of reason and morality are essential in the very constitution of the human mind. As perspective supposes an agreement in the different appearances of objects, as music supposes a perception of various sounds, so moral philosophy supposes an acknow-

On the 'Fable  
of the Bees.'

\* Preface to Maurice's Edition of Law's 'Remarks.'

CHAP. XII.            ledged difference of good and evil. It is an improvement on the common reason, as eloquence is an improvement on speech.

Against  
Tindal.

William Law could defend reason and morality against Mandeville, but he could not see that he had a fellow-labourer in Matthew Tindal. In his answer to 'Christianity as Old as Creation,' he misstates the whole question in the very first page. The rest of the book is an assault on reason. The position which Tindal was supposed to give to reason is described as pride and presumption, the cause of the fall of devils and men. The argument rests finally in a supposed incomprehensibility of the moral nature of God. We cannot be judges of His actions. We cannot say when they are right or wrong. One inference from this is, that without revelation we should not know what worship was acceptable to God.

Against  
Hoadly on the  
Eucharist,

We have no record of the history of Law's mental development, but in his later writings we find a theology essentially different from that of the Nonjuror. There are clear traces of it in the answer to Hoadly on the Lord's Supper, though it is still mixed up with some of the views peculiar to the party to which Law originally belonged. He tells Hoadly that Christ's atonement was not an act performed on the cross once for all. Christ was the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, and after the sacrifice on the cross the atonement continued to increase in virtue and power. Christ shed His blood that He might for ever do in reality that which the High Priest did in a type, when with the blood of the atonement he entered once a year into the holiest of all. Sacrifice, therefore, has not ceased. But this work of Christ has an inward meaning. All revelation in Law's hands becomes inward. Christ is the light within, the light of all men. The difference between Christians and heathens is, that the latter do not know what Christ has done or is doing for them. But they are both partakers in different degrees of the same light.

Becomes a  
disciple of  
Jacob Böhme.

Law's mystical theology, in its fully-developed forms, is to be found in his 'Spirit of Love,' 'Spirit of Prayer,' 'Way to Divine Knowledge,' 'Grounds and Reasons of Christian Regeneration,' and some other tracts. In these books, after

the example of Jacob Böhme, he makes everything to be in God, even hell and the devil. They are included in God's immensity. That same evil which exists in man in antagonism to the good in man, exists also in the very being of God. But there is going on in the divine essence a process for its extinction. Hell, the serpent, and the worm, of which we read in Scripture, are all within us. The Redeemer must, therefore, also be within us. The seed of the woman must have its ground and essence in our nature. Some persons suppose that God was angry with fallen man, and that His wrath had to be atoned with His Son's blood. Law reverses all this. He finds the wrath only in man. It is the dark root of evil. God, on the other hand, is all love, and does not need to be appeased that He may love man. The Christian religion is nothing but a manifestation of God's infinite love to man. The Son of God is come to quench the wrath that is in our fallen nature, to destroy the dark root of evil which is in us as hell itself is in God. At our first coming into life we became partakers of the light which enlighteneth every man. Baptism is a step in the process of regeneration, and this is a work not accomplished at once, but carried on by degrees till the last trace of evil be destroyed, and the perfect image of the Holy Trinity set up in the human soul.

The celebrity which Dean Swift had in England as a Dean Swift. writer on Church subjects demands for him a passing notice. His theology might be described as High Churchism without religion. It would have been a sin against prudence for him to have had any theological views different from those which best served the material or temporal interests of the Church. His theological writings, if we may dignify by that name anything he wrote, teach us little more than the tenacity with which superficial and interested men will cling to their party. In his 'Thoughts on Religion,' Swift professes to be guided only by 'impartial reason,' but his highest idea of religion was policy. People who have doubts were not to mention them. The doctrine of the Trinity might be modified in preaching to the Chinese or Mahometans; but in England, where it is believed, the people's faith must not be disturbed. The same kind of prudence is recommended

CHAP. XII. in 'A Project for the Advancement of Religion.' The Queen was to compel her domestics to attend church once a week, and to receive the sacraments at least four times in the year. They were to put on at least the appearance of temperance and chastity. This would make religion fashionable, and perhaps induce people to be upright from the hope of having the favour of their prince in this world, and of escaping eternal punishment in the world to come. The necessity for reformation in Queen Anne's days must have been urgent if there is any approach to truth in Swift's picture of the decline of religion. He says that not one of our 'people of quality or gentry seemed to act upon it. Great ministers own their disbelief of religion in ordinary discourse. The common people are ignorant and profane to a degree beyond conception.' Great officers of the army are reported to have said that they never knew more than three of their profession who believed one syllable of the gospel. In the navy it was no better. Swift undertook to refute Tindal's 'Rights of the Christian Church,' and he made a travesty of Collins's 'Discourse of Free Thinking.' The former effort consisted mainly in vilifying Tindal's moral character, and defending the divine right of episcopal government. The latter from its very nature is worse than worthless. Swift might have done more service to Christianity if he had had the morality or the sincerity of either Matthew Tindal or Anthony Collins.

His prudent  
Religion.

John Hut-  
chinson.

The theology of John Hutchinson would scarcely require notice but for the influence it had over several eminent men in the last century. Many, indeed, who were called Hutchinsonians, repudiated any connection with the founder of the party, though they adopted his views and used his arguments. Hutchinson was not a clear writer, but it is possible, by an effort, to get some idea of what he meant. He had embraced, in a very dogmatic spirit, some extraordinary doctrine about the perfection of the Scriptures, that is, the original Scriptures in the Hebrew language. He found deep meanings in recondite etymologies, and supposed that the Hebrew Bible contained all knowledge, human and divine. Hutchinson was also a zealous student of nature, and found the fact of Noah's Deluge proved by

chinks in the earth, and sea-shells on the tops of mountains. The rise of Paganism he traced to the neglect of the Hebrew language. The heathen worshipped the air instead of the Deity. The same, or similar idolatry, is very prevalent now, through our language being Pagan, and partly through the influence of Greek and Roman learning. The Bible was written to cure the madness of the naturalists and the star-gazers. Modern philosophers, as, for instance, Sir Isaac Newton and Dr. Samuel Clarke, are 'idiots in respect of languages, and in respect of things ignorant.' Newton's doctrine of a vacuum in nature with the laws of gravitation are continual subjects of condemnation; and especially a theory to which Newton seems to have given some countenance, that in nature God sometimes works without the mediation of a second cause. Hutchinson found in the Hebrew Elohim the name of the Trinity, who agreed together that if man fell, one of them would become incarnate. This Trinity has its emblem in the elements which constitute nature—light, fire, and air. The persons in the Godhead are made so distinctly three intelligent agents that Unitarians, or such as believe in the absolute personal unity of the Deity, are said not to worship the God of the Christian revelation.\*

The only other theological writer among the laity who represented any phase of religious thinking at this period is Joseph Addison. If his treatise on 'The Christian Religion' had been finished, he might have been classed with the evidence writers. But this tract is only a fragment, and is as far as possible removed from originality. Addison rests his arguments on such legends as the account of Jesus, ascribed to Pontius Pilate, and mentioned by the Fathers; on the story of Agbarus, and references to bits of gospel history supposed to be made by Pagan authors. Chalcidius mentions the star in the East, Macrobius the slaughter of the innocents, Celsus that Jesus was in Egypt, Julian that He wrought miracles, and Phlegon is a witness to the earth-

Joseph Addison on the Evidences.

\* Hutchinson's works were collected in twelve volumes by some of his followers. They consist mostly of expositions of Genesis and discourses on natural subjects. The same ideas are repeated in many forms.

CHAP. XII. quako that attended His crucifixion. Devils were exorcised by the apostles, and since that day Esculapius and the gods have ceased to converse with man.

On Faith and  
Morality.

In some of Addison's papers in the *Spectator*, we have specimens of the common sense theology that was beginning to possess the minds of serious men. The mysteries of faith were not denied, but greater prominence was given to what was clear and definite. In one paper,\* religion is said to consist of things to be believed, and things to be done. The first are those revealed in Scripture. The second consists of duties dictated by reason and natural religion. The writer says that many lay great stress on the first, and neglect the second. Others, again, build so much upon morality, that they do not pay a due regard to faith. The perfect man should excel in both. Yet the pre-eminence is given to morality. It is something fixed and eternal. It will endure when faith shall fail. A man may do more good to the world by morality without faith, than by faith without morality. All civilised nations agree in morality, though they may differ in points of faith. Immorality is worse than infidelity. A virtuous infidel may be saved, but not a vicious believer.

The final  
triumph of  
virtue.

The certainty of our being under a divine government, notwithstanding the apparent irregularities of the world, was the great religious idea which governed this age. Addison is full of it in all his works. Amid all injustice, we have traces of justice. Amid the darkness, there is still a light. Cato may say, 'This world was made for Cæsar,' yet all nature cries aloud that there is a Power above us, and that

'He must delight in virtue,  
And that which He delights in must be happy.'

A great part of the pleasures of the blessed in the future life may be the discovery of the secret and amazing plans of Providence. At present we cannot judge the ways of God. But in the life to come the whole economy will be disclosed, and those events which now seem to be evil, may declare and magnify the divine wisdom and goodness.†

\* *Spectator*, No. 459.

† *Ib.*, No. 237.

## CHAPTER XIII.

BOYLE LECTURES.—JOHN CRAIG ON EVIDENCE.—SAMUEL COL-  
LIBER.—ARCHBISHOP KING ON THE ‘ORIGIN OF EVIL.’—  
BISHOP BROWNE ON ANALOGY.—BUTLER’S ‘ANALOGY.’—  
BISHOP BERKELEY.—ANDREW BAXTER.—WARBURTON’S ‘DI-  
VINE LEGATION.’—DAVID HARTLEY.—THOMAS MORGAN.—  
THOMAS CHUBB.—‘CHRISTIANITY NOT FOUNDED ON ARGU-  
MENTS.—ANSWER BY DR. BENSON.—DEISM FAIRLY STATED.—  
LORD BOLINGBROKE.—DAVID HUME.

NOTWITHSTANDING many ardent discussions among Evidence the clergy themselves, the great religious question of writers. the first half of the eighteenth century was the controversy with the Deists. To this subject an entire chapter has already been devoted.\* The present chapter is reserved specially for the evidence writers, with those of the Deists who have not been already noticed.

The principles of the Deists began to assume a definite form before the close of the seventeenth century. They were not without some connection with the progress of natural or experimental philosophy. Books on evidences had been written before this time, but it is to the rise of the Deists that we owe nearly the whole of our evidence literature. Robert Boyle founded his lectureship in anticipation of the difficulties that might be in the way of Christianity from the discoveries of the Royal Society.

The early Boyle Lectures were standard works on the evi- Boyle Lec-  
tures.

\* Chap. xi., Vol. ii.



## CHAP. XIII.

dences of religion. The first were delivered by Richard Bentley in 1692. His subject was 'The Folly of Atheism and Deism even with respect to the Present Life.' Bentley was then only a young man, and his lectures have some of the peculiar vices of his great intellect. Many of the arguments show the influence of the new philosophy. The discoveries of Newton had put to flight the ghosts of the schoolmen, and in Bentley's hands seemed to furnish new arguments for the truth of revelation.

Bentley on  
Atheism.

The text of the first sermon was, 'The fool hath said in his heart there is no God.' This sermon indicates the kind of treatment which the Deists used to receive at the hands of Christian advocates. Bentley interpreted the text of those who call themselves Deists. They really do not believe in God, yet they use devices to escape the name of Atheists. Like the old Epicureans, they profess to believe a deity, but it is merely a profession in words. Descartes used the same device when he said the earth did not go round the sun. He wanted to escape the fate of Galileo. The 'gross folly and stupidity of Atheists is such that they even rejoice that there is no God.' Religion promises them infinite joys and boundless treasure, and yet they are willing to give up all. 'Their god is their belly, and their very hope destruction. There would be no infidels if heaven could be obtained without the necessity of a good life.'\*

Faith rational.

Bentley supposes faith to be something quite rational. If, he says, what we are required to believe be really repugnant to reason, it is right to reject it. If men could only be saved by believing that the diameter of a circle is as long as the circumference, or that the same body may be all of it in distant places at once, then the kingdom of heaven would become the inheritance only of 'fools and idiots.' But the Christian religion requires no such faith. It is so rational

\* This way of speaking of the Deists continued through the whole controversy. Here is a specimen of a later date: Dr. Evans, a High Church Oxford divine, wrote a poem called 'The Apparition.' The devil, in the guise of an old college bed-maker, appears to Tindal, to thank him for his works, and concludes thus:—

'To all thy real and admiring friends  
Satan by thee his hearty love com-  
mends,  
To Toland, Collins, Stephens, Asgil,  
tell  
Sir Richard Howard greets them  
kindly well,  
And hopes to meet them shortly all in  
hell.'

that its ways are pleasantness and its paths peace. The pre-cepts of Christianity are all agreeable to man's nature, and in the mere observance of them there is great reward. They promote sobriety and temperance, health and wealth, honesty and industry. They secure the peace of the commonwealth and the stability of society. CHAP. XIII.

The second lecture was called 'A Confutation of Atheism from the Faculties of the Soul.' The argument is that there is in man an immaterial substance called soul or spirit, which is essentially distinct from our bodies. As sensation and perception are not inherent in matter, and cannot be produced by motion, there must be an immaterial being to whom they belong. From this was inferred the existence of a supreme and purely spiritual Being. The next three lectures are occupied with arguments for the existence of Deity from the origin and structure of the human body. The arguments are the usual ones from design in nature. The preacher had some knowledge of physiology, as it was understood in his day. He called spontaneous generation the great support of Atheism, and he marvelled at the 'impudence' of Atheists who asserted as a fact what all scientific men knew to have been disproved by the experiments of Redi and Malpighi. The soul not material.

The last three lectures were 'A Confutation of Atheism from the Origin and Frame of the World.' It could not be eternal; that is to say, the primary parts of the earth, the sun, and the planets, with their motions, could not have existed always. There cannot be infinite revolutions, because revolutions are finite, and no number of them can make up an infinite. Even supposing matter eternal, it could never of itself have produced the world. The laws which are connected with matter, are not inherent in matter. They are the hand of God effecting that which matter could never effect. If these laws really belonged to matter, as such, a chaos would have been impossible. The same order that exists now would have existed always. Gravitation, for instance, or attraction, is not the property of bodies. Mere matter cannot operate on matter without mutual contact. 'We have great reason to affirm that universal gravitation, a thing certainly existent in nature, is above all mechanism and material causes, and proceeds from a higher principle—' The argument from design.

CHAP. XIII. a divine energy and impression.' The planets are kept in their orbits, not by laws inherent in matter, but by the immediate hand of God.

On Revela-  
tion.

Bentley was again Boyle Lecturer in 1693, but his second series was never published. The subject was 'The Christian Revelation.' He took the same subject for a sermon at 'The Public Commencement at Cambridge in 1696.' After the fashion of Locke, he calls reason the native lamp of the soul, placed and kindled there by our Creator. True reason never is itself deceived, and never deceives any man. 'Even revelation is not shy, nor unwilling to ascribe its own first credit and fundamental authority to the test and testimony of reason.' Bentley says that he does not differ from the Deists about the dignity and authority of reason, but only about the exercise of it, and the extent of its province. The Deist stops when reason does not go with him, but the Christian, like Moses, sees by divine illumination the land of promise. Reason receives from revelation new discoveries and prospects, though it cannot itself pass on to them. These were fine words, but Bentley did not touch the real difficulty as to reason and faith. He spoke of receiving mysteries on the authority of the word of God, while he made reason the test by which we are to know that a doctrine is really worthy of God.

Francis Gas-  
trell on the  
Necessity of  
Religion.

The next Boyle Lecturer was Richard Kidder, whose 'Demonstration of the Messiah' has been already noticed. The lectures of John Williams in 1695-6 have also been noticed. Williams was succeeded by Francis Gastrell, afterwards Bishop of Chester. Gastrell's subject was 'The Certainty and Necessity of Religion in General.' He noticed in the preface the universal tendency of all writers to represent their own age as the most vicious. It was an old complaint, for which there was but little foundation, that the former times were better than these. Every generation has its peculiar vices, and supposes its own time to be the worst. The distinguishing characteristic of Dr. Gastrell's day was 'a public denial of religion, and all the obligations of it, with an endeavour to despise the evidences brought for it, and to offer a more rational scheme of libertinism.' The reason of this denial of religion is finally resolved into the natural

wickedness of men, who now see that the profession of Christianity is not compatible with an evil life. They prefer denying the truth of the Scriptures to becoming moral. They call themselves Deists, but they are in reality Atheists. Religion has been so long established that Dr. Gastrell regards those who dispute its authority as guilty of an 'unreasonable defiance of the common sense of mankind.' They deserve punishment rather than confutation. It is only out of consideration for those who are in danger of being misled that he condescends to produce arguments. He proves the possibility of the Being of God from our ideas of eternity and infinity. The probability of His existence is shown from the universal consent of mankind. As a matter of pure reason, in which all men agree, we have as much assurance as we can have of the truth of religion. It may not amount to an irresistible conviction, but it is sufficient to warrant assent, and to be a ground for action. By considering the works of nature, we reach the certainty that there is a God. The duties of religion arise from our knowledge of God, and our relations to Him. These are all conducive to man's happiness, which is the real test of what we ought to do. Religion is in harmony with our nature; it is in this sense our interest.

The Boyle Lecturer for 1698 was Dr. John Harris. His eight sermons bear the title 'Immorality and Pride, the Great Causes of Atheism.' The lecturer, however, could find no Atheist except Thomas Hobbes, and he was not an Atheist, nor could it ever be proved that he was immoral. Hobbes said that we have no notion of Deity, because we can only have a 'notion' of what is cognizable by sense. Dr. Harris called this denying God, and then he refuted Atheism. Hobbes also said that there was no such thing as an immaterial substance. Whatever really was a substance, must, he thought, be material. For this he was also convicted of Atheism, and by Dr. Harris refuted. Spinoza, Hobbes, and Blount among the moderns, with Epicurus and Lucretius among the ancients, traced the origin of superstition to fear. By superstition the lecturer said they meant religion, and under this supposition he refuted them all. The rest of the lectures are occupied with the usual arguments for the

John Harris  
on the Causes  
of Atheism.

CHAP. XIII. existence of Deity. Dr. Harris is very clear in maintaining the eternal distinction between good and evil, and he refutes those who say that religion was invented as a matter of state policy:

Samuel Bradford on the Credibility of the Christian Revelation.

In 1699, Dr. Samuel Bradford, afterwards Bishop of Carlisle, and finally of Rochester, preached the sermons at the Boyle Lecture. His subject was 'The Credibility of the Christian Revelation from its Internal Evidences.' The first part was a consideration of the qualifications necessary in those by whom it was to be received. These were found in such texts as 'Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice,' and 'He who hath heard and learned of the Father cometh unto Me.' The evidences of Christianity, Dr. Bradford says, are of that kind that they can only be fairly judged by those who have right tempers and dispositions. We may 'learn of the Father by studying the works of creation, by the suggestions of conscience, and by the inward teaching of the Divine Spirit.' They who make a right use of these means to learn of the Father shall know of 'the doctrine whether it be from God.' Dr. Bradford describes those who in his day rejected Christianity as men 'of light and inconsiderate tempers, who very hardly admit of any serious thoughts, even about the common affairs of this world; such whose time is wasted in sport and luxury, who have never improved or exercised their higher faculties according to the design of their natures, nor furnished their heads with any solid materials to think upon.'

On Christian doctrine.

The rest of the sermons are mainly occupied with an exposition of the meaning of Christianity. Christ is said to have 'satisfied' Almighty God that He might be 'reconciled to fallen man.' Christ stood between man and punishment. The Christian religion is excellent in its precepts—in the example of humility, meekness, and piety which it gives us in the character of Jesus. An additional sermon is added to meet the objection from the want of universality in the promulgation of the Gospel. Dr. Bradford says that 'if we could give no account of this we ought to be silent, because of the infinite distance between God and us. It may be that those who have not heard the Gospel in this life may have a period of probation in the future life. Of those who

hear the Gospel, they only who believe shall be saved. This we know, but of God's dealings with the heathen we know nothing. The efficacy of Christ's death may extend to those who never heard the Christian name. In virtue of that death their repentance may avail for the forgiveness of sins. Because of the expiation on Calvary, the Spirit of God may work in the hearts of those to whom Christ has not been preached. We may rest assured that God will judge men according to what they have, and not according to what they have not.' CHAP. XIII.

In 1700, the Boyle Lecturer was Offspring Blackhall, afterwards Bishop of Exeter. The title of the first sermon, 'The Sufficiency of a Standing Revelation,' seems intended to apply to the whole series. The text is—'If they hear not Moses and the Prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead.' The words were true as addressed to the Jews. But since they were spoken, Jesus Christ, a more credible messenger than Lazarus, has risen from the dead. If with such evidence men do not believe Christianity, no evidence will convince them. The objection of the unbeliever must either be that no standing revelation is sufficient, or that there are defects in the standing revelation which we have in the Scriptures. There is no certainty, it may be said, in writings; and there is always a difficulty to convey to one generation ideas clothed in the words that suited another generation. Dr. Blackhall answers, that what is impossible with men is possible with God. A divine revelation once given might contain all truth. In after ages nothing more could be required than a right understanding of the truth already revealed. It may be objected that we can have no certainty that a book written centuries ago was intended to be a standing revelation. The writers may have been deceivers, or they may have been themselves deceived. Dr. Blackhall answers that it is the same with other books. We do not know with certainty that they were written by the persons whose names they bear; and yet we are not incredulous because we were not eye-witnesses of their authorship. We have the same ground for believing the honesty of a writer that we have for believing the honesty of men in general. When a man relates what is credible,

Offspring  
Blackhall on  
the Sufficiency  
of Revelation.

CHAP. XIII. and gives evidence that he is telling the truth, we have sufficient grounds for believing what he says. The only thing incredible in the report of a divine revelation must concern the matter of it. This may be such as natural reason could not have discovered, yet it is not incredible if it does not imply a contradiction. The revelation becomes more credible if it influences the life of the person through whom it is made; if, for instance, he refuses to deny that it is divine, though the affirmation of it be to him certain death. To the objection that he might be deceived, the answer is that this objection applies equally to a revelation made direct to every individual, and not through the medium of another. But as one man can speak his mind to another without any uncertainty, it is surely possible for God so to speak to men.

And the  
Evidences.

Coming to the actual revelation in the Scriptures, Dr. Blackhall maintains that there is no defect either in the matter of it or in the proof. We have sufficient directions what to do, and sufficient motives to persuade us to do it. Unbelievers do not reject the Scriptures because they teach too little, but because they teach too much. Sometimes, indeed, to unsettle the minds of others, they say that we have not the entire canon, and so not the complete will of God. The motives which the Scriptures present are deliverance from everlasting misery, and assurance of everlasting blessedness. He admits that the evidence of a future life does not amount to a certainty; yet so long as there is a possibility, much more, a probability, we should act upon it, and be 'safe.' For the genuineness of the books of Scripture, and the authenticity of the facts, we have the same evidence that we have for other books and other facts. The kind of objections brought against the New Testament would invalidate all history. The Evangelists were honest and upright men, who saw the things which they record. Besides the miracles of Jesus, there was a voice from heaven testifying that He was the Son of God. The evidence for the truth of Christianity is so complete that it is 'an unreasonable request to ask more.' Those who do not believe with the evidence we have, will not believe though one rose from the dead.



Dr. George Stanhope, afterwards Dean of Canterbury, had the Boyle Lectureship for the years 1701 and 1702. The first eight sermons were chiefly addressed to Jews. The evidence for the mission of Jesus was shown to be greater than the evidence for the mission of Moses. Those who received the Old Testament ought much more to receive the New. Christ did not make void the law of Moses. He only set aside those parts of Judaism which were local and peculiar to the Jews. He exalted the moral law, and made worship more spiritual. The interpretations which Christ and His apostles made of the Old Testament were those accepted by the Jews in their day. Many of the prophecies are obscure, but they served the purpose for which they were written. They kept up the hope of a coming Redeemer. Prophecy, Dr. Stanhope says, is necessarily obscure until it be fulfilled. The predictions concerning the first and second advent are mixed together, and sometimes interwoven with other events. Prophecy has generally more senses than one. The second series of sermons is on Christian doctrines. They are very elaborate, but too orthodox to have any interest.\*

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George Stan-  
hope on the  
Mission of  
Jesus.

The only series of Boyle Lectures which conferred immortality on their author was that of Dr. Samuel Clarke, delivered in 1704. Clarke had great reasoning powers, and he came to the study of theology with all the originality of genius. He was an enemy to metaphysical creeds, because they obscured Christian doctrine, but he was no enemy to metaphysics. We might have expected from him more sympathy with Hobbes and Spinoza, but here he only followed the popular belief that they were Atheists, or, at least, that the tendency of their systems was necessarily Atheism.

Samuel  
Clarke.

The subject of Clarke's lectures was 'A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God.' He put into systematic form the ontological arguments which have always had a peculiar charm for philosophical theologians. His first proposition was that 'Something must have existed from Eternity.' If we suppose the contrary, we imply that the things which now are must have arisen out of nothing absolutely, and without cause. The manner of eternal existence cannot be explained, yet we must admit that an eternal

His Demon-  
stration of the  
Being of  
God.

\* Dr. Adams' Lectures for 1703 were not printed.

CHAP. XIII. duration is now actually past. The second proposition is that 'There has existed from Eternity some one Unchangeable and Independent Being.' If we do not admit this, the alternative is that there has existed an infinite succession of changeable and dependent beings, produced one after another in an endless progression without any original cause. But this is absurd. An endless succession of beings can have no cause 'from without,' for the succession includes all things. As no being in this infinite succession is necessary, or self-existent, there can be no cause of existence 'from within.' An eternity without existence is as conceivable as an infinite succession of dependent beings. The supposition of eternity without existence is impossible, and dependent beings could not exist by necessity, by chance, or be caused by nothing. There must, therefore, have existed from all eternity one Immutable and Independent Being.

The Divine Being self-existent.

The third proposition is that this 'Unchangeable and Independent Being, which has existed from eternity without any external cause of its existence, must be self-existent, that is, necessarily existing.' Whatever exists must either have come from nothing without a cause, which is impossible, or it must have been created by an external cause, which everything cannot be, or it must be self-existent. We have in our minds ideas of infinity and eternity which make it a contradiction for us to suppose that there is no Being to whom these attributes belong. The first and simplest idea in our minds is that of a Being absolutely eternal, infinite, original, and independent. To suppose that there is no such Being is to suppose that eternity and immensity do not exist, while we are assuming that they do exist. Next to our own existence, the existence of this Being is most certain. The fourth proposition is that 'What the substance or essence of that Being, which is self-existent or necessarily existing, is, we have no idea. Neither is it at all possible for us to comprehend it.' The material world cannot be that Being, for we can conceive the non-existence of the material world. It is not, as some have imagined, mere infinite space; nor does it explain anything to say with the schoolmen that God is 'pure act,' or 'mere form.'

Incomprehensible.

The fifth proposition is that 'Though the Substance or

Essence of the Self-Existent is itself absolutely incomprehensible to us, yet many of the essential attributes of His nature are strictly demonstrable as well as His existence. Thus, in the first place, the Self-Existent Being must be eternal.' The attribute of eternity is implied in self-existence. We cannot explain eternity. The schoolmen called it a point in which the past and future co-exist as an eternal present. This definition, Clarke says, is now generally rejected for that which makes eternity never-ending duration. The sixth proposition is that 'The Self-Existent Being must of necessity be Infinite and Omnipotent.' What is self-existent must be infinite. The necessity by which it exists must be 'everywhere' as well as 'always.' The infinity of a self-existent Being must be an infinity of fulness as well as of immensity.

The seventh proposition is that 'The Self-Existent Being must of necessity be but One.' This also follows from necessary existence. It is a contradiction to suppose two necessarily self-existent natures independent of each other. If they are independent, the one may exist without the other; and if one may be non-existent, its existence is not necessary. The unity of God, therefore, is a unity of nature and essence. It is possible that there may be emanations from the Supreme Being, who are made partakers of the Godhead; but this is a matter of revelation, not of reason. The eighth proposition is that 'The Self-Existent and Original Cause of all things must be an intelligent Being.' In this proposition lies the great question between the Theist and the Atheist. It cannot be strictly demonstrated *à priori*, and so here Clarke passes to the argument *à posteriori*. Intelligence in man, who is the Effect, is the ground of inference for intelligence in God, who is the Cause. The beauty, contrivance, and fitness of created things manifest intelligence. A first Mover was necessary to give motion to matter.

The ninth proposition is that 'The Self-Existent and original Cause of all things is not a necessary agent, but a Being indued with liberty and choice.' An intelligent being must be free unless intelligence be, not a capacity to act, but merely a consciousness of being acted upon. A

Not a necessary Agent.

CHAP. XIII. — cause or agent supposes freedom of action. Here is Clarke's essential disagreement with Spinoza, who was a necessitarian. He supposed that by a necessity of the Divine nature all creation emanated as it is, and that it could not have been otherwise than it is. Creation with Clarke, on the other hand, is an act of the Divine will. His arguments are from the qualities of motion, the laws of gravitation, the number of the heavenly bodies, and their axial movements, which, he says, are all arbitrary—that is, imposed by a will. Another argument is from final causes. The Deity proposes an end or object in all His works. The effects would not be finite if the first Cause were not free; for what proceeds by necessity from an infinite must be infinite. Moreover, if the Supreme Cause be not a free agent, there must have been an infinite progression of causes without any original cause. Without liberty there could be no first Mover. The tenth proposition is that 'This Self-Existent Being, the Supreme Cause of all things, must of necessity have infinite power;' this following from the attribute of self-existence, and from the *à posteriori* fact of creation.

Infinitely  
wise.

The eleventh proposition is that 'The Supreme Cause and Author of all things must of necessity be infinitely wise.' If He is infinite, omnipotent, and intelligent, He must know all things that are, and all the possibilities of things that are to be. As with His boundless presence He embraces and surrounds all things, and penetrates every part of every substance with His all-seeing eye, He must be infinitely wise. This Clarke calls an *à priori* demonstration, because it is founded on the attributes already demonstrated. It is affected only by one circumstance, which is, that the attribute of intelligence was proved by the argument *à posteriori*. Clarke passes to the argument from design, showing from modern discoveries that there are no faults in the constitution of the world. The twelfth and last proposition is that 'The Supreme Cause and Author of all things must of necessity be a Being of infinite goodness, justice, and truth, and all other moral perfections; such as become the Supreme Governor and Judge of the world.' As He has infinite knowledge of all things, their fitness and relations, it is impossible that He can be influenced by any wrong affection.

And as He has infinite power, there is a moral necessity that He will do always what is fittest and best to be done. All imperfection comes from acting contrary to reason and the nature of things. This we cannot suppose to be possible with God. CHAP. XIII

The *à priori* argument was controverted by several writers, who quite agreed with Dr. Clarke's conclusions. Edmund Law, afterwards Bishop of Carlisle, made some remarks on it in the notes to his translation of Archbishop King on the 'Origin of Evil.' Dr. Clarke was defended by his brother, Dr. John Clarke. John Jackson, in a treatise on the 'Existence and Unity of God,' had used the same arguments as Clarke. In answer to these, Law wrote his 'Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time, Immensity, and Eternity.' Space, he said, was something so indefinite, that scarcely two philosophers ever held the same opinions respecting it. Some have called it a substance, some a property, and others some middle thing between a substance and a property. What was so uncertain, and so certainly unreal, could not be a solid ground for an argument to prove the existence of Deity. The other ideas are found to be equally indefinite. They are, in fact, mere abstractions. The whole foundation, therefore, on which Clarke had built is unstable, and so the fabric falls to pieces. Samuel Colliber, with many other writers who did not give their names, made the same objections to Clarke's argument. It did not escape some of them that, though Clarke was refuting Spinoza, there was an essential likeness between his own system and that which he intended to refute.

Dr. Clarke's *à priori* argument was refuted by Dr. Waterland. It was not to be found in the Fathers, and therefore it could not be valid. It was, moreover, fraught with danger both to religion and science. The ancients have proved that it is impossible to demonstrate the existence of God. They never apply to Deity the words 'necessary' or 'necessarily.' This argument, Waterland says, had its origin in the barbarous Latin translation of Aristotle and the Averroean philosophy. Albertus Magnus is the first Christian writer who speaks of God as a necessary Being, but he did not presume to found on this necessity an

Controversy  
on the *à priori*  
argument.

Clarke refuted  
by Water-  
land.

CHAP. XIII. argument *à priori* for the Divine existence. Thomas Aquinas argued from God's necessary existence to His eternity, but this was only arguing from attribute to attribute, and not to the being of Deity. Several other schoolmen have used similar arguments, but it is difficult to say what they meant. Suarez, the Jesuit, professed to give an *à priori* demonstration of the existence of God, but all modern theologians are agreed that the existence of Deity can only be proved by reasoning from the effect to the cause.

Butler's letter  
to Clarke.

When Bishop Butler was a very young man, a student in a Dissenters' Academy, he wrote to Dr. Clarke, controverting the arguments for the sixth and seventh propositions. In the sixth it was said, that 'To suppose a finite being to be self-existent, is to say that it is a contradiction for that being not to exist, the absence of which may yet be conceived without a contradiction.' If it can be absent from one place, it may be absent from another, and so from all places. Butler objected that a thing might be absent from one place at one time, and from all places at different times. A man might live a thousand years. During that time he might be absent from all places at different times, without its following that he had ceased to exist—that is, to be absent from all places at the same time.

Objections to  
Clarke's argu-  
ments.

The seventh proposition established the unity of God by showing that 'Two different natures existing necessarily and independent of each other, implies this plain contradiction, that each of them being independent of the other, they may either of them be supposed to exist alone, so that it will be no contradiction to imagine the other not to exist, and consequently neither of them will be necessarily existing.' Butler could not see the inference. There was nothing to connect it with what went before. The words 'existing alone' might mean either that they existed independent of each other, or that the one implied the non-existence of the other. If the last, it is plainly no contradiction to suppose one not to exist. Yet each of the two natures may be supposed to exist alone without the other.

His answers.

Clarke answered to the first objection that whatever is absolutely necessary, is so in every part of space and in all duration. What may be absent from one place



may be conceived as absent from all. The illustration of a man living a thousand years, supposes that he cannot be absent from all places, because the fact of his living implies his presence in some places. But it is not absolutely necessary that he live at all. Demonstration is only applicable to what is necessary in itself. To the second objection, Clarke answered that what exists necessarily must exist alone, so as to be independent of everything else, and so as that all other things may be supposed not to exist at all. Something necessarily existing is implied in the first idea of existence. Butler professed to be convinced by Clarke's arguments on the first question, and he seems ultimately to have yielded on the second.

In the following year, Clarke preached his second series of sermons at the Boyle Lectures. The title of this series was 'The Unchangeable Obligation of Natural Religion and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation.' In the former lectures he called the evidence demonstrative, but here, he says, it is only moral. The Deists are classed and refuted according to their views. The first are those who profess to believe in an eternal, infinite, and independent Being who made the world. They suppose that God created a certain quantity of matter and set it in motion, and that all things result from this matter and motion. This is called Atheism, and is refuted from what we know of gravitation, and other laws of the natural world, which are not the result of motion, but of an intelligent Cause. The second class believe in God, and that He governs the world, but they do not allow any difference between moral good and evil. They do not admit an eternal fitness of things according to which God acts and which ought to guide all men in their actions. This kind of Deists are also logically Atheists. Neither of these classes is to be reasoned with, for they reject not only Christianity, but even the moral obligations of natural religion. A third class believe in God, and have right apprehensions of His natural attributes, and to some extent of the moral, but they do not believe in the immortality of the soul. They imagine that Divine justice and goodness are not the same as justice and goodness with man, so that we cannot reason from the



## CHAP. XIII

inequality of justice here to the certainty of a day of retribution. The last kind of Deists are those who believe all the principles of natural religion, and that it is our duty to live according to them, but they reject Divine revelation. These Clarke calls the only true Deists; but if any such really exist, if they consistently followed their own principles, they would end by embracing Christianity. The little use made of the light of reason would convince them of the necessity of revelation. They would be anxious to know how sin was to be forgiven, and they would desire certainty as to the future life. A consistent scheme of Deism is not possible for Deists who have had Christianity fairly presented to them.

Christianity  
founded on  
Natural  
Religion.

The foundation of Clarke's argument is laid in natural religion. There are eternal and necessary differences of things. By these the will of God is determined to act according to justice and goodness for the welfare of the universe, and by these men ought to determine their actions for the universal good. This is a duty previous to all compacts, and can no more be denied by rational men than that light proceeds from the sun. The difference between good and evil is not made by laws either divine or human. It is eternal. The knowledge of it is the distinction between a man and a beast. It has no reference to rewards or punishments, however necessary these may be to maintain the practice of virtue in the present world. The positive will of God cannot differ from this eternal morality. The most certain part of natural religion is to imitate the moral attributes of Deity. Seneca has wisely said, 'If you wish to propitiate the gods, live a good life. He sufficiently worships them who imitates them.' In the present world the natural order of things is often perverted, and virtue does not meet its proper reward. On this fact rests the strongest argument from natural religion for a future life. There are, of course, other arguments, as the universal belief in immortality, the natural desire for it, and the consciousness which all men have of being responsible for their actions.

Special teaching  
necessary.

The obligations of natural religion are capable of demonstration. But special teaching is necessary, because of the

many hindrances which prevent the multitude of people discovering these things plainly. The wise and good men among the heathen found the truth for themselves, but they were unable to reform the world. Their indifference as to some doctrines, and their want of certainty as to others, was the cause of their making no earnest efforts. What they knew for themselves they had no authority to enforce on others. Though they said that to imitate God was the best worship, yet they felt that external worship was also necessary. But they were ignorant how it should be offered. Socrates ordered a sacrifice to Esculapius. This may have been a jest, yet Plato advises men to worship the demons and the inferior gods. He did not dare to condemn the image worship that was sanctioned by the laws of his country. Cicero, Epictetus, and other philosophers, showed the same anxiety not to interfere with the national worship. They were all of them ignorant of what was of the greatest importance to be known—the method of the sinner's restoration to the Divine favour. Nature left them in endless perplexity about the means of appeasing the Deity.

The philosophers were also in great uncertainty about many other doctrines necessary for the reformation of the world. They had good arguments for the immortality of the soul, and yet they were not sure. When Socrates was dying, he said, 'I am now about to leave this world, and you are still to continue in it—which has the better part allotted us God only knows.' He hoped that he was now going into the company of good men, but he would not be too confident. Cicero said that the future life was a guess. On moral questions they could not speak with such certainty as to persuade men to virtue. Varro reckoned up two hundred and eighty opinions concerning the chief good. The disciples of Socrates and Plato were not prepared to lay down their lives for the cause of virtue. The philosophers confessed the need of revelation. They were not like our modern Deists, who think they have light enough without it.

The culmination of the argument is, that the Christian religion is the only religion which has any appearance of reason. If it is not true, there is no revelation made to man. But Christianity has all the marks that we should expect in

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Uncertainty  
of the philo-  
sophers.No revelation  
if Christianity  
be not true.

CHAP. XIII. a Divine revelation. It embraces all that was good in Paganism without its absurdities. Its practical tendency is to make men like to God. Its articles of faith are all agreeable to reason. They may not be discoverable by reason, but they are all reasonable when discovered. Its authority is proved by miracles and fulfilment of prophecy.

Clarke and Leibnitz.

The correspondence between Clarke and Leibnitz may be regarded as a supplement to the first series of lectures. Leibnitz lamented the decay of religion in England. He said that many of our philosophers made souls material, and God corporeal. Locke was mentioned among those who were uncertain if the soul was not material and perishable. Sir Isaac Newton was quoted as saying that space is an organ which God uses by which to see things. From this it was inferred that they did not depend on Him and were not made by Him. Newton and his disciples were said to believe that creation, like a watch, required occasionally to be wound up. This was founded on a passage where Newton speaks of some small irregularities in the movements of the planets, 'which, it is probable, will in length of time increase more and more, till the present system of nature shall want to be again put in order by the Author.' Against this, Leibnitz set forth the beauty of his own system of pre-established harmony, according to which the same amount of force is always in the world, and undergoes changes according to fixed laws. Miracles were only wrought to supply the wants of the kingdom of grace, but never those of nature.

On God's presence in Nature.

Clarke answered that Newton did not make space the organ by which God perceived the external world. On the contrary, God was present to all things, and saw them without a medium. Newton had called the sensorium of animals the place where the perceptive substance is present, and to which the sensible images of things are conveyed by the nerves and brains. To this sensorium he likens infinite space, in or by which the Omnipresent sees and discerns all things. Newton did not call space the sensorium of the Deity. He only said that space is, *as it were*, the sensorium of the Omnipresent Being. A machine constructed by a human mechanist depends on laws which are altogether

independent of the artificer. But God makes the laws by which the world exists, as well as the world itself. Without His government and inspection, nothing can be done. He does not interfere at different times, for He is never absent. To suppose this world to go on without His presence is as difficult as to suppose it to have existed eternally without Him. And yet Leibnitz thought, that only by separating God from the world could we think of Him as a supra-mundane Intelligence. CHAP. XIII.

Leibnitz answered that God's operation must either be natural or supernatural. If it was supernatural, then the world would be governed by miracles; if natural, then God would be comprehended under the nature of things—that is, He would be the soul of the world; and this was the legitimate result of Clarke's doctrine. Clarke answered that God was neither mundane nor supra-mundane, but an Omnipresent Intelligence. He was both within and without the world. He is in all and through all, as well as above all. Natural and supernatural are alike to God. The difference is only in our conceptions. To cause the earth to move regularly is a thing which we call natural. To stop its motion for a day we would call supernatural. But they are equally the effects of the same power. With respect to God, the one is not more nor less natural or supernatural than the other. God's being present in or to the world does not make Him the soul of the world. A soul is a part of a compound. The body is the other part. They mutually assist each other as parts of a whole. But God is present to the world, not as a part, but as a Governor, acting upon all things, Himself acted upon by nothing. He is not far from any one of us, for in Him we and all things live, and move, and have our being. Infinite space and infinite duration are constituted by God's existence. In the words of Newton, God is not 'eternity or infinity, but eternal and infinite. He is not duration or space, but He endures and is present everywhere, and by existing always and everywhere, constitutes duration and space, eternity and infinity.'

And the method of the Divine working.

The Boyle lecturer for 1706 was Dr. John Hancock, rector of St. Margaret's, Lothbury. His sermons were published under the title 'Arguments to Prove the Being of John Hancock on Atheism.

CHAP. XIII. God, with Objections against it answered.' Dr. Hancock shows that those who ascribe the works of creation to nature, really acknowledge God while they wish to deny Him. They suppose in nature an intelligent mind, which guides and governs all things. This mind is God. The Atheists refuted are Vanini, Hobbes, and Spinoza. The greatest proof which Dr. Hancock could find of the Atheism of his time was the denial of ghosts and witches. These apparitions, he said, were divinely sent to convince sceptics of the existence of the invisible world. Aristotle, Descartes, and several other philosophers, both ancient and modern, were thoroughly refuted, and with the refutation of these false philosophers fell the whole system of Atheism.

John Turner  
on Redemp-  
tion.

William Whiston's lectures on Prophecy have already been noticed. He was succeeded by John Turner, whose subject was 'The Wisdom of God in the Redemption of Man.' Those who did not receive the doctrine of redemption by a literal propitiation were called Deists, and their Deism was traced to their immoral lives. They oppose the Gospel because the Gospel is opposed to their 'uncleaness, sensuality, and impious debaucheries.' Charles Blount, for instance, committed suicide because he could not marry his deceased wife's sister. This proves that the Deists defend 'incestuous marriages and self-murder.' But apart from their morals they sin against reason by leaning to their own understanding, and denying the doctrines of a 'well-attested revelation.' The lecturer defends the doctrine of satisfaction for sin on the ground of the eternal distinction between good and evil. God's eternal justice required absolutely to be satisfied.

Lilly Butler  
against  
Shaftesbury.

In 1709, Dr. Lilly Butler bewailed 'the Atheism and Infidelity' of the times, referring specially to the writings of Lord Shaftesbury. The men who boast of reason, he said, will not reason about Christianity. They rather propose to test it by ridicule. But he that believeth need not be ashamed. The primitive Christians endured ridicule. They were exposed to the scorn of men, and were made the reproach of the people. But profane wit had no more power against them than the stake or the scaffold. Shaftesbury was proved to be an Atheist, because he was supposed to

ascribe the belief in Deity to the 'ill-humour' of men. The lecturer shows that religion is the welfare of the soul as health is of the body. It gives temporal prosperity and peace of mind, and in death it takes away fear. Should it turn out that after all there is no future life, the Christian loses nothing. But if there be 'a God and a future state of happiness and misery according to men's work, it will be incomparably best for them that have believed.'

CHAP. XIII.

Dr. Josiah Woodward was Boyle lecturer in the year 1710. His subject was 'The Divine Original, and Incomparable Excellence of the Christian Religion.' He proved that the Christian religion must be true, because it rests on God's word; and that must be true, because it is God's word. By God's word he meant the Scriptures, which contained 'excellent wisdom far above the sphere of this world's wisdom.' The foolishness of Greek philosophy was contrasted with the wisdom of revelation. Dr. Woodward proved against Deists that human wisdom without revelation could not make men wise and good. Against Atheists he proved that human wisdom was able to know God. Revelation makes clearer what is known by reason, and adds doctrines which are beyond the light of nature. The Pagans were ignorant, for instance, of many moral duties. They knew nothing of the origin of the world, and they were ignorant of the way of reconciliation with God. Two sermons are devoted to the refutation of Arians and Socinians, who are supposed to come in some measure under the category of the notorious infidels for whose conviction the Boyle Lectures were intended. One sermon is on the causes of modern infidelity, which are found mainly in the violence of men's carnal and worldly inclinations.

Josiah Woodward on the Christian Religion.

'Physico-Theology,' by William Derham, canon of Windsor, was the title of the Boyle Lectures for 1711-12. Derham had already written his 'Astro-Theology,' in which he had surveyed the heavens, and from the manifestations of power and wisdom derived arguments for the existence and attributes of Deity. To the facts of the natural world he applies the same method in his Boyle Lectures, telling us that Boyle's intention in founding the Lectures was to derive fresh arguments for religion from the discoveries of science.

William Derham's Physico-Theology.



CHAP. XIII. Derham illustrates the design argument by an immense collection of facts from all the natural sciences.

Benjamin Ibbot on Free Thinking.

'Free Thinking' was the subject of Dr. Benjamin Ibbot's sixteen sermons in 1713-14. This subject was suggested by Collins's 'Discourse,' which had recently been published. The tone of Ibbot's lectures is very liberal. He advocates without any apparent limits St. Paul's principle of proving all things, which he explains as 'debating, arguing, or reasoning upon every matter proposed for our acceptance.' We are to think about all things freely, and examine them without partiality. But this, the lecturer says, is not the character of the free-thinking which now prevails. It is not the right use of reason, nor the legitimate exercise of private judgment. It is licentiousness and not liberty, 'foolish talking and jesting, babbling and prating against religion with malicious words.' As Collins had spoken of the uncertainty of the meaning of the Scriptures, Dr. Ibbot defends the text, the canon, the genuineness and authenticity of the New Testament. The really important parts of Christianity have never, he says, been questioned except by 'those who have either had weak heads or wicked hearts.' All controversies on questions of moment would soon end 'if men would but read the Scriptures with humility and sincerity.' There can be no dispute about the foundation of the Christian religion, for it rests on 'plain principles of reason and natural religion.' Locke has justly observed that the multitude of controversies about religious questions would soon be settled if words were sufficiently definite to express ideas. Collins had quoted the famous passage in the 'Liberty of Prophesying,' where Jeremy Taylor advocates toleration because of the uncertainty of the meaning of the Scriptures. Dr. Ibbot says it is true only so far as opinions are concerned, but not true as to essential doctrines. In the same book, it is said, that 'all sects of Christians agree in the Articles of the Creed as things plainly and clearly set down, and as containing all that which is of simple and pure necessity.'\*

John Leng on Revelation.

In 1717 and 1718, Dr. John Leng, afterwards Bishop of Norwich, took for the subject of the Boyle Lectures the

\* The Lectures for 1715-16 were not printed.



‘Natural Obligations to believe the Principles of Religion and Divine Revelation.’ The reason usually given for unbelief is want of evidence ; but Dr. Leng says that men are so immersed either in business or pleasure that they will not take the trouble to examine for themselves. Some are haunted by a dread of superstition, and to escape this they avoid all religion. . But religion is a matter of such great importance that no rational being can be indifferent to it. The duty of ‘free-thinking,’ in a good sense, is imperative on all men. Collins was not wrong in what he said on this subject, but he had an ulterior and evil object. If we miss the truth for want of serious examination, we are without excuse. All morality is founded on religion. Where there is no fear of God there is no security for society. When Abraham went to Gerar he knew how he would be treated, because ‘the fear of God’ was not in that place. Cicero says that ‘if piety towards God were taken away, there would be an end of all virtues.’ All human actions that are not merely animal depend upon a belief or persuasion of something future or invisible. All societies of men that have existed in the world with any kind of order have believed in the existence of God, and of rewards and punishments in a future life. This belief must have been put in their minds by God Himself. Dr. Leng goes through the usual arguments for the truth of Christianity, from the necessity and probability of revelation with the proofs for miracle and prophecy. He defends against Shaftesbury the ‘policy’ of believing, for that is to be on the ‘safe’ side.

In 1719-20, Dr. John Clarke, brother of Samuel Clarke, discussed the ‘Origin of Evil,’ with special reference to what had been written by M. Bayle, in defence of the Manichean doctrine of two principles. The existence of evil could not be denied. Lucretius, from the imperfection of the world, argued that it could not be the effect of Divine power. Solomon said that all things happen alike to all ; and Diogenes, when he saw the prosperity of the robber Harpalus, said it was a testimony against the gods. All experience testifies to the existence of evil, and our wisdom cannot reconcile the fact with the existence of Deity. Alphonso X. of Spain once said that if he had been with the Creator when He made

John Clarke  
on the Origin  
of Evil.

CHAP. XIII. the world he could have suggested improvements. Clarke's answers are those with which we are familiar. We do not see the whole plan. Things which appear evil and imperfect may not be so in reference to the whole. Whatever is created must be finite, and so far imperfect. Physical evil is found in the nature of matter, and moral evil originates in the free agency of man. Notwithstanding these explanations, Clarke admits a difficulty still unexplained. There is, however, in the world enough to convince us that God is greater than evil, and there is reason to believe that evil itself is a factor in the purposes of ultimate good. While reason goes with us so far, there is no necessity to follow the principle set forth ironically by Bayle, that we must renounce reason to receive revelation. Faith is not something irrational, nor is a mystery a contradiction. Clarke adopts Toland's definition of mystery, that it is something concealed until it is made known, when it ceases to be a mystery. God's ways are incomprehensible, because our reason has limits, and not because it is different in kind from the Divine reason. It is valid so far as it goes. 'Nothing,' the lecturer says, 'can strike more directly at the root of all religion, both natural and revealed, than to assert that wisdom, justice, and goodness in God are of another nature and kind than the moral qualities so denominated in men.'

'The Pretended Difficulties in Natural and Revealed Religion no Excuse for Infidelity' is the title of the Boyle Lectures by Brampton Gurdon, for 1721-2. The meaning of this is that the difficulties are more imaginary than real, and that the evidence is so clear as to leave no excuse for unbelief. Many subjects were discussed, but nothing was said that had not been said by others. Hobbes was refuted as thousands had refuted him before. Spinoza, too, the very prince of Atheists, was annihilated. Toland did not meet any better fate. He, too, was certainly an Atheist, for he ascribed motion to matter. Shaftesbury and Collins were easily settled.\*

Dr. Thomas Burnet, probendary of Sarum, was Boyle Lecturer in 1724 and 1725. His subject was 'The Demonstration of the True Religion.' The being of God is demon-

Brampton  
Gurdon on  
Infidelity.

Thomas Burnet on 'The Demonstration of True Religion.'

\* The Boyle Lectures for 1723 were not printed.

strated *à priori* and *à posteriori*, by the help of many propositions, inferences, and corollaries. The order of revelation is founded upon the order of nature. What God, according to Scripture, has done, and what we are commanded to do, are all in harmony with reason. Man required revelation even in Paradise. He could not know otherwise what he was to eat or not to eat. He required revelation for such things as marriage and language. But in his fallen state man stands in need of revelation much more. The condition of the Pagan world proves this. If a revelation was needed, it must have been given. Christianity is such a revelation as man requires. Dr. Burnet's lectures are not without originality. He proves, for instance, that the Mosaic laws about virginity were intended to exclude all doubt about the virginity of the Virgin Mary.\*

Dr. William Berriman, in twenty-four sermons, in the years 1730-31-32, 'set forth and explained' 'The Gradual Revelation of the Gospel from the time of Man's Apostasy.' Dr. Berriman refuted Collins and then Tindal, who had just published his 'Christianity as old as Creation.' After this he convicted Dr. Conyers Middleton of being a Deist, and all the more dangerous because he professed to be a Christian. Dr. Middleton's Deism consisted in his not believing literally the story of Adam and Eve. Dr. Berriman's orthodoxy is unimpeachable. He proves the light of nature to be insufficient; and he finds the whole of the Scriptures to be direct revelation. The prophecies might be obscure, and, as Collins said, capable of other meanings than those given them by New Testament writers; but the evidence of miracles must shed light on the meaning of prophecy.

The Boyle lecturer for the next three years was Richard Biscoe, who is described as 'Chaplain in ordinary to His Majesty.' Biscoe departed from the beaten tract, and argued for the truth of Christianity from 'The History of the Acts of the Apostles.' His lectures are not only an original, but a very able and learned work. In the introduction the principle is laid down broadly that the first inquiry concerning any revelation must be if it is worthy of

\* Dr. Denne's Lectures for 1726-7 were not printed. The Lecturer for 1728-9 is unknown.

CHAP. XIII. God. Doctrines which are opposed to the Divine nature, or precepts which are inconsistent with the eternal rule of right reason, cannot be established by any external evidence. But, on the other hand, it is not enough that a revelation be worthy of God and suitable to the necessities of man. There must be positive evidence that it really came from God. The Acts of the Apostles record facts which, if themselves true, involve the truth of Christianity. The general authenticity of the Acts is proved by contemporary history, and by undesigned coincidences between statements in the Acts and in other parts of the New Testament. If the miracles recorded in the Acts were never performed, the wonderful spread of Christianity was a greater miracle than any of these. The Acts of the Apostles extend over a considerable space of time. They refer to events and circumstances in different and widely distant countries. If the book had been forged, it could not have escaped detection. Many things in the history are confirmed by Josephus and Tacitus. The geography agrees with Strabo. We need not be incredulous about the miraculous part, for all the Fathers testify that during the first three centuries it was in the power of any Christian to cast out devils by a word.

Leonard  
Twells on  
miracles and  
prophecy.

Dr. Leonard Twells was Boyle lecturer in 1739-40-41. The difficulty of getting a subject after so many predecessors was now somewhat pressing. Dr. Twells returned to the miracle and prophecy question, as it was raised by Anthony Collins. In direct opposition to Biscoe, he started with the principle that we had nothing to do with the contents of a revelation till the revelation is proved by external evidence. If this be not settled first, we shall scarcely ever have an opportunity of doing it. A revelation confirmed by miracles must be received, whatever our reason may think of its 'immorality, absurdity, or falsehood.' The answer to the objection that evil spirits may work miracles is that God would not suffer men to be deceived on a matter of such infinite importance. Miracles in favour of idolatry will always be over-matched by greater miracles in favour of truth. The miracles in behalf of Christianity were very great and very numerous. If we do not believe on their evidence, we must refuse to credit everything for which we have not the im-

mediate testimony of sense. They were admitted to be true miracles both by Jews and Pagans, and those who saw them gave their lives in attestation of what they had seen. CHAP. XIII.

The miracles of the New Testament give certainty to what Christ and His apostles taught. They also justify the application of the Old Testament prophecies as they are quoted in the New Testament. The passage in St. Peter, which had often been interpreted of the superiority of prophecy to miracles, Dr. Twells interprets as the promise of the Messiah being more sure than other prophecies. It shone in a 'dark place,' that is, under the old covenant. The Jewish dispensation was only a provisional light. The words in the parable of the rich man do not prove the superiority of prophecy to miracles. The meaning is that without a right disposition men will not believe in Christianity, even though one rose from the dead. It may be said that evil spirits sometimes have the gift of prophecy. But God always controls them, and does not suffer men to be deceived. The writers of the New Testament could not be wrong in the application of Old Testament prophecy. If they were, the cause of Christianity is ruined. But we should doubt our own sagacity before we come to this conclusion. When miracles are added, we may be sure that the prophecies are rightly applied. Our difficulties may be due to the nature of prophecy and to the changes of language. We cannot suppose that the inferences made by Christ and His apostles will be as clear to us as they were to the Jews seventeen hundred years ago. Jesus did not send His disciples to the Scriptures, but gave them the evidence of miracles. He did not openly claim to be the Messiah, but directed His hearers to the works which He did among them. Christianity stands fast on miracles, even should prophecy be uncertain. But to prove that prophecy is not uncertain, Dr. Twells examines the principal prophecies of the Old and New Testaments.\*

Dr. Henry Stebbing was Boyle lecturer in 1747-48-49. His lectures are called 'Christianity Justified upon the

\* Dr. Thomas, afterwards Bishop of Winchester, was Boyle Lecturer in 1742-3, and Dr. John Roper in 1744-5. These lectures were not printed. The lecturer for 1746 is unknown.

CHAP. XIII. Scripture Foundation, being a Summary View of the Controversy between Christians and Deists.' Stebbing repeats the ordinary commonplaces about Christianity being built on the foundation of natural religion. It requires the performance of all the duties of natural religion, and it reveals the fact of pardon and reconciliation. Nothing, Stebbing says, that contradicts the reason of man can be from God. The second part of the lectures is a refutation of Conyers Middleton, in which Stebbing upholds the authority and infallibility of the books of the New Testament. The argument from prophecy and miracles is stated in its usual form.\*

John Craig on Evidence.

There are some other books on evidences besides the Boyle Lectures and those we have mentioned, but there are not many of them that have any special interest. In 1699, a clergyman of the name of John Craig published a curious Latin treatise, proving that Christ must come before the year 3150; for by that time, by the natural laws of evidence, the historical fact of Christ's life will cease to be believed.

Samuel Col-  
liber on the  
Christian  
Religion.

Two essays on the 'Christian Religion,' by Samuel Colliber, published in 1729, have some interest from the use made of them by Waterland. Their object was to show that Christianity was founded on reason. The foundation was laid by showing the reasonableness of natural religion, which was summed up in four practical duties—prayer, praise, repentance, and patience. The actual state of the world required revelation. It could not be anything superfluous, nor must it supersede the faculties given to man. That revelation be reasonable was to be expected. But this was not enough to constitute evidence of its being divine. We expect that it will also have external evidence such as prophecy and miracles. Judaism and Christianity are the only religions that have the characteristics which we would expect in a revelation. The only difficulty is with such doctrines as the Trinity, the fall, the resurrection, and eternal punishment. These are received because of the external evidence of revelation.

The obligation of moral precepts is found in the nature of

\* In the second half of the century, the only Boyle Lectures published were those of Jortin, Newton, Heathcote, Worthington, Owen, and Williamson. Jortin says, that in his day the demand for sermons had become very 'cool.'



things. Positive precepts may appear indifferent, yet they also may have reasons of the same kind as moral precepts. The observance of them may be absolutely necessary, though they are out of the circle of duties dictated by reason. The Corinthians, who abused the sacrament of the Supper, were weak and sickly. We are not competent judges in every case of the ends which God may have proposed in enacting positive laws. The knowledge that the end is important should be enough for us. The doctrines of revelation make known new duties which arise naturally out of the things revealed, and which are really as moral as those within the grasp of natural reason.

CHAP. XIII.  
On Moral and  
Positive  
Duties.

The works of two Irish bishops also require to be noticed, if only for their connection with the views of later writers. The first is Archbishop King, and the other is Bishop Browne. King's treatise on 'The Origin of Evil' was published in 1702, and was intended as a defence of the attributes of Deity. The arguments have been often repeated, and are the best that can be found to account for the mystery of evil. They have been controverted by Bayle, and ridiculed by Voltaire. They are not, perhaps, logically consistent with belief in the Mosaic account of the fall of man, and those in England who have adopted them have generally been called Deists. Archbishop King divides evil into three kinds—that of imperfection, natural evil, and moral evil. The first means the absence of perfection, the second physical pain, and the third evil actions injurious to ourselves or to others. The very fact of the existence of evil is an objection against the goodness, or wisdom, or power of the Deity. It is not pretended that this objection is entirely removed, but suggestions are made which it is hoped will show that it is not altogether unanswerable. The first important consideration is the predominance, in the world, of good over evil. All creatures prefer existence to non-existence. Imperfection is inseparable from created beings; as absolute perfection belongs only to God, and cannot, therefore, be an attribute of a creature. Supposing creation to consist of a chain of beings endowed with all degrees of perfection, yet between the creatures next to God and God Himself, the distance must be infinite. We may

Archbishop  
King on 'The  
Origin of  
Evil.'



CHAP. XIII. believe that the present system of the universe is the best that could possibly have been made. It may seem to us that it might be improved in many things, but perhaps that could only be at the expense of greater inconvenience. Natural things, being related to matter, are subject to natural evils; and moral perversity is easily accounted for by the fact of free agency in man.

On Predestination.

Archbishop King published a sermon on Predestination, in which he set forth a view of the Divine attributes, which has been the cause of some controversy. He denied the possibility of our knowing God or of understanding His ways. We ascribe to God hands and feet, parts and passions, —but these, in reality, are mere figures of speech. The Divine attributes are in their nature different from the attributes in man, which have the same names. Wisdom and justice, for instance, are not the same with God as they are with us. The application of this was, that predestination with God is not to be interpreted by our ideas of predestination. It is not inconsistent with contingency or free-will. It only means that everything depends on God, and that all events happen according to His designs.

Bishop Browne on the Human Understanding.

When Peter Browne replied to Toland, he said that we can know nothing of God as God really is. Toland, representing an extreme section of the school of Locke, believed in Christianity because it was reasonable, and only so far as it was reasonable. What did not accord with reason was to him no revelation. To find room for mysteries, Browne had to rest Christianity mainly on the external evidence. The voice of God, he said, telling us what to believe, is a sufficient ground for faith. We have not capacity to know God, and therefore all that is revealed, notwithstanding its being revealed, must ever be a mystery. Twenty-five years later this thesis was made the subject of an elaborate work called 'The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human Understanding.' Our knowledge is divided into two kinds, that which is immediate and that which is mediate. Of the first kind is our knowledge of external things, which we have immediately through the senses. Of the second kind is our knowledge of the things of another world, which we have only mediately. The sensuous world

is really known to us, but the spiritual world is only known by analogy. Everything spiritual is conceived under the form of something material. But for this analogy we could have no idea whatever of spiritual things. We have no real knowledge of the nature and attributes of God. They are in themselves as much unknown to us as light to a man who has been born blind. This denial of our capacity to have any true knowledge of God, the author maintains to be necessary for the refutation of Arians, Socinians, and Deists.

Analogy, however, is not to be confounded with metaphor. This was the mistake of Archbishop King.\* It was this which caused many to reject the doctrine altogether, and to argue that if our knowledge of God is not real, religion is impossible. But the knowledge which we have by analogy, so far as it goes, is true knowledge. Christ, for instance, is the Son of God. If this were only a metaphor, it would not be really true that Christ is the Son of God. But as analogy, it means that Christ is as really and truly the Son of God, though in a supernatural and incomprehensible manner, as a human son is the son of his father. The Sabellian and Arian heresies both had their root in a misunderstanding of analogy. It was supposed that the terms Father and Son were only applied to God by way of metaphor, and were in no way reality. Socinianism, 'the last great effort of the devil against Christianity,' is grounded on the same error. Enthusiasm has its origin in the supposition that we really know God and the spiritual world as directly as we know objects of sense. To prove his position against Deists and enthusiasts, Browne maintains that we have no knowledge, either human or divine, but through the five senses and reason. The senses are the groundwork. Reason can do nothing without what they contribute. Our most abstract spiritual knowledge is founded ultimately in the knowledge derived from sensation. The fundamental error of metaphysicians is in deriving ideas from reflection, as well as from sensation. It is to be

On knowing  
God.

Archbishop King admits a knowledge of God by analogy or comparison, but in explaining these words he seems to make it only metaphorical. It is a question if King really differed

from Browne. Archbishop Whately republished King's sermon with notes defending King's doctrine, and giving the sermon the title of 'The Right Method of Interpreting Scripture.'

CHAP. XIII. observed in Browne's argument, that his definition of an idea is an image. We have no image of anything except through the senses. With this definition of idea, it follows that we have no idea of spirit. The common notion of spirit as a thinking substance, he calls an absurd confounding of opposite terms. As we have no idea of immaterial substance, we cannot from it have an idea of active power or pure spirit. The position that we have as clear and distinct an idea of spirit as we have of body, Browne calls ridiculous. It is but a 'jumble of ideas' to say that we have as clear and distinct an idea of God as we have of man, and that we are as ignorant of the essence of a pebble or a fly as we are of God. We have really no knowledge of God or His attributes but by reasoning on what we know by direct sensation. We see God in the visible world as in a glass darkly; that is, by analogy, or by a reflection in creation.

Bishop Butler  
on Evidences.

It was on the fourth of November, in the year 1713, that Joseph Butler wrote his first letter to Samuel Clarke, controverting some positions in the *à priori* demonstration of the being and attributes of God. In that letter Butler said that it had been his business ever since he was 'capable of reasoning on such subjects to endeavour to find a demonstrative proof.' He wished this, not merely to satisfy his own mind, but 'to defend the great truths of natural religion, and those of the Christian revelation which follow from them, against all opposers.' Hitherto he had got 'very probable arguments,' yet he could go but a very little way with 'demonstration in the proof of those things.' The objections to Christianity, as it was then understood, had become formidable. The host of evidence writers were content with an easy victory over the Deists by tracing their unbelief to immorality, or treating their objections as frivolous. Earnest men, like Butler, saw that a grave crisis had come, and that it could not be met by any evasion of difficulties. For nearly thirty years' almost entire seclusion from the world, he pondered over the great problem of his age. The result was the 'Analogy,' published in 1736. Since the letters to Clarke, the Deist controversy had engrossed public attention. Collins, Woolston, and Tindal had in succession engaged the

His 'Ana-  
logy.'

great defenders of the faith. The time had come when thinking men refused to be satisfied with anything but a rational religion. That in Christianity which went beyond what was called the religion of nature was regarded as mystery. It rested merely on authority, and the Deists said that the evidence for the authority was not sufficient. Butler's object was to make that which is peculiar to revelation commend itself to reason, and to show that, all other things considered, the external evidence was, on the whole, sufficient for faith.

Butler does not let the heat of the Deist controversy disturb his calm impartiality. He does not refute any particular Deist. He does not allude to any of them, except, perhaps, once or twice incidentally. He does not confine himself to parts, but takes a general view of the whole question, balancing the arguments on both sides, that all which is false might disappear, and only that which is true might remain. He addresses himself to the serious Deists, but he does not overlook another class, for whom he could only have had pity. There were a multitude of unthinking people who took the objections of the Deists at second hand, proclaimed themselves freethinkers, and treated with contempt not only Christianity, but everything that required serious attention. Some of the arguments refer only to this class. The recommendation, for instance, to follow prudence could have no meaning addressed to a sincere Deist, but it had a meaning addressed to one whose unbelief was made the ground of a vicious life. The 'Analogy' has often been charged with having a sceptical tendency, but it was just by this method of scepticism, in a good sense, that Butler wished to meet the difficulties of sceptics. He believed that there really was truth in Christianity, though people generally had come to the conclusion that it was false. He believed also that that truth could be discovered if men would only examine Christianity again, and with the sincerity of the sincere Deists. The great uncertainty of the meaning of words makes it very difficult to follow the reasoning of the 'Analogy.' We avoid at present any estimate of the arguments, but we shall try so to state them as that their precise validity, or the contrary, may speak for itself.

His calm impartiality.

CHAP. XIII. The 'Introduction' is a discourse on probable evidence. This has many degrees from the lowest presumption to the highest moral certainty. In questions of difficulty, where more satisfactory evidence cannot be had, however small the probability may be, we are under obligation to act upon it from motives of prudence and interest. Butler declines entering into any definition of analogy. He uses the word in a wide sense—in fact, in several senses. One is that which suggests probability. A passage from Origen is the text of the treatise. 'He who believes the Scripture to have proceeded from Him who is the Author of Nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it as are found in the constitution of nature.' If we say that the Scriptures are not from God, because of difficulties, we may also say that nature is not the work of God, because of similar difficulties. So far the argument is only negative. It silences the Deist; but Butler seems to find in it something positive. This analogy gives a presumption that the Scriptures are from God, as well as the world, which the Deist believes to be the work of God. The same difficulties suggest the same Author. To follow analogy is to build on fact, not on hypothesis. Instead of making theories how the world might have been constituted, we inquire into what is known of God's ways, and from that reason to what is unknown. The motto from Quintilian, applied originally to grammar, expresses another form of the same principle: 'The force of analogy is that it refers that which is doubtful to something similar, concerning which there is no question, that it may prove the uncertain by the certain.' What we know is made to explain, or to suggest explanations of, what we do not know.

The analogy of nature and natural religion.

The proper title of Butler's work is 'The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature.' The title suggests an earlier beginning than that of a discourse addressed to Deists. It promises to show first the analogy of 'natural religion' to the constitution and course of nature. The meaning of analogy in this connection seems to be resemblance. Natural religion consists of certain beliefs. There are things in nature that seem to ratify these beliefs. Birds and insects have

different stages of existence, with different degrees of life and enjoyment. Our own bodies have undergone transformations. The life of an embryo in the womb is very different from the life of a full-grown man. These facts give but a very small probability of our existence in a future state. But they make it possible and conceivable, if not probable. Butler includes them as analogies, in the wide sense in which he uses analogy. In these cases we see the continuation of the same body, but at death our bodies are dissolved. This may seem an objection, but the body is not the life. There is no ground for believing that our present powers will cease with the existence of the present body. There is nothing in nature to afford the slightest presumption that animals ever lose their living powers. We have no faculties to discover what happens at death. Consciousness is a single and indivisible power, and, so far as we can judge, the soul in which it resides is also single and indivisible. Men may lose their limbs, and even the greatest part of their bodies, and yet remain the same living agents. Death may be but another birth by which we pass into a higher state, and have a new and wider scope for the faculties which we now possess.

In the present life all we enjoy, and a great part of what we suffer, is put in our own power. Pleasure and pain are the consequences of our actions, and we have capacities given us to foresee their consequences. The connection which God has made between actions and their results, shows that we are under His government. The whole course of nature is so framed as to make delight follow some actions, and uneasiness to follow others. It is not incredible that the same order of rewards and punishments will continue in another life. We have many instances of suffering for imprudence or wilfulness. An excuse is often made for the thoughtlessness of youthful actions, but this does not prevent the natural consequences of evil-doing.

These consequences prove an intelligent Governor of the world, but they do not show that His government is moral. Men are not rewarded or punished in the exact proportion of their personal merits or demerits. But God has given us a moral nature, and a natural notion of Himself as a



CHAP. XIII. righteous Governor. There are, moreover, in the world traces of a righteous government. A virtuous life brings more satisfaction than a vicious life. Amid the infinite disorders of the world there are some exceptions; but these are far from leaving it doubtful whether or not virtue be happier than vice. There is no presumption against God's rewarding and punishing men in a future life on the same principles that they are rewarded or punished in the present life. The constitution of our minds leads us to expect that a government by rewards and punishments will be carried on in a future state. The consequences of mere prudence or imprudence are instances of a right constitution of nature, and, indeed, imply a kind of moral government. The Author of Nature has put society under the necessity of punishing vicious actions. In the natural course of things, virtue as such is actually rewarded, and vice as such is punished. Virtue brings satisfaction; vice produces uneasiness, makes us vexed with ourselves, and sometimes is followed by remorse. There is something in our nature which has regard to veracity, justice, and charity. But there is nothing natural in falsehood, injustice, and cruelty. The strongest objection to the argument for moral government is the fact that virtue often misses its reward, and vice is often in prosperity. From this the inference is a natural one that this same irregularity may continue in a future state. Butler's answer admits the full force of the objection. His object is not to prove God's moral government, but to observe what there is in the constitution and course of nature to confirm it, supposing it to be known.

Probation.

Government—especially moral government—implies difficulties and dangers. There can be no probation without trials and risks. We often see men sacrificing their worldly interest for the sake of indulging their passions. The want of prudence is generally punished. It may be so with the want of prudence as to the future life. Our difficulties and dangers are often due to the ill-conduct of others, to a wrong education, or to irregular habits. Our present circumstances do not seem the most advantageous for securing either our present or our future good. Yet men may manage their temporal affairs so as to pass their days on earth with tole-



able satisfaction. We see here a uniformity in the Divine procedure. We may certainly conclude that in religion nothing more will be required than we are well able to do. But there is a correspondence of circumstances as to our probation, both for the present life and the future. If we had all things necessary in this world without care or anxiety, it would be difficult for us to believe that future happiness depended on our good behaviour. We do not understand why we should be subject to hazard in matters of such importance; but here is the fact. We secure nothing but by care and anxiety. Our interest in this life is not offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisition. It may be the same in religion.

We cannot explain why we are in circumstances which appear to us manifestly evil. All explanations of how we came into these circumstances leave something to be explained. Yet we can see in our present condition something without which we could not have been in a state of probation. Religion teaches us that our present business is improvement in virtue as a qualification for a future state of happiness. The beginning of life is an education for mature age. This is analogous to our present condition as a probation for a future life. We do not know what will be the employment of good men in the life to come, but some qualification for it must be necessary. We find in ourselves capacities which are improved by exercise. These capacities are all necessary for the duties of life, and yet nature does not qualify us with them wholly, nor at once. We acquire them in the different conditions of infancy and youth through which we have to pass. Here we have a providential dispensation similar to that under which we are now placed as to the future life. That life may be only another sphere for the exercise of virtues acquired in our present state. A moral nature is not enough in itself. We must also have that nature fortified by discipline. This world, with its present circumstances, is peculiarly fitted to give the education which we require. We are surrounded with temptations, but at the same time we know the infinite disorders that are consequent on vice. Butler admits the objection that to many this life is not a discipline of virtue, but the

Moral discipline.

CHAP. XIII. contrary ; and he answers by an analogy from the seeds of vegetables and animals. Not one, perhaps, in a million ever reach the maturity for which they were intended ; yet this is no argument against the fact that they were created for an object.

Necessity.

Butler's discourse is mainly addressed to Deists. He supposes, however, the objection from an Atheist that necessity is sufficient to account for the origin of all things without an intelligent Author of Nature or moral Governor of the world. He meets the objection with the practical answer that, if the objector admits the compatibility of necessity with our probation as to temporal affairs, he must also admit its compatibility in religion. Such a necessity could not destroy the proof for an intelligent Author of Nature and Governor of the world. An agent may work necessarily, and the necessity may not exclude design and intelligence. In the present natural government of the world we are practically free. Necessity, therefore, though speculatively true, is to this argument as if it were false.

Objections to  
God's govern-  
ment con-  
sidered.

There may still be objections against the wisdom, equity, or goodness of the Divine government, to which analogy can give no direct answer. But as analogy makes it credible that this government is a scheme imperfectly comprehended, the objections may have a general answer. We see in the natural government parts that are related to a whole which is beyond our comprehension. The same may be inferred concerning moral government. Every act of Divine justice and goodness may look beyond itself, and have reference to a general moral plan. Of this scheme we see but a small part. Our ignorance is an answer to all objections. What we call evil may not be evil in its relation to the whole. In the natural world no ends are accomplished without means, and undesirable means often bring about desirable ends. The world is governed by general laws, and so far as we can know it is best that it should be so. Interpositions might produce greater evils than they would prevent, or prevent greater good than they would produce. Our ignorance, however, is not absolute. We may know that God's government is moral, without in every case being able to vindicate its morality.

The second part of Butler's work treats of the analogy of 'revealed religion' to the constitution and course of nature. The first part, on natural religion, in which the Deists in the main agreed with Butler, was little more than a preparation for the second. By revealed religion was understood the orthodox system of doctrine which is, or is supposed to be, in the Scriptures. Revelation with Butler was what the Scriptures taught as he understood them. In order fairly to estimate his arguments, it is necessary to remember precisely how much he included under the words revealed religion. The light of nature was not sufficient. The analogies from nature were not proofs, but mere resemblances that suggested probabilities. The state of the Pagan world is practical evidence of the necessity of revelation and the incapacity of the human mind, by itself, to reason out a system of natural religion. The Deists continually proclaimed that virtue was the end to be obtained, and that it was indifferent whether the means was natural religion or revealed. Butler agreed with them to the extent that moral duties have an everlasting pre-eminence over positive duties. But if positive duties were really commanded by God, the observance of them, he argued, could not be a matter of indifference. If a revelation has been given, the things commanded, or the duties rising out of our relations to the things revealed, may have reasons which make them as important as the duties which we call moral.

This argument is confessedly borrowed from Waterland and Collier. It assumes that what Butler calls revelation is as certainly from God as moral precepts are from God. The importance or significance, then, of Christianity is not only that it is a republication of natural religion with authority, but also an account of a dispensation of things not discoverable by reason. It was on this additional part that doubts were cast by such moderate Deists as Herbert, Toland, Shaftesbury, and Tindal. Butler's success, therefore, must be measured by his success in establishing this part. He describes the 'particular dispensation' as carried on by the Son and the Holy Spirit for the recovery and redemption of mankind. Out of this dispensation arise new duties and new precepts. We are commanded to be baptized not only in

CHAP. XIII.  
 Analogy of  
 nature and  
 revealed reli-  
 gion.

Christianity a  
 particular dis-  
 pensation.

CHAP. XIII. the name of the Father, but of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. The regards which natural religion tells us are due to the Father, revelation tells us are due to the other persons of the Trinity. The commands of revelation cease to be merely positive precepts. They have in them something moral arising out of the offices of the Son and the Spirit. Ignorance as to what is revealed will be an excuse of as little avail as ignorance in any other case. Neglect of moral duties is punished in this world by natural consequences, without regard to the measure of our knowledge. In the same way punishment may follow the neglect of duties arising out of the things made known by revelation.

Revelation a  
miracle.

The presumption against a revelation is the same as the presumption against a miracle. It is something out of the order of nature. But this is more a question of words than of reality, for the natural and the supernatural may not have the same difference with God which they have to us. There is no presumption from analogy against the general scheme of Christianity. We are acquainted only with a very small part of the natural and moral system of the universe. It is then no presumption against the truth of what is revealed that it lay beyond the reach of our natural faculties. The scheme of Christianity, however, is not unlike the course of nature. At the beginning of the world, when no course of nature was fixed, there could be no presumption against a revelation. It would only have been the exercise of the same power in a different form from that which fixed the course of nature. And after the course was fixed, the exertion of this power is still conceivable. It would then, however, be called a miracle, for a miracle has reference to a fixed order in nature. There is a presumption against the most ordinary facts till they are proved. The question, then, is concerning the degree of presumption against miracles, if it be such as to render them incredible. Whatever the presumption may be, it is entirely removed when we take in the consideration of religion, and the necessity for greater instruction than mankind could have from the religion of nature.

Objections to the scheme of Christianity are answered from analogy. Butler does not wish to be understood as

Revelation to  
be judged by  
reason.

vilifying reason. He rather calls it the faculty by which we judge all things, even revelation itself. If what is called revelation contained immoralities and contradictions, that would be a sufficient reason for rejecting it. Yet, as we are not competent judges of the natural government of the world, it is highly credible beforehand that revelation will contain things of which we are not competent judges. If we are convinced that the Scriptures contain a real revelation from God, we need not be disturbed with difficulties which we did not expect. Obscurity, inaccuracies of style, various readings, doubtfulness of authorship of some parts, are no objections unless it had been promised that the book containing revelation was to be free from these things. The mode in which Christianity is given, has some analogy to the mode of instruction in nature. There is the same struggle with the ambiguities and imperfections of language, the same apparent capriciousness and irregularity. If we are to be prejudiced against the mode in which we receive instruction, we might reject all ordinary education. The hindrances of natural and of supernatural knowledge are the same in kind. The meaning of the Scriptures must be found out by patient study, just as useful remedies are discovered in the world of nature. The objection to some precepts in Scripture that they require immoral and vicious actions is answered by the consideration that the precepts are not contrary to immutable morality. They are precepts given to particular persons; detached commands, which have no natural tendency to make an immoral habit.

A general answer to all objections against Christianity is the same as to objections against the constitution and course of nature. It is a scheme imperfectly comprehended. In both schemes means are used to accomplish ends. That in the Gospel which men call foolishness may be the wisest method of bringing about the end proposed. The Christian dispensation may have always been carried on by general laws as much unknown to us as many laws in the natural world. Even that in Christianity which is miraculous, may have its place in the region of law and order. The means used in the natural world are often tedious. Man is impatient, but God takes His time. Nature advances by slow

Christianity a scheme imperfectly comprehended.

CHAP. XIII. steps. It is a continual progression. And here the analogy between it and revelation is complete. The chief objection to the contents of the Gospel is to the doctrine of mediation. But the government of the visible world is carried on by mediation. We come into life by the instrumentality of others. If in the future world vice is to be punished in the way of natural consequence, as it is in this, we may see the necessity of mediation, and find analogies for it. There are reliefs and remedies in nature, available by the help of other men, which may avert the bad consequences of our follies. This gives ground for the hope of the same thing in the general government of the universe. It may be that repentance and reformation are not sufficient. This seems to be indicated by the prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the whole heathen world. There may be general laws which, if permitted to operate without interposition on our behalf, might have brought irretrievable punishment by natural consequence. Christianity tells us that such an interposition as nature gave us grounds to expect, has been made. Christ interposed to prevent the execution of justice upon sinful men. Butler is careful to explain that we do not know in what the efficacy of the atonement consists. We only know that it effected something necessary to be done for man's salvation.

Objections to  
revelation  
from want of  
universality  
and deficiency  
of evidence.

A common objection to revelation is from its want of universality, and from a supposed deficiency in the proof of it. The answer is that God is not obliged to give His favours equally to all men. The evidence is different at different times. The Jews who lived in the days of the prophets were more favoured than those who lived after prophecy had ceased. The Christians who lived in the age of miracles had more evidence of the truth of miracles than we have. It is quite the order of God's providence that men should have different degrees of light. There are different orders of creatures, and different moral capacities. It is in perfect analogy with this that there be different religious advantages. For anything we know, this may be the consequence of a previous existence, bearing the same relation to the present as the present does to the future. The deficiency, real or supposed, in the evidence of religion, may be a part



of some men's trial. It may leave room for a virtuous exercise or a vicious neglect of the understanding in examining or not examining the evidence. The difficulties in which the evidences of religion are involved are no more a just ground of complaint than external circumstances of temptation. It is also possible that the difficulties may be the fault of the men themselves. Perhaps they are more eager to find objections than to find evidence. Vice, levity, and prejudice are the principal causes in shutting men's eyes and ears to the cause of truth.

On the positive evidences of Christianity, Butler has nothing to offer different from the arguments of other apologists. Miracles and fulfilled prophecy are the foundation. To these are added collateral proofs; the whole producing a conviction compared to 'effect' in architecture, or other works of art. The miracles and the histories of the Bible rest on the same evidence. The miracles are satisfactory accounts of events of which no other satisfactory account can be given. Scripture history may be received as authentic till the contrary is proved. The multitudes in the apostolic age who embraced Christianity must have been convinced of the reality of the miracles. The prophecies may be sometimes obscure, and may relate to events beyond the knowledge of the prophets who uttered them. But this might be expected of prophecies indited by the Spirit of God.

Butler ends his treatise by considering some objections to his arguments from analogy. To solve difficulties in revelation by showing that we have the same difficulties in natural religion seems but a sorry argument. What is really wanted is to clear up the difficulties of both. But to do this it might be necessary to comprehend the Divine nature, and the whole scheme of Providence from everlasting to everlasting. It has always been allowed to reason from what is known to what is uncertain. In matters of daily life we act upon inferences and deductions which have nothing more than probability. To the objection that we ought to have more reason for the obligations of religion than we have for worldly pursuits, the answer is that religion is a practical thing. It consists in following such a definite course of life as the Author of Nature has commanded. Butler says

Positive evidences.

Objections to analogy.



CHAP. XIII. that the design of his treatise is not to vindicate the character of God, but to show the practical obligations of men. It is enough for us that the things objected against may, for anything we know, be consistent with justice and goodness. The arguments of the 'Analogy' may not be satisfactory, but they are the same in this respect as the arguments for any natural institution in life. The evidence on which we continually act is rarely satisfactory. The evidence of religion is not what we desire it to be, but we crave a degree of satisfaction which is never given us. We cannot in reason demand more than that it be sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue which it presupposes in man. It is further objected that if the evidence of religion is doubtful, it cannot be expected that men will forego present interests and pleasures for the sake of it. Butler answers that the object of his treatise is not to inquire what sort of creatures mankind really are, but what the light and knowledge within their reach require them to be.

Bishop  
Berkeley.

George Berkeley, the only other name in the last century that deserves to be placed beside that of Joseph Butler, was engaged during the same years with the same problems as occupied the mind of Butler. The mental character of the two men was very different, but they had both a large share of the practical spirit of the century to which they belonged. They both tried to find a solid ground for religion, to banish theories, and to get a firm hold of realities. It may seem a paradox to say that Berkeley's ideal philosophy was an effort to grasp what is real, and that its elaboration was intended as an answer to Atheism and Deism. But that this was the case is simply history.

His philoso-  
phy.

Berkeley, as a Dublin student, in the beginning of the eighteenth century, was probably nurtured in the theological metaphysics of Archbishop King, who then presided over the See of Dublin, and of Bishop Browne, who was at that time Provost of Trinity. The works of Newton and Locke had begun to be studied in the University, and the pulpits of Ireland were still ringing with anathemas against the awful name of John Toland. Berkeley's first embodiment of his philosophy was in the 'Essay towards a New Theory of Vision,' published in 1709, and more fully in the following

year, in the 'Principles of Human Knowledge.' The one idea which was really original was the denial of the existence of matter as an abstract unperceived substance. Other ideal philosophers had logically annihilated matter; yet with all of them it remained more or less an unknown something. Even Locke, the great reformer of philosophy, had left a place for matter as an abstract substance, of which we could know nothing. And this substance, moreover, was the cause of our sensations. Berkeley inverted the whole process. He denied the existence of all abstractions. Abstract matter, abstract space, and abstract time were only creatures of the scholastic imagination. The perceived, the concrete, the known, is that which exists. Without the mind present to perceive, there is nothing to be perceived. The activity of mind is the only reality. The universe consists of the ideas or phenomena of living persons. The root of every existence is not matter, but mind. The whole creation is the phenomena of the mind of God.

The object which Berkeley expressly proposed in his 'Principles of Human Knowledge' was to inquire into the chief causes of error in the sciences, with the grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion. He was to satisfy those who want a demonstration of the existence and immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the soul. Berkeley had more faith in human reason than either Locke or Butler. He believed that real knowledge was within our reach, and that the cause of our missing it was due, not to our faculties, but to our misuse of these faculties. The position of inevitable ignorance which Bishop Browne had taken up against Toland was entirely opposed to the whole of Berkeley's system. We are not doomed to be deceived by phenomena. We can really grasp reality. Our thoughts are real substances, and our perception of thoughts in the external world is our perception of the mind of God. We know God as certainly and as immediately as we know the existence of any mind distinct from our own minds. 'We may even assert,' Berkeley says, 'that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men; because the effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents.'

On the causes  
of error.

## CHAP. XIII.

Against Col-  
lins on Free  
Thinking.

Berkeley visited England in 1713, and was introduced by Swift to the Court of Queen Anne, and to the celebrated men of that time. Anthony Collins had just published his 'Discourse on Free Thinking,' which had provoked the polemical spirit of the whole body of the militant clergy. Berkeley, still young, and eager to help in the defence of the faith, tried his skill on the famous Deist. In the 'Guardian' of March, 1713, he published 'Remarks on Collins's Discourse.' There is nothing in this paper to indicate that Berkeley was capable of taking a comprehensive or liberal view of the controversy raised by the Deists. There is the same prejudice in favour of his order which was characteristic of Swift, and the same disposition that was manifested by Bentley to ascribe to Collins a malicious intention. The spirit of the paper was to show the free-thinkers as little mercy as we would show to an assassin or a dangerous beast of prey. It is probable that this was only a mode of writing, and that the men who adopted it did not mean the half of what they said.

Papers in the  
'Guardian.'

This paper was the first of a series which Berkeley contributed to the 'Guardian.' They all relate to the subject of free-thinking, and contain some good remarks. But they are disfigured by that levity of style and that affected wit in which it was then too common to treat religious questions. The second essay is on 'The Natural Grounds to expect a Future State.' The argument is the universal appetite for immortality, which we cannot suppose to have been given us if it was never to be satisfied. The third essay is on 'The Pineal Gland of a Free-Thinker,' in which Berkeley makes some jests over the littleness of the soul of Anthony Collins. The allusion is to Descartes' theory of the seat of the soul being in the pineal gland.

'Alciphron, or  
the Minute  
Philosopher.'

'Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher,' contains Berkeley's systematic defence of Christianity against the Deists. It was published in 1732, four years before Butler's Analogy, just at the very climax of the Deist controversy. The 'Minute Philosopher' is the free-thinker, who is to appear in the various lights of atheist, libertine, enthusiast, scorner, critic, metaphysician, fatalist, and sceptic. This announcement prefixed to the work intimates that there is

not to be that freedom from personal references to the Deists, and insinuations as to their lives and characters, which gives such great dignity to the treatise of Bishop Butler. A free-thinker, supposed to be Collins, is said to have found out 'a demonstration against the being of a God.' The minute philosopher himself is made to trace his mental history, in which he begins as a Latitudinarian, and ends as an Atheist. The Deists are proved to own no providence, no spirit, no moral duty. There is indeed an intimation that the general character given to the Deists is not applicable to every one of them, but the tone of all the remarks is that the whole race of free-thinkers were on the high road to Atheism. Many persons of both sexes, who had been trained in the 'minute philosophy,' are represented as filling the fashionable world with licentiousness, and dying in debauchery. The only writer who really advocated vice on principle was Mandeville, and it is a question if he can be called a Deist. Shaftesbury, on the other hand, drew all his arguments from the fact of a moral sense in man, and that virtue was the welfare of the race. Berkeley refutes Shaftesbury by maintaining the insufficiency of a mere sense of virtue without the sanction of a future life. Honour among unbelievers is compared to honesty among pirates, something confined to themselves, but against which every one else should be on his guard.

The interest of Berkeley's treatise is the application of his philosophy to the defence of religion. Alciphron, regarded as an Atheist, is presented by another speaker in the dialogue with arguments for the being of God. These are that the manifestations of mind throughout the universe show a living agent as clearly as the works of a man show a human mind. It is the mind of which we are cognizant. Creation cannot be separated from mind. It does not exist, but as it is connected with mind. God speaks to man by sensible signs as plainly as men speak to each other, and the same evidence which we have of the existence of other men we have of the existence of God. The doctrine of Bishop Brownie that we only know God by analogy is again refuted. Our knowledge of God is immediate, and wisdom and goodness in Him are the same in kind as wisdom and goodness in us. The argu-

The Evidences of Christianity.

CHAP. XIII. — ments for Christianity are its tendency to good, its superiority to all other religions, and its natural harmony with all which our minds tell us is conducive to the proper well-being of man. But the final proof that it has really come from God is found in miracles and the fulfilment of prophecies. The evidence we have that miracles were really wrought is as good as the evidence we have for anything which happened such a long time ago. They are recorded by eye-witnesses in books declared canonical by a Council which probably had reasons for the genuineness of the Gospels unknown to us. Some collateral proofs are added, as, for example, the testimonies of profane writers, which show that the world was created about the time ascribed to creation in Genesis. It is admitted that finally faith rests on probability; and, to obviate any objections, it is shown that it is on probability that a man commits his health to the care of a physician.

The virtues  
of tar-water.

Berkeley's 'Siris, or Philosophical Reflections, and Inquiries concerning the Virtues of Tar-water' contains his philosophy in its final development. By the time this treatise was written he had studied the history of philosophy, and was able to trace clearly the form of theology which was its lawful result. As nothing but mind existed in the universe, and that mind was God, it followed that the universe so far as it had reality was God. The relation between God and created minds is never explained; but phenomena or matter being no reality, that which gives it substance is mind. It seems a burlesque on the whole of this philosophy to make it find its consummation in the divinity of tar-water. But tar-water, in Berkeley's judgment, was the universal remedy for all the ills to which human flesh is heir. As everything has in it something divine, much more must that 'acid spirit or vegetable soul,' which is extracted from tar by the help of water. It is charged with that invisible firelight, or æther, which is the vital spirit of the universe. The mind which governs and actuates this mundane system is the proper real Agent or Cause. Berkeley found that in this, his philosophy was nearly identical with that of many of the ancient philosophers. The Pythagoreans, the Platonists, and especially the Neo-Platonists, may have meant by their soul of the world, or

their doctrine of spirit pervading nature, the same thing as Berkeley meant by invisible fire, or vital æther. This theology may be called Pantheism. It is so in the sense in which that word is often used. But it is not so in the sense that the phenomenal world is uncaused. Berkeley excludes all causation except that which proceeds from mind. The Divine Being works immediately. He is present always and everywhere executing His own laws. The universe is not a clock which is wound up at intervals, or repaired when it is disordered by long exercise. It is a phenomenon caused by the immediate activity of God. It is the manifestation of His presence not less now than on the first day of creation.\*

Andrew Baxter's 'Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul' was written in answer to Berkeley. Baxter took in Hobbes at the same time as representing the other extreme, which denies all existence except matter. Berkeley was certain of the existence of spirit, but could never reach that of matter. Hobbes was certain of the existence of matter, but could never reach that of spirit. They both believed that one substance only constituted the all of existence. Baxter, on the other hand, undertook to demonstrate that there were two substances in the universe, one matter and one spirit. The first has no active power. The second is the power which puts matter in motion. Berkeley said, that by expelling matter he had expelled with it all the absurdities of Atheism. Baxter answered that the Atheists were sufficiently refuted when it was shown that matter was a substance destitute of motion. He then defends the theory which we have already met in Newton, Bentley, and Clarke, that God is present as an immaterial Spirit in all nature,

Andrew  
Baxter on the  
Human Soul.

\* There is no necessity for more than a notice of Berkeley's 'Analyst,' addressed to Dr. Halley, an 'infidel mathematician.' Berkeley was to prove that mathematicians who rejected mysteries in religion, yet received corresponding mysteries in mathematics. The argument was derived from Newton's doctrine of fluxions, which, when resolved into their first principles, involve conceptions that surpass the human understanding.

Newton's doctrine is now abandoned; in fact, it was so by himself in his later years. For the controversy evoked by the 'Analyst,' and the whole history and connection of the different parts of Berkeley's philosophy, the reader must consult Professor Fraser's charming biography of Berkeley in the edition of his works recently printed at the Clarendon Press in Oxford.



CHAP. XIII. not merely superintending, but working actively and immediately. Matter can do nothing. It has no faculties, either inherent or acquired. If, as Locke supposed, it were endowed by God with the power of thinking, it would cease to be matter. The soul is a simple immaterial substance, and in its nature immortal. It is admitted that the argument is equally valid as to the souls of brutes.

The existence of matter inferred from the idea.

Baxter derived his arguments for the Being of God from the existence of matter. Of this existence, he says, Berkeley denied the possibility. But as we have the idea of matter, its existence cannot be impossible. God does not give us ideas of things that cannot possibly exist. It is difficult to demonstrate absolutely the existence of anything that is not in itself a necessary being. But this is no reason for denying that it exists. The existence of soul or mind might be denied for the same reason as the existence of matter. We are percipient of nothing but our own perceptions and ideas with respect to the soul of another man, any more than with respect to the body of another man. If we believe that souls exist because God excites in us the idea of them, we use the same argument which Samuel Clarke used for the existence of matter. But if we conclude that our perceptions perceive nothing but themselves, we cannot know that there is a God, for He is either not perceived, or He is but a perception in the mind of man.

Bishop Warburton's 'Divine Legation of Moses.'

In 1738, two years after the appearance of Butler's 'Analogy,' William Warburton published the first volume of 'The Divine Legation of Moses.' This work was also due to the Deist controversy. It proposed to deal directly with but one subject, yet the author found opportunities not only to refute the Deists, but to discourse of everything and everybody. The Deists are reported to have said that the omission of any mention of a future life in the books of Moses is an argument that Moses was not sent by God. Warburton, on the other hand, raised an argument for the divine mission of Moses from the very fact that the Mosaic institution had no reference to a future life. For the demonstration of this thesis he wrote elaborate dissertations, which, with considerable ingenuity, he tacked on to the machinery of his argument. Sykes quotes the words of one



of his friends, who described 'The Divine Legation' as a learned romance, the digressions of which, about the mysteries, the hieroglyphics, and the book of Job, were 'so many ingenious novels, which serve to relieve or divert the reader.' Warburton, however, was evidently serious in his argument. He really supposed that he was settling for ever the question of revelation. His contemporaries were all reviewed, and the great divines of that age were proved to have contributed to further the progress of Deism.

The argument from the omission of a future state in the economy of Moses, Warburton classes under the head of internal evidence. It is an argument drawn, not from the history, but from the contents of revelation. Internal evidence in any higher sense he scarcely seems able to understand. But so far as this went, he differed from most of the evidence writers by making the internal evidence of more importance than the external. By its very nature it is perpetual, and fitted for all ages and occasions. But external evidence, by length of time, was subject to weakness and decay. Hitherto the internal had been used only as introductory to the external. By the one they showed that Christianity was worthy of being reckoned divine. By the other they proved that it really was divine. Warburton's argument was to carry the internal to the height of which it is capable, even 'moral demonstration.'

Two errors are met by the way: one is a common notion that the truth of Christianity is independent of the Jewish dispensation; the other, that the Jewish religion cannot be proved but on the truth of the Christian. The first error is the 'Socinian notion' that Christianity is only the republication of the religion of nature. This error was due to difficulties, now to be removed, connected with the Jewish dispensation. Warburton keeps in view three classes of persons:—The first is the Deists, to whom the special argument is addressed from the omission of a future state in the Mosaic economy; the second is the Jews, whom the omission of this doctrine obliges to look for a more perfect revelation; the third is the Socinians, to whom it is to be shown that if Christianity be only a republication of the religion of nature, it neither agrees with itself nor with Judaism.

## CHAP. XIII.

The Jews  
ignorant of a  
future life.

The main argument rests on these three propositions: First, That the doctrine of future rewards and punishments is necessary for the well-being of society; second, that all mankind have thought so; and, third, that the Mosaic dispensation is without this doctrine. The inference from these three propositions is that the law of Moses must be divine. A religion and civil commonwealth not supported by the doctrine of a future life, must depend on an extraordinary Providence. Moses would not have omitted the doctrine of future rewards and punishments if he had not believed that the nation was under the immediate government of God. In all Utopian states, from the Republic of Plato to that of the Lilliputians, rewards and punishments are the hinges of governments. But in actual governments there is no possibility of executing these sanctions. The state can only touch public transgressions. Private injuries escape its cognizance. To restrain the natural violence of men, there must be belief in a future state, and an Omniscient Judge who will reward or punish all men according to their actual merits or demerits.

The doctrine  
necessary for  
society.

The acknowledgment of this fact is found in the old argument against religion, that it was invented for a political purpose. There were, however, unbelievers who denied the civil utility of religion. Bayle thought that society was possible on principles of Atheism. Warburton refutes Bayle; and at the same time Cudworth, Clarke, Shaftesbury, and all who supposed morality was of perpetual obligation, independently of the Divine will. He does not deny the existence of a moral sense, but he denies its sufficiency for obligation without a Divine command. It is not man's nature to follow virtue without reference to self-interest. The well-being of society can only be secured by a religion which proposes rewards for obedience to morality founded on will.

Proved by  
many argu-  
ments.

The second proposition, that all men have believed that future rewards and punishments are necessary to the well-being of society, is proved by many arguments, and supported by long digressions and learned dissertations. The ancient lawgivers never omitted religion when they imposed laws. It was so universally associated with government in old times that Plutarch supposes religion had its origin from

the founders of states. Every commonwealth, with the exception of that of the Jews, was founded on the belief of future rewards and punishments. Cicero and Seneca argued for the immortality of the soul from the consent of all nations and peoples. The first deities among the Pagans were departed kings and lawgivers. The first nation whose civil government was perfect was the Egyptians; and of them Herodotus says that 'they were the first who built altars, and erected statues and temples to the gods.' All ancient legislators pretended to be sent from God; and all Pagan religions regarded chiefly the interests of society. The object of the institution of the ancient mysteries was to confirm this belief in a future state. The testimonies of many of the philosophers are quoted in evidence that society cannot exist without the doctrine of future rewards and punishments. The lawgivers themselves may not have believed the doctrine, but they believed it necessary for the welfare of the state. Even Shaftesbury acknowledges that 'among the vulgar a devil or a hell may prevail where a jail and gallows are thought insufficient.'

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The third proposition, that the doctrine of a future life is no part of the Mosaic dispensation, is the subject of the later books of 'The Divine Legation.' Before coming to the direct proof of this proposition, Warburton, in a dissertation on the antiquity of Egypt, explains the relation between the polity of the Egyptians and that of the Jews. The similarity had been used as an argument against the Divine mission of Moses. The argument had been answered by a denial of the premises, when in reality the only thing to be denied was the conclusion. Spencer, however, wiser than the rest of our divines, found the reasons of the Jewish ceremonial in the rites and superstitions of the Egyptians. The laws of Moses, according to Warburton, were instituted in compliance with the prejudices of the people, and, in some cases, to wean them from Egyptian superstition. These circumstances are really a confirmation of the Divine mission of Moses.

Relation between Jewish polity and Egyptian institutions.

The Jewish commonwealth was the union of two societies, one civil and one religious. Of this commonwealth, God was the Ruler. The object of the Jewish economy was the

Jewish commonwealth a theocracy.

CHAP. XIII. preservation of the doctrine of the Divine unity in the midst of idolatry and Polytheism. The constitution in Church and State was settled by God Himself. Whether under kings or judges, Judaism was still a theocracy. This kind of government was necessary for the object. It is only a theocracy that can justly enforce penal laws in matters of opinion. A theocracy means an extraordinary Providence, extending not merely to the whole state, but also to individuals. In the Mosaic economy rewards and punishments were the immediate consequences of evil actions. The sanctions of religion were not future. They were temporal, not eternal. The Jews were to have, as the rewards of obedience, peace, prosperity, and length of days. At the dedication of the Temple, Solomon prayed only for temporal blessings. In Isaiah, the consequences of well-doing are fruitful fields. In Jeremiah, the results of evil-doing are the destruction of the vines and the fig-trees. The prophets are not only silent concerning a future life, but they positively declare that the Jews expected no such thing. The woman of Tekoa said to David, 'We must needs die, and are as water spilt on the dry ground, which cannot be gathered up again.' Job says, 'As the cloud is consumed and vanisheth away, so he that goeth down to the grave shall come up no more.' And again, 'There is hope of a tree if it be cut down that it will sprout again; but man dieth and wasteth away. Yea, man giveth up the ghost, and where is he?' Christianity has no temporal rewards. These were confined to Judaism. The passage in Job about the Redeemer is interpreted of a temporal deliverer. The book of Job is a drama probably written by Ezra, and so a fair reflection of the spirit of the Mosaic institution. The leaders and patriarchs of the Jews may have looked for a heavenly city, but the people had only temporal promises. The prophets had no commission to teach them anything concerning a future state. This was reserved for the ministry of Jesus.

Warburton's  
opponents.

The main argument of 'The Divine Legation' was assailed by many writers. It was universally denied that the Jews were ignorant of a future life. Dr. Stebbing, in an examination of Warburton's second proposition, reasoned that, even granting a future life were no part of the Mosaic

institution, it was yet known to the Jews through the Patriarchs. Moses described Jacob's life as a pilgrimage. Enoch was translated to his reward. The covenant with Abraham implied a life after the present life. That the old fathers did not look for transitory promises was shown from many evident intimations in the Old Testament, and from express declarations in the New. Dr. Lowth and Dr. Zachary Grey disputed Warburton's opinion of the character and age of the book of Job. Dr. Pococke, the traveller, dissented from the interpretation of the Egyptian hieroglyphics. Warburton said that they stood for things, not for words. Pococke said that they did not stand for things, but for sounds. John Tillard proved that the ancient philosophers were believers in a future life. Dr. Sykes disputed Warburton's account of the theocracy of the Jews, of the double doctrine ascribed to the old philosophers, and some other points of smaller importance. Warburton's view of the ancient mysteries was ridiculed by Gibbon, and a literary clergyman of the name of William Webster refuted the whole of 'The Divine Legation.' All these refuted Warburton; and Warburton, in return, proved them all to be 'rascals' and 'vagabonds.'

In the works of Dr. Sykes we have a view of the evidences of Christianity from a stand-point different from that of any of the other opponents of the Deists. Besides his reply to Collins, Sykes wrote two elaborate works expressly on the evidences. The first was published in 1740, and was called 'The Principles and Connection of Natural and Revealed Religion distinctly considered.' The complaint, Sykes says, is very common that all religion grows daily into disrepute. The cause is that natural religion is not understood, and that the religion of Christ is not set forth in the light in which it ought to be. He is to show that both are strictly rational and deserving the attention of every serious man. Christianity is built on the foundation of natural religion. Both have the same end; but Christianity offers more motives and more reasons than natural religion to obtain that end. The arguments for natural religion are in substance the same as those of Clarke and Wollaston. Nature prescribes a rule of action to all rational creatures. They desire to be happy, and

CHAP. XIII. happiness is connected with moral virtue. So far, we have morality, and an obligation to follow it. But we know by reason that there is a God; and this knowledge introduces us to other relations and other duties, or, at least, to other motives for the same duties. Hence, we have religion, or the performance of the duties of our station, from the fact of believing that there is a God. Religion thus comprehends all morality, and is a great motive to lead men to practise it. It is not, however, limited to morality. It may embrace such duties as prayer, praise, and thanksgiving, which are not mere ceremonies, but real duties arising from our relation to God.

Revelation a  
light in addi-  
tion to that  
of nature.

Revealed religion makes known more of these relations, and, as it were, adds a new light to the light of nature. The most common objection to the Christian revelation is its want of universality. But this holds good also against natural religion. The whole natural world is not alike fertile. Every land does not flow with milk and honey. All men have not equal health or equal length of days. There are some nations in barbarous ignorance who have not even an idea of God. But supposing that we could not account for this want of universality in revelation, we ought still to weigh the actual evidence. If this is strong and clear, revelation cannot be given up merely because it is not universal. But there are no principles of morality, or natural religion, which may not be known by natural reason without revelation. If men, therefore, do not know them, it is their own fault. Those who have not revelation, have no right to complain. God has done His part. He is not obliged to be equal with His favours any more than to make all lands equally fertile. It is not impossible that in the life to come there may be different states and degrees of happiness corresponding to the use which men have made of their advantages in this life. 'Those who have no light, or those who through a faulty education; through strong and earnest prejudices which they could never overcome, fall into great mistakes and errors—those, I say, need not be miserable, nor yet be placed in that station where the most wise and virtuous shall be placed. As they live for ages, they may go on from glory to glory, till at length they reach the highest state of blessedness.' If this supposition is possible,



the necessity that all should have the same privileges in this life no longer exists. CHAP. XIII.

Revelation rests on authority. What it reveals is not to be judged by reason; but there must be no contradiction between the revelation and what reason already knows to be true. That God, for instance, will judge the world by Jesus Christ can only be known by revelation; but there is nothing in this inconsistent with reason. Everything revealed must be rational, otherwise it would be incredible. That of which we have no idea is nothing to us. For matters of history and moral truth the writers of the Scriptures were left to their natural knowledge. Their inspiration only extended to things extraordinary. Sykes was perhaps the first English writer on evidences who saw that supernatural facts could not rest on ordinary evidence. The common argument was that the facts of Christianity are as well attested as other facts in history, and this was supposed to be sufficient. But where the matter is miraculous, the credibility is less, and therefore there is need of greater evidence. This Sykes found in prophecy. Miracles might have been wrought in past times, but they were evidence only to those who saw them. We have only testimony that they were miracles. But when we find that the persons who are said to have wrought these miracles made predictions of things to come, and that these predictions have been since fulfilled, we may also believe that they wrought miracles. In common history, the evidence of facts becomes less the greater the distance from the time when they happened. But in a series of prophecies the evidence constantly increases as the predictions are fulfilled. This kind of evidence we have in the Scriptures. Isaiah prophesied of Ephraim, that within three-score and five years it should not be a people. This was fulfilled thirteen years after, when Samaria was taken by Shalmenezer. Some of the people were then left in the land, but their entire extirpation was in the time of Esarhaddon, exactly three-score and five years after the prophecy. We have similar predictions in the prophets concerning Babylon, Tyre, and Egypt, all of which have been fulfilled. Daniel foretold the rise of the Papacy, out of the ten kingdoms into which the Roman empire was to be divided. These kingdoms were represented

Rests on  
authority.



CHAP. XIII. by ten horns, three of which were to be plucked up by a little horn. This little horn is the Papacy, and the three kingdoms over which the Pope gained dominion were the exarchate of Ravenna, the kingdom of the Lombards, and the state of Rome. In the New Testament we have the predictions of the destruction of Jerusalem and the dispersion of the Jews until the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled. To this day the Jews remain a distinct people, though scattered in all lands. It was also foretold that Christians should fall into idolatry, worshipping demons; that there should be a great Apostasy; and the description of this Apostasy corresponds to what the Church of Rome has become. Were the evidence of miracles to decrease, yet the evidence from prophecy would continually increase, 'because we have a series of prophecies that extend to the end of the world.'

Prophecy the  
main argu-  
ment.

In resting the main link of the evidence of Christianity on prophecy, Sykes was obliged to maintain that the prophets did not speak obscurely or ambiguously, and that the fulfilment of these prophecies was not figurative, but literal. Prophecy is given that, when the event comes, men may infer a certainty concerning God's intention. If a prediction were to relate to many events, no one could say when it was accomplished. The many meanings which some people find in Scripture have no more foundation than the double senses which some critics discover in Homer and Virgil. To those who say that the writers of the New Testament find double senses in the Old, Sykes answers that they only made citations. Where there was any similitude of circumstances they introduced the citations, with the words, 'that it might be fulfilled.'

Revelation  
not unneces-  
sary because  
of the suf-  
ficiency of  
reason.

Though revelation is something in addition to the religion of nature, it does not follow that the exaltation of the sufficiency of reason as a rule of life implies that revelation was to be set aside as unnecessary. Those who deny the sufficiency of reason should mention some point of morality or duty which is not written in men's hearts, or not discoverable by reason. It is not enough to name a particular mistake of Cicero, or any ancient moralist, or to declaim upon the weakness of reason from the ignorance of savages. It is also a useless distinction which some make that reason is 'remotely,'

but not 'proximately,' sufficient. Arguments of this kind against the sufficiency of reason, hold equally against the sufficiency of revelation. Amidst all the uses or benefits of revelation, 'if we look into the Christian world we shall find idolatry and superstition in all its forms little inferior to what it was in the heathen world; vices and immoralities are shamelessly practised in Rome Christian, as in Rome heathen.\*' Revelation gives no rule of morality, prescribes no duty towards God which is unknown to natural reason. Its province is to enforce by new motives the duties already known. It reveals facts concerning the kingdom of Christ and an invisible world; and from this additional knowledge presents fresh reasons for virtue and religion. Revelation is doubtless a great privilege, but it is not absolutely necessary to the future happiness of mankind;† and, therefore, it is not necessary that it be universal. Men shall be judged according to the measure of light which has been given them.

After showing the importance of natural religion, and putting revelation in what he regarded as its true light, Sykes answered some of the popular objections of the Deists. One was that Christians are divided concerning every precept or institution of Christianity. It was argued that if revelation had been given, there would have been no dispute concerning its meaning. The answer is, that the really important doctrines of Christianity, those which concern actual life, are not subjects of debate among Christians. The things disputed are speculative doctrines, which are not expressly revealed. The objection is equally valid against natural religion. Every principle of morality has been debated in the schools. But we do not, therefore, infer that there is no such thing as truth. Tindal had urged against the Scriptures that they sanction cruelty and immorality. His arguments were from the sacrifice of Jephtha's daughter and the extirpation of the Canaanites. Sykes denies that Jephtha's daughter was sacrificed. In fulfilment of her father's vow she was given to the service of the priests. The command to extirpate the Canaanites was limited to the destruction of the polity of the seven nations.

Objections of  
the Deists  
answered.

\* P. 242.

† P. 278.

CHAP. XIII. In 1742, Sykes published 'A Brief Discourse concerning the Credibility of Miracles and Revelation.' He acknowledged that some of the writings of the Deists showed great ability, and required to be carefully answered. This treatise was intended as a supplement to the other, and Sykes did not wish to assume the attitude of finding fault with the defences of other Christian writers; but he thought that he had found a more satisfactory method of answering the Deists. He was to vindicate the Christian religion in a 'consistent, rational manner,' and show that there was nothing in it absurd or incredible.

On the Credibility of Miracles.

Only two religions profess to be founded on miracles.

There are only two religions that profess to be founded on miracles—Christianity and Judaism. It is true that many of the religions of antiquity professed to be revelations from Heaven; but none of them ever pretended to be established by miracles. The word miracle is often used in an improper sense. A wonder, an omen, a dream, a prodigy, any unusual event is called a miracle. In the same way we speak of the wonders of creation, and call it a miracle that the planets move in circles and do not fly off at tangents. It is common also to describe anomalies or irregularities as miracles. But a miracle proper is a designed effect, sensible, unusual in itself, beyond the art or power of man to do.\* It may be the work of any being superior to man. Into the definition of miracle, Sykes expressly refuses to put 'above, or beside, or contrary to the order of nature.' A miracle in itself may be agreeable to the course of nature, though not the course of nature known to us. A man cannot fly through the air or walk upon the water, but an angel, for instance, might help him to do either without violating any law of nature.

The doctrine established by miracles must be worthy of God.

The doctrine established by a miracle must be consistent with goodness, mercy, truth, and all the other attributes of God. These are tests by which a man may judge whether or not the doctrine is from God, and so the miracle to be believed. There is a general prejudice against receiving a miracle; because the more unusual anything is, the more improbable it is. The general principle is granted to be right, yet there may be evidence stronger than the improba-

bility. The persons who, in Scripture, are said to have wrought miracles had also the spirit of prophecy. They foretold events, the truth of which is a confirmation of their miracles. Prophecy is a standing perpetual miracle, wrought before men's eyes. The miracles of the Jansenists, at the tomb of the Abbé Paris, differ in many things from the miracles of the Gospel. But supposing that the former were real miracles, it is not even alleged that they were wrought to confirm any doctrine. They might be equally miracles with those in the Gospels, yet they prove nothing. But in Christianity the miracles are connected with a doctrine, which is useful and agreeable to reason.

The second part of David Hartley's 'Observations on Man' may also be classed among books on the evidences. The first part treats of the senses and the intellect. The second starts with an admission of the difficulties both in natural and revealed religion, expressing a hope that they may be lessened by a consideration of our frame and constitution. Something must have existed from eternity, for we cannot conceive of a time when there was nothing. An infinite succession of finite dependent beings is impossible, and therefore we conclude that there must be an infinite and independent Being. This Being must have infinite power and knowledge, for these are necessary to the very conception of His existence. We have many evidences of this in creation, but the most satisfactory is the impossibility of conceiving the universe to be finite. Our minds declare it infinite, and an infinite universe can only be the effect of a cause infinite in power and knowledge. The existence of evil may seem in the way of our believing in God's infinite benevolence. But as He is infinite in power and knowledge, He must be infinitely benevolent or infinitely malevolent. The predominance of happiness over misery forbids the latter supposition, and every argument which excludes infinite malevolence proves the infinite benevolence of God. Many things convince us that the present constitution of the world is on the whole the best. The tendency of benevolence is to augment itself without limits, but that of malevolence ultimately to destroy itself. Several other propositions follow, supported by much the same arguments as in Samuel

David Hartley's 'Observations on Man.'

CHAP. XIII. Clarke's Lectures. It is admitted that man is free practically, but it is proved that in a philosophical sense he is a necessary agent.

On Evidences  
of Chris-  
tianity.

The truth of the Christian religion is established by proving the genuineness of the books of the Old and New Testament, their authenticity and Divine authority. If the books are genuine, their authenticity follows almost of necessity. It is very rare to meet with genuine historical writings in which the facts are not true. In this case the writers were contemporary with the events recorded; these were of great importance, and the moral character of the writers gives us the best assurance that they wrote what they believed to be correct. If the genuineness of the books be a sufficient evidence for the common facts, the miraculous must also be allowed, because of their close connection with the others. The Divine authority of the books is also deduced from their genuineness. The book of Daniel, for instance, if genuine, must be of Divine authority, because it contains unquestionable evidence of the Divine foreknowledge. The same is true of other books which contain prophecies. The truth of the principal facts will also establish the Divine authority of the books, such as the miracles and prophecies of Christ and His apostles. Many arguments are brought forward for the genuineness of the Scriptures, the sum of which is that the evidence is as good as for the genuineness of books in general.

On the Rule of  
Life.

After treating of the evidences of Natural and Revealed religion, Hartley adds a chapter on 'The Rule of Life.' This is found in the practice of mankind, but more correctly in the common opinions of mankind. It is universally agreed that virtue is happiness in the present life, and that it has the best prospect for the life to come. It is advantageous to society and in harmony with man's nature. Many duties of religion and morality derived from man's constitution are confirmed by Scripture. It is shown to be probable from reason that the whole human race will be ultimately restored to complete happiness. The infinite goodness of God is a pledge of this, and it is confirmed by the fact that all suffering is a means to final good. In the conclusion, Hartley notices some of the things which at that

time threatened ruin and destruction to Christendom. One of these was 'the growth of atheism and infidelity,' and another, 'the worldly-mindedness of the clergy, and their gross neglect in the discharge of their proper functions.' Even the women had ceased to believe Christianity, and the prospect for the next generation was dark indeed.

Deism had made its great triumph in the publication of Tindal's 'Christianity as old as Creation.' The distinction which Lord Herbert had made between moral truth and traditional or revealed religion had been received in different degrees by nearly all men on both sides. Revelation, so far as it was not identical with natural religion, rested on another basis, and, according as men estimated this basis, they were classed as Deists or Christians. Many subordinate questions came up for discussion in the course of controversy, but all were related to the original question concerning the comparative certainty of moral truth, and the system of dogmatic theology, supposed to be drawn from the Scriptures. Deists and Christians were not always separated from each other by a very distinct line. There were Deists whose Deism embraced Christianity, and there were Christians whose Christianity impinged on Deism.

After Tindal, there were two writers of some celebrity, who belonged to the class which we shall call Christian Deists. These were, Thomas Morgan and Thomas Chubb. The first was a Dissenting minister, and is said to have connected himself with different sects, but none of them could tolerate his views of Christianity. He wrote a book called 'The Moral Philosopher,' which was followed by the usual number of replies and defences. It was in the form of a dialogue between Philalethes, a 'Christian Deist,' and Theophanes, a 'Christian Jew.' The speakers are both professedly Christians, but the one is a liberal Christian and the other is orthodox. The 'Christian Deist' is the chief speaker, and expresses the views of the author. The 'Moral Philosopher' is not one of the ablest of the Deistical works, but it has the advantage of coming after the great controversy had been nearly exhausted. In the preface, Morgan thanks those who defended Christianity against the Deists for their resting religion 'upon moral truth, reason, and

The triumph  
of Deism.

Thomas Mor-  
gan.



CHAP. XIII. the fitness of things.' On this foundation alone it is secure and defensible. But the defenders of Christianity who have done this have not given satisfaction to orthodox Christians. The real conflict is, therefore, within the very fold of Christianity itself. Morgan gives an account of a society which had long met to discuss these questions. The members had come to the conclusion that moral truth cannot be altered by any law whatever, that it is the only criterion of any doctrine as coming from God, that the 'gifts' of the apostolic age were not annexed to moral character, and that infallibility belongs only to God. They did not deny that doctrines or precepts might come by inspiration or by authentic testimony of those who were immediately inspired; but revealed religion must always be the same as natural, and the reasonableness and fitness of the doctrines must ever be the test of their coming from God.

On Revelation  
and Reason.

The two speakers begin by trying to affix definite meanings to such words as Deism, Christianity, Revelation, and Inspiration. Theophanes admits that revealed religion must not be opposed to the religion of nature. Christianity he calls revealed religion, as distinguished from natural; or the revealed truths and doctrines of revelation as contained in the books of the Old and New Testament. Philaethes says that he would be satisfied with this definition if the doctrines and truths supposed to be revealed in the Scriptures were sufficiently clear and intelligible to men of honesty and integrity with ordinary capacity and attention. But this is so far from being the case, that Jews would never admit the sense which Christians have always put upon the writings of Moses and the Prophets. Moreover, Christians themselves have never been able to agree about the sense of their revelation. They are divided as to the most important doctrines. The most learned and impartial inquirers, after all their researches, have been unable to agree about such doctrines as the Trinity, the pre-existence of Christ, His incarnation, His miraculous conception, and His death, as a sacrifice of propitiation or atonement for sin. The question then returns, What is that revealed religion which is distinguished from natural religion?—what are its fundamental doctrines?—and what is



the definite sense of the Scriptures concerning these doctrines? If mistakes are so easily made concerning the doctrines of revelation, it cannot surely be that any of them are fundamental or necessary. Theophanes thinks that the obligation is ended if every one would earnestly study the Scriptures, and believe such doctrines as, after honest inquiry, he found to be there. But Philalethes answers that it is strange God should reveal a religion which is to be understood in as many different senses as there are different capacities or ways of thinking among men. That would be to make a vast number of religions. This word religion, he adds, is abused by being applied to such abstract, intricate, and merely speculative points, which men may either believe or not believe.

The first question earnestly discussed concerns the Levitical law. Philalethes says that he has St. Paul on his side when he maintains that it was not originally of Divine institution. The apostle calls it carnal, the law of ordinances, beggarly elements, and the rudiments of this world. It was a yoke of bondage which neither the Jews of Paul's time nor their fathers were able to bear. Such a law could not surely be a Divine revelation. St. Paul does not condemn merely the Jewish abuses of the law, but expressly the law itself. He preached a new doctrine contrary to that of Moses and the prophets. Moses gave to the people the ceremonial as well as the moral law, for a perpetual standing ordinance, an everlasting constitution and covenant between God and them throughout all the generations. St. Paul, on the other hand, says that the law was temporary. Moses, in positive and express terms, established propitiations and atonements for sin by the blood of beasts. When the priest sprinkled the sacrificial blood, the atonement was made, and the offence forgiven. But St. Paul declares that it was impossible for the blood of bulls or goats to take away sin. Christ and His apostles gave Moses and the prophets a figurative or allegorical sense. This was in accordance with a custom that had arisen among the Jews in the time of Ezra, and was now everywhere received. Christ and His apostles, especially St. Paul, reasoned with the Jews upon their own principles. St. Paul showed great prudence and

On the Levitical law.

CHAP. XIII. policy, but he was very decided against the law of Moses, and became the leader of the liberal or free-thinking party in the early Church. He defended reason against authority and superstition. Peter took the side of the Judaizing Christians, but Paul contended for freedom and deliverance from the tyranny of the old law.

On Inspira-  
tion.

The sharp opposition which Philalethes makes between the two parties in the Apostolic Church evokes from Theophanes the remark that, in this case, it was impossible they could have been all inspired, and under the infallible direction of the Holy Ghost. Philalethes' answer is that there was no such pretence in early times. The apostles never supposed themselves infallible. This was the wild claim of the Church of Rome in after ages. In the apostolic times Christians were at liberty to exercise the common principles of reason and human prudence. The extraordinary gifts of the apostles did not make them infallible, and the power of working miracles had no connection with the truth of their doctrines.

But, even supposing they had been infallibly inspired, that which was revealed to them could not have been certified to us, except so far as it was capable of proof by its own nature. The communication of anything beyond what we know by reason and conscience coming to us at second hand is not revelation but tradition. As the apostles neither were nor professed to be infallible, nothing which they taught of a positive or ritual character could have the same obligation as moral truth. At the most it is only probable that it was received from God. Traditional religion, depending on history and human authority, has always been different in different ages and countries. Even in the same age, and country, and church, men could never agree about it. If, then, this be religion, no two thinking men in the world are of the same religion. Philalethes adds, 'I take Christianity to be that most complete and perfect scheme of moral truth and righteousness, which was first preached to the world by Christ and His apostles, and from them conveyed down to us under its own evidence of immutable rectitude, wisdom, and reason. This definition, as I imagine, takes in all that is essential to Chris-

tianity, or that can be received or allowed as a constituent part of it.'\* CHAP. XIII.

Philalethes ascribes the origin of positive and ritual religion entirely to the clergy. They have even perverted the sacraments to serve their own interests. Baptism was a rite which Jesus found already in the Jewish Church. He appropriated it as the initiatory rite of the new covenant, but he never limited its administration to be by the clergy only. Among the Jews, the priests had nothing to do with the corresponding rite of circumcision. As Christ made no new regulations concerning baptism, we ought to understand it according to the practice and custom of the Jews. The other sacrament followed another custom among the Jews. After supper they broke bread, and each one present had a cup of wine. Jesus and His disciples were together at the Passover Supper, after which He followed the usage of breaking a biscuit, and distributing wine to those present. He asked His disciples henceforth to do this as they were to do all other things in His name. It was to be a reminiscence of His death as a martyr, in confirmation of what He taught and of His love to men. Jesus did not administer the Last Supper as a priest, or bishop, or clergyman, but as the Master of the family. The usage became general in the Christian Church. When it got into the hands of the clergy, they first made a 'mystery' of it, and then a 'contradiction.' By a misinterpretation of a passage in John's Gospel they thought the two sacraments necessary to salvation. On this ground they began to baptize little children, and to give them the Eucharist. When the children were weak, or could not swallow the bread, it was thrust down their throats, that, as one of the Councils expressed it, they might not perish for want of the grace of God. It was thought better to choke the innocents than to suffer their souls to be lost.

The great stumbling-block to Philalethes is the atonement. The Jewish religion said that without shedding of blood there is no remission. Christianity, especially as represented by St. Paul, adopted apparently the same maxim. But Philalethes contends that this was merely St. Paul's

\* 'Moral Philosopher,' p. 97, Ed. 1737.

CHAP. XIII. method of bringing the Jews out of their gross ideas. They had such an opinion of propitiatory sacrifices and atonements by blood, that had St. Paul told them in plain terms that they were altogether wrong they would have stoned him. As they thought that God could not be otherwise satisfied, St. Paul did not miss the opportunity to reconcile them to the death of Christ as a common Saviour upon their own principles. He 'put a figurative and allegorical construction upon their legal sacrifices as having only shadowed and typified the great sacrifice of Christ the Messiah.\* It was reasonable and proper that Christ should die in defence of the true religion, but the imputation of His merits or His righteousness is a later addition to His Gospel. After His death there was a general act of grace or indemnity for all past sins, but this was not repeated. All men are to be judged according to their deeds, and rewarded for the good they have done, and not for the death of Christ. Philalethes shows that the Christian world, in giving up Calvinism, has virtually given up the doctrine of satisfaction. The Arminian scheme that Christ did a part, and man another part, or that Christ died that God might forgive, Philalethes calls 'such a composition of truth and falsehood as proved like iron and clay, that would by no means mix and hang together.' †

Morgan answered by Joseph Hallet.

Morgan was answered by Joseph Hallet, junior, one of the Arian Dissenters, in a tract called 'The Immorality of the Moral Philosopher.' Hallet said that Morgan did not treat the Bible with ordinary fairness. His arguments all rested on misapprehensions or perversions of the meaning of Scripture. Instead of giving the facts as recorded by the sacred writers, he often invented history. The Lord's Supper was so far from being a private meal eaten at home, that St. Paul asks those who misused it if they had not houses to eat and to drink in, that they despised the Church of God by making the supper a riotous feast. Morgan said that the sacraments had no relation to the fitness of things, which Hallet answered by maintaining that they had. Christian doctrines, such as the atonement, were shown to be perfectly rational. An interpretation of

\* 'Moral Philosopher,' p. 164.

† Ibid., p. 158.

a text different from what Morgan takes, and, at least, equally as well founded, generally obviates the whole objection. A miraculous revelation was necessary to reveal many things which reason could not discover, and to give authority and certainty to the things which reason did discover. In Morgan's defences of 'The Moral Philosopher,' he showed still more of the spirit of invention. But originality of this kind is dangerous. Hallet had an easy victory by simply showing the natural sense of the Scripture texts on which Morgan had raised his objections. No objection could be made to revelation on the ground of its contents.

Dr. Moses Lowman, another Presbyterian, wrote 'A Dis-

sertation on the Civil Government of the Hebrews,' which was mainly intended as an answer to the 'Moral Philosopher.' Morgan had regarded the religious ordinances of Moses as simply a refinement of the superstitions of Egypt. He called it blasphemy to suppose that they had proceeded from God, and the government which Moses established he described as arbitrary and despotic. In opposition to this, Lowman maintained that the institutions of Moses were intended to wean the Jews from Egyptian superstition; that the Jewish polity was not only worthy of God, but well fitted to preserve the liberties as well as the property of the people. The design of the Mosaic ordinances was to prevent idolatry. The original contract between God and the people was that they were to have great temporal blessings if they kept themselves free from the idolatry of the nations. The reason of this sanction is found in the gain which was supposed to be derived from the worship of the local deities. In Hosea, Israel is represented as going after her lovers for the sake of corn and wine and oil. In Jeremiah, the Jews are described lamenting that after they had ceased to worship the Queen of heaven, they were consumed by famine and the sword. The Hebrews, after their residence in Egypt, were so prone to idolatry that it was necessary to keep them separate from all other nations. Some of the laws which seem very trifling to us were very important to them in their circumstances. The command, for instance, not to round the corners of the head nor to mar the corners

CHAP. XIII.  


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 By Moses  
 Lowman.

CHAP. XIII. of the beard, was a command not to be like the idolatrous priests who did these things to obtain blessings from their idols. The same priests wore garments 'mingled of linen and woollen,' and, therefore, all such garments were forbidden to the Jews. In the worship of Venus the men were dressed as women, and in the worship of Mars the women as men. Hence the command in the laws of Moses that a man was not to wear woman's clothing, nor a woman a man's.\*

Peter Annet  
against Sher-  
lock on the  
Resurrection  
of Jesus.

The controversy concerning the resurrection of Jesus, begun by Woolston, was renewed some years later by a writer who called himself 'A Moral Philosopher.' His treatise was an answer to Sherlock's 'Trial of the Witnesses,' and was called 'The Resurrection of Jesus Considered.' The writer was supposed to be Morgan, but was afterwards found to be Peter Annet, a clergyman who some years later was prosecuted, fined, and put in the pillory for the publication of a periodical called 'The Free Inquirer.' Annet found the accounts of the resurrection in the gospels to be contradictory and improbable. The apostles were not the most suitable persons that might have been chosen for witnesses. The evidence of the soldiers who formed the watch, or of those who were known as Christ's enemies, would have been of infinitely more value. The single testimony of St. Paul had greater effect than that of all the others. Jesus may not have been dead. His bones were not broken, and Joseph of Arimathea was allowed to take away the body. The wound might not have been serious; and, moreover, Jesus was a young man, in whose healthy frame a bodily injury would soon be healed.

Answers to  
Annet.

Sherlock answered Annet in a 'Sequel to the Trial of the Witnesses.' He was also answered by Samuel Chandler, and by an anonymous writer in a tract called 'The Evidence of the Resurrection Cleared.' Annet answered all of them, remarking that, while they all said there was no contradiction in the gospels, yet, in their harmonies they neither agreed with each other nor with the Evangelists. Annet

\* Dr. Morgan was also answered second volume of the 'Moral Philosopher,' and a third in answer to In reply to these he published a Lowman.

met another opponent in Gilbert West, a private gentleman, who had been hitherto considered an unbeliever. West answered all the objections to the history of the resurrection, and added some considerations which confirmed the truth of Christianity. The evidence he showed must have been sufficient to those who were witnesses. We have their testimony confirmed by the very existence of Christianity, which could never have succeeded in the world had the foundation on which it rested been false. The existence of Christianity confirms the resurrection of Jesus in the same way that the existence of shells on mountain tops confirms the truth of the Deluge.\* Sir George Littleton, afterwards Lord Littleton, who had been converted from Deism probably by West, wrote a tract in favour of Christianity, which he called 'Observations on the Conversion and Apostleship of St. Paul.' The argument was, that St. Paul must have been either an impostor or an enthusiast, or that his conversion was a real miracle. It is proved that he was neither an impostor nor an enthusiast, and consequently Christianity was true. Littleton's tract gave another turn to this controversy. Annet wrote 'The History and Character of St. Paul Examined,' in which he questioned the genuineness of St. Paul's epistles. Christian antiquity he described as such a fabricator of falsehoods that no reliance could be placed on its authority.

Thomas Chubb first appeared as an author in the Arian controversy on the side of William Whiston. While a young man, following his trade in Salisbury,† he met Whiston's 'Historical Preface.' He became a convert to Whiston's views, and wrote an essay on the subject for the benefit of some other intelligent persons in Salisbury, in the same rank of life, who had also read the 'Historical Preface.' This essay was not intended for publication, but it was handed about in manuscript, and gave rise to some local controversy. One person who had been convinced by it, had occasion to undertake a journey to London, and proposed submitting it to Whiston's judgment. Soon after, Chubb received from Whiston a letter of approbation, and the

\* P. 410. † He was a journeyman glover, but was partly occupied assisting in a tallow chandler's shop.



CHAP. XIII. essay was given to the public. This was the beginning of a long career of authorship. Chubb, though without learning, was an intelligent man, and, there is every reason to believe, perfectly sincere and honest. Towards the end of his life, when he republished some of his tracts, he said that the reader was not to be surprised if sometimes he differed from himself. His life had been spent in pure investigation, and it was not to be expected that he should always see the same things in the same light. The collection of the earlier tracts was dedicated to Bishop Burnet, the 'vigilant and laborious Diocesan of Sarum.' We are not to suppose that Burnet agreed with any of them, but as yet Chubb was within the limits of at least unorthodox Christianity.

On Arianism.

The first tract contains nothing new after the writings of Clarke and Whiston. It gives eight arguments from Scripture to prove the supremacy of the Father and the inferiority of the Son. These arguments are derived from such passages as those which speak of the Father as committing all judgment to the Son, and the Son as receiving gifts and blessings from the Father. The tract was answered by Dr. Claget, and in a second tract vindicated by the author. But Chubb had not metaphysics enough to be a right Arian. He makes the Word of God to be God the Father; and the Son of God, Christ in His human nature. Another tract is on sin, and especially what is called original sin. The main point is, that the corruption inherited from Adam should not be called sin, as sin implies personal transgression. A similar argument is employed in another tract against imputed righteousness. Christ redeemed men, but they can only be righteous through faith and repentance. Our righteousness is not 'filthy rags,' nor did the prophet say it was. What he spoke of was the ceremonial righteousness of the Jews, their 'new moons and appointed feasts,' which, being put in the place of an upright life, were 'filthy rags.' St. Paul did not wish to be found in his own ceremonial righteousness, but in that of obedience to the Christian faith. Justification is of grace on condition of repentance and reformation, but not because Christ satisfied God's justice, for then it would have been of debt

and not of grace. Christ obtained deliverance for man, but not by the merit of His sufferings, which were simply endured in obedience to His Father's will. The forgiveness of man is the effect of God's free grace, which is not compatible with the idea of Christ having merited our redemption. In an 'Enquiry Concerning the Justice of God,' Chubb denies that God was at liberty to create men to a miserable existence. To give being to non-entity for this end is called a criminal injustice, because non-being is better than wretched being. On faith and mysteries, he says that we can only believe what is intelligible. He advocates prayer to Christ, but not for all things, as there may be things which the Father has not revealed to the Son.

Some other tracts of a later date indicate a further departure from orthodox Christianity. In an 'Enquiry Concerning the Books of the New Testament,' it is maintained that the histories and epistles were not inspired in the ordinary sense of inspiration. The writers had a firm belief of a future judgment, and were disposed according to the best of their ability to give honest accounts. The doctrines and duties they delivered were what they had received verbally from Christ, or by special revelation from God, or by inferences from the Old Testament on the reason of things. That the histories were not inspired is shown from the divergences in the accounts of facts. Had God Himself been the historian, the histories would have been so written as that men would not have had to rack their inventions to reconcile differences. Neither would there have been omissions of important parts of the history, as, for instance, that Jesus was seen of five hundred persons after His resurrection. This is the greatest appearance that Christ made, and yet it is only mentioned incidentally by St. Paul in one of his epistles. Other things are mentioned doubtfully, as if the writers were not altogether sure. In the dispute about circumcision the decision was based upon reason and argument.

Christianity, Chubb says, was not founded on the resurrection of Christ. The faith of the disciples was established before that event. The object of the resurrection was to assemble them previous to their being sent forth to

CHAP. XIII. convert the world. The circumstances of the resurrection were not sufficient for evidence to those who knew of it only at second hand. Had it been intended as the chief evidence of Christianity, it would have been more public. In a tract on Abraham being called to offer up Isaac, Chubb says, that if the act was wrong in itself, no Divine command could make it right. He notices, however, that the command was given only to try Abraham, with the reservation that he was not to be permitted to sacrifice his son. The opposition which Bishop Gibson made to Dr. Rundle's appointment to the see of Gloucester was founded on some doubts that Dr. Rundle was said to have once expressed concerning the story of Abraham and Isaac.\* Chubb calls the reason of Gibson's opposition frivolous, and denies that it is necessary for a Christian bishop to believe all the histories of the Old Testament. Christianity is not to be made responsible for every bit of history in the Scriptures. This is called the true answer to Tindal's remarks in 'Christianity as Old as Creation.' Bishop Butler made the necessity of satisfaction for sin the peculiar doctrine of Christianity; that, in fact, which constituted Christianity as distinct from

The case of  
Bishop  
Rundle.

\* Thomas Rundle was domestic chaplain to Bishop Talbot at the same time as Thomas Secker. Through the influence of the Lord Chancellor Talbot, he was proposed for the see of Gloucester. Bishop Gibson, who had the control of Church patronage under Walpole's administration, objected to Rundle, calling him a Deist. This act, with some others, is said to have cost Gibson the primacy, which he expected on the death of Wake. Rundle was next year preferred to

Derry. His enemies say he was a Deist, and his case is still quoted as a specimen of the bad bishops that were sent to Ireland. From all we know of him he seems to have been an excellent man: one of the choice friends of the lamented Talbot, who on his death-bed recommended to his father's special protection Joseph Butler and Thomas Secker. He is celebrated by Thomson in the poem to the memory of the Lord Chancellor Talbot:—

‘And thou, O Rundle, lend thy strain,  
Thou darling friend; thou brother of his soul!  
In whom the head and heart their stores unite;  
Whatever fancy paints, invention pours,  
Judgment digests, the well-tuned bosom feels,  
Truth natural, moral or divine has taught,  
The Virtues dictate, or the Muses sing.  
Lend me the plaint which to the lonely main,  
With memory conversing, you will pour.  
As to the pebbled shore you, pensive, stray,  
Where Derry's mountains a bleak crescent form,  
And mid their ample round receive the waves  
That from the frozen pole resounding, rush  
Impetuous!’

natural religion. Chubb denies that it is any part of Christianity. He draws his arguments from the parable of the Prodigal Son, where the father forgives freely, without atonement or satisfaction. God sent His Son into the world out of the fulness of His love to man, to call men to repentance and reformation. He was already propitious, and did not require any propitiation. The sin-offerings in the Old Testament were not intended to make God merciful, but rather to proclaim His mercy.

Chubb wrote a book called 'The True Gospel of Jesus Christ Asserted,' the object of which was to show that the objections of the Deists do not touch Christianity. They merely concern doctrines and commandments which are the inventions of men. The Gospel can be defended on rational principles, and the Deists may be answered in the spirit of Christ, which is the spirit of meekness, forbearance, and love. But, he adds, for a man even to suppose this, will secure him the name of an unbeliever. The common cry is, that it is not their difficulties but their vices which make the Deists infidels. Yet it is well known that for a man who wishes to follow without molestation his vicious inclinations, the safest way is to adhere to the established religion.

Christ came into the world to teach men to cease to do evil and to learn to do well. To be a Christian is to be governed by Christ's laws. It is not to be a member of a visible Christ, but to be united to Him who is the Head of the whole community of faithful believers. Christ's teaching is all in harmony with that immutable morality which is dictated by the reason and the conscience of men. The Gospel is not certain facts concerning Christ's sufferings, death, and resurrection. These must rest entirely on their own evidence. The Gospel was preached before them, and is quite independent of them. The reasonings and speculations of evangelists and apostles are not to be confounded with the Gospel. St. John's disquisition about the Word existing in the beginning was his own private opinion, and not a part of the Gospel. The good news which Christ proclaimed were plain and intelligible to the meanest understanding. He asked repentance and amendment of life. Satisfaction for sin and imputed righteousness are not even doctrines taught

'The True Gospel of Jesus Christ Asserted.'

The Gospel is not speculative doctrine.

CHAP. XIII. by the apostles. They are grounded on a misapprehension of the apostles' application of the Jewish figures and illustrations from the temple-worship. The sum of the whole treatise is that there is a right and a wrong in nature which Christianity does not set aside, and which no revealed religion can set aside. Mankind stood in need of a revelation, not because of any defect in the original constitution of things, but because of the general corruption. This revelation can be no other than a republication of the original and primary law of nature. Its precepts must be interpreted by reason, otherwise we shall be continually in danger of being misled. These principles are said to be fairly drawn from Sherlock, Stebbing, and other orthodox divines who praised up reason while reason was with them, but were against reason when reason was against them. If revelation was given because of the deficiency of reason, the original constitution must have been defective.

Discrepancies  
between the  
Old and the  
New Testa-  
ment.

In 'Four Dissertations' on the Old Testament histories, Chubb mentions some cases where he thinks the New Testament writers have evidently misunderstood the Old Testament records. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews says that Abraham gave tithes to Melchisedec; while the Book of Genesis says that Melchisedec gave tithes to Abraham. In the same Epistle, Esau is called a 'profane person,' who sold his birthright for a morsel of meat. But no notice is taken of the circumstances under which this was done. It is also said that he found no place for repentance; but in Genesis he is so far from seeking repentance, that he lays the whole blame on his brother. He lifted up his voice and wept, because Jacob had deprived him of the blessing. Esau was a better man than Jacob, whose covetousness, craft, and cunning were not incompatible with some acts of piety and enthusiasm recorded in his life. In another dissertation, the conduct of Balaam is vindicated from the reproaches of St. Peter and St. Jude. Balaam's behaviour throughout the whole transaction, as recorded in the Book of Numbers, is excellent. He refused to go one step beyond the commandment of the Lord. He went through the usual parade of sacrifice, and yet no man had ever more just views of genuine spiritual worship. The ass rebuked him for going with the

man, but God told him to go. This part of the story is scarcely credible. But there is nothing to justify the censure of St. Peter, that 'Balaam loved the wages of unrighteousness,' or that of St. Jude, who speaks of the error of Balaam. In Deuteronomy and Joshua, Balaam is represented as trying to persuade God to allow him to curse the people of Israel; and in Numbers he is charged with making the people to trespass in the matter of Peor. But these things are all contradicted by the tenor of the history, and by the character of Balaam. He was slain along with the kings of Midian. That the putting to death of so great and good a man might not remain a blot on the history of the Jews, their historians have tried to injure his reputation by calumnies.

Two volumes of 'Posthumous Works' contain Chubb's final views. He denies all the charges made against him that he had been digging up the foundations of religion. The Scriptures, he says, are a collection of books written at different times and places, and by a variety of persons. They contain histories of actions both good and bad, which must be carefully examined, and the good distinguished from the bad. It would be unjust to the Divine Being to call the book, as a whole, 'the revealed will or word of God.' The writers differ in their doctrines; and these differences are the cause of divisions in the Christian Church. Even the precepts of Christ's Sermon on the Mount require to be understood according to reason, otherwise they would sadly mislead us as to the duties of this present life. The neglect of taking thought for the morrow, and of making provision for an evil day, will be punished as all acts of imprudence generally are. Even the Quakers, who prefer to take all Christ's sayings literally, are the last to omit laying up treasure upon earth.

The chief part of the 'Posthumous Works' is 'The Author's Farewell to his Readers,' in which he reviews the whole question of revelation. He repeats three heads on which he had often before insisted. The first is the law or rule of action arising from the essential difference of things, by observing which men can be acceptable to God. The second is the necessity of repentance and reformation to those who have departed from this rule. And the third is that

Chubb's final views.

'Farewell to his Readers.'

CHAP. XIII. God will judge the world by eternal rules of right and wrong. — These three things are the sum and substance of the Gospel of Christ. Men have power from God by nature to do what God requires. While they have this natural assistance they do not require the supernatural, or what is called special grace.

Hope of a future life.

The arguments for a future life do not amount to demonstration, but there is nothing to the contrary. We cannot turn to revelation for certainty, because the evidence for revelation is probability, and that of which we have not certainty cannot give certainty of something else. We have no proof that Christ rose from the dead. He did not appear to the general public, but only to a few of His disciples. St. Paul's story about the five hundred cannot be credited. There were only a hundred and twenty disciples at the time of the Ascension. It is, however, probable that there will be a future life for man. But in any case our obligation to well-doing remains the same. Of this life to come, Thomas Chubb had a good hope, and he bade his readers farewell in the prospect of meeting them again with all good men, whether Heathen or Christian.

Answered by Caleb Fleming.

Most of Chubb's works were answered by Caleb Fleming, a Presbyterian, or, more correctly, a Socinian preacher. With Chubb's avowed object Fleming had full sympathy. But in removing what in Christianity was reckoned not rational to leave only the rational, Fleming believed that Chubb had gone too far, and had rooted up some wheat with the tares. If the evangelists and apostles had made so many mistakes, the authority of the New Testament was gone. And if the writers of the New Testament had no more authority than Socrates or Plato, how was the Gospel a revelation to man? The Presbyterians had always pleaded for the Scriptures alone. Concerning their authority the Socinian and the Deist had their last fight.

Particular providence defended.

In defending a particular providence, Fleming rests on the view of the relation of the Deity to creation, which Clarke maintained against Leibnitz. Chubb supposed that when God made the world He retired to a distance from His work, and left it to general laws. Fleming, on the contrary, maintained that the same Divine energy which was



present at creation continues to work. Everything in the world is according to law, but God Himself is present executing all law. This is shown from many parts of Scripture, such, for instance, as the hundred and fourth Psalm, and the words of Jesus, 'My Father worketh hitherto, and I work.' Fleming defends the prayer of Elias against Chubb's objections by denying that it is an angry prayer. He is so zealous for the perfection of Scripture that he does not admit there was anything infirm or imperfect in the Jewish dispensation. St. James, he says, regarded the prayer of Elias as the prayer of faith. If we are to suppose that this was only his private opinion, we may make all that the New Testament says the private opinions of the writers. On miracles, Fleming said that they could only be wrought by God, or by permission from God. He would not suffer men to be deceived by supernatural working. A miracle, therefore, wrought in attestation of a doctrine must be regarded as a valid proof.

The most successful part of Fleming's answer to Chubb is the answer to the 'Four Dissertations.' Melchisedec is set forth in the narrative as the priest. It is not said who gave the tithes, but Abram had just returned from a victory. The whole history supposes that it was he who gave tithes of all. It is absurd to suppose that Melchisedec gave Abram a tenth of the provisions he brought forth, when Abram was only one of five hundred. As the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews was not wrong in his account of Abram paying tithes, neither was he wrong in his character of Esau. It is not evident in what the birthright consisted, but, in any case, Esau could not be said to have preferred a greater to a less good. It is absurd to suppose that Esau would have died for want of food if Jacob had not given him the pottage. By his saying so he only expresses his longing for that particular food. But, apart from this story, Esau's conduct shows him to have been a profane person. He threatened to take Jacob's life after the days of mourning were ended, and this was the cause of Jacob's having to leave his home. It is evident, too, his marriage with the daughters of Heth had been the cause of great grief both to Isaac and to Rebecca. The just and proper notions of the

Answer to the  
'Four Dissertations.'

CHAP. XIII. Deity which Chubb ascribed to Balaam, Fleming says, belonged to Micah. Balaam's character was so different from this that he told Balak to build altars for sacrifice; and it is expressly said in the narrative that he sought after enchantments. Fleming finds in Chubb's works many positions which would justify his being classed as a Christian rather than a Deist. But, on the other hand, he finds positions which are not compatible with the idea of revelation.

Chubb answered by Joseph Hallet.

Another answer to Chubb was written by Joseph Hallet. This was confined to the treatise on 'The True Gospel of Jesus Christ.' Hallet maintained the necessity of faith in Jesus Christ, that the Gospel was a direct revelation, and that the evangelists and apostles were inspired by God. Chubb's main idea that the Gospel was proclaimed as in harmony with the highest reason was entirely controverted. Hallet showed that however rational Christianity might be, it did not rest on this, but on its authority. Jesus Christ continually referred all institutions to the will of God, and not to reason. He never said that repentance and reformation were sufficient for salvation. He taught, indeed, that nothing could stand instead of these. They were necessary, but faith was always added. There was no forgiveness without atonement, and no benefit from Christ's atonement without faith. The whole meaning of the Gospel is the revelation of a dispensation of redemption unknown to reason or the religion of nature.\*

'Christianity not Founded on Argument.'

In 1741 there appeared an anonymous treatise, which marks in itself a distinct phase of the Deist controversy. This treatise was called 'Christianity not Founded on Argument.' The writer is said to have been Henry Dodwell, son of the famous Nonjuror of the same name. It professed to be written on the Christian side, and it is only by inference that it has been classed among Deistical writings. Christianity is defended, but not on grounds of reason. The Gospel, the writer says, requires faith and not reasonings. Nobody believes Christianity because of the strength of the arguments by which it is supported. If we begin our

\* There were many tracts written against Chubb; most of them anonymous. Dr. Stebbing made 'The True Gospel' the subject of an archidiaconal charge, showing that Chubb had misunderstood the Gospel, the cornerstone of which was the doctrine of atonement or reconciliation.

inquiries by asking reason, it is impossible to say where we shall end. To try to prove all things, is the sure way never to hold fast anything. The writer sets forth with great ability some real difficulties in the relations of faith to inquiry. We cannot say that we believe a doctrine so long as we have any doubts concerning it, and the very fact of inquiry supposes that we are still in uncertainty. But Christianity demands faith at once and always. To suspend faith until we have found reasons for faith, is to renounce our baptismal vow. To become an inquirer is to be an avowed Antichrist. He that is not with Christ is against Him.

From the nature of the intellect, and from the nature of religion, the writer proves that reason cannot be a guide to true faith. Christianity requires all men to believe alike, but we can never all come by reason to believe the same thing. Reason says that if we inquire freely and decide honestly, we must be safe, whatever be our decisions. But it is God's appointment that we be baptized into faith, and when we come to years of discretion, we are not to inquire so as to be guided by reason, but to pray that our faith be increased. The reasoning Christian starts as a sceptic, but scepticism is just what Christianity forbids. If doubting were lawful for a moment, it might be lawful for a lifetime. Those who wish to work out their salvation by the use of reason must have time for deliberation. The whole subject of revelation must be thoroughly investigated; and the greater the integrity of the inquirer, the more numerous are the hindrances in the way of coming to a decision. A rational faith, which from its very nature requires a lifetime for investigation, cannot be the guide of life. When we most require help, reason is least able to give it. The use of faith is to overcome the world; but if that faith must be reached by reason, the time for victory will be past before we have put on our armour. Such a sense of right as will lead to a moral life can be of no avail. Good works without faith do not make men meet to receive grace. After years of inquiry, before the rational inquirer has found a reason for faith, he may receive the dread sentence, 'Thou fool, this night thy soul is required.'

Reason not a  
guide to faith.

As the duty of faith is imperative on all, what is to be

CHAP. XIII. believed must be self-evident. It cannot depend on inductions and inferences; on knowledge of histories and authority of books. These things are beyond the capacities of the multitude from whom faith is required. If the truth of the Gospel depended on deep studies, it would be good news to the learned, but not to those who have neither time nor capacity for acquiring knowledge. Faith cannot depend on ingenious interpretations of mysterious prophecies, nor on such inferences as those recently put forth in the 'Analogy of Religion.' Butler's speculations are very interesting so long as the issue of believing or not believing is indifferent. But they cannot be necessary for the establishment of that truth which all men at their everlasting peril must believe. Christianity must have existed long before such defences were invented. The force of its evidence must have been complete from the day it was published. The command to believe is absolute. It is not made on condition of our having the time and capacity to make inquiries and to weigh probabilities.

Faith does not depend on knowledge.

A rational faith would be deficient in zeal.

A rational faith, moreover, would not serve the object for which faith is required. It would be deficient in zeal. A rational believer would not be sufficiently anxious about the success of his inferences, nor would he resent contradiction with becoming ardour. A man who has experienced the difficulties and uncertainties that attend reasoning, will never show warmth in the defence of his opinions. His zeal will always be according to knowledge, and that is a very temperate zeal. He will not contend earnestly for a faith which is founded on a rational probability, which he may possibly have mistaken, and which one day he may abandon. The zeal of a rational Christian is always in marked contrast with that of those who by simple faith believe in 'occult and mysterious articles.' Reason never gives that tranquil spirit, that complacency and mental satisfaction, which they possess who have never asked a single question nor engaged in any elaborate speculation. A rational faith will not deter men from present pleasure while there is no certainty of a future recompense. It will never produce a faithful martyr.

Christ required faith,

In the Scriptures, the writer says, no appeal is ever made

to reason. Christ laid His doctrines before His disciples, not to be examined, but to be believed. He taught them as one having authority, and not by arguments and proofs of His divine mission. Before any miracles were wrought the disciples were to believe. It was a foolish and an adulterous generation that sought after a sign. The apostles imitated their Master. They demanded immediate assent to their doctrines without allowing time for doubt or deliberation. They were not sent to dispute but to preach, not to wrangle but to instruct. There is no reward promised to the right use of reason or the following of conscience, but only to faith. Had it been otherwise, Saul, the persecutor, would have been as safe before his conversion as after it.

CHAP. XIII.  
and not reasoning.

A matter of such importance as revelation could not depend on historical or traditional evidence. Jesus wrought miracles which were a demonstration to those who saw them, but which are no evidence to us. The present age needs miracles as much as the first ages of Christianity. Some have supposed that an infallible Church will supply the want. But this also must be established by reason. We must find a more general principle as the foundation of that assent which the Gospel requires. The principle wanted is clearly laid down in the New Testament:—‘No man can say that Jesus is Lord but by the Holy Ghost.’ By the divine light the lamp of faith burns in the believer’s heart. He has the witness in himself. This faith is the gift of God. The Spirit of truth testifies of Jesus. This testimony is universal. The grace of God has appeared to all men, and the true light lightens every man that comes into the world. A still small voice speaks the immediate presence of God, and presents His truth to the mind as self-evident. The terms of our salvation, therefore, do not depend upon a writing which must run the hazard of all other writings. ‘The Trial of the Witnesses’ is an excellent demonstration of the resurrection of Jesus. But there must have been sufficient grounds for faith before the days of Sherlock. The Holy Spirit gives faith. Unbelief is a crime because it is not an error of the intellect but of the heart. The want of faith is the want of a right disposition.

Revelation depends on the witness of the Spirit.

The writer of this treatise seems for the most part to be This tract ironical.

CHAP. XIII. in earnest, but more than once the irony is so apparent as to give the doctrine he advocates a grotesque form. All the articles of faith, he says, are repugnant to reason, as Lord Bacon has shown in his 'Paradoxes.\*' A child is saved by baptism without understanding a word of Christianity. The children of this world learn science, but believers do not so learn Christ. Progress in carnal wisdom is retrogression in the knowledge of the Gospel. A rational Christian walks by sight and not by faith. The Boyle Lecturers, who defend Christianity by argument, are the great promoters of infidelity.†

Answered by  
Dr. Benson.

The most elaborate answer to 'Christianity not Founded on Argument' was written by Dr. George Benson. This was called 'The Reasonableness of the Christian Religion as delivered in the Scriptures,' and was another effort to establish external revelation on the principles of Locke. Reason, or the clearness of natural religion, was the weapon which the rational divines had put into the hands of the Deists. They were unable to wrest it from them again, and the author of 'Christianity not founded on Argument' made for them an ironical defence that they could do without reason so long as they had immediate inspiration. Dr. Benson, like the great majority of theologians in his day, was quite willing to allow any amount of spiritual influence in the first ages of Christianity, provided that not a breath of inspiration was to come upon the Church now. He goes back to pure reason, and defends Christianity on the ground of its reasonableness, maintaining that it is founded on argument.

His account  
of faith.

Dr. Benson defines faith as not a mere assent upon evidence, or a bare act of the understanding, but also combined with these an act of the will. To attain it, it is necessary that we lay aside prejudices and cultivate a sincere love of truth.

\* Ascribed to Bacon; see note in Vol i., p. 97, of the present work.

† This argument had been advanced seriously in an anonymous pamphlet published in 1731, called 'A Demonstration of the Insufficiency both of Reason and Revelation (separately or jointly considered) in matters of Religion, with a Conclusion showing

what is sufficient.' The one thing necessary was the immediate inspiration of God, without which all revelation and all reason was dark. This pamphlet was answered in 'A Plea for Divine Revelation,' and in 'A Plea for Human Reason.' These were answered and defended in a series of controversial pamphlets.



The Gospel does not demand implicit faith, but a faith which is founded on examination. We should be like the Bereans of old, who searched diligently into the grounds and reasons of what St. Paul taught them. The unbelief which Scripture condemns is that which results from suffering the intellect to be guided by prejudice or passion. It is also necessary to right faith that we be willing to suffer dangers and difficulties on account of it. There is no virtue in giving assent where the evidence is so clear as not to require examination. Nor is there any vice in unbelief, where the evidence is not sufficient. Thomas was blamed for want of faith after he had sufficient evidence that Jesus was the Christ, and that what was foretold of His resurrection would be fulfilled. The evidence on which Christianity rests is twofold, internal and external. The first is the reasonableness of its doctrines and precepts. The scheme of redemption, for instance, corresponds to the mediatorship, which is the basis of human society. We all depend on each other for help. The moral duties are such as philosophy has always recommended. The rules of piety are without superstition. The sanctions of Christianity are reasonable, and it sets forth a future life without the fictions of the poets, or the doubts and disputations of the philosophers.

It is this very reasonableness of Christianity which raises the objection against the necessity of revelation to make known things in themselves so clear. The answer is, that revelation confirms what reason teaches. It condescends to human weakness, and by prophecy and miracles calls attention to things of such great importance. The Messianic prophecies may not be very clear when taken singly, but when a whole series centres in one event we have good grounds for concluding that we have got the right meaning. It is in the very nature of prophecy that it be obscure till the event is accomplished. Those who saw the miracles of Jesus confessed that no man could do such works unless he were sent by God. If Christianity can be proved by its reasonableness, by prophecies and by miracles, it is founded on argument.

But doubts had been raised about the certainty of history. The question came at last to the reliableness of testimony.

Revelation confirms the teaching of reason.

Faith never required without evidence.



CHAP. XIII. Benson repeats the commonplaces about the general trustworthiness of history and the wisdom of acting on probability. To the objection that the process of inquiry might go on for life, Benson answers that Scripture never condemns a suspense of judgment till we receive proper information. A sincere desire to know and to do God's will must supply the deficiency of actual knowledge. Faith is never required without evidence. South once said that there were certain things which, if not received as mysteries, ought to be exploded as absurdities. Beveridge said, concerning an article of the faith, that he believed it because he could not understand it. Bacon said, that to believe only what is agreeable to reason is to assent to the matter and not to the Author, which is a faith different from that of Abraham. Benson says, that those who speak in this way seem as if they wished to betray religion. Christ gave evidence of His mission that men might believe. Christianity is founded on argument. To be taught of God is to have the miraculous gifts of the Spirit, which were only given in the days of the apostles.

'Deism Fairly Stated.'

Dr. Benson was answered in an anonymous treatise called 'Deism Fairly Stated and Fully Vindicated from the Gross Imputations and Groundless Calumnies of Modern Believers.' The author virtually contended that the Deists were about as much Christians as Dr. Benson, or conversely that Dr. Benson was about as much a Deist as the Deists. They both advocated rational religion, and nothing more. Dr. Benson contended for some external evidences, but the Deists took the rational religion without troubling themselves about external evidences. The writer said that he was very sorry to be considered an infidel. He no more doubted that there was such a thing as true religion, than he doubted his own existence; but he did not believe that it consisted in a set of opinions. He believed that men who were upright in heart and regular in life might have a well-grounded hope of salvation, though they regarded some uninvestigable points of faith as things indifferent. Deism is the essential religion. It is the true original religion of nature and reason; and this is the very definition which Sherlock, Chandler, and many others have given of Christianity. Nothing in Chris-

tianity which is merely positive, and not a part of natural religion, can be necessary to eternal life. The institutions and doctrines which are not grounded in reason, depend on Scripture, and before Scripture can be received as an authority it must be proved to have come from God. When this is done, the controversy will be ended. But on no subject is there less agreement among Christians than on the Divine authority of the Scriptures. Roman Catholics include among canonical Scriptures many books which we regard as apocryphal, resting their authority on the testimony of the Church. If the Church is fallible, the testimony is insufficient: if it is infallible, we want proof for the infallibility. Protestants say that the Scriptures are their own evidence. Some understand by this that there is a special illumination from the Spirit of God to enable the mind to see that the Scriptures are the word of God. Others think that the evidence is only to be found by an impartial and honest use of reason. Chillingworth made the Scriptures the only rule of faith, but he left reason the judge of all that concerned the Scriptures. Dr. Chandler said that the religion of Christ must be understood before it can be believed. He supposes the contents of religion to be within the compass of reason. But reason cannot judge of things supernatural, and say whether or not they are the word or revelation of God. The understanding of man cannot reach to the things that are beyond the faculties of man. There is no external evidence at all sufficient to prove that the collection of books which we call the Bible is the word of God. The external evidence is far short of a demonstration, and the mysterious and unintelligible parts of Scripture reveal nothing to reason. The trumpet gives an uncertain sound. Who then shall prepare himself for battle? Christianity may have come in aid of natural religion, but it is now evident that we want a new revelation in aid of Christianity.

Leland, Doddridge, and other writers, also replied to Dodwell. They all said that Christianity being a rational religion gives a very subordinate place to merely positive precepts. Dodwell answered that Christianity being founded on faith made positive duties of supreme importance. The

Dodwell answered by Leland and Doddridge.

CHAP. XIII. first of these was the duty of baptism, without which it was impossible to be saved.

Lord Bolingbroke.

The Deist controversy closes about the middle of the century. The last two names of importance are Lord Bolingbroke and David Hume: the one the most worthless, the other the most sagacious of all the Deists. Bolingbroke was known to be a Deist, but his philosophical works were not published till 1753, a year or two after his death. They contained nothing which had any importance, except what it derived from the great reputation of the author. Burke once exclaimed, 'Who now reads Bolingbroke?' And yet in the days of Queen Anne where was there a greater man than Henry St. John? It was the summit of Pope's ambition that as Bolingbroke's name was wafted down the stream of time, his own might be as the 'attendant bark' participating in the gale. The 'Essay on Man' begins—

'Awake! my St. John, leave all meaner things  
To low ambition and the pride of kings.'

To the same patron he addresses the concluding lines—

'When statesmen, heroes, kings in dust repose,  
Whose sons shall blush their fathers were thy foes,  
Shall then this verse to future age pretend,  
Thou wert my guide, philosopher, and friend?'

His eloquence.

A man who, like Bolingbroke, was the admiration of the age in which he lived, must have had something to recommend him. Lord Brougham said that Burke's question, 'Who now reads Bolingbroke?' suggests another equally natural exclamation: 'What would we not give to hear him!' Tradition makes Henry St. John the most accomplished orator that ever graced the Senate House of England. There is a story that Pitt was once conversing with some friends about the *desiderata* most to be lamented. One said, 'The lost books of Livy.' Another said, 'Those of Tacitus.' A third, 'A Latin Tragedy.' Pitt said, 'A speech of Bolingbroke.' That no speech of Bolingbroke's is extant is the more to be regretted, since the world has set so little value on the many volumes of his works which he bequeathed to it as his last and most valued legacy. It is with these neglected volumes that we have at present to deal. This may seem a disadvantage, but there are many things

without interest in themselves which become interesting in their connections. CHAP. XIII.

As a philosopher, Bolingbroke was a disciple of Locke. Intellect was the artificer, and sense the instrument, while experience was the pillar of fire that was to lead to the land of promise. Metaphysicians like Plato, Socrates, Plotinus, Descartes, and Malebranche were but idle dreamers, filling books with 'jargon,' as their own heads were full of 'whimsies.' These were the *ignes fatui* by whom Bolingbroke was not to be misled. The works of Plato and Aristotle, he says, have been preserved, perhaps more to the detriment than the advancement of learning. He doubts if Plato was always in his senses; and as for Socrates, he lost himself in the clouds, substituting fantastical ideas for real knowledge. The belief that the Divine mind communicated directly with the mind of man is mere fanaticism. To suppose, with Cudworth, that we are partakers of the Divine nature, and that God breathes upon our spirits, is not only enthusiasm, but blasphemy. The inspiration of Quakers and Methodists, with the metaphysical reveries of Malebranche, is traced back to the Pagan belief that all things were full of God, thus expressed by Cicero: 'Cognitione divinorum animorum animos humanos commoveri.' Bolingbroke was essentially anti-Pantheistic. His favourite philosopher among the ancients was Anaxagoras, who believed in God, certainly, but who also believed Him to be as far away from the world as it was possible for God to be.

Bolingbroke was to teach, as his fundamental principle, a *first philosophy*, which was to have nothing to do with that of 'the philosophical and theological tribe.' It was not to be an 'ontology' nor an 'ontosophy,' nor any metaphysical pneumatics woven out of scholastic brains. It was to be, however, a real philosophy, and not such as Lord Bacon describes, 'a science of general observations and axioms.' Its objects were to be natural theology or theism, and natural religion or ethics. The method of it, so to speak, was to rise from below, from observation and experience, not to descend from above by supernatural revelation or by hypothetical reasoning. Natural philosophy, he says, is the mother of all the sciences. There are things outside of us,

His hatred of metaphysics.

On experimental philosophy.

CHAP. XIII. and there is within us a consciousness of our own existence. These are the foundations of all the knowledge we acquire of body and of mind, which are both alike objects of natural philosophy. Metaphysicians who demonstrate the existence of God and the certainty of moral duties *à priori*, are like Ixion, who imagined he embraced Juno in his arms, while he only embraced a cloud. But to proceed by way of observation, by reasoning from the natural world, we rise to a certain knowledge of the existence of God. 'We know that God is, but we do not know what He is.' This was the favourite saying of Hobbes, and it was adopted by Bolingbroke. To the general statement all theologians agree, whether metaphysicians or not; but with Hobbes and Bolingbroke it meant that there was nothing in common between the Divine mind and the human; that intelligence was not the same with God as with us; and that we were not judges of God's moral attributes. This conclusion was supposed to result from the method of starting with Locke's axiom that there was nothing in the mind which was not derived through the senses. The mind could only be trusted so far as it could lean upon the senses.

His arguments for the existence of Deity.

The existence of God is demonstrated not by *à priori* reasoning, nor by innate ideas, nor by the universal consent of mankind, but by reasoning from 'nature up to nature's God.' Here we must stop. We must not confound what is to be known of God with what is unknowable. We have no capacity to understand the manner of His being. We cannot explain the Divine nature. The only attributes of which we can know anything are what Bolingbroke calls the physical, such as are manifested in the natural world—power and wisdom. We cannot speak of Divine justice or Divine goodness. We rise from a knowledge of ourselves and the works of God to a knowledge of His existence, His infinite wisdom and infinite power. With this knowledge we should be content. The phenomena of nature do not give sufficient foundation for our concluding that God is just or good. There are many things in the world which seem to say that He has no such attributes; that is, according to our ideas of justice and goodness. It is absurd to speak of man imitating God, except in so remote and imperfect a sense that the ex-

pression should never be used, much less such a duty recommended. Those writers and preachers who exhort us to imitate God 'must mean, not the God whom we see in His works, and in all that His providence orders, but the God who appears in their representations of Him.' It was an instance of the impertinence of Socrates' doctrine, that 'he imagined in his auditors the power to make themselves as like as possible to their great exemplar, the Supreme Being.' Bolingbroke quotes St. Paul and Dr. Barrow as authorities against the believers in the moral attributes. St. Paul declared the Divine judgments unsearchable, and God's ways past finding out. The advocates of Judaism reasoned against the casting away of the Jews and the receiving of the Gentiles from their ideas of justice and the other moral attributes. St. Paul answered at first from ideas of general equity and the nature of God; but, after steering his discourse through various rocks, he thought it safe to cast anchor and cry, 'Oh, the depth!' There was no solution but in the incomprehensibility of God. Dr. Barrow says that God may often act according to rules of wisdom and justice not to be comprehended by our faculties, and that those rules of equity and experience which we follow in our transactions with each other would be found incongruous and deficient if applied to the dealings of God.

The right following of Locke's method, and the conclusions which were supposed to be its inevitable consequences, led Bolingbroke to deny the immateriality of the soul, and to question its immortality. Though we can demonstrate that there is a God, and though we conclude that He must be immaterial, because of the absurdity of supposing Him material, yet we cannot prove that there are any other immaterial beings. Evodius inquired of St. Augustine if the soul, when it forsakes the gross terrestrial body, is united to one more ethereal. This, Bolingbroke says, was one of the Platonic 'whimsies;' but no one asks such questions now. Nor is any one so inquisitive about spiritual physiognomy as to ask how the soul of Dives could be distinguished from that of Lazarus. We have no right to make the hypothesis that soul and body are distinct substances. We have a perfect idea of matter, but not of spirit. We understand solidity



CHAP. XIII. and extension. They are the primary qualities of matter, and by them we conceive it. Descartes, indeed, says that thought is the primary quality of spirit. But this is untrue; for thought is no more the essence of soul than motion is of body. A future life, however, is probable. The soul is not naturally immortal, but God may give it immortality. Seeing He has given us life once, the probabilities are that He will continue to give it. The universality of this belief among all nations is specially noticed, and the usefulness of it in restraining vice and promoting virtue. Speaking of the first chapter of Butler's 'Analogy,' which treats of the probabilities of a future existence, Bolingbroke says:—'This hypothesis may be received. It does not so much as imply anything repugnant to the perfection of the Divine nature. I receive with joy the expectations it raises in my mind—the ancient and modern Epicureans provoke my indignation when they boast as a mighty acquisition their pretended certainty that the body and the soul die together. If they had the certainty of this, could the discovery be very comfortable? I should have no difficulty which to choose, if the option was proposed to me, to exist after death or to die whole.'

On natural religion and moral duty.

From his *first philosophy* Bolingbroke educes a system of natural religion and moral duty. By applying ourselves to the observation of the phenomena of nature, corporeal and intellectual, we avoid fantastical and arrive at some degree of real knowledge. Natural theology is a revelation to the reason of mankind. The morality of actions is tested by their bringing happiness agreeable to our nature. It does not depend merely on the will of God nor on innate ideas, but on the fact that virtue is the perfection of man's nature, and that he conforms himself by the practice of it to the designs of infinite wisdom. Man, as it were, co-operates with the Almighty. There may be rewards and punishments reserved for another life, but with these the religion of nature is not concerned. It teaches that morality is our highest interest, because it tends to the greatest happiness of the whole of mankind. Even should this present life terminate our existence, moral obligations remain the same. God has given us faculties by which we may know all that is necessary for



us to know in our natural state concerning His existence, His nature, His attributes, His providence over His creatures, and their duties to Him and to each other. CHAP. XIII.

Bolingbroke charges divines with being in a confederacy with Atheists. The latter, looking at the evils of the world, conclude that there can be no God, otherwise these evils would not be permitted. Divines, looking at the same evils, infer the certainty of a future life in which the present inequalities will be rectified. Bolingbroke denies the existence of the inequalities, and vindicates the divine proceeding considered only as it regards this world. Against the 'Epicurean Atheists' and the 'Christian Philosophers,' it is maintained that God is just in His dispensations here, that His goodness is abundantly manifest, and that, consequently, there is no need of the supposition of a future life to enable us to justify the ways of God. The arguments are, that we have abundant cause for thankfulness, because of the blessings we have in this world. We are, indeed, subject to many evils, physical and moral. But the good greatly surpasses the evil. The general state of mankind in the present scheme of Providence is not merely tolerable, but happy. There is no room for the current exaggerated description of human misery. The good may often have some alloy, but the evil also is mitigated by many circumstances. If pain is violent, it spends itself, or it puts an end to the sufferer. If it is moderate, it is tolerable, and may be compensated, or the sense of it may wear out. The greatest evils men have are from themselves, not from God. The sure mark of a base spirit is to censure the order of Providence, and, instead of mending his own conduct, to set up for correcting that of God. The softest pillow on which we can lay our heads is resignation—

Vindicates  
God's moral  
government;  
considered  
merely in refer-  
ence to the  
present life.

'To reason right is to submit.'

Perfect happiness or perfect virtue are not, indeed, to be found in this world, and we may be overtaken by physical calamities, but all is for the best; and, therefore, 'whatever is, is right.' Not that whatever is, is good and right, because present evils will be rectified in a future state. This may have been Pope's meaning in the 'Essay on Man,' but Bolingbroke means that all is for the best as to the general

CHAP. XIII. good of the universe. Even though in this world the evil were greater than the good, that would be no objection against the divine attributes, for the world is but a part, and must be made subservient to the well-being of the all.

Professes to  
be a Christian.

Bolingbroke professed to be a Christian; but in a way peculiar to himself. He believed the simple Christianity of Jesus, as taught by Jesus Himself. The Gospel of Christ, he says, is one continued lesson of the strictest morality, of justice, benevolence, and universal charity. It is in every point conformable to the law of nature; if it were not, no authority could oblige us to receive it. As contained in the Gospels, Christianity is the word of God, and had it been propagated with the same simplicity as it was taught by Jesus, Christianity would have been the word of God still. But what the metaphysical philosophers did for natural religion, the divines have done for Christianity. It was left immediately after its first publication in the midst of a frantic world, and in an age of most licentious reasonings. A metaphysical and artificial theology took the place of the Gospel. A baptized Platonism was substituted for Christianity. The divine republication of the Law of Nature was made by theologians a republication of the doctrines of Plato. The Greek Fathers were as full of the metaphysical reveries and Platonic 'whimsies' as the mystified Pagans. St. Augustine, by his own confession, was converted to Christianity through the influence of Pagan philosophy. He thanks God, with many pious ejaculations, that God had procured for him some books of the Platonic philosophy, in which he found the divinity of the Word established by many arguments.

Denies the  
apostolical  
commission of  
St. Paul.

This departure from true Christianity began with the apostles themselves. They did not know what spirit they were of. The great corruptor, however, of simple Christianity was St. Paul, who preached 'another Gospel, and not that of Jesus.' He was of the school of Gamaliel, and not of Christ. He was a Cabalistic rabbi, a loose declaimer, a vain-glorious boaster, who practised 'hypocrisy' and 'dissimulation,' an 'absurd, profane, obscure, trifling writer.' He had no apostolical commission. He pretends to one, indeed, in the Acts of the Apostles, which were written by St. Luke, and probably dictated by himself, but he entered a 'volunteer

into the apostleship.' The most extraordinary inconsistency of modern times is that John Locke should write upon the Reasonableness of Christianity, and yet publish commentaries on the Epistles of St. Paul. Locke, indeed, has succeeded better than any other expositor in making these epistles intelligible—'By happy conjectures and a great license of paraphrase, he has given them an air of coherence, consistency, and rationality. St. Paul, by his prolixity and obscurity, doubles mystery, and adds everywhere a mystery of words to a mystery of things. He might very well talk of *his gospel*, even in contradistinction to that of Christ.' One is a plain and clear system of religion, with here and there a doubtful phrase, that casts no obscurity on what is plain. The other is an intricate and dark system, with here and there an intelligible phrase that casts no light on the rest, but is rather lost in the gloom of the whole.

Bolingbroke did not adopt many of the objections to Christianity which were made by other Deists. He believed an external revelation to be quite possible. It might be proved by miracles and prophecies; it might depend on facts of history; and it might contain positive precepts making obligatory certain duties that were not enjoined by the laws of nature. The Christian revelation depends on facts. It is quite absurd for metaphysical divines to try to establish 'revelation on philosophy.' This was intended to take the defence of Christianity out of the hands of all Platonic Christians, who look rather to the internal than the external evidence. A religion, Bolingbroke says, which appeals to facts must be proved by the facts, and these he seems to consider valid for the establishing of Christianity so far as they relate to the life, teaching, and miracles of Jesus. The certainty, however, of the laws of nature is greater than any historical certainty. They do not depend on authority, but on their own truth, which is manifest. Christianity was intended only for the Jews. Jesus told His disciples to do what was taught by those who sit in Moses' seat. He commanded His apostles to teach and baptize all nations; that is, the Jews dispersed throughout all nations. The reception of the Gentiles into the Christian Church without circumcision was inconsistent with the teaching and the prac-

CHAP. XIII. tices of the Jews. The four Gospels may be genuine, but there were forty Gospels besides, which may not have agreed with those in our canon. The Trinity, or three hypostases constituting one godhead, is an importation from Paganism and Platonism. It came first from Egypt into Greece. St. Paul and St. Peter, however, sometimes contradict themselves, calling Jesus at one time a man, and at other times speaking of Him as God. Mahometanism was the reassertion of the unity of God amid the prevalence of Trinitarian corruptions in that age of the Church. The absurd doctrine of a Mediator between God and man was another importation from the dark superstitions of Paganism. It suited the poor Heathen, who, filled with a religious horror, durst not approach the Divine Monarch except through the mediation of His ministers. It is altogether unbecoming a Christian, who believes that he may always have access to the throne of grace. The doctrine of redemption is not to be reconciled with the wisdom, justice, and goodness, to say nothing of the dignity, of the Supreme Being. It is grounded on the incredible story of the fall of Adam. Repentance alone must be sufficient to expiate a merciful God. If He requires another to appease Him, He is not merciful in Himself. Dr. Clarke says that man by the use of his faculties could never have discovered the method of reconciliation between God and man, from which it is inferred that it is not agreeable to sound, unprejudiced reason.

Jewish history  
fabulous.

At the hands of Lord Bolingbroke the Old Testament meets still less favour than the New. He has scarcely patience to inquire what Judaism means. Its history is fable; its morality is impure; and its laws opposed to sense and reason. Jewish history never obtained any credit in the world till after Christianity was established. The Jewish Books come to us on the faith of a superstitious people among whom the custom of pious lying remarkably prevailed. The New Testament gives authority only to particular parts of the Old. Christ came to fulfil the law and the prophets, but not to consecrate all the written, any more than all the oral traditions of the Jews. Abbadie and some other theologians have maintained the necessity of a perpetual miracle to preserve the Scriptures from accident.

And this is what God would have given had the Scriptures been dictated by the Holy Ghost. But it is just what He has not given. The Scriptures have come to us full of additions, interpolations, and transformations, made we know neither when nor by whom. The law and the history were not originally blended together as they now are in the Pentateuch. There is no evidence that the books ascribed to Moses were written by him, unless we can believe with Philo and Josephus that Moses wrote the account of his own death. Where could Moses get the record of creation? Adam knew nothing of what passed before the sixth day, so that it could not have come by tradition from him. We have no testimony but that of the writer of Genesis for the fact of Noah's flood. If we receive the Old Testament on the faith of the Jewish scribes, we cannot consistently reject the histories which were compiled and preserved by the Egyptian priests. It is impossible that in the course of a few generations the whole race of the Israelites should have become confirmed idolators in Egypt, and have forgotten the traditions of their fathers, and the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

If the miracles said to have been wrought for the people of Israel had really been wrought, nothing but the greatest of all miracles could have made them ineffectual. It is incredible that the Israelites should have endured the oppression of the Egyptians when they were so numerous that they could bring into the field 600,000 fighting men. The whole of the Mosaic history is repugnant to the experience of mankind. In Livy and other historians there are incredible stories; but the Jewish history consists of little else. Everything is done by magic and enchantment. The system of nature which there prevails is altogether different from ours. The books contain legible marks of a human original, and to speak of them as divinely inspired is blasphemy. They represent the Supreme Being as partial, cruel, and unjust—as commanding by one law what He forbids by another. The laws in the thirteenth chapter of Deuteronomy are opposed to the laws of nature. It is impossible to read the Books of Moses without feeling contempt for the author 'as a philosopher and as a divine.'

Jewish miracles incredible.

CHAP. XIII. If Moses knew anything of the doctrine of a future life, he ought to have told the people. By not doing this, he left them in darkness, both as to what they had to expect and what they had to fear.

Dr. Leland's  
answer to  
Bolingbroke.

The greater part of Dr. Leland's 'View of the Deistical Writers' is taken up with a reply to Bolingbroke. This is also the best part of Leland's book, though Bolingbroke, of all the Deists, deserved the least notice. He complains justly, in the beginning, of Bolingbroke's want of method, his repetitions and digressions, which are so many as to make his books tedious and irksome. To refute Bolingbroke, it was enough to collect the passages in which he contradicts himself. He sometimes forgets in one chapter what he had said in the previous one. Though he had denied that we could ascribe to God any moral attributes, Leland finds him saying in one place, 'I know that there is a God, a first intelligent cause of all things, whose infinite wisdom and power appear evidently in all His works, and to whom, therefore, I ascribe most rationally every perfection, whether conceivable or inconceivable.' Every perfection must include goodness and justice. Bolingbroke had described the God of Moses and Paul as cruel and arbitrary, yet what else can the God of nature be if destitute of moral attributes? If, from the knowledge of ourselves and God's works, we rise to a knowledge of the Divine wisdom and power, why may we not also rise to a knowledge of the Divine justice and goodness? We cannot, by the very constitution of our minds, help regarding these as perfections, and we are led naturally to ascribe them to the Supreme Being. There are, indeed, phenomena in the world not conformable to our ideas of Divine goodness, but there are also phenomena not conformable to our ideas of Divine wisdom. The objections made by Atheists are drawn from the natural as well as the moral world. All that the Theist can maintain is, that wisdom and goodness predominate. The objection to the moral attributes is equally valid against the physical. Leland urges that though we cannot see the whole extent of the Divine proceedings, it does not follow that we are not judges of the Divine goodness and justice. God may do things the reasons of which are unknown to us, but if we



did know them we should see that they were done wisely and justly, and that according to our ideas of wisdom and justice. The Scriptures often speak of God's ways as above human comprehension, and yet they sometimes represent Him as appealing to men concerning the equity of His proceedings. CHAP. XIII.

Bishop Warburton wrote 'A View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy, in Four Letters to a Friend.' He begins with the *first philosophy*, which he says Bolingbroke, after the manner of other inquirers, erects on a general desolation. 'His meditations,' says the bishop, 'on divine matters are so extensive, that scarce any one who has written in defence of virtue and religion but will find himself either insulted in his person, or misrepresented in his opinions, and that merely for being in his lordship's way.' 'This conservator of States, this legislator of philosophy and religion,' is described as being unable to raise his head above the rank contagion of the schools. Warburton's  
view of  
Bolingbroke's  
philosophy.

'Tis mighty odd,  
A fit of vapours clouds this demi-god.'

He has 'the roughness of South without his force, the malignity of Marvel without his wit.' The irregular distribution of moral good and evil has appeared to all men so obvious that it seemed strange for Bolingbroke to deny it. The verses of the Latin poet express a fearful fact, which has baffled all our efforts at solution:—

'Cum res hominum tantâ caligine volvi  
Adspicerem, laetosque diu florere nocentes,  
Vexarique pios—labefacta cadebat  
Religio.'

We may object to the inference. Divines have objected to it, but the phenomenon is unquestionable. The premises from which the Atheist reasoned against the existence of an intelligent Ruler, and from which the theologians inferred the necessity of a future life, were just what Bolingbroke denied. Divines, Warburton says, demonstrated—strictly demonstrated—the existence of God and His moral attributes. This being done, they proceeded to show that if man's whole existence were included in this life, the present distribution Warburton  
denies that  
God's moral  
government  
is perfect con-  
sidered only  
in reference to  
this life.



CHAP. XIII. of moral good and evil would contradict that demonstration. Hence followed the natural conclusion that there would be a future reckoning. Against Atheists, divines had to prove the existence of God, and against Deists that of a future life. Bolingbroke jumbled the two controversies together. He represents the divines as making a future state the proof of God's moral attributes, while the argument really is that the moral attributes prove a future state. The only confederacy between divines and Atheists is that they hold a principle in common with the rest of mankind. Warburton vindicates Pope's 'Essay on Man' from the charge of teaching the doctrines of Bolingbroke. He calls it a vindication of Providence against Libertines and Atheists who quarrel with the present constitution of things, and deny a future state. To both of these Pope answers that whatever is, is right—and the reason he gives, is that we see only a part of the moral system, that the present state of the moral world is necessary for the greater perfection of the whole. Bolingbroke's doctrine is that our moral world is an entire system of itself, and therefore whatever is, is right. His argument is directed against an imaginary confederacy between Atheists and Divines, who for different ends and purposes use a common principle, namely, the *inequality of God's moral government here*, but this very inequality is what Bolingbroke denies. In this he stood alone, even among the Deists. Toland, Collins, and Tindal, admitted the moral attributes of the Deity, and on them based their objections to revelation. They had some pretence for saying that natural religion was perfect; but Bolingbroke, denying both the future life and our capacity to know anything of God as a moral agent, could not pretend that natural religion is perfect.

Shows no  
mercy to  
Bolingbroke.

The 'View of Bolingbroke's Philosophy' is the most original, powerful, and characteristic of all Warburton's writings. He treated Bolingbroke with even less mercy than he had ever shown to any opponent. As Bolingbroke was dead, it was thought the bishop should have tempered his severity. The author might not be a dead lion, but Warburton was accounted little better than a living dog. The sentiment may be unreasonable, but it is universal, that

the silence of death should calm resentment, as well as stop the tongue of envy. CHAP. XIII.

‘Pascitur in vivis Livor, post fata quiescit  
Cum suus ex merito quemque tuetur honos.’\*

Mrs. Mallet, the wife of David Mallet, ‘the beggarly Scotchman,’ on whose head Samuel Johnson poured out the concentrated essence of his hatred of Scotland, once said to Hume, ‘Allow me, Mr. Hume, to introduce myself to you. It is right that we Deists should know each other.’ ‘Madam,’ replied Hume, ‘I am not a Deist, and do not wish to be known under that name.’ If Hume had been asked what he was, and by what name he wished to be known, he would probably have declined to answer. If he had been willing to answer, he would probably have found it difficult. No mind would have rebelled more than his against being classed and labelled. David Hume.

Hume’s first publication was the ‘Treatise of Human Nature.’ As this work was afterwards disowned by its author, we need not do more than mention it. Its place was supplied by the ‘Essays,’ in which the chief questions were treated with more accuracy and clearness, while many of the more intricate and ingenious but less important reasonings were omitted. His ‘Essays.’

We shall best begin by viewing Hume in his relation to Locke. He was avowedly an experimentalist, holding the senses to be the only channels of knowledge. Through them the mind has what Hume calls *impressions*. The *memory* of these impressions constitutes ideas. Upon these the mind works. It arranges them, transposes them, and reasons upon them. There is here an unusual meaning attached to the word *ideas*, but that meaning is definite, and the peculiarity itself clearly marks Hume as on the side of the sensuous philosophy. He cannot find in the mind any innate ideas or any infinite ideas, such as those of infinite time or infinite space. His relation to Locke.

The title generally applied to Hume is that of Sceptic, and Generally called a Sceptic.

\* Thomas Church, Vicar of Battersea, wrote an ‘Analysis of Lord Bolingbroke’s Philosophy.’ James Hervey answered Bolingbroke’s ‘Letters on the Study and Use of History,’ defending the Old Testament historians. Charles Bulkeley, a Dissenting minister, also wrote ‘Notes on the Philosophical Works of Lord Bolingbroke.’

CHAP. XIII. this both in philosophy and religion. He follows experience till he finds there is something beyond experience. Then he either acknowledges that we must fall back upon natural instincts, and trust to reason, such as it is, or he gives way to despair, and with an easy indifference flings the problem aside as insoluble, bidding us be content with our ignorance, for all is an enigma, a riddle, and a mystery. These two states of mind are clearly distinguishable in Hume. They are both called Scepticism, yet they are so different that the one leads to inquiry, the other to indolence.\* The one was a quality of his own keen intellect, the other was learned in France. It is only the first which we care to notice further.

His relation  
to Berkeley.

Locke imagined that he found in experience the grand remedy for the reveries of schoolmen and metaphysicians. It was a method which suited the practical character of the English mind. Hume, who was not disposed to be a metaphysician, but a man of the world, accepted it readily; but being by nature a metaphysician, he could not escape a previous question, What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience? nor a subsequent inquiry as to how we were to solve questions not soluble by experience. Every subject in philosophy which he touches plays round this word. The first inquiry always is, How far do we know it by Locke's method? This knowledge in Hume's searching analysis invariably turns out to be small. It was objected to Locke by Stillingfleet that he discarded substance out of the world. Bishop Berkeley, for an object in no way sceptical, but rather the contrary, showed the impossibility of our ever being able to demonstrate the existence of a material world. Hume accepted Berkeley's arguments and Berkeley's conclusions. We are conscious of mind. There is an intellect which perceives,—but what does it perceive? Impressions and ideas that belong to it? or impressions and

\* This has been well expressed by Professor Maurice in his admirable remarks on Hume. 'It is not when he is pushing his investigations as far as they will go that we ever complain of him; then he is doing a service to truth and to mankind. It is when, as often happens in this treatise, he declines investigation, laughs at the effort to make it as useless and ridicu-

lous, flings himself into his arm-chair, becomes as indolently and contemptuously acquiescent as any priest ever wished his disciples to be; it is then that he exhibits the state of mind to which we are all tempted, and against which, whatever others do, the believer in a God of truth must wrestle to the death.'—*Modern Philosophy*.

ideas that belong to an external world? Without the mind CHAP. XIII.  
 to perceive, where would be that which we suppose to be  
 perceived? The mind is conscious only of its own impres-  
 sions and ideas, but it has no certainty of any existence be-  
 yond that of which it is conscious. So far Hume went with  
 Berkeley. But experience not only fails to guide us to an  
 external world, it does not even prove to us the existence of  
 mind. When we say we are conscious of mind, we assume  
 as much as when we say we are conscious of matter. Our  
 consciousness extends only to impressions and ideas, so that  
 the existence of a mind perceiving is as much beyond  
 demonstration as the existence of an external world per-  
 ceived. Here is the first of the shortcomings of experience.  
 The existence of matter and mind is demitted to the limbo of  
 scepticism.

The common-sense philosophers have always reckoned On causation.  
 themselves certain of matter and motion—that motion could  
 not exist without a Mover, nor any effect without a cause.  
 But how did they come by this knowledge? Hume showed  
 that it can never be reached by experience. We cannot  
 discover that force or energy which produces an effect. We  
 can never see what that is which makes an effect the infal-  
 lible consequence of a cause. All we know is that one fol-  
 lows the other. The impulse of one billiard ball is attended  
 with motion in the second. This is all that is manifest to  
 the outward senses. From the first appearance of any object  
 we never know what effect will result from it. By experience  
 we know that certain effects follow certain causes—that  
 heat, for instance, is the constant attendant on flame. But  
 prior to experience we do not know that flame contains that  
 force which we call heat. The idea is evidently not derived  
 from the contemplation of bodies. Some philosophers say it  
 is an inward impression, or an idea derived from reflection  
 on the operation of our minds, or a conclusion reached by  
 our reasonings guided by experience. These are supposi-  
 tions. All that we can say is simply that such a thing fol-  
 lows another because we have seen before a similar conjunc-  
 tion. What the connection is we do not know. The first  
 time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse or  
 by the shock of two billiard balls, he could not pronounce

CHAP. XIII. that the one event was connected with the other, but only that they were conjoined. It is not till after he has felt these events to be connected, by having observed several instances of the same nature, that he can foretell the existence of the one from the appearance of the other.

On the four-  
dation of  
morals.

When Hume writes of morals, experience is still playing its part. For a time it is a guide, then it fails, and Hume, after stumbling on other philosophies not experimental, falls finally into doubt and uncertainty. He proves by observations drawn from experience that virtue is the interest of man. He proves also, though this is not his object, that the distinctions of right and wrong exist anterior to all experience. For those who deny the reality of these distinctions he has no other name but 'disingenuous disputants.' Their reality must be admitted. The only questions are those which concern their extent and their foundation. The pleasure of a virtuous deed may be the motive which leads to it. This motive Hume founded on what he calls a *sentiment*. This is in opposition to the philosophers who find the motives of virtue in reason. This *sentiment* he calls an internal sense, or fine feeling. It is, in fact, the 'moral sense' of Lord Shaftesbury—an intuition of the mind not in any way derived from the impressions of the external world or from experience of human life. To separate this from reason could only be done by giving reason a limited meaning—a meaning which it may have had in Locke's philosophy, but to which it was never limited in any other philosophy. With Hume, reason means merely reasoning. It does not include what the Germans understand by *Vernunft*, nor what Plato and the ancient philosophers meant by that reason in which the world is constituted. Hume accordingly finds that these ancient philosophers, and such as Shaftesbury among the moderns, were confused between *reason* and *sentiment*. The former, he says, often affirmed that virtue is nothing but conformity to reason, and yet they considered morals as deriving their existence from taste or sentiment. The moderns talk much about the beauty of virtue and the deformity of vice, yet they commonly account for this distinction by metaphysical reasonings, and by deductions from the most abstract principles of the

understanding. Having in this way placed 'sentiment' in opposition to 'reason,' Hume admits that there are many specious arguments for both sides, and concludes with something of the confusion of which he complains in others. 'In many orders of beauty,' he says, 'particularly those of the fine arts, it is requisite to employ much reasoning in order to feel the proper sentiment, and a false relish may be frequently corrected by argument and reflection. There are just grounds to conclude that moral beauty partakes much of the latter species, and demands the assistance of our intellectual faculties in order to give it a suitable influence on the human mind.' After saying this, he announces that he will confine himself to the experimental method; fact and observation being the only ground for a system of ethics. From this ground he comes to a conclusion partly sceptical; regarding virtue as unquestionably the interest of man, yet adding an exception perhaps in the case of justice. 'That honesty is the best policy may be a good general rule, but it is liable to many exceptions, and he, it may perhaps be thought, conducts himself with most wisdom who observes the general rule and takes advantage of all the exceptions.' In the treatise on 'Human Nature' the question was discussed, if moral distinctions are to be found in nature. The answer is, that if by natural we are to understand the opposite of miraculous, they are in nature, and also if by natural is to be understood the opposite of unusual; but in the sense of natural as opposed to artificial, some virtues are said to be natural and others artificial.

Experience always landed Hume in scepticism, but in his really philosophical moods he was never willing to stay there. He believed in an external world as much as the most ordinary individual who puts his foot on this firm earth. He no more doubted the existence of his mind than he doubted of his doubts. Nature provides a remedy for scepticism. Hume could not discover the connection between cause and effect, but he never denied its existence nor the validity of our reasonings concerning it. 'Allow me to tell you,' he says in one place, 'that I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that anything might arise without a cause. I only maintained that our certainty of the falsehood of that

The remedy  
for scepticism.



CHAP. XIII. proposition proceeded neither from intuition nor from demonstration, but from another source . . . . There are many different kinds of certainty, but some are satisfactory to the mind, though perhaps none so regular as the demonstrative kind.'

Hume a  
Theist.

Hume refused the name of Deist, but it is probable that he would not have refused to be called by the Greek equivalent, Theist. There is a story that once dining with a large company at the Baron d'Holbach's, the discourse turning on natural religion, Hume said that as for Atheists he did not believe there ever was one. 'You have been a little unfortunate,' said the baron; 'you are now at table with seventeen for the first time.' It is not generally admitted that Hume was a Theist. He came with his experience to find out if it could lead him to a demonstration of the being of God. As in other cases, it came short. He had never seen God, he was not with Him before the mountains were brought forth. He saw effects in the world, but no agent producing them. He saw workmanship, but no hand at work. His experience did not reach a handbreadth into the deep that is infinite. Hume, however, brings forward his objections avowedly as 'sceptical paradoxes' with a distinct affirmation that he does not approve of them. In the essay, 'Of a Providence and Future State,' a philosopher of the sect of the Epicureans is supposed to address the common people of Athens. He urges them to abide by the ancient religious traditions of their forefathers, and not to attempt to establish religion upon reason. The religious philosophers indulge a rash curiosity. They excite doubts which they never satisfy—they paint in the most magnificent colours the order, beauty, and wise arrangement of the universe, and then ask if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concourse of atoms, or if chance could produce what the greatest genius can never sufficiently admire. This is an argument from effects to causes. It is inferred from the order of the work that there must have been design and forethought in the worker. The Epicurean philosopher answers that he allows the argument to be solid so far as it goes, but its advocates must not pretend to



establish the conclusion in a greater latitude than the phenomena of nature will justify. When we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must proportion the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect. We cannot return back upon the cause and infer other effects from it besides those by which it is known to us. No one merely from the sight of Zeuxis' pictures could know that he was also a statuary or architect. We may fairly conclude the workman to be possessed of the talents and taste displayed in his works, but we have no right to infer that he has any talents beyond what he manifests. Supposing the Deity to be the Author of the existence and order of the universe, we can ascribe to Him that precise degree of power, intelligence, and benevolence which appear in His workmanship, but nothing more. The supposition of further attributes is mere hypothesis, and so too is the supposition that in distant regions of space or periods of time there will be a more magnificent display of these attributes. We can never be allowed to mount up from the effect to the cause, and then descend downwards to infer any new effect from that cause. It is objected that as we reason from a half-finished building that it is a work of design and contrivance, and justly return to the cause to infer that the building will soon be finished, so may we infer the completion of what is wanting to the perfection of this world. If we find on the seashore the print of a human foot, we conclude that a man had passed that way, though the sand may have effaced the print of the other foot. Why then may we not reason that the Author of Nature is capable of producing something greater than nature at present manifests? The answer is, human art and divine are not the same; man is a being whom we know by experience, and from our knowledge of him and his works we can draw a hundred inferences of what may be expected from him. The print of a foot in the sand can only prove that there was some figure adapted to it by which it was produced, but the print of a *human* foot proves likewise from our other experience that there was probably another foot which also left its impression. 'The case is not the same with our

CHAP. XIII. reasonings from the works of nature. The Deity is known to us only by His productions, and is a single Being in the universe, not comprehended under any species or genus, from whose experienced attributes or qualities we can by analogy infer other attributes or qualities in Him. As the universe shows wisdom and goodness, we infer wisdom and goodness. As it shows a particular degree of these perfections, we infer a particular degree of them precisely adapted to the effect which we examine.'

Uncertainty  
of the analogy  
between di-  
vine and  
human attri-  
butes.

The source of our mistake is said by the Epicurean philosopher to be that we tacitly consider ourselves as in the place of the Supreme Being, and conclude that 'He will act on every occasion according to our ideas of what is reasonable. But the ordinary course of nature might convince us of the contrary. It is regulated by principles and maxims very different from ours. We cannot reason from ourselves to a Being so remote and incomprehensible, who bears much less analogy to any other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper.' Bolingbroke had already reasoned in this way with reference to the divine attributes of power and justice, but he did not hold his reasoning applicable to the attributes of wisdom and goodness. Hume proposes to introduce these objections as 'sceptical paradoxes,' nothing more than curious; but in a note to the essay, where he speaks in his own person, he says it may be established as a maxim that, when any cause is known only by its particular effects, it must be impossible to infer any new effects from that 'cause.'

'Dialogues on  
Natural Reli-  
gion.'

It is still, however, not evident how far Hume agreed with the philosophy of his Epicurean philosopher. The subject was resumed in a tract, which was published after his death. This was called 'Dialogues on Natural Religion.' The principal disputants are Philo and Cleanthes. The one is a Sceptic, the other a Theist. The author of Hume's Life, John Hill Burton, says that Hume showed most sympathy with Cleanthes, and, indeed, very nearly professed the theistical doctrine for his own. Philo says that the inquiry can never be concerning the *being*, but only concerning the nature of the Deity. The being of God is

not to be questioned. It is a truth self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause, and the original cause of the universe we call God, and piously ascribe to Him every perfection. But as all perfection is purely relative, we ought never to imagine that we can comprehend the attributes of the Divine Being, or suppose that His perfections have any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human creature. We justly ascribe to Him wisdom, thought, design, knowledge, because these words are honourable among men, and we have no other language nor other conception by which we can express our admiration of Him. But we must not think that His attributes have any resemblance to these qualities among men. He is infinitely superior to our limited view and comprehension, and is 'more the object of worship in the temple than of disputation in the schools.' Cleanthes saw in the world but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivision to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace or explain. All these various machines, and even the most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends throughout all nature resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance, or human design. And since the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble each other, and that the Author of nature is in some way similar to man, though possessed of much greater faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of His work. By this argument, *à posteriori*, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of Deity and the likeness of the divine mind to the human.

Philo answers that if we see a house we conclude with the greatest certainty that it had an architect or builder, because this is precisely the species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But we cannot affirm that the universe bears such resemblance to a house that we with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect.

God's work  
unlike man's.

## CHAP. XIII.

Order not  
always an  
evidence of  
design.

Cleanthes dwells on the resemblance, which he maintains is not slight, in the economy of final causes—the order, proportion, and arrangement of every part. And Philo points out to Demea, another of the speakers, that Cleanthes tacitly allows that order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final causes, is not of itself any proof of design, but only so far as we have experienced it to proceed from design. For anything we know, *à priori*, matter may contain the spring or source of order originally within itself as well as mind, and there is no more difficulty in conceiving that the several elements, from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, than in conceiving that these ideas in the great universal mind, from a like internal unknown cause, fall into the same arrangement.

Cleanthes allows the equal possibility of both suppositions, but finds from experience that there is an original principle of order in mind, not in matter; and as from similar effects we can infer similar causes, so he concludes that the adjustment of means to an end is the same in the universe as in a machine of human contrivance, and, therefore, the causes of both must resemble each other.

Thought may  
not be the  
model of the  
universe.

Philo is scandalized with this comparison made between the mind of God and the created mind. Thought, design, or intelligence, he says, such as we discover in men and animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat and cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred others which fall under daily observation. Why should thought be the model of the whole universe? It is true that in this minute globe of earth, stone, wood, brick, iron, brass have not an order or arrangement without human art or contrivance, but it does not follow that the universe has not its order without something similar to human art. Is a part of nature a rule for the whole? Is a very small part a rule for the universe? This is not to be allowed. The inhabitants of other planets, have they thought, intelligence, and reason, or anything similar to these faculties in man? When nature has so extremely diversified her manner of operation in this small globe, can we imagine that she incessantly copies herself throughout

the universe,\* and if thought is confined to this narrow corner, with what propriety can we assign it as the original cause of all things?

Cleanthes answers that if even in common life we assign a cause for an event, it is no objection that we cannot assign a cause for that cause, and answer every new question that may be started. What philosophy could submit to so rigid a rule? Philosophers, who confess ultimate causes to be unknown, are sensible that the most refined principles into which they trace the phenomena are still as inexplicable as the phenomena themselves are to the vulgar. The order and arrangement of nature, the curious adjustment of final causes, the place, use, and intention of every part and organ—all these bespeak, in the clearest language, an intelligent Cause, an Author. The heavens and the earth give in the same testimony. The whole chorus of nature raises a hymn to the praise of the Creator. 'You alone,' says Cleanthes to Philo, 'or almost alone, disturb the general harmony. You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections. You ask me, What is the cause of the cause? I know not; I care not; that concerns not me. I have found a Deity, and here I stop my inquiry. Let them go further who are wiser or more enterprising.'

Design in nature defended.

Philo admits that the grandeur and magnificence of nature are arguments for Deity, but argues that on Cleanthes' *à posteriori* principles they become objections. He also points out to Cleanthes that by confining himself to this method of reasoning he renounces all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of Deity. For as the cause ought to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognizance, is not infinite, we cannot ascribe this attribute to the Divine Being. Nor can we, on Cleanthes' principles, ascribe perfection to God, for there are many inexplicable difficulties in the works of nature which, if we allow a perfect Author to be proved *à priori*, are easily solved, and become only seeming difficulties, from the narrow capacity of man, who cannot trace infinite relations. But on the rigid final

Nature does not prove its Author infinite.

\* Had the discoveries now known as morphology and typology been known in Hume's day, he would scarcely have made Philo reason after this fashion.

CHAP. XIII. cause supposition these difficulties become real ; and further, were the world ever so perfect a production, it must still remain uncertain whether all the excellencies of the work can justly be ascribed to the workman. He may have botched and bungled many worlds throughout an eternity. Ere this system was struck out much labour may have been lost, many fruitless trials made, and a slow but continual improvement in the art of world-making carried on during infinite ages. Nor by this reasoning solely can we prove the unity of God as in a piece of human workmanship—a house, a ship, or a city ; though unity be in the work, a great number of men may be employed in working.

The 'Natural History of Religion.'

In an essay on the 'Natural History of Religion,' Hume, speaking in his own person, clearly declares himself on the side of Theism. The whole frame of nature, he says, bespeaks an intelligent Author ; and no rational inquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and religion. This belief Hume thinks is not an original instinct or primary impression. It is the result of reasoning. There are nations without any sentiment of religion, and there are no two nations, perhaps no two men, that ever precisely agreed in their religious ideas. By studying the works of nature we come inevitably to the conclusion that there is an Author of nature ; but if we leave the works of nature, and trace the footsteps of invisible power in the various and contrary events of life, we are necessarily led to Polytheism. From this Hume argues that Polytheism preceded Monotheism. The apparently capricious powers of nature would be the first divinities—beings corresponding to the elves and fairies of our ancestors. As men advanced in the knowledge of nature, they would see that the work of nature could not be ascribed to these deities. The idea of the unity of God being once reached, the human mind could never again lose sight of it. The intelligent Pagans never ascribed the origin and fabric of the universe to these imperfect beings. Hesiod and Homer suppose gods and men to have sprung equally from the unknown powers of nature. Ovid speaks of the creating Deity in the doubtful terms, 'Quisquis fuit ille Deorum ;'

Polytheism preceded Monotheism.



and Diodorus Siculus, beginning his work with the enumeration of the most reasonable opinions concerning the origin of the world, makes no mention of a Deity, or intelligent mind. Hume denies the universality of the religious sentiment in order that he may deny the existence of a primary instinct, which, as a mere experimental philosopher, he was bound to do; yet here, as in other places, he is forced to go beyond his own philosophy to find a rational explanation of the phenomena of religion. A people, he says, destitute of religion are but a few degrees removed from the brute. And again, he says, that if the propensity to believe in invisible intelligent power be not an original instinct, it is, at least, a general attendant on human nature, and may be considered as a mark or stamp which the Divine workman has set upon His work, and 'nothing, surely, could more dignify mankind than to be thus selected from all other parts of the creation to bear the image or impression of the universal Creator. What a noble privilege is it of human reason to attain the knowledge of the Supreme Being, and from the visible works of nature be enabled to infer so sublime a principle as its Supreme Creator!' After saying all this, Hume's natural dislike to religion comes upon him. He finds ignorance the mother of devotion, revolts at the corruptions of theological systems and the evils to which they have given rise, and finally sinks into his wonted scepticism, finding that all is an 'inexplicable mystery;' that the result of inquiry is, 'doubt and uncertainty, from which our only escape is into the calm though obscure regions of philosophy.'

Hume was in Paris about two years after the great excitement that had been raised by the miracles supposed to have been performed at the tomb of the Abbé Paris. He had many conversations with the priests about the reality of these and other miracles. A Jesuit of La Flèche once answered Hume that the same objections which he urged against Catholic miracles were valid against those of the Gospel. Hume says he admitted this as a sufficient answer. If there are no real miracles but those recorded in the Bible, they become so exceptionable that there is a very strong probability against their being genuine. The order of nature is visible to us; a Gospel miracle comes to us only on the

On miracles.



CHAP. XIII. authority of testimony ; which, then, is the stronger evidence, our senses or testimony ? Archbishop Tillotson had already weighed the question in arguing against the doctrine of the ' real presence.' This doctrine might have the authority of Scripture or tradition, but these cannot overbalance the testimony of our senses. The Apostles saw the miracles of Jesus. To them the evidence was equal to the evidence of the senses ; but to us, who have only their testimony, it is not equal. When we believe anything on human testimony, the principle of our belief is founded on an observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. Here all the experiments and observations give a probability in favour of the truth of that to which testimony is made. But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, there is a contest of two opposite experiences. The Indian prince who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost reasoned justly. It required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts which bore so little analogy to the events of which he had constant and uniform experience. The action of frost was not *contrary* to his experience, but it was not conformable to it. It was *extraordinary*, not miraculous. In a wider knowledge of nature it was found to be within the operations of nature. A miracle Hume defines as a *violation* of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be. The Indian prince rightly required strong testimony to believe in ice, but no testimony is sufficient to evidence a miracle.

Hume refuted. No writer on miracles omits to notice Hume. To refute him has been the ambition of every Christian apologist for the last hundred years ; but what could really be said in reply was said in his lifetime. It is recorded of a professor in the University of Edinburgh that he annually refuted the great sceptic, and with as much complacency as regularity. A portion of his lectures was always introduced with the words—' Having considered these different systems, I will now, gentlemen, proceed to refute the ingenious theories of our late respected townsman, Mr. David Hume.' As there

really was but one answer, that answer has been repeated with variations and amplifications by all who have undertaken to meet his objections. CHAP. XIII.

William Adams, who is described as chaplain to the Bishop of Llandaff, was one of the first who wrote on miracles with reference to Hume's argument. Adams at once objected to the definition of miracle as a 'transgression of the law of nature.' If the Author of nature performs any work different from what we see going on every day, He does not thereby violate or transgress any law. He does not even depart from the order of nature, but only from what we know of the order of nature. Our idea of a natural law is nothing more than our observation of what usually goes on in the world. It is not contrary to nature that the dead should be raised, or that the winds should be controlled by a word. It only supposes a power in nature greater than what is manifested in our daily experience. Our individual observation may testify to a uniformity of sequences in nature, but we have no right to make this the universal measure where so much evidently lies beyond our knowledge. Extraordinary occasions may require extraordinary manifestations of power. For the truth of these we must depend on testimony. If they became frequent they would cease to be extraordinary, and so cease to serve the end for which a miracle is wrought. The uniformity of nature must be acknowledged before we can acknowledge a miracle. This, says Adams, is a position which has been laid down by all who write in defence of miracles, and he expresses wonder to see it now pleaded as decisive against them. Adams sometimes speaks of God changing or subverting His laws, which are not much better words than 'transgressing' or 'violating.' He confesses a necessity of speaking in this way, for a miracle is apparently a subversion of law, but in reality it is conformable to nature. This was taking the force out of the distinction which Hume made between the extraordinary and the miraculous.

It appears from Dr. Campbell's 'Dissertation on Miracles,' that Hume in the first edition of his 'Essay' maintained the impossibility of miracles. Some of the reasoning still looks in that direction, and many who replied to Hume argued against the thesis that miracles are impossible. In the early

By William  
Adams.

By Dr. Camp-  
bell.

CHAP. XIII. editions there was a passage which read thus—‘Upon the whole, it appears that no testimony for any kind of miracle *can* ever possibly amount to a probability, much less to a proof.’ The passage now reads thus—‘Upon the whole, it appears that no testimony for any kind of miracle *has* ever amounted to probability, much less to a proof.’ This fairly changes the question from possibility to probability. While Hume maintained that miracles were improbable, Campbell held that they were not only probable, and might be proved from testimony, but that the miracles on which our belief in Christianity is founded *are* sufficiently attested.

Testimony  
and experi-  
ence.

Campbell refuses to admit that our belief in testimony has its foundation in experience. He regards it rather as an original instinct or intuition. It is not, therefore, to be put into the balance against experience. He makes this simple illustration of the case between him and Hume:—He lived near a ferry; he had seen the ferry-boat cross the river a thousand times and return safe. One day a stranger comes to his door and seriously tells him that the boat is lost; he stood on the bank, and saw it upset. Here is what Hume would call ‘a contest of opposite experiences;’ but Campbell maintains that his having seen the boat cross and recross a thousand times in safety is no proof against the testimony of the stranger—that must be overthrown by contrary testimony. Another person testifies that he had seen the boat safe; that it has not been upset. Here the things balanced are homogeneal, here is testimony against testimony; but until the second testimony came there was no inconsistency in believing that, though the boat had crossed a thousand times in safety, it was now upset. The application of this illustration might be charged with a fallacy. It might be said that we have experience that boats are upset, but we have none that dead men are raised to life. But in making this objection we should be carrying with the word experience an ambiguity which Campbell is careful to mark. Did Hume mean by experience his own, personally? If so, there is no fallacy in Campbell’s illustration. He may never have seen a ferry-boat upset. Did Hume mean by experience that of men in general? If so, what did he know of other men’s experience except by testimony? This boasted uniformity

of nature, then, has only testimony for its foundation, the same as that on which miracles depend; so that testimony really forms the greater part of that experience which was to overthrow the validity of testimony. To make Hume's case valid, evidence is required from experience that ferry-boats have never been upset. This is a considerable change from Dr. Tillotson's argument about transubstantiation, with which Hume began his 'Essay.' That argument rested on the superiority of sense over testimony. The Apostles saw the miracles of Jesus; they had the evidence of their senses. But if our senses cannot be trusted,—if what appears bread and wine is not bread and wine, but flesh and blood,—we overthrow not only testimony, but the evidence on which testimony rests, which is the veracity of sense. Here the things opposed are the evidence of our senses and an external authority. In Hume's argument the opposition is between his own personal experience, added to what he knows traditionally of the general experience of mankind, and an external testimony of certain facts which, though out of the range both of general experience and his own experience personally, are yet not incompatible with either. This seems to be the force of Campbell's argument, but Hume had sheltered himself by a subtle distinction which it was necessary to examine. The Indian prince who did not believe in ice because he had never seen it, and could not conceive the possibility of it, having no conception of the conditions on which its existence was possible, reasoned rightly on the whole. It required strong testimony to convince him. Both sides agree in this. Both sides also agree that the testimony might be such as it would be unreasonable for him to reject. Hume says that his unbelief might be overcome by testimony, because, though it is not *conformable to his experience* that water should be turned into ice, it is yet *not contrary to it*. This is just what Campbell says of miracles. They are not contrary to our experience, but they are outside of it or not conformable to it. Our acquaintance with the laws of nature is only partial. In the idea of a miracle as contrary to experience, Hume is still working upon his definition that it is 'a transgression of law,' which Campbell of course rejects. To illustrate his meaning, Hume says it

CHAP. XIII.  
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Miracles not impossible.

CHAP. XIII. is no miracle that a man in seeming good health should die suddenly, but it is a miracle that a dead man should rise to life. The main difference here is, according to Campbell, that the one is common—conformable to experience,—the other is not conformable to experience. The Indian prince would not have been more unreasonable in refusing on the strongest testimony to believe in ice than we should be in refusing on the same testimony to believe that a man was raised from the dead.

Hume grants  
the possibility  
of miracles.

But Hume comes even nearer to his opponents than this. He grants that there may possibly be ‘miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony.’ There may be; but he does not grant that there has been. Suppose, he says, there was a universal testimony that for the first eight days in January, 1600, there was a total darkness over the whole earth. Such a testimony ought to be received by philosophers, and the cause of the miracle investigated. By ‘miracle’ Hume evidently means here something natural. For philosophers are to investigate the cause of it. But this is not surely the kind of ‘miracle’ concerning which he wrote his ‘Essay;’ yet into something of this kind Dr. Campbell resolves all the miracles which he defends,—miracles which are variations from the usual course of nature, but not violations of the *actual* system of nature. The conclusion is, that the kind of miracle against which Hume writes is a kind of miracle whose existence Christians, as represented by Dr. Campbell, do not profess to believe.

Bishop  
Douglas on  
miracles.

John Douglas, Bishop of Salisbury, wrote ‘The Criterion; or, Rules by which the True Miracles in the New Testament are distinguished from the spurious Miracles of Pagans and Papists.’ Douglas connects Hume’s argument against miracles with his doctrine of cause and effect. It is only when our experience connects a cause with a particular effect that we believe it. Testimony is not sufficient. The plain inference made by Douglas is that Hume’s argument proves too much. It is equally valid against the Christian miracles, and everything wonderful in nature which has not yet come within the narrow limits of our experience. Douglas

assumes the omnipotency of God, and from that reasons for miracles. He notices the contradiction pointed out by Campbell, that Hume in the plainest terms admits that human testimony may in some cases give credibility to a miracle. He also noticed a limitation which Hume expressly wished should be noticed, that only such miracles as are made the *foundation of a new system of religion* cannot be made credible by testimony. His previous reasoning had struck at all miracles; but 'he is lost in a labyrinth, surely,' says the author of 'The Criterion,' 'when he now applies it only to miracles connected with religion.' Bishop Douglas argues for the necessity of revelation. Socrates had seen this necessity when he told Alcibiades of a Great Teacher who was to teach men their duty towards God and man. The expediency of a revelation involves the expediency of miracles. The 'rules' for testing miracles are that the accounts be not published too long after the time when the miracles were said to have been performed, nor distant from the place; and if published at the time and place, not allowed to pass without examination. The 'Life of Apollonius Tyanæus,' by Philostratus, was not published till a hundred years after the death of the hero. Moreover, the whole of that biography is made up of imitations of New Testament miracles. The 'Life of Ignatius,' by Ribadeneira, in the first two editions contained no miracles. These were first inserted in an abridgment printed at Ypres in 1612, fifty-five years after the death of Ignatius. Bishop Douglas examines at some length the miracles said to have been wrought at the tomb of the Abbé Paris, and does not find that they were so wonderful as the cures of Valentine Greatrakes, which were attested not only by the Bishop of Dromore, but by such rational theologians as Dr. Cudworth, Henry More, Bishop Wilkins, and Bishop Patrick, with many eminent physicians, and yet they were not accounted miracles.

The introductory part of Dr. Paley's 'Evidences of Christianity' is devoted to Hume's argument; but Paley only repeats, in a condensed form, the substance of Dr. Campbell's dissertation. The very first sentence of Paley's book assures us that the writer is a man who understands an argument and can reason calmly. The previous advocates of Christianity

Dr. Paley on  
Hume's argu-  
ment.



CHAP. XIII. generally held it necessary to exalt the light of the Gospel, and to contrast with it the darkness and insufficiency of natural religion. This was done under the belief that the Deists had exalted the light of natural religion so as to make Christianity unnecessary. Paley at once states the case as it appears to every dispassionate and unbiassed mind. It is unnecessary to prove that mankind stood in need of a revelation, because, he says, 'I have met with no serious person who thinks that even under the Christian revelation we have too much light.' On the supposition that there is a Creator and Governor of the world, and a future life for man, it is not unlikely that God would give a revelation. The probability that God would acquaint men with the fact of the future life is not greater than the probability that He would do it by miracles. To say that these doctrines, or the facts connected with them, are violently improbable, is a prejudication which should be resisted. Hume's position is stated to be that it is contrary to experience that a miracle should be true, but not contrary to experience that testimony should be false. The narrative of a fact, Paley says, is only contrary to experience when the fact is related to have existed at such a time and place, at which time and place, we being present, did not perceive it to exist. This is properly contrary to experience. This was Tillotson's contrariety. There is no intelligible meaning that can be attached to the words contrary to experience, except that we ourselves have not experienced anything of the kind related, or that such a thing has not been generally experienced by others. We cannot say that *universal* experience is against it, for that would be to assume the whole question. Paley accepts it as a fair statement of the controversy, 'whether it be more improbable that the miracle should be true, or the testimony false;' and he asks, in argumentative justice, that in considering the probability of the miracle we should be allowed to take in all that we know of the existence, power, and disposition of the Deity. A miracle will appear more incredible to one who does not believe in God than to one who does; and more improbable when no purpose can be assigned, than when it is done on an occasion which seems to require it. Paley concludes by defending the Christian

Contrary to  
experience  
defined.



miracles as well attested, and showing that some pretended miracles are not well attested. CHAP. XIII.

Bishop Warburton wrote 'Remarks on Hume's "Natural History of Religion."' They are not of much value; in fact, this is one of Warburton's poorest performances. His words were many and strong, his arguments few and feeble. Warburton defended Christianity by throwing mud at its opponents. He denied that Polytheism preceded Monotheism. His argument was 'the authority of an old book.' When Warburton reviewed Bolingbroke, he extolled Toland and Tindal as good reasoners. He described them as men who really had something to say, and could say it; 'but as for Bolingbroke, he was the mere essence of emptiness and nonentity.' Now that Hume is to be brow-beaten, Bolingbroke is extolled as a man who knew how to reason; but as for Hume, he 'insults common sense,' and defends 'dogmatical nonsense with scepticism still more nonsensical.'\*

We have abstained hitherto from any remarks on Leland's 'View of the Deistical Writers.' Leland was industrious, he had good intentions, he was disposed to be candid, and yet he is one-sided. His book does not deserve the reliance which has generally been placed on it. Two of the writers especially were entirely beyond him. These were Hobbes and Hume. Of the former he does not say much; of the latter he says a great deal too much. He is most successful with Bolingbroke. He fails entirely with Hume. He says that the tendency of Hume's writings is to confound rather than to enlighten the understanding. But this depends on the character of the understanding. He marks a few things in Hume's writings that 'strike at the foundations of natural religion.' When Leland wrote this, the 'Dialogues on Natural Religion' had not been published, so the reference was probably to the essay on 'Providence and a Future State.' Hume, as we have seen, distinctly avows that he did not approve the principles advocated by the Epicurean philosopher. The extent to which he did agree

Bishop Warburton on the 'Natural History of Religion.'

Dr. Leland on Hume.

\* The 'Remarks' were published by Cadell in 1777, as written by Bishop Hurd, in the form of a letter to Bishop Warburton, with the addition of a few lines at the beginning and a few at the end.

CHAP. XIII. with him, as expressed in a note at the end, is only unfavourable to natural religion as different people may view it differently. The impossibility of tracing the connection between cause and effect Leland would have been willing to pass by as a display of metaphysical subtlety, if Hume had not made it the foundation of conclusions relating to matters of great importance. But this was just one of the things which Hume denied he had ever done. The inquiry was limited to the question of the source whence we have the idea of power in causation. The answer is that it is from experience, and not from intuition or demonstration, but the fact of its existence and the validity of our arguments depending on it remain the same. Following his own interpretation of Hume's doctrine of causation, Leland finds Hume inconsistent, when treating of liberty and necessity he speaks of necessary connection.

The limitation  
of the design  
argument.

It may be some excuse for Dr. Leland that he was not alone in supposing that Hume's principles were unfavourable to natural religion. The objection which Hume put into the mouth of Philo, that we had no ground for ascribing to the cause more than we found in the effect, did not invalidate the argument from design, but it showed that it had limitations. It might prove a Creator, but it did not prove an Infinite. It might prove that there was some analogy between the mind of God and the mind of man, but it could not annihilate the manifest interval between the Divine and the human. Yet the things suggested by Philo have been taken into account by all philosophical Theists. They are to be found in Plato and Plotinus, in John Scotus Erigena and Benedict Spinoza. The acknowledgment of them has caused all philosophy of religion to be charged with Pantheism.

Reason and  
faith.

The result of Hume's criticism of the design argument has been finally settled by Kant. In the *pure reason* which leads to scepticism, it loses its force, but it finds it again in what Kant calls the *practical reason*. It is valid as far as it goes. In concluding his Essay on Miracles, Hume said with a sneer that our religion is not founded on reason but on faith. Those who replied to him found at least that it was not against reason. The internal sense which men have of the truth of religion is properly called faith; not that it

is opposed to reason, nor in the sense of implicit reliance on authority, but as designating a state of mind rather than an act of the mind. In this sense the most devout and rational Christians of the present day will not object to taking Hume's conclusion seriously, that the foundation of our belief in Christianity is not from a process of reasoning concerning miracles, or any other external evidence, but really has its foundation in something which is called *faith*. Why should Hume have sneered at this? He had proved that reason, as he understood it, had failed in everything, even in proving its own existence. He had shown, too, that our only escape from scepticism was to return to reason, such as it is, and to put faith in it. So that a rational faith really is practical reason.

Hume's biographer, Mr. Burton, claims that Hume's place should be not among the sceptics, but among the philosophers of the porch. There is some justice in this claim when the easy French philosophy is put off. Hume's character is that of the genuine Stoic—calm, patient, unbiassed, self-sacrificing. In the *Essays on Epicurean, Stoic, Platonist, and Sceptic*, each of the philosophers is made to speak as if Hume felt that each of them had some truth on his side. Though avowedly a disciple of the experimental philosophy, his eagerness to follow principles to their last results continually leads him to some region which that philosophy forbids its disciples to enter. He refused to engage in controversy. The agitation of mind which that kind of gladiatorship produces, he did not think conducive to the discovery of truth. When Dr. Campbell, through his friend Dr. Blair, submitted to him the manuscript of the 'Dissertation on Miracles,' Hume sent to Campbell one of the kindest letters ever written. If it had not the name of Christian, it had the reality without the name. To Dr. Blair he wrote that whenever they met it must be with the understanding that no subjects relating to his profession were to be introduced in their conversation. He had made up his mind; and such subjects might destroy the good feeling which existed between them. The entire simplicity of Hume's character, as delineated by his friends, is in keeping with all that we know of him from his

Hume as a  
philosopher.

His Christian  
spirit.

CHAP. XIII. writings. It is traditionally recorded that his mother, speaking of her son David, once said, 'Our Davie's a fine, good-natured eratur, but uncommon wake-minded.' It is possible that David, destitute of the religious element, without prejudice or bias, may have appeared to his devout mother precisely in this light.

Deficient in  
the religious  
sentiment.

The eighteenth century had so many men remarkable for their virtues, their great human gifts, and their practical common sense, that we often wish it were possible to vindicate it from the usual charge of irreligion. But all the evidence seems against us. Hume says that the clergy had lost their credit; their pretensions and doctrines were ridiculed; and even religion could scarcely support itself in the world. We have the same testimony from Bishop Butler, Archbishop Secker, and others. Hume's mind was essentially pagan, without one Shemitic element. There is no great man of whom we know anything who had by nature so little of the sentiment of religion. The whole spirit of the Bible was alien to him. He does not seem to have had even a taste for its literature or its lessons of human wisdom. In every great English writer, passages, similes, or illustrations from Scripture are plentiful in almost every page, interweaving themselves in their happiest sentences; but in all Hume's philosophical writings we have marked only two references to the Scriptures. One of them is about the treasures of Hezekiah. It is introduced in a political essay, and with the indifferent words, *if I remember right*. In the whole history of his life there is but one occasion where he ever manifests the least sense for religious feeling. When in London he learned of the death of his mother. His sorrow was overwhelming. His friend Mr. Boyle said to him, 'You owe this uncommon grief to having thrown off the principles of religion, for if you had not, you would have been consoled with the firm belief that the good lady, who was not only the best of mothers, but the most pious of Christians, was completely happy in the realms of the just.' To which Hume answered, 'Though I throw out my speculations to entertain the learned and metaphysical world, yet in other things I do not think so differently from the rest of the world as you imagine.' This is a solitary instance, and,

if really genuine, is altogether exceptional. When he drew near his own end, with all his faculties entire, he amused himself and his friends with jests about crossing the Styx, and how he would banter old Charon, and detain him as long as he could on this side the river before he entered the ferry-boat.\*

CHAP. XIII.

Hume's principles, of necessity, made him many enemies. We may praise the zeal of those who opposed him, but we can also admire the calm, self-possessed spirit which bore the opposition with meekness and patience. There is a story, well authenticated, that when an old man, and very heavy, he fell into the swamp at the bottom of the wall that surrounded Edinburgh Castle. He was unable to get out, and in great dread of there ending his life, he called to an old woman for assistance. The old woman told him that he was 'Mr. Hume the Deist, and she would help none of him.' 'But, my good woman,' said Hume piteously, 'does not your religion teach you to do good even to your enemies?' 'That may be,' she replied, 'but ye shall'na come out o' that till ye become a Christian yoursel', and repeat the Lord's Prayer and the Belief.' He performed the task, and got the promised assistance. David Hume is not the first whom ability to say the Creed has helped out of a ditch.

His meekness.

Got out of a ditch by repeating the Creed.

\* What is here said of Hume is the substance of an article which was written for the *Contemporary Review*, May, 1869. The Editor, the late Dean of Canterbury, added the following note:—A saying of Bishop Horne to Hume illustrates this defect in the sceptic's character. Hume had used it

as an argument against the alleged consolatory effect of religion, that all the religious men he had met with were melancholy persons. 'The sight of you,' replied Horne, 'is enough to make a religious man melancholy at any time.'

## CHAPTER XIV.

THE 'THREE DENOMINATIONS.'—OCCASIONAL PAPERS.—EXETER CONTROVERSY. —SALTERS' HALL CONFERENCE.—EDMUND CALAMY.—DR. CHANDLER.—DR. BENSON.—HENRY GROVE.—DR. LARDNER.—DR. LOWMAN.—LORD BARRINGTON.—DR. WATTS.—DR. DODDRIDGE.—CALEB FLEMING.—HUGH FARMER.—DR. JAMES FOSTER.—ROBERT ROBINSON.—DR. JOHN TAYLOR.—DR. PRICE.—DR. PRIESTLEY.—THEOPHILUS LINDSEY.—DR. JEBB.—DR. DISNEY—EDWARD EVANSON.—GILBERT WAKEFIELD.—EMMANUEL SWEDENBORG.

'The Three Denominations.'

AT the end of the seventeenth century the Presbyterians, as we have seen, separated from the Independents. The chief cause of their separation was a departure from the doctrines of Calvin. Since their ejection in 1662, the Presbyterian leaders, in their progress to a more liberal theology, had kept pace with the rational Divines of the Established Church. This was due in a great measure to the influence of Baxter. He not only modified the harsher features of the theology of Calvin, but he opposed the principle of enforced subscription to articles of faith. By the beginning of the eighteenth century a new generation of Presbyterians had arisen. They had still scruples about conformity, but they lived in hope of concessions which would enable them to conform. Though separated ecclesiastically from the Independents, they were generally classed as constituting along with the Baptists—'The Three Denominations.' We shall speak of them separately, but the three denominations so often acted together in defence of their common interests that the distinction, especially be-

tween the Presbyterians and the Independents, is not always clear. It will be seen, too, that they are not to be definitely marked off from each other on grounds of doctrine. The three denominations have each had among them Calvinists, Arminians, Arians, and Socinians.

It is difficult to form an estimate of the influence or importance of the Nonconformists at the beginning of the last century. They were evidently considerable, though far short of what might have been expected from the strength of the Presbyterians at the time of the Restoration. Bishop Burnet says that he remembered the churches in London, after the ejection of the Nonconformists, as very poorly attended; but by the end of the century he did not know of many that had not overflowing congregations. For this change many causes might be assigned. The generation that had personal grievances had passed away. Between the Restoration and the Revolution, it was not legal to form Nonconformist congregations, and after the Revolution the liberal spirit of the rulers of the Church made it unnecessary. There was, besides, a continual hope of comprehension, and the practice of occasional conformity was very general among the Presbyterians. During the reign of Queen Anne, 'High Church and Sacheverell' was the religion of the mob. Liberal bishops and Presbyterian preachers then became companions in tribulation. Lost tithes were restored, and new churches built by command of the State. A bill was passed against occasional conformity, and another for the prevention of schism. The last was intended to suppress the Nonconformist Academies. The Queen, however, died on the very day in which the act was to come into operation. The accession of the House of Hanover brought back liberty and toleration.

Extent of their influence and importance.

It is hard to decide which was more fatal to the interests of the Presbyterians, oppression or toleration. The grounds of their separation, apart from personal or accidental circumstances, were not sufficient to warrant great sacrifices. They saw men in the Church doing the work which they wished to do. The subscription required by the Act of Uniformity was rigid in words, but in reality it had great tension. The difficulties were magnified by the more rigid Noncon-

Decline of Presbyterianism.



CHAP. XIV. formists, but there were always some the object of whose separation was to effect greater freedom within the Church. This was probably true of the great body of Presbyterians. There is distinct evidence that the Presbyterians, as a separate body, were visibly on the decline. Their congregations were not numerous, and showed no signs of increase. Calamy describes even Sylvester's congregation as comparatively but a 'handful.' Nonconformist quarrels have always had a peculiar malignity. The contending parties have generally been implacable, and people who hated quarrelling could generally find peace by going to the parish church. The smallness of the congregations and the uncertainty of any settled maintenance for the ministers may have had a considerable share in determining many of their best men at this date to abandon the Nonconformist cause. They may have been, to use Dr. Doddridge's words, 'starved into a good opinion of conformity.' Calamy\* gives a long list of Presbyterian ministers and students who in the second decade of the century conformed to the Established Church. In this list are the names of Joseph Butler and his friend Secker, who lived to be Archbishop of Canterbury. About the same time, Isaac Madox, who died Bishop of Worcester, left the Presbyterians, and Josiah Hort, afterwards Archbishop of Tuam, whom Dr. Watts describes as one of his fellow-students, and 'the greatest genius in Mr. Rowe's academy.' The Presbyterian cause continued to decline during the whole of the century. The orthodox among them either conformed or went with the other Dissenters; while the remnant became Arian, and ultimately Unitarian.

The Occasional Papers.

'The Occasional Papers,'† begun in 1716, were written by Presbyterians. They are a fair index of the general tone of that party, both in politics and religion. The editor said, in the advertisement, that he was to defend the 'cause of truth, liberty, and Catholic Christianity.' He was to eschew alike 'the bigot, the party man, the affected and the lewd profaner of the name of free-thinker.' The first paper is on

\* 'Life and Times,' vol. ii., p. 503. the same as those with the same name mentioned in Vol. ii., p. 245.  
Ed. 1829.

† This series of papers was not

'Bigotry,' and is ascribed to Dr. Benjamin Grosvenor. CHAP. XIV.  
 Bigotry was not confined to those who shouted 'High Church and Sacheverell.' On 'Bigotry.'  
 The writer found many violent bigots among the sects, and there was even, he said, a 'bigotry for Deism and pretended free-thinking.' A man with an inquiring and ingenuous mind, Dr. Grosvenor describes as the glory of human nature, the ornament of Christianity, and the truest friend of the public peace.

In the second paper, Dr. Samuel Wright delineated the character of a Protestant. The character of a Protestant.  
 He was one who believed in the perfection of Scripture, and went to it alone as his rule of faith. There was a time, the writer said, when the Church of England was the great defence of the Reformation; but now the cry of 'the Church' was raised as if the Church of England was not identified with the cause of Protestantism. Dr. John Evans, in another paper, expounded the principle of State supremacy in religion, which he regarded as the protection of our civil liberties. Simon Browne followed with a clear exposition of the duty of the civil magistrate, which was to protect the State and check all that was injurious to it; but not otherwise to interfere with men's conscience. The writer also proposed, as an expedient for promoting harmony among Protestants, that all matters of opinion be left open, and that there be full liberty for every one to follow his own convictions. The unity of the Spirit was to be kept in the bond of peace, and not by contentions and disputings.

In a paper on 'Orthodoxy,' the writer maintained the inconsistency of creeds with the principle of a Protestant Church. On 'Orthodoxy.'  
 Protestants take the Bible as their rule of faith. They confess that they cannot make an infallible interpretation, and yet they put their fallible creed in the place of the infallible Scriptures. This notion of 'orthodoxy' was consistent among Roman Catholics, but Protestants are under the law of liberty. By keeping to the Scriptures, we have a stable faith, but by following the creed-makers we are carried about with every wind of doctrine. One paper prescribes following the word of God only, as the best method of putting an end to uncharitable disputes about the Trinity.

CHAP. XIV. The rise of Arianism among the Presbyterians in Dublin has been already noticed in the account of Thomas Emlyn. He was prosecuted, condemned, expelled, fined, and imprisoned. Such was the orthodox zeal of the Irish Presbyterians. It is as difficult to trace the course of heresy as of any other infectious disease. Arianism, suppressed by the united force of Church and State in Ireland, broke out again among the Presbyterians of Exeter, and gave rise to controversies which convulsed the three denominations. James Pierce, one of the ministers in Exeter, had read Clarke and Whiston. He had some vague doubts about the common doctrine of the Trinity, but they had not taken any definite form. He was in this state of mind when he accepted the invitation to become pastor of the Exeter congregation. He said nothing about his doubts, regarding the subject as one that belonged mainly to speculation. He did not allude to it in his sermons; but this omission subjected him to the suspicion of heresy. His defence was that he had found among Dissenters the same diversity of opinion on this subject which existed in the Church of England. Some, like Sherlock, were for three infinite minds in one self-consciousness. Some, like South, were for one mind in three different manifestations. And some, who had read Clarke and Whiston, were for denying the equality of the Son and the Holy Ghost with the Father. The last view had not been tolerated in the Church of England, except as explained by Clarke, where the distinction became so fine that it escaped the penetration of the Upper House of Convocation. Pierce claimed the same liberty among the Nonconformists which Clarke had in the Church of England.

The Exeter controversy.

The beginning of the Exeter controversy was not, however, with Pierce. A young student, in the neighbourhood, who hitherto had been vehemently orthodox on the Trinity, had also read Clarke, and his former faith had been put to confusion. He did not publish his opinions, but they became known through private sources, and had excited some controversy. This was scarcely at rest, when an orthodox minister, preaching one day for Pierce in his absence, charged some among the Dissenters at Exeter 'with damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them.'

This re-kindled the strife. When Pierce returned, his congregation begged that he would preach next Sunday on the atonement, and allay the suspicions that had been raised concerning his soundness in the faith. This he did to the satisfaction of both parties, who each understood his sermon as favouring their own side. A few weeks later, however, one of the congregation made the objection that Pierce had lessened the evil of sin in order to lessen our sense of Christ's atonement. The prevalence of heresy was so alarming that at the County Assize the judge made the spread of Arianism the chief subject of his charge. He was followed by the Archdeacon of Barnstaple, who solemnly warned the clergy of the contagious heresy that had infected the Presbyterian ministers and congregations in Exeter. The clergy of Exeter prolonged the notes of alarm, and solemnly warned their parishioners not to come near the plague-stricken Dissenters; to avoid them both in the house and in the field, and to have no communion with them either in going out or in coming in. The Baptist congregation, also smitten with terror, dismissed their minister, on suspicion that he also had imbibed the heresy of Arius. He was known to assemble students at his house to instruct them in theology, and that was a clear intimation that he was not free from heresy.

At the September Meeting of the Presbyterian ministers, inquisition was made concerning the new heretics. The orthodox determined to clear themselves by a declaration of their faith in the doctrine of the Trinity. The heretics proposed that this should be done only in the words of Scripture, but one of the ministers maintained that Scripture was not a sufficient test for heresy. This motion was not put to the vote, but each minister followed his own judgment as to the mode of declaring his faith. Joseph Hallet, senior, the oldest minister in Exeter, made the first declaration. He quoted a few Trinitarian texts, renounced the distinguishing doctrines of Arians, Sabellians, and Socinians, and concluded with the words of Baxter, that the Church would never have peace till all creeds were expressed in Scripture language. John Withers, another minister, defined the doctrine of Arius, and disclaimed it. He then declared his belief in

Inquisition  
made for  
heresy.

CHAP. XIV. Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, three persons yet one God. — Pierce said in his turn, 'I am not of the opinion of Sabellius, Arius, Socinus, or Sherlock. I believe there is but one God, and can be no more. I believe the Son and Holy Ghost to be Divine persons, but subordinate to the Father; and the unity of God is, I think, to be resolved into the Father being the fountain of the Divinity of the Son and Spirit.' Some others expressed their agreement with Hallet, and even used the words of the Westminster Assembly's Catechism, that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one God. One party described the Trinity as consisting of three 'persons,' and another of three 'modes.' One minister read Ephesians iv. 4, 5, and 6, as his confession of faith on the Trinity. Pierce says that this was the only declaration that was reckoned heterodox. Three ministers refused to make any declaration. Pierce expressed his regret that he did not follow their example, and so resist the claim of the Assembly to enforce any confession of faith.

The Exeter ministers refuse to subscribe orthodox Articles.

A few months later the managers of the churches, with some of the citizens, waited upon the Exeter ministers, begging that they would restore peace by clearing themselves of the suspicion of heresy. They were asked to subscribe either the first of the XXXIX. Articles of Religion, the sixth Answer in the Westminster Assembly's Catechism, or the words in which two-thirds of the Exeter Assembly had declared their faith—'that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one God.' Three out of the four Exeter ministers refused to subscribe to any declaration. The managers wrote to the London ministers for advice, and after consulting with the other ministers in the neighbourhood of Exeter, they again demanded satisfaction from the Exeter ministers concerning their faith in the doctrine of the Trinity. Withers expressed his views in the words of Bishop Pearson, that, 'though the Father and the Son are two distinct persons, yet since the Son is of and from the Father as the fountain of Deity, and ultimately united with Him, I conceive that in this sense He may be said to be one God with the Father.' This was not considered satisfactory, and Withers soon after agreed to subscribe the first of the Articles of the Church of England. Pierce and Hallet refused to make

any subscription whatever, and were in consequence excluded from the Exeter churches. The orthodox said that this was done because they did not believe in the Trinity, but their own account is that they were expelled because they refused to subscribe creeds which were not written in the words of Scripture. CHAP. XIV.

The managers of the Exeter Presbyterian churches showed some discernment in rejecting as heterodox the words of Bishop Pearson. They were not strictly Arian, but they really covered the whole case of the Exeter ministers. Pierce did not admit that Christ was the Supreme God, yet he denied that He was a created being. He was God over all blessed for ever, and yet He was not God the Father. It was easy to urge the dilemma that in this case there must either be two Gods, or Christ must be the Father. For his defence Pierce had to fall back on the mystery of the Divine nature. He wished to abide by what Scripture said, and to regard all beyond that as purely speculation. Some who contended for the other side maintained that Christ must be the Father, and that it was the Father who became incarnate and suffered for sin. To avoid this, Pierce said that the Son was not the Father, and yet the Son was God, but inferior to the Father. He was not the fountain of Deity, but only 'very God of very God.' The word 'person' was thus properly applied to Father, to Son, and to Holy Ghost. Pierce denied that he ever believed, or in any way countenanced, the distinctive opinions of Arius. He explained the unity of God in the words of the first four General Councils. He agreed with Bishop Bull in maintaining the subordination of the Son to the Father, but he denied that the three persons in the Trinity were only one Being. Their Arianism explained.

In Pierce's sermon on the Satisfaction of Christ there is no doctrine remarkably heterodox. It is not said that the satisfaction is infinite, nor is the necessity of such a satisfaction made to rest on the scholastic idea of infinite sin. Christ's death made atonement because it was appointed by God as the means of deliverance. Pierce refused to go into the question whether God might have been reconciled without any satisfaction. The Socinians, he said, have contended Pierce on the Atonement.



CHAP. XIV. that this was possible, but they had a hypothesis to serve.

It is enough for us to know that God provided a propitiation. There were doubtless reasons for it, since God thought fit that it should be made. It is just both to God and the sinner that justice be satisfied. Christ offered Himself through the Eternal Spirit. Pierce explains this not as the Holy Spirit or third person in the Trinity, but as 'Christ's Divine nature.' The Spirit was the Logos that was united to the human nature. It was this which gave 'such mighty virtue and efficacy to His propitiation.'\*

The contro-  
versy referred  
to the London  
ministers.

Both parties in Exeter had friends among the London ministers, from whom they received such advice as they each desired. It was, however, finally agreed that all the ministers of the 'three denominations' in and about London, should be invited to Salters' Hall, to deliberate on the Exeter controversy. Thomas Bradbury, a zealous and orthodox Independent, proposed that the first thing to be done was for every minister present to declare his own faith by subscribing the first of the XXXIX Articles, and the fifth and sixth Answers in the Assembly's Catechism. This motion was rejected by seventy-three against sixty-nine. The ground of its rejection was the inconsistency of human creeds with the principles of the Nonconformists. But this was an inconsistency which the minority could not see. They left the conference and constituted themselves a distinct meeting. Both parties continued to send advice to Exeter. The subscribers maintained the right of the congregations to inquire into the doctrines taught by their ministers, and to receive from them a reasonable satisfaction as to their soundness in the faith. If the ministers were not sound, they were to be requested to resign. The subscribers said that to deny the proper divinity of the Son and of the Holy Ghost was contrary to the Holy Scriptures and to the common faith of the Reformed Churches. The non-subscribers, who were mostly Presbyterians, recommended that no accusation should be received against the doctrine of any minister unless it could be well sustained; and if a minister be called upon to give an account of his doctrine before a public assembly, he is to do it in the words of Scripture. The non-subscribers added

\* 'The Western Inquisition,' p. 20.



that they utterly disavow the Arian doctrines, and sincerely believe the doctrine of the blessed Trinity and the proper divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ. They also gave reasons why they did not subscribe a declaration on the Trinity. There was, they said, no charge of Arianism against them, and no suspicion of their not being sound in the faith. This division among the London ministers became the occasion of a great controversy. The non-subscribers vindicated their freedom as Protestant Dissenters, and the subscribers charged them with spreading the poison of Arius. They had refused to shut the flood-gates against a damnable heresy. They had already subscribed all the doctrinal articles of the Church of England to get toleration from the Government; and now they refuse to subscribe even the first to put a stop to the progress of error.\*

Joseph Hallet, senior, who was Pierce's colleague in Exeter, was the son of one of the ejected two thousand of 1662. He opened an Academy for the education of young ministers, among whom he encouraged the utmost freedom of inquiry. He was himself orthodox, but his Academy, like most of the institutions of the same kind, became a nursery of heresy. He was succeeded by his son, Joseph Hallet, junior, who was an avowed Arian, and in his youth corresponded secretly, for fear of the orthodox, with William Whiston.

We need not repeat Hallet's arguments for Arianism, as they are only what have been urged by others. But this is the only point on which he departed from the commonly received doctrines of Christianity. He everywhere advocates the literal sense of atonement and satisfaction, and he maintains that the theory of the Arians is the only ground on which it can be defended. On the Trinitarian hypothesis it is only the man Jesus Christ that suffered, and not the Godhead which dwelt in Him. The value of His sacrifice was only the value of the sacrifice of an innocent man; such, for example, as Adam was before his fall. But, according to the

\* The case of Matthew Tomkins, who was expelled from the church in Stoke Newington, was similar to Pierce's case. Tomkins denied that the Son of God was supreme God, yet admitted that He was from everlasting, co-existing with the Father. There never was a time when He was not.

CHAP. XIV. Arian doctrine, 'He who suffered was so great and glorious a Being, as was not only above the highest angels, but had wisdom and power to make the angels and all the world besides, in comparison of whom innocent Adam was a mere trifle.\*'

His theology. In Hallet's answers to the Deists he earnestly maintained the authority of the Scriptures and the validity of all the arguments from prophecy and miracles. In his other discourses he manifests an unwavering faith in revelation as distinguished from natural religion. He could find no rest except in the idea of a direct interposition of Deity to assure men of an existence beyond that of the world of sense. He set aside all the arguments for the immortality of the soul drawn from its immateriality, or from anything which man supposes to be known concerning the essence of spirit. The soul may be either material or immaterial, but whether or not it shall exist in a future state depends entirely on the will of God. Without revelation we can never determine if the soul be really distinct from the body; or if matter exists independent of spirit, or spirit of matter. We cannot by natural reason prove it to be the will of God that we shall live again. Revelation has made known the fact and the means of our recovery from the consequences of Adam's sins. But from mere reason we are not competent judges of what it was meet for God to do after the departure of man from righteousness. So far as reason goes it might have been as wise and just to have deprived the race of existence as to have provided redemption. The unequal distribution of blessings in the world is no argument, for all having sinned, every man has here as much good from God as he deserves. Repentance could not make a man righteous without faith in Christ. The good which any man does still leaves the past evil uncanceled. We can find no ground, either in reason or equity, that there should be a future life for man. Hallet objects to all Dr. Clarke's arguments from natural reason for a future life. We can only have it as the pure will of God. It is purchased by the satisfaction of Christ, and revealed to us in the Gospel.†

On positive duties.

In a discourse on moral and positive duties, Hallet follows

\* 'Discourses and Observations,' p. 330.

† *Ib.*, pp. 211—384.

the argument which Waterland used against Clarke. This also resulted from his regarding what was called revelation as having more certainty than natural religion. Moral duties were defined as those of which the reason is obvious ; while positive duties were also supposed to be moral from reasons which God may have had for enjoining them, though these reasons are not given. Among these positive duties which are made of the same obligation as moral, there are not only the two Christian sacraments, but for the Jews the rite of circumcision. Hallet, however, makes the necessary remark that though commanded by God, their value is not in mere obedience, but in the spirit in which they are obeyed. There is wanting too, what gives meaning to the argument in Waterland, the idea of these positive rites being supernatural channels of the Divine grace. Besides the answers to Morgan and Chubb, already noticed, Hallet also wrote a brief answer to Tindal. This, however, like many more tracts of the same kind, was rather an answer to an interpretation of Tindal. It supposed that Tindal denied the necessity of that kind of revelation which Hallet defended, and then it maintained that necessity from the insufficiency of natural religion.

The representative leader among the Presbyterian ministers in the beginning of the last century was Edmund Calamy, grandson of the famous Calamy. He was a moderate Nonconformist, without much of the zeal of the old Puritans, with no particular prejudices against the Established Church, yet preferring a more free and simple worship. According to a custom prevalent at that time among Nonconformist students, he prosecuted his studies at the University of Utrecht. He afterwards spent a year at Oxford, frequenting the Bodleian, hearing, when he could, the lectures of the professors, and carefully reconsidering the grounds of Dissent. With Calamy, and indeed with all the English Presbyterians at this date, the ruling passion was freedom both in religion and government. They wished to be bound by no creeds and no declarations of faith, except such as could be directly grounded on the very words of Scripture. Calamy was not a member of the conference at Salters' Hall, but his sympathies were altogether with the non-subscribers. He was once

Edmund  
Calamy.

CHAP. XIV. present at a sitting of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, where he had an opportunity of seeing the ecclesiastical government of the Scotch Presbyterians, which he describes as an 'inquisition.' Whatever might be the final or legitimate result of the freedom which Calamy advocated, it is certain that his own theology was without a stain of heresy. He was formal and stately, a sort of Presbyterian bishop; but he followed Calvin closely, starting with the Bible as an infallible book. This view of the Scriptures as a book different altogether in kind from all other books, was the ground of his rejection of what he called human articles of faith. The words of Scripture were assumed to have a meaning independent of the faculty which apprehends the meaning of words. The book of revelation was the 'lively oracle.'

On Inspira-  
tion.

We have Calamy's views on Inspiration in a series of sermons preached at the 'Merchants' Lecture' in Salters' Hall. The Old Testament he calls the oracles of God committed to the Jews. While the Pagans were in ignorance of their origin and destiny, the Jews learned from the Scriptures that they were made from dust, that their spirits came forth from God, and would return to God. While the Pagans had but the dim light of nature for the guide of life, and often mistook good for evil and evil for good, the Jews had the written law preserved in the tabernacle and the temple. From this they learned the origin of evil, and the method of its removal. Inspiration was an impression on the imagination of the person inspired. Ideas were conveyed as words convey thoughts, by producing a motion in the brain. The impression was so made, that the person had no doubts about the suggestions being the voice of God. The natural understanding of the inspired writers was not taken away, but by inspiration they were secured from error. The argument by which this theory was supported is, that if the Bible be not infallibly inspired, our religion totters. The object of the sermons was to check the 'growing infidelity' of that age, and the argument was that the book must be from God, for, being a good book, it could not come from the devil.

On the  
Trinity.

In 1719, Calamy again undertook the Merchants' Lecture.

This time his subject was the Trinity. Four sermons, by way of supplement, are added in vindication of the genuineness of the text concerning the three witnesses. This volume was dedicated to the King. Calamy was anxious to convince his Majesty that the Dissenters were orthodox on the Trinity. The few that had taken up Arian notions had learned them from Clarke and Whiston, so that the heresy really began in the Established Church. The subscribers at Salters' Hall were zealous for the orthodox faith, and the non-subscribers only wished to be delivered from human creeds that the Scriptures might be the only standard of truth. The Trinity as explained by Calamy is that each of the three persons is God, and that the three together are one God. The Son is this one God, as well as the Father. There never was a time when God was not a Father, and, therefore, He always had a Son. Bishop Bull, Bishop Pearson, and Dr. Waterland admitted an inferiority of the Son as to order, though not as to nature. Calamy calls this opening the door for Arianism. In denying that the Father has any supremacy above the Son or the Holy Ghost, he seems sometimes to be in danger of 'confounding the persons.'

The names of most of the other Presbyterian leaders we have already met in the warfare with the Deists. A few of them, as Chandler, Benson, Henry Grove, Nathaniel Lardner, and Dr. Lowman, may require a more special notice. Samuel Chandler was a fellow-student with Butler and Secker at Jones's Academy, in Tewkesbury. We have already mentioned his answer to Collins on Prophecy. The argument was that Christianity rested on miracles, and the reasonableness of the doctrine revealed. Chandler shows in this treatise a commendable moderation. He avowed himself a friend to free inquiry, and endorsed the defence of private judgment which Collins prefixed to his 'Grounds and Reasons.' He rejoiced in the liberty of speech which was granted to all parties under George II., and he denied that infidelity had any necessary connection with immorality. He admitted that there was great uncertainty concerning the principles by which prophecy was to be interpreted. The virgin that was to bear a son certainly lived in the time of

Samuel  
Chandler.

CHAP. XIV. Isaiah, yet in 'a natural, literal sense' this prophecy was fulfilled at the birth of Jesus. 'Out of Egypt have I called my son' was merely an observation of the agreement of circumstances between the infant state of the Hebrew commonwealth, and that of the child Jesus.\* Several other prophecies quoted in the New Testament are explained in the same way. As addressed to the Jews, on their principles they were arguments that Jesus was the Messiah.

On Church  
and Dissent.

In a 'History of Persecution,' Chandler not only denies the right of the civil magistrate to enforce any religion, but defends toleration, even when the doctrine tolerated is injurious to the State. In a tract on 'The Case of Subscription,' one of the last which he wrote, he speaks of years and experience having softened his mind as to the differences between the Church and the Dissenters. He says that the learning, candour, moderation, and piety of many of the clergy, and especially of the bishops, afforded him the agreeable prospect that peace and harmony would long continue between them and the Nonconformists. This was followed by the lamentation that 'infidelity was spreading among all ranks and degrees,' that there were many 'converts to Popery,' and that these things were 'the results of the luxury, debauchery, and impiety of the present generation.' He opposes the use of creeds, against which his great argument is that the inspired language of the Scriptures is superior to any words of man.

George Ben-  
son.

Dr. George Benson was educated at a Dissenters' Academy, near Whitehaven. His first trouble was with the doctrine of predestination, which he had been taught to believe by his parents. He was able, however, before he had finished his theological studies, to see through the misapplication of Scripture words by which it is commonly defended. He is said to have ultimately inclined to Arianism; but if this can be inferred from his writings, it is only Arianism in a very mild form. The Presbyterians with whom he associated, even when they took the orthodox side, were disposed to regard all such questions as merely speculative. Benson began his public life in 1721, just after the Salters' Hall Conference, when the young generation of Presby-

terians even improved on the moderation of their predecessors. In his 'Sermons,' he always lays the foundation of Christianity in that eternal and immutable morality which, since the days of Cudworth, had been the strength of rational religion. A new meaning was given to the very texts on which the old Presbyterian built his whole scheme of redemption. That we are children of wrath by nature, for instance, does not mean that we are born under God's wrath and curse. It means that some men are children of wrath 'in reality.' They have made themselves so not by the nature which God gave them, but by an acquired evil nature. St. Paul distinguished between the Jews who were by nature holy, and the Gentiles who were by nature sinners. The Gospel, that is, the truth of the Gospel, is not discerned by the merely sensuous. They are the lost, to whom the cross of Christ is foolishness. But to the saved, that is, to the reformed or virtuous and well-disposed, the doctrine of the Gospel appears to be the wisdom of God, and the miracles worked in support of it to be the power of God.\* Dr. Benson repeats Toland's definition of a mystery. Christianity was a mystery until it was manifested. The calling of the Gentiles was a mystery to the old Jews; but in the days of the Messiah the mystery was unveiled.

Henry Grove, of Taunton, is chiefly known from his sermons. He wrote also on moral subjects, and contributed several essays to the *Spectator*. Grove's theology is professedly orthodox, but the spirit is scarcely in harmony with that of orthodox theology. His favourite subject is the reasonableness of religion, which teaches us how to moderate our passions, and how to bear up under adversity. It promotes the health of the body as well as the health of the soul. It is natural to man. There is a voice within which speaks of our nearness to God, gives joy if we are like God, and misery if we are unlike. We crave many things which religion does not bring. But if we carefully study human life we shall find that well-doing is the spring of all our joys. The morality of the Gospel is so agreeable to nature, that the marvel is it was not discovered without revelation. The Gospel is 'the most lovely delineation of

\* P. 164.



CHAP. XIV. nature in its greatest purity.\* Religion is founded on the very frame of our nature, makes provision for the gratification of every faculty, and finds for it the best employment. Vice, on the contrary, degrades nature, destroys the order of the faculties, and miserably perverts them from their right use.† Grove explains the Calvinistic texts in a way that would have shocked the old Calvinists. ‘We are complete in Him,’ means the perfection of the Christian religion. Christ being to us wisdom, sanctification, and complete redemption, means the promises of the Gospel. The doctrine of the atonement is not often mentioned, but it is not positively denied.

The theology  
of his sermons.

The very titles of Grove’s sermons frequently suggest heresy. One sermon is on the natural capacity of man to know and do what is right. ‘He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good,’ is explained as the natural light of human reason. This is improved by sincerity and uprightness. To ‘the upright mind no prejudices are invincible, no difficulties insurmountable, no objections unanswerable.’‡ The upright are taught of God. They have heard and learned of the Father. Persons of a reprobate and undiscerning mind have made themselves so by custom. Good works produce good dispositions, and so the path of the just is as the shining light that shineth more and more unto the perfect day. Reason is one mode of revelation, and by the knowledge which it gives the Heathen may be saved. For sayings like these Grove was called by his more orthodox brethren ‘a friend and encourager of the Deists.’ One of them wrote concerning him, ‘Fellow Christians, mark the man and avoid him. Let no one admonish him as a brother, for so I never did; but count him an enemy, a grievous wolf entered in among you not sparing the flock, and, therefore, not to be spared nor treated according to the laws of honourable war.’§

Dr. Lardner.\*

The first of the English Presbyterians who may be said fairly to have become a simple Unitarian, was Dr. Nathaniel Lardner. He was one of the non-subscribers at Salters’ Hall, but at that time he declared himself a believer in the doctrine of the Trinity. He seems for a time to have

\* Posthumous Works, vol. i., p. 33.

† *Ib.*, p. 37.

‡ Works, vol. vi., p. 349.

§ ‘Some Remarks on a New Way of Preaching,’ by John Ball.

embraced the Arian idea of the pre-existence of Christ as a distinct being from the supreme Deity, but, after further study of the Scriptures, with the help, he says, of the early Fathers, he was led to believe in Christ's simple humanity. Lardner is best known by his great work on 'The Credibility of the Gospel History,' in which he undertakes from contemporary histories to establish the truth of the things related in the New Testament. He had written against Woolston in defence of Christ's miracles, and this work was intended as part of the argument in defence of historical Christianity. It is admitted that proving the books of the New Testament to contain authentic histories does not prove the truth of Christianity. The object is the secondary but important one of establishing a foundation which is indispensable for the other evidences.

In a letter on the 'Logos,' Dr. Lardner gives his reasons for renouncing Arianism. He had believed that the Logos was to Christ in the place of a human soul. But he was now convinced that this idea was not reconcilable with either reason or Scripture. In the Gospels Jesus is frequently and explicitly called a man. This would not be correct if He had not a human soul as well as a human body. The sufferings of Christ can only be supposed real on the idea of His simple humanity. He could not be an example for us if He were not a man as we are men. But it is expressly said that the Word was made flesh, that is, became truly man. The Word is the Wisdom of the Father. That Wisdom dwelt in Jesus, and the disciples beheld His glory. According to Socrates, the historian, it was the opinion of all the ancients that Jesus was a perfect man, in whom the Wisdom of God was incarnate. The personality ascribed to the Holy Ghost is explained by the custom of personifying principles or things inanimate. In some posthumous sermons we have the same doctrines taught even more explicitly. Lardner describes the Trinity of South, that of one God in three modes, as agreeing with the Athanasian Trinity. He refutes the Arian hypothesis by the texts which declare that Jesus was man. His own doctrine in his own words is that Jesus is 'a man with whom God was in a most peculiar and extraordinary manner.'

On the Logos.

## CHAP. XIV.

Dr. Lowman.

Some tracts by Dr. Lowman, published after his death, were supposed to teach the same doctrine. This, however, was only inferred. The subject of the tracts was the theophanies of the Old Testament. Lowman says that they were the appearances of God Himself, and not of any created spiritual being acting in His name. The person who appeared is always called God, and has all the titles of the Supreme Deity. It was commonly said that the old Fathers always interpreted these manifestations of the Logos. Lowman doubts if this can really be shown to be the general opinion of the Fathers. They always made the Logos invisible, and, therefore, as such He could not be the representative of God. Augustine says that the Father sometimes appeared to the prophets in the form of a man. But such appearances were only symbols, like the light, the cloud, or the fire. The manifestations of God in the Old Testament are in the New applied to Christ. They were typical of His coming, foreshadows of the incarnation of the Divine Word. The chief of these was the Shechinah, which was an abiding type of the manifestation of God in the flesh. In Jesus the Logos, or the fulness of the godhead, dwelt as the visible presence of God in the Shechinah. Lowman carefully refutes the Arian idea that it was any created being distinct from the Supreme God, that was incarnate in Jesus. There is nothing to cause suspicion that he was not defending the orthodox Trinitarian doctrine. But it has been inferred that he agreed with Dr. Lardner in making the Logos not an eternal person, but the wisdom of God, and that this wisdom had a special incarnation in Jesus.

Lord Barrington.

The most eminent layman among the Presbyterians in the early part of the century was Lord Barrington. He has already been mentioned as taking part in the controversies on Occasional Conformity. He wrote an account of the Salters' Hall Conference, in which he advocated the side of the non-subscribers. Barrington is usually classed with the Presbyterians, but we first read of him as a member of Thomas Bradbury's congregation. After the division on the question of subscription, he joined the meeting in Pinners' Hall, which was under the pastorship of Jeremiah Hunt, nominally an Independent, but in reality a

liberal Presbyterian. Swift says of Lord Barrington, that he attended indifferently church or meeting, which probably means nothing more than that he was an occasional conformist. He refused to take office under government in the time of George I., until the act against occasional conformity, and the schism act, passed in the previous reign, were repealed. This is a proof of the sincerity of his attachment to the cause of the Nonconformists, and a sufficient answer to the arguments of De Foe, that the occasional conformity of the Presbyterians was only intended as a qualification for a public office. CHAP. XIV.

Lord Barrington wrote several theological works, chiefly in the form of essays.\* They contain some views of Christianity peculiar to the author, but the originality is not striking. The beginning of the first essay raises great expectations by the statement that the Holy Ghost is the principal witness to the truth of Christianity. This was said with reference to the objections of the Deists, some of whom Lord Barrington describes as 'capable, diligent, and fair inquirers.' As one of Locke's disciples, he possessed something of Locke's judicial and impartial spirit. He was on terms of intimate friendship with Anthony Collins, who, with the leading Presbyterian ministers, used to meet at Barrington's house, in Essex, for conversation and discussion on religious questions. The witness of the Spirit, which was to be the great evidence of Christianity, turns out to be nothing more than the miraculous gifts of the Spirit, in the early ages of the Gospel. Spiritual gifts were necessary for the planting of the Church. The Apostles being illiterate men had the Holy Ghost conferred on them, that they might be able not only to preach the Gospel, but to prove their Divine mission, and to govern the Churches established by them. His 'Essays.'

In another essay, there is an argument for the truth of revelation drawn from the unity of idea in all the Divine dispensations. Lord Barrington again speaks of the growth of Deism among thinking and virtuous men, and demands On the harmony of the Divine dispensations.

\* They were collected and published in three volumes, in 1823, by the Rev. George Townshend, Prebendary of Durham, with a life of the author and a memoir of his son, the Bishop of Durham.

CHAP. XIV. for them the right of free inquiry and discussion. Revelation, he says, was given in aid of natural religion. He did not believe that a man could not be saved because he had never heard the Gospel. He calls limiting the possibility of salvation to those only who have had revelation, the chief cause of Deism. He blames, however, the divines who make Christianity nothing more than a republication of natural religion. Those who did this, practically made Christianity of no particular use, except as a popular religion for the illiterate multitude. But Christianity has doctrines of its own, distinct from natural religion, and these are doctrines which help us in the performance of natural duties. The cure of Deism is to set forth Christianity as a rational scheme, consistent with itself, and with that unity of plan which is seen in all the dispensations of God to man.

The Independents.

The Independents after the division at Salters' Hall, were more orthodox than the Presbyterians. It might serve as a distinction between the two sects, to say that the Presbyterians were the Arians or Unitarians, and the Independents were the orthodox. But such a distinction can only be provisional. The most eminent writers among the Independents in the first half of the eighteenth century were Dr. Watts and Dr. Doddridge.

Dr. Watts.

Dr. Isaac Watts was in the main an orthodox divine, but there was originality even in his orthodoxy. He received the doctrine of a fall and a restoration as it was generally received by the theologians of the Established Church. This doctrine was that the consequences of Adam's sin extended to his posterity, and Christ's death was a satisfaction made to God for the sins of men. This Divine scheme understood literally, we know by revelation. But Dr. Watts, true to the spirit of his age, must also prove it by reason. Man, he says, must have been made upright, for no other conception is compatible with the justice of God. There is, however, the fact that man is fallen. He is not upright. The earth itself bears witness to the fall by its utter ruin and desolation. It is not a proper habitation for an upright being. Its form is 'rude and irregular, abrupt and horrid.\*' It has not the appearance of a lovely and well-adjusted piece of

\* Works, vol. vi., p. 61. Ed. 1811.

workmanship. It is full of floods and waterfalls, burning mountains, and lakes of liquid fire. It has noxious plants and fruits that never could have existed in a state of innocence. Our very gardens are full of caterpillars and insects innumerable. The world is so overgrown with wild beasts, and so abounds with dangers, that we cannot give God thanks for it.

The hypothesis of the pre-existence of man has been adopted by some as a solution of the mystery of evil. But Watts thinks it impossible that God could punish us for crimes of which we have no remembrance. Others have pointed to the law of natural consequences, showing that if our first parents were corrupt, we must also be corrupt. This is regarded as a partial solution, but it does not account for all the miseries of life. It does not account for earthquakes and burning mountains. The only explanation which Watts can find compatible with Divine justice, is the orthodox theory of a federal head. We became liable to all those sufferings, because of a covenant which God made with Adam. If he were to sin, his posterity were to have their gardens overrun with insects and caterpillars. In this way the orthodox scheme is proved to be agreeable to reason. What reason did in vindicating the doctrine of the fall, it is also to do for the doctrine of redemption. It could not indeed explain the mode of deliverance, but it could show that repentance and amendment make men partakers of the Divine mercy, and that if satisfaction were necessary it would be provided. After Divine justice was satisfied, reason teaches us that some persons must be elected to receive the benefit of Christ's satisfaction. Without this election Christ might have died, and no one have been saved. But all the chosen, and such of their children as die in infancy, are to receive the benefits of the atonement. As Christ died for all, the ungodly, with their children, have some of the blessings procured by His death. One of these is that the earth produces for man's use a great variety of vegetables and animals, which otherwise could not have escaped the curse. Moreover, it is by Christ's death that men have their intellects, their senses, their health, and probably also the natural virtues of benevolence and compas-

On original  
sin.

## CHAP. XIV.

sion. It is because of Christ's death that salvation is continually offered to the reprobate who can never possibly accept it. In this way Dr. Watts proves that the doctrine of satisfaction is agreeable to reason, and to the moral justice of God.

On the evidences of Christianity.

The evidences of Christianity are discussed in several places in Dr. Watts's works, but with only the usual arguments. In a dialogue on 'The Strength and Weakness of Human Reason,' the Christian advocate is enraptured with Bishop Gibson's 'Pastoral Letters,' which set forth the necessity of revelation, to make known a religion for sinners. The Deist argues from the light of nature, but the Christian denies all distinctions between virtue and vice to be possible without revelation. It is explained that by the sufficiency of reason Gibson and Clarke meant that it was sufficient speculatively, but insufficient practically. The weakness of reason is finally resolved into evil habits. In his sermons on the 'Inward Witness,' Dr. Watts says some very good things on the spiritual power of Christianity being its best evidence. The eternal life which the Gospel promises begins now. Books may be corrupted or their origin may be uncertain, but the witness of a new life stands fast for ever.

On the civil power in religion.

In an 'Essay on the Civil Power in Things Sacred,' Dr. Watts expounds his doctrine concerning the relations of Church and State. He defines the duties of a civil Government, as not in themselves extending to religion. Yet because of the advantages of religion to the State, he thinks that all the citizens should be compelled to be of some religion. Belief in a God is necessary for the welfare of society. Watts says, too, that the State should pay teachers of morality or natural religion, and that the people should be compelled to hear them. Exception was to be made only when there was a plea for liberty on the ground of conscience. He scarcely thought an established worship possible without interfering with the liberty of the people. He proposed, however, the establishment of natural religion, with permission for those who wished more to add mental prayer. Toleration was the right of all whose doctrines were not dangerous to the commonwealth. A State inter-



ference was advocated for the benefit of the people, and not for the furtherance of any particular creed. As to Christianity, it flourished best and was purest, when it was left to itself. CHAP. XIV.  
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Dr. Watts is said, in his later years, to have inclined to Arianism. This statement rests mainly on the authority of Dr. Lardner, and has been disputed. He denies that the Divine Sonship implies eternity or consubstantiality. Christ, he says, was not the Son of God as to His divinity. This would have made Him inferior to the Father. A son is derived, so that had Christ been the Son of God, He would have been a subordinate Deity. The pre-existence of Christ was the pre-existence of His human soul. The title Son of God, designated His office as Messiah, and not any eternal or inconceivable generation.\* Is said to have become an Arian.

Dr. Doddridge's life was spent in practical work. He never had the time, even if he had possessed the disposition, to inquire deeply into the foundations of the theology which he had learned in his youth. It might have had difficulties, but these did not interfere with his natural piety. In his popular treatise on 'The Rise and Progress of Religion,' the main argument is derived from the danger of 'everlasting burnings.' His 'Ten Sermons on the Power and Grace of Christ' contain little more than the platitudes of piety. His defences of revelation are amplifications of exhausted arguments about probabilities, that have to make a violent leap to reach a conclusion. The 'Lectures' published after his death show great reading, and a manifest affection for theological studies, but the dull routine is scarcely relieved by even a spark of heresy. Dr. Doddridge.

Dr. Doddridge, however, was not uninfluenced by the spirit of free inquiry which had arisen among the more intelligent Dissenters. He strongly opposed subscription to articles of religion, whether imposed by ministers or by congregations. He received into his Academy students whose theological views considerably differed, and he en- A liberal yet orthodox theologian.

\* Something might have been said of the exaggerated use of sacrificial language in Watts's hymns, which seem to ascribe all the divine mercy and compassion to Christ, and to represent the Father with a 'frowning face.' This was once mentioned to

Dr. Watts by Grove, of Taunton, and the answer was, that he would gladly have expunged many such passages, but the copyright of the hymns was sold, and he had no power to alter them.

CHAP. XIV. encouraged them all to use free and unrestrained discussion.

— In one of his letters\* he laments the divisions of the London ministers about subscription, praying that God would give them 'orthodoxy of temper as well as orthodoxy of belief.' Like the most liberal Presbyterians of his day, he wanted to have no standard but the Bible. It was to be interpreted according as men had capacity to interpret it. Where it spoke clearly, its decision was final, but where its meaning was not obvious, private judgment was free. The result of Dr. Doddridge's teaching was, that many of his pupils went with the spirit of the age. Hugh Farmer, Dr. Aiken, and Dr. Kippis, with many others, departed from the faith of the old Nonconformists, and became either Arians or Unitarians. Some very orthodox persons have supposed that they discovered even in Doddridge's 'Family Expositor,' opinions that are dangerous to the authority of the Scriptures. The freedom of his method raised suspicions which were not justified by his conclusions. He confesses that in his studies on the Trinity he once leaned to the heretical side, but he came finally to the orthodox view.

With Dr. Doddridge we take leave of the last representative of the old Puritan Dissenters in their best moods. To his day the Nonconformists had striven to keep up equality with the Established Church. They still clung to their old traditions of learning and respectability, but Nonconformity had been fast sinking ever since the accession of George I. One cause which we have noticed was the actual freedom existing within the Established Church. Another was the attempt among themselves to enforce new subscriptions. The very suspicion, too, that heresy was spreading among them, was injurious. Ardent minds may have welcomed the change in theology as the coming of spring, but the multitude of worshipping people wish nothing new in their religious teaching. Dr. Doddridge and some other writers made inquiry into the causes of the decay of the 'Dissenting Interest.' It was found that Nonconformist worship had become cold and formal—that the sermons were like those of the clergy in the Established Church, moral and rational. Dissenters stood on the Church level, and therefore the very

Last representative of the old Puritans.

\* Correspondence, vol. i., p. 182.

reason of dissent had in a great measure ceased. There was also the evil of divisions, which made small congregations who 'starved' their ministers into 'a good opinion of conformity.'\* It was found, too, that 'many gentlemen' had left them, that they had lost many members by marriage, and their main strength was now among the humbler classes. CHAP. XIV.

It was not much that kept Doddridge out of the Church of England. The principle of a State Church in its most extreme form he expressly advocates. The honour of God, he said, and the good of society, oblige the civil magistrate to see that the people be instructed in the truth. He adds, that 'if the majority of the people by their representatives join with the magistrate in such establishments, it is the duty of the minority, though they cannot in conscience conform themselves, yet to be thankful that they are left in the possession of their own liberty.'† The subscriptions were the chief barrier between the Church and the old Dissenters. There was still hope, even in Doddridge's day, that the impositions which had created Nonconformity would yet be removed. He writes on one occasion to his wife that he had had a long conversation on the subject of comprehension with Archbishop Herring. Doddridge suggested that the first step should be for some of the clergy to preach for the Dissenters, and some of the Dissenters to preach in the Church. The archbishop was favourable to the scheme, and there were some hopes of its success.‡ At no time was there a better understanding between the clergy and the Nonconformists than during the public life of Dr. Doddridge. He had the intimate friendship of many eminent Churchmen. Among his most frequent correspondents were Dr. Richard Grey, Prebendary of St. Paul's; Dr. Francis Ayscough, Tutor to the Prince of Wales, and Dr. Thomas Hunt, the famous Orientalist. He had also friendly letters from Secker, Sherlock, and Dr. Hiddersly, afterwards Bishop of Sodor and Man. Even the uncivilised Warburton could write to Doddridge with all the gentleness of a Christian. His relation to the Church of England.

\* 'Free Thoughts on the most Probable Means of Reviving the Dissenting Interest,' p. 13.

† Lectures, vol. i., p. 296.

‡ Correspondence, vol. v., p. 76.

CHAP. XIV. In his last illness he was taken in charge by Dr. Madox, Bishop of Worcester, and some of the clergy about Bristol, by whose assistance money was raised to send him on a voyage to Lisbon, where he died. In his last hours he was attended by the chaplain of the British factory, and was probably buried by him with the rites of the English Church.

Spread of  
heresy among  
the Noncon-  
formists.

We have no hope of being able to distinguish clearly the different parties among the Nonconformists in the eighteenth century. The names by which they were called were used very vaguely, and convey no certain idea of the doctrines they held. In a manuscript in Dr. Williams's library\* which gives an account of the Nonconformist Churches in 1730, the 'three denominations' are subdivided into Calvinists, Antinomians, Arminians, Baxterians, and Socinians. Besides these subdivisions, there were Churches in London called Independent that could not be described. One is marked 'doubtful,' and two come under the denomination of 'disorderly.' The Pinners' Hall congregation, which had separated from that at Salters' Hall, taking the Antinomian side in the Crisp controversy, was now evidently as liberal as that which met at Salters' Hall. One of its ministers was Caleb Fleming, whose doctrines are clearly those of the Unitarians or Socinians. Fleming had been brought up a strict Calvinist, but he was sent to one of the liberal academies, which was conducted by a minister who afterwards conformed to the Established Church. He wrote many tracts, but they were mostly on subjects that had only a passing interest. In a treatise called 'Considerations on the Logos,' he expounded the Logos as 'the express manifested Will of God.' It was in the beginning. It was with God, and must be received as God. This Word was always in the world, but the world knew it not. The invisible things of God are clearly seen, unless when men are so ignorant and depraved that from the invisible creation they do not infer His eternal power and Godhead. This Logos, which was in the beginning, is the Word of which the Psalmist says, that by it the heavens were made. It was not made flesh, as our version reads, but it abode supremely

Caleb  
Fleming  
on the Logos.

\* The Palmer MS.

in Jesus as in the Shechinah or temple of God. Amelius, the Platonic philosopher, recognised his own philosophy in St. John's Gospel. The Word 'descended into a body, put on flesh, and took the form of man.' Fleming says that Amelius understood John better than the orthodox Christians, yet he did not quite understand him. John did not teach that the Logos was any part of the person of Christ. He had all wisdom from the Father, and was distinctly a man in whom the wisdom of God was made manifest. The doctrine of the incarnation, as held either by Bishop Law or by Bishop Sherlock, was regarded as sufficient to overthrow the whole of Christianity. CHAP. XIV.

Fleming is probably the first Nonconformist who advocated the entire separation of the Church from the State. One of his tracts has the bold title, 'Civil Establishments in Religion a Ground of Infidelity.' The chief arguments were taken from Hoadly, and had force only as Hoadly meant them, that is, in their relation to the civil sanctions, which were then considered part of the Establishment. Fleming clearly maintains that a State Church is a hindrance to religion, and that it is, by its very nature, unfair to those who cannot conform. The duties of the State being entirely distinct from those of the Church, an alliance between them is injurious to both. One tract is a defence of the immortality of the soul, another is against the doctrine that the soul sleeps from death to the resurrection, and a third tract, dedicated to Sir George Fleming, Bishop of Carlisle, is against the perpetual obligation of the fourth commandment. Fleming defended Foster against Stebbing in a controversy on Schism. From the description of a heretic in the Epistle to Titus, he inferred that heresy was a breach of charity rather than a difference about a doctrine. We have already spoken of Fleming in his controversy with the Deists. He also came to the help of Bishop Gibson against the Methodists. Against Civil Establishments of Religion.

Hugh Farmer, whom we have to notice for some singular views on the demoniacs of the New Testament, and for a general tendency to heresy, was also an Independent. He had a Church at Walthamstow, and was afterwards Lecturer at Salters' Hall. Farmer had been educated at Doddridge's Hugh Farmer.

CHAP. XIV. Academy, and had gone apparently with the Arian or Unitarian tendency that had set in among the educated Nonconformists. In his 'Essay on the Demoniacs,' he denies that the persons so called were really possessed by evil spirits. Christ and His apostles spoke of them as such in compliance with the customs of their day. The idea of demoniacal possessions, was derived from the Pagans. It did not necessarily imply that the spirit which possessed a person was an evil spirit. The word demon is always used by the Greeks in a good sense. The demons were the Pagan deities by whom men were inspired. Madness and phrenzy were also ascribed to the influence of these demons. The ghosts of murdered persons were said sometimes to possess men. The Jews seem to have regarded the demoniacs as influenced by evil spirits, but these spirits were not fallen angels. Beelzebub, the prince of the demons, is not to be confounded with Satan. The demoniacs of the New Testament were probably persons afflicted with madness or epilepsy. Jesus cured them miraculously, so that the cure was a miracle, though the disease was natural. The Evangelists called the persons afflicted, demoniacs, in the same way as we still call one disease St. Anthony's fire and another St. Vitus's dance, though we no longer believe that they are in any way caused by these saints.

His Dissertations on Miracles.

Farmer also wrote 'Dissertations on Miracles,' in which he took the view advocated by Bishop Fleetwood, that miracles were wrought only by God, and were therefore proofs of revelation. A miracle was defined as a transgression of the laws of nature, but with the explanation that by laws of nature was meant the order of nature as known by experience. If inferior beings could work miracles, we should never be safe from their devices. The Scriptures always ascribe miracles to God only. Where Moses instructs the Israelites what they were to do in case of a false prophet working signs and wonders, Farmer explains as merely a supposed case which Moses knew was impossible to happen. The false prophets that were to arise in the last days were not to work miracles, but to appeal to miracles. The works of the Egyptian magicians were not real miracles. In the narrative in the book of Exodus they are ascribed to

enchancements. Farmer wrote a curious interpretation of the temptation in the wilderness. He made it a vision in which Christ saw a symbolical representation of His office and ministry. CHAP. XIV.  
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The Baptists, from their origin, had been divided into the two classes of Arminians or Calvinists. It was in the Arminian or General Baptist sect that the free spirit was most largely developed. John Gale, their most eminent man in the beginning of the last century, we have already met in company with William Whiston and the other heretics of that day. Gale was minister of a church in the Barbican, and is said to have inclined to Arianism. He was succeeded by James Foster, the most popular of the Nonconformist preachers, and the only Baptist whose reputation went beyond the confines of the sect.\* The Baptists.

Foster was educated at Joseph Hallet's Academy, in Exeter. He was probably of Presbyterian origin, and may have begun his public life as an Arian. His ultimate views are in substance those of the old Unitarians, but his sermons deal less with doctrine than with practice. He plainly calls morality the most important and essential part of the Gospel. When St. Paul explained before Felix what were the doctrines of the new religion, he reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come. To preach the Gospel is to inculcate the great duties of morality, and to enforce the practice of them from regard to a future judgment. No miracles would have been sufficient to establish Christianity, if it had in any way subverted the religion of nature, or lessened the importance of the essential duties of morality. Speculations, doctrines, mysteries, and ceremonies even when ordained by God, are only of value in the degree that they produce righteousness of life. To preach Christ is not to use His name as a charm, nor to exalt His glory to the disparagement of the goodness of the Creator and Father of all. James Foster.

In 'An Essay on Fundamentals,' Dr. Foster denies that the doctrine of the Trinity is an essential doctrine of Chris- His Essay on  
Fundamentals.

\* All who write of Foster quote Pope's lines :—

' Let modest Foster, if he will, excel  
Ten Metropolitans in preaching well.'



CHAP. XIV. tianity. By fundamental is understood a belief necessary to obtaining the happiness promised in the Christian covenant. No doctrine is fundamental if it be not clearly revealed, and also declared in the Scriptures to be an express term of salvation. Whatever be the ground on which men shall be finally judged, it cannot be the uncertain one of speculative doctrines, about which every variety of opinion is possible. The Trinity is not a doctrine so plainly revealed as that a sincere man might not miss the knowledge of it. Different views concerning the Trinity should not be the cause of division in the Christian Church. We should follow the exhortation of the Apostle to be of one mind, and live in peace; but we can never expect to agree in matters of 'doubtful disputation.'

On natural religion.

Foster wrote some elaborate discourses on natural religion, in which he maintained much the same positions as Clarke and Wollaston. He had an important share in the Deist controversy, and defended Christianity against some of the exceptions of Shaftesbury, Woolston, and Tindal. To the remarks of Shaftesbury, that Gospel morality is without the virtues of friendship and patriotism, Foster answers that these are included under universal benevolence, and, at the same time, some of the evils connected with these virtues are corrected. The resurrection of Christ is defended in a very able sermon 'preached at Trowbridge.' The external evidence of Christianity is reckoned sufficient to convince any unprejudiced mind, that is, taking in first the consideration of the credibility of the doctrines of Christianity. The appearance of Christ after His resurrection only to chosen witnesses and not to the whole Jewish nation, is shown to be 'a method of proceeding perfectly consistent with the wisdom and goodness of Divine providence.' The Apostles had such an assurance of the certainty of Christ's resurrection, that they gave their lives to bear witness to it. Their whole conduct shows that they were honest, undesigning men. The story of the body having been stolen is altogether improbable. The watch consisted of sixty-two persons. To suppose that they were all asleep is impossible.

Foster's great work in defence of Christianity was his answer to Matthew Tindal, called 'The Usefulness and

Against Matthew Tindal.

Excency of the Christian Revelation defended.' He expressed surprise that infidelity was increasing in an age of free inquiry. An institution so rational and excellent as Christianity ought to commend itself to the approbation of all sincere men. The reason why it did not was found in the corrupt doctrines and superstitious worship that prevailed throughout Christendom. Foster believed that Tindal was a real enemy to Christianity, and that his profession of regard for the purity of the Christian religion was made merely to escape the danger of a prosecution. He advocated morality only, and regarded all the rest of Christianity as superstition and enthusiasm. In opposition to this Foster maintained the necessity of revelation, because of the corruption of human reason. The actual corruption that prevails is no more a proof of the insufficiency of reason than it is of the insufficiency of revelation, but the sufficiency of reason is no argument against the value of revelation. Reason may be able to find out many duties of natural religion, but Christianity makes them clearer and gives them authority. We have also in Christianity the revelation of atonement for sin. Christ's death is the ground of forgiveness. This does not mean that Christ appeased His Father, or even that He made reparation to offended justice. It is explained simply that God pardons men for Christ's death, because this was the method which He chose to appoint. The answer to Tindal contains a judicious defence of positive precepts, which are shown to be of great service when not abused by superstition.

Among Foster's sermons there is one on Schism, which was the cause of a great controversy. The preacher denied the possibility of all men agreeing on doctrines that are merely speculative. He followed the definition of Hales and Jeremy Taylor, that schism was only a sin when there was a breach of charity. Even the Church of Rome, grievously as it has departed from the simplicity of the Christian religion, would not be in schism if it did not make mere opinions necessary terms of communion. By doing this it renounces all friendship and unity with those of a different persuasion. Against the heresy of this sermon, Dr. Stebbing protested in a charge to the clergy of the archdeaconry of Surrey. He

CHAP. XIV. upheld the orthodox view that the unity of the Church was to depend on articles of faith, and not on the spirit of Christian charity.

The Particular Baptists were chiefly remarkable for their attachment to the doctrines of Calvin, sometimes in a very extreme form. Towards the end of the century some eminent men, as Dr. John Gill, Abraham Booth, and Andrew Fuller, defended the logical Calvinism which is generally called Antinomianism. The most eminent preacher, however, among the Particular Baptists in the latter half of the century, Robert Robinson, of Cambridge, became almost, if not altogether, a Unitarian, without resigning his pastorate. Robinson began his career as a Methodist, under Whitefield. He afterwards adopted Baptist views, and undertook the charge of a Baptist Church. In answer to Theophilus Lindsey, he wrote 'A Plea for the Divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ.' This was a temperate and thoroughly orthodox pamphlet. Robinson had also a share in some controversies that only concerned the Baptist sect, taking always the liberal or more charitable side. He defended open communion against Abraham Booth, and he strongly advocated the views of Hoadly and Sykes concerning the innocency of error. In company, however, with some Unitarian Nonconformists, he inclined to fanaticism on the subject of Church establishments.

Robert Robinson of Cambridge.

Dr. Taylor of Norwich.

Dr. John Taylor, of Norwich, may be regarded as representing in the middle of the century the transition stage of the Presbyterians from the orthodox faith to decided Unitarianism. We have but little definite information what his views were on the Trinity; but when he entered on his charge at Norwich, he invited the congregation to study along with him Dr. Clarke's 'Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity.' It is probable that he adopted Clarke's views. His biographer says that the majority of the congregation agreed with their pastor; but a minority who adhered to Calvinism seceded. The work which made Dr. Taylor famous for heresy was a treatise on 'Original Sin.' He professed only to follow revelation, and by revelation he understood the doctrine of the canonical Scriptures. In these Scriptures, he says, the consequences of the first transgression are only mentioned

five times : twice in Genesis, and three times in the writings of St. Paul. The first text is where God says to Adam that if he eat of the fruit of the forbidden tree he shall surely die. Death, that is, the loss of life, was the penalty of disobedience. There is not a word about Adam's posterity. Of course, if Adam had died when he sinned, his posterity would never have existed. The next text is the record of the transgression. Adam and Eve were seized with shame, and trembled for the natural effects of guilt. The guilt was personal, and so was the punishment. The woman was to bear children in sorrow, and the man was to earn his bread in the sweat of his brow. We their posterity suffer through their sin, but not as a punishment for their sin. We cannot in the nature of things be guilty of the transgressions of our first parents.

CHAP. XIV.

On original sin.

The first of the New Testament texts is where St. Paul forbids the woman to usurp authority over the man, because she was first in the transgression. The next is concerning death by Adam and resurrection by Jesus Christ. Here it is plainly taught that through Adam all men became mortal, but through Christ they shall be again restored to life. The sole consequence here of Adam's sin is the death of the body. The third text is admitted by all parties to be really a difficult one. It is the discourse in the Epistle to the Romans, concerning many being made sinners by one man's disobedience, and by the obedience of one many being made righteous. Dr. Taylor's interpretation is that, by one man's disobedience many died, and by one man's obedience they shall rise again from the dead. Passages are quoted to prove that the Hebrew expression 'made sinners,' is equivalent to being condemned to death. They who are 'made sinners' by the disobedience of another, can only be so in the sense of being made sufferers. They share the calamities of those who have sinned. All the disadvantage we had in Adam is turned to our advantage by the free gift in Christ.

On death in Adam.

The treatise on 'Original Sin' was followed some years later by one on the 'Atonement.' The views advocated were for the most part those of Dr. Sykes. The sacrifices under the old law were called expiatory, but they were really of no avail without a right disposition in the worshipper. All

On the Atonement.

CHAP. XIV. ritual acts had a spiritual meaning. The popular ideas of bearing sin, and of one suffering for another, were due to a misunderstanding of figurative expressions or customs in the Old Testament. No Levitical sacrifice ever literally bore sin. The victim is never offered instead of the sinner. The word atonement never means in the Scriptures an equivalent. Christ's sacrifice was well-pleasing to God, but it did not make Him merciful. It did not turn away His wrath or satisfy Divine justice. This can only be done by the sinner bearing the punishment of his sin. God as the Governor of the universe, for the ends of government required Christ's death. By appointing this as the means of forgiveness, He showed the evil of sin in a way that could not have been done had there been forgiveness without atonement.

The Unitarians.

In the second half of the eighteenth century the Arians and Unitarians became more definitely separated from the orthodox Dissenters. The process of the separation was gradual, but long before the end of the century the Unitarians were cognisable as a distinct community, inheriting generally the property and the churches of the old Presbyterians. The Unitarian body was really constituted by the heretical ministers of the three denominations. But before the end of the century it had a powerful contingent in the accession of several clergymen who seceded from the Established Church.

Richard Price.

The two representative men of Nonconformist origin were Richard Price and Joseph Priestley. Price was the son of a strict Calvinistic minister in the south of Wales. He was sent to a Dissenters' Academy, where it is supposed he imbibed the liberal principles which had by this time made considerable progress among the more educated class of Nonconformists. His father finding him one day reading Dr. Clarke's sermons, immediately seized the volume and committed it to the fire. This was not likely to be a successful method of checking the ardour of a young heretic. Price's first work was 'A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals.' He refutes Hutcheson's theory of a moral sense, which, he says, makes virtue only a matter of taste, and morality itself nothing but a simple sensation in the mind. He maintains, on the other hand, the

existence of absolute morality discovered not by a moral sense but by the understanding. He vindicates the validity of the understanding in its cognisance of all our ideas in opposition to the mere sensation and reflection of Locke, or the impressions and copies of impressions which lay at the foundation of the scepticism of Hume. Price repeats the characteristic sayings of his century about the gain of religion and the high probability of its truth. He makes, however, a distinction not generally made by other writers on the same subject, between religion as it implies belief, and religion as it implies a virtuous life. A good life, he says, is its own reward, even should there be no recompense in a future state of being.

In a volume of 'Dissertations,' and another of 'Sermons,' we have the details of Price's theology. The first dissertation is a defence of a particular providence, extending to all that happens in the world. This is maintained in opposition to the theory of a general providence which takes no account of contingent or secondary events. The argument is that the importance of small affairs is so great that, without attention to them, there could be no general providence. It is not, however, admitted that this particular providence interferes with the order of the world. The familiar illustration in the discussion of this subject was the tottering wall which, it was urged, must fall in its own time in obedience to the laws of gravitation, though it tumbles on the head of a saint. Price answers from the possibility of the Deity preventing the presence of a saint at the moment when the stones must fall. An invisible hand might guide all things in perfect wisdom, without interfering with the general laws that constitute the order of nature. The government of the world would be defective if one single event were to happen without the permission of the Supreme Ruler.

In another dissertation Dr. Price opposes the principle so zealously maintained by Bishop Browne, that we can only know God as He manifests Himself in nature. On the contrary, he says that the discoveries of reason infinitely transcend those of observation and experience. The world manifests wisdom, and as God is uncaused, we infer that there is more in the cause than appears in the effect. In many cases

His theology.  
On God and Nature.

CHAP. XIV. this wisdom surpasses our highest conceptions. From this we infer a similar wisdom as to all events, even when we cannot see it. Price does not deny second causes, but he refers them all to Divine activity. God is the life of the world, the Infinite Spirit by which it is 'informed and sustained.' Interpositions are not miracles, but special manifestations of the Divine presence in nature. This is identified with the doctrine of Newton, who refused to exclude Deity from the operation of natural laws. Price also finds his idea in Butler, who supposes a miracle to be possible without the violation of any general law. The waters of Jordan, for instance, might have been driven back without a suspension of the laws of gravitation. This principle is utilised in another dissertation for the defence of the duty and the profit of prayer. An answer from Deity need not suppose a miracle. He may interpose without the violation of any of the laws of nature.

On the importance of Christianity.

The last dissertation is on 'The Importance of Christianity, the Nature of Historical Evidence and Miracles.' The first consists in the importance of the doctrines revealed. The second is treated in the style of Bishop Butler, and with many of his arguments. The common objection to revelation from the want of clearness and precision is answered by the consideration that God has followed the same method in giving us natural religion. We are not judges either of the measure of light which God might give us nor of the best mode in which it is to be given. Revelation is not universal, and yet in every nation there are men that fear God and work righteousness. The knowledge which is imparted to some by Christianity, God was not obliged to give to all. Even if Christianity be regarded as an extraordinary dispensation, the object of which is the redemption of the race, it does not follow that it was necessary that all men should know of this redemption. The benefits of Christ's death were extended to all good men, whether Christians or Pagans. The Gospel histories concerning demoniacs were written in accordance with the language and ideas of the Jews at that time. If Christ had tried to correct those ideas it might have been a hindrance to the Gospel. The idea of the Apostles and Evangelists



being inspired is modern, and not compatible with the facts of their history. The hypothesis of infallible inspiration is not necessary to the defence of Christianity. It is enough that the Evangelists were honest men, with a competent knowledge of the facts. The objection that the whole atmosphere of the Bible is miraculous, and, therefore, the history incredible, Price answers by saying that we are ignorant of the causes that operate in nature. Our experience gives a probability that what has been will continue to be, but our experience has only narrow limits. Any event, however improbable, may be certified by the evidence of competent witnesses.

In his sermons Dr. Price says that all Christians are agreed as to the main doctrines of Christianity. The 'orthodox' may have some absurd ideas about three persons being one God, yet, in spite of this, they strongly maintain the Divine Unity. All Christians admit that the Gospel teaches with all clearness that God is a Being of infinite perfections, that repentance and holiness are necessary for salvation, and that there will be a future life in which all men shall be judged according to their works. The Gospel teaches further, and this is its peculiar doctrine—that Jesus Christ is the Mediator between God and man. In this, too, Price says there is an agreement among all Christians as to all that is deemed essential. By Christ we are delivered from death. In Him we have eternal life. The mode of redemption may be explained in different ways, but all are agreed that through Christ we are redeemed. If He has risen from the dead, and if He will raise us from the dead, it is a matter of small importance whether He was only a man endowed with extraordinary powers, or the second person in the Godhead offering Himself a propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of the world. According to either interpretation there is a scheme of mercy for sinful men. We have the 'deed' which gives us the title to the estate, and compared with this the meaning of secondary clauses is unimportant. Price quotes and endorses on this subject the words of Bishop Butler. We should be satisfied with the fact of Christ's mediation, and not seek to explain the efficacy of His sufferings beyond what the Scriptures

On the general agreement of all Christians.

CHAP. XIV. have revealed. Dr. Price maintained the Arian position of the pre-existence of the Logos, and described the Socinian method of interpreting the first verses of St. John's Gospel as doing violence to the meaning of words.

Dr. Priestley. Joseph Priestley was also the son of parents who were Dissenters of the strictest sect of the Calvinists. He was educated at an Independent Academy, where, however, doctrinal views were not strictly enforced. Here he embraced the prevalent Arian theology, but was convinced soon after, by reading Dr. Lardner on the Logos, that Arianism was untenable. He then adopted the doctrine of Christ's simple humanity. His first charge was over an orthodox congregation, but he was soon promoted to a tutorship in Warrington Academy, where he could breathe more freely the atmosphere of heresy. Dr. Priestley's collected works are very voluminous. Like all men who write too much, he repeats himself very often, and sometimes advances things which, after more consideration, have to be withdrawn. We shall follow him chiefly in two characters, first as the exponent of Unitarianism, and then as an apologist of Christianity from his stand-point of the Christian revelation.

On the cor-  
ruptions of  
Christianity.

The two most important works on the first subject are a 'History of the Corruptions of Christianity,' and a 'History of Early Opinions concerning Jesus Christ.' The great Patristic scholars of the seventeenth century had almost unanimously declared that all antiquity before the Council of Nice was Arian. Bishop Bull was the first orthodox writer who earned a great reputation by maintaining the contrary. Dr. Priestley also denied that the Ante-Nicene Fathers were Arians, but without admitting that they were orthodox. The opinion of the Arians, he says, began with Arius, and before his time all Christians were Unitarians. This was certainly a startling thesis, but there was at first sight room for it, when the orthodox could maintain that the early Fathers were Trinitarians, while such learned men as Petavius and Huetius, Sandius and Episcopius, Daniel Whitby and William Whiston were confident that they were Arians. Dr. Priestley refused to allow Arians the name of Unitarians. He reckoned them as much, if not more, idolatrous than the worshippers of the Athanasian Trinity. With the one Supreme

God they acknowledge two inferior gods. The first direct argument from antiquity is the absence in ancient liturgies of prayer to Christ. In the Clementine, the oldest extant, dating, probably, from the fourth century, there is no trace of any such prayer. Origen, in a treatise on prayer, says that it should be addressed only to the Father, and not to Christ. Priestley says that the Arian hypothesis is sufficiently absurd to be incredible, though it cannot, like the orthodox Trinity, be reduced to a simple contradiction. The creation of the world is never ascribed to Christ in the books of the New Testament, nor is there any mention in these books of His pre-existence. The Logos, in the beginning of St. John's Gospel, he denies to be a person, or that it refers to Christ. CHAP. XIV.

Priestley's main argument from antiquity rests on a denial of the genuineness of nearly all the writings that bear the names of Apostolical Fathers. Passages in accredited books that seem to favour the Trinity, he regards either as interpolations or as figures of speech. The Clementine Homilies, evidently, he says, written by a Unitarian, know nothing of the personification of the Logos. They defend the simple unity of God against all Platonist and Gnostic theories. The Supreme Being is the Demiurgus or world-maker, and of Him it is not allowed to predicate generation. The Homilies contain a doxology to the Holy Ghost, but this is evidently an interpolation, as even in the time of Basil, a doxology to the Holy Ghost was complained of as an innovation. Persons in the early Church like the Ebionites, who said that Christ was a mere man, or who even denied His miraculous birth, were not regarded as heretics. The only heretics of whom we read among the early Christians were the Gnostics. It was not till the time of Origen that Unitarians were called heretics, and even Athanasius was more favourable to them than to the Arians.

The Athanasian Trinity originated with Plato. His later disciples corrupted the doctrine of Christ. The Neo-Platonists made the Logos or Divine Intellect a person, and the Greek or Alexandrian Fathers identified this person with Christ. The Nous or Logos in Plato was the Mind of the Deity by which all things were made. With Plotinus Origin of  
Athanasian  
Trinity.

CHAP. XIV. the *Nous* became the *Demiurgus* or world-maker. Philo interpreted Plato in the same fashion. God the Father created all things, but the forming of created matter was committed to the *Logos*. The first Christian Father who clearly makes the *Logos* a person is Justin Martyr. He is followed by Irenæus, Theophilus, Athanagoras, Clement of Alexandria, and other Greeks. Then arose the question as to the time when this *Logos* or Son of God was generated. This was an old question with the philosophers, and impinged on their speculations concerning eternity and duration. Some said that as there was no time with God there could be no time when the Son was generated. But those who regarded eternity as constituted by duration, had no difficulty in finding a point in time in which the Son may have been generated. Priestley quotes many passages from the Fathers to prove that they regarded the Son as inferior to God. The term God used absolutely always, he says, with the Ante-Nicene Fathers means God the Father only. Until the time of Arius Christ was always regarded as a man, with a human body and a human soul. The divinity of the Holy Ghost originated with Athanasius. It was afterwards established by a Council held at Constantinople. Hitherto the doxologies gave glory to the Father through the Son and the Holy Ghost. But about this time some monks of Antioch began to use the present orthodox form, which ascribes equal glory to the three persons of the Trinity.

Trinity unknown to the Jews.

This Platonic Trinity thus introduced into the Christian Church was unknown to the old Jews. Ben Mordecai had, indeed, interpreted the Jewish Angel Metatron as the *Logos*, but in this he is opposed by all Jewish writers. The New Testament never represents Jesus as claiming Divinity. Chrysostom says that the Apostles knew of Christ's Divinity before His resurrection, but Cyril of Alexandria says they knew nothing of it till the day of Pentecost. Augustine says it was not clearly taught till St. John wrote his Gospel. The reason given by some of the Fathers why it was not made known, was that the devil would have prevented the crucifixion. The devil, says St. Cyril of Jerusalem, swallowed Christ's body, not knowing that 'it was the bait which concealed the hook of His Divinity.'

Many Fathers testify that St. John first taught the pre-existence of the soul of Jesus. Before that time all Christians were certainly Unitarians. It is even doubtful if St. John's Gospel really teaches what the Fathers supposed they found in it. The Jewish Christians, who were clearly Unitarians, do not seem to have noticed that it contained strange doctrine, which they would have done had it taught the pre-existence of Christ. Three learned men of the Ebionites or Nazarenes, Aquila, Theodotion, and Symmachus, translated the Old Testament. Eusebius calls the first two Jewish proselytes, and says that they believed Jesus Christ to be the son of Joseph and Mary. They were never reckoned heretics, and their translations were highly esteemed by the ancient Christians. No Unitarian was excommunicated from the Church Catholic until the time of Victor, Bishop of Rome, which was the beginning of the third century.

On the Evidences Priestley published two volumes of discourses, some of which were delivered in England and the rest in America. The century was now closing, but we still hear the old complaint that unbelief is everywhere universal. It had come too in a provoking form. Books like Paine's 'Age of Reason' were circulated widely among the humbler classes, who had not the means of acquiring the information necessary to judge of so great a subject. In France Deism had passed into Atheism. This development, Priestley said, could only be prevented by holding fast to revelation. Without revelation Deism had no practical value. It could not give sufficient certainty for the grounds of morality, such as would induce men to live moral lives. Jesus had a divine mission to reveal a future life, to teach righteousness and to confirm what He taught by miracles. The doctrine of rewards and punishments is the foundation of morality. Revelation with Priestley is an interposition. It was shown to be necessary because men had derived very little religion from the light of nature. Those who reject revelation are so little influenced by principles of religion, that the actual choice is between revelation or no religion at all. Virtue without the prospect of a rich dowry, has not sufficient charms to induce men to deny the pleasures of

CHAP. XIV. sense. Every precept of morality has been controverted by the philosophers. What we call conscience within us is not a uniform principle. The first philosophers followed tradition and not reason. When reason came into the schools it gave birth to doubt. The light of nature does not tell us that justice in a future world will be less indifferent than it is here. Nature gives no such idea of God as would lead men to pray. A revelation, on the other hand, confirmed by miracles, gives an immediate and satisfactory proof of the existence of Deity. This is evidence not depending on inferences, but level to the meanest capacity.

On inspira-  
tion.

The proofs of revelation from miracles and prophecy Dr. Priestley treats in the orthodox fashion. He differs from orthodox apologists by setting aside what he calls the incumbrances that do not belong to Christianity. These were not merely the doctrines which he regarded as irrational, but also such indefensible theories as that of infallible inspiration. He calls it a great relief to find that revelation can be defended without believing that the writers of the Scriptures never made mistakes. It is enough to believe that they were good men, and inspired as all good men are. Priestley's philosophical theories are in the background of his views of Christianity, but not always inseparably connected with them. He adopted the necessarian views of Hobbes, and like Hobbes he was conscious of that insoluble relation of mind and matter, which hitherto has baffled all human thought and human language.

Theophilus  
Lindsey.

Of the clergymen who seceded to the Unitarians, the best known are Theophilus Lindsey,\* Dr. John Jebb, Dr. John Disney, Edward Evanson, and Gilbert Wakefield. Lindsey was Vicar of Catterick, in Yorkshire. He seems to have been an amiable and sincere man, but the few tracts he has left do not indicate that he had any particular gifts of intellect, or that his learning was extensive. With the zeal of an ardent enthusiast who supposes that he has discovered all truth, he speaks of the worshippers of the Trinity as dark idolaters, and classes them with Pagans and Polytheists. He took his stand on the old Presbyterian ground, of the Bible as the

\* Lindsey was a friend and neighbour of Archdeacon Blackburne, whose step-daughter he married.



only creed, which he regarded as truly and properly the word of God as distinguished from the words of men. In this creed he could not find the doctrine of Christ's Divinity nor any authority for worshipping Him as God. If St. John had meant that the Logos was Christ, he would have taught two Gods, which is impossible. The passages which speak of Christ's pre-existence are explained to mean something else. Even the 'I am,' in the place where Jesus says He existed in the days of Abraham, is not allowed to refer to the name Jehovah. Julian the Apostate charged St. John with being the first who called Christ God, but Lindsey shows that Julian was wrong, for John never did anything of the kind. When Dr. Price reprobated the forced interpretation which the Unitarians put on the Scriptures, he probably had in his mind Lindsey's expositions of St. John.\*

Dr. Jebb was intellectually a much superior man to Lindsey. He was a Fellow of St. Peter's, in Cambridge, and had long sustained a liberal position in the University. He was an ardent promoter of all reforms, and specially zealous in advocating the abolition of subscription to articles and creeds. When he found that he had clearly ceased to believe the doctrines of the Church of England, and that there was no hope of any alteration in the law of subscription, he resigned his preferments, which consisted of three livings in Suffolk, besides his fellowship. He devoted himself afterwards to the study and practice of medicine. Dr. Jebb's works do not supply any arguments for his becoming Unitarian different from those we have frequently met in other writers. He started with the sufficiency of the Bible, which he called the word of God. The Church of England, he said, was not consistent in binding the clergy to teach the people only that which they were persuaded could be proved by the Scriptures, and at the same time requiring them to subscribe articles which profess to be interpretations of these Scriptures. The sixth Article gives a liberty to the individual judgment, which is again taken away by requiring subscription to the other Articles.

\* Lindsey gathered a congregation in London, for whom the chapel in Essex Street was built. He used Dr. Clarke's Reformed Liturgy, with amendments. This was the origin of Liturgical worship among the Unitarians.



CHAP. XIV. The Church of England, Dr. Jebb says, being the creature of the State, and with no independent jurisdiction, has, therefore, no right to impose anything which interferes with the liberty of the subject. Those who are most eager to impose the Articles are in many cases the greatest transgressors against the doctrine of the Articles. Warburton, for instance, is a zealous advocate for subscription, and yet the thesis of his 'Divine Legation' is in flat contradiction to the Article which denies that the old Fathers looked only for transitory promises. Dr. Jebb reduces the doctrines of Christianity to those which relate to practice. He believes in Christ's miraculous birth, but the Trinity and all kindred doctrines are contrary to the great standard of faith, 'the word of God.'

Dr. Disney. Dr. Disney\* was also a Cambridge man, and took the same ground as Dr. Jebb. He had long striven for reformation, especially in the matter of subscription, but when every hope of any change in respect of this was gone, he resigned his livings. He succeeded Lindsey as minister in Essex Street Chapel, but without making any change in the standpoint of his party, which was, that the Bible is the word of God, the only Christian creed, and that it knows nothing of the system of theology set forth in the XXXIX Articles of Religion. Disney's chief works, besides some volumes of sermons, are his biographies of Sykes and Jortin.

Edward  
Evanson.

Edward Evanson and Gilbert Wakefield were both men whose intellects had by nature a peculiar turn, and can scarcely be regarded as representing anybody but themselves. Evanson was many years in orders before he obtained any preferment. During that time he was engaged in tuition, and too much occupied to think about doctrine. The Lord Chancellor however gave him the vicarage of Tewkesbury, and soon after he found that the whole orthodox faith was derived from Paganism, that it was made the State religion by Constantine, and that it was, in fact, nothing else but the great apostacy predicted by the Apostles, which was to be utterly destroyed before the second coming of Christ. As there was some hope of a change in the matter of subscription, Evanson did not at once resign his living. He wrote

\* Dr. Disney was Archdeacon Blackburne's son-in-law.

books and preached sermons on the doctrine of the Trinity and other orthodox articles, setting forth the liberty which he must have in the Church, otherwise he would secede. A prosecution followed, and Evanson, like an inspired apostle of the latter days, denounced the Church of England creeds as 'the plain marks of heresy and antichrist.' The prosecution failed on some technical points, but soon after Evanson resigned his preferments. The rest of his life was spent in retirement. For some years he had a school at Mitcham, in Surrey. When he had a company in his house he conducted worship with Dr. Clarke's liturgy, and administered the Sacrament of the Supper, which he said was the only sacrament under the Gospel, and was to be administered always when a congregation of Christians met for worship. He sometimes preached at Unitarian meetings.

CHAP. XIV.

Evanson wrote several books and tracts. One of the latter was against keeping Sunday as a day of rest. His chief argument was the loss to industry of the seventh part of time. He also proved from Ovid that the mind of man could be civilised by the fine arts, and, he added, that this could not be done by going to church on Sunday. His chief work was a book called 'The Dissonance of the Four generally received Evangelists.' He found it impossible to reconcile the different statements in the four Gospels. As no reliance could be placed on the records of the Evangelists, Evanson set aside the miracles, and rested the truth of Christianity solely on the fulfilment of prophecy. The first great proof of Christianity from prophecy was the civil establishment throughout Europe of orthodox creeds according to the prediction concerning the great apostacy. After examining the four Gospels, he found St. Luke the only Evangelist worthy of credit. His Gospel was a consistent, well-connected story. Matthew, on the other hand, was an incoherent writer, and Mark was only the copyist of Matthew. The best parts of their Gospels are taken from Luke, and their narratives and parables are only awkward imitations of those which St. Luke records. The Gospel which bears the name of St. John differs entirely from the other three, and represents Christ as having been several

On keeping Sunday.

On the Gospels.

CHAP. XIV. times in Jerusalem, when, according to St. Luke, He never left Galilee till near the Passover at which He was crucified. The Gospel began, not from the birth of Jesus, but as St. Luke himself, in the beginning of the Acts of the Apostles, expressly tells us, from the beginning of His public life. It was a record of all that Jesus 'began to do and to teach.'

Gilbert  
Wakefield.

Gilbert Wakefield was the son of a clergyman who held the living of Richmond, in Surrey. He wrote an autobiography, in which he gives an account of his education, his mental history, and his views on religion. He had not been long in orders when he felt that he could not in conscience use the Liturgy of the Church of England. He joined the Unitarians, and held the office of classical first in the Academy of Warrington, and afterwards in that of Hackney.

On the Evi-  
dences of  
Christianity.

Wakefield's most important religious work is a treatise on the 'Evidences of Christianity.' It consists of a number of ingenious remarks, which render probable many things connected with revelation. The first is the natural expectation that a revelation would be made. Such knowledge concerning prayer and sacrifice as Christianity provides, was what Alcibiades desired and predicted would come. Another remark concerns the Jewish character of the New Testament. This is illustrated by the story of the angel at the pool of Bethesda. A Greek or Roman writer would have found a physical cause for the medicinal properties of the water. But the Evangelist ascribes the healing virtue to an angel. The Jews found the reason of all events in the immediate action of Jehovah. The same thing is illustrated by the record of the angel which appeared to strengthen Jesus in Gethsemane, and by the words in the Acts of the Apostles, 'the Spirit suffered them not' to go into Bithynia, that is, 'their own judgment' did not suffer them. Other remarks concern the morality of the gospel and the wisdom of Jesus. When the multitude said, 'Behold thy mother and thy brothers,' Jesus answered, 'Whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother and sister and mother.' Aristotle did not equal this, but he comes close upon it in the Hymn to Virtue, where he says that virtue is 'of more worth than gold or parents.' What Jesus says of riches is true to fact, and finds its confirmation

in the united testimony of heathen moralists. The words in the parable, 'If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead,' have often been called a mere piece of rhetoric. But Wakefield shows that they rest on a fact in human nature, which is, that disinclination to be persuaded will start some ingenious cavil. The Pharisees said that the people, that is, the multitude, were accursed, but Jesus recognised the dignity of humanity, and never despised the humblest of men. CHAP. XIV

As Evanson denied the necessity of keeping a day in the week sacred for worship, Wakefield denied the necessity of public worship at all. This gave rise to a good deal of controversy among the Unitarians. Dr. Priestley answered both these heresies. The plea that keeping Sunday was a loss to industry was easily set aside. If, Priestley said, the working classes are not provided with a day of rest, they will make one for themselves, and spend it worse than even the worst-spent Sunday. The obvious arguments for public worship are its expediency and utility. We have, moreover, an argument sufficient for Christians in the example of Jesus. Mrs. Barbauld also wrote an answer to Wakefield, showing that public worship was not only a Christian duty, but that it had its origin in the best impulses of our nature. Evanson on  
Public Wor-  
ship.

The theology of Emmanuel Swedenborg can scarcely be said to have had any influence on the development of religious ideas in England. It may, however, be regarded as belonging to England, though its author was a foreigner. Swedenborg's works are so numerous, written in such defiance of method, and with the ideas so overloaded with words, that it is not easy to get a general view of his whole system so as to set every part of it in its right place.\* His statements are often so wild, that, taken in their obvious meaning, they sound like the ravings of a man whose intellect is deranged. The real meaning, however, is never the apparent one. Behind the veil of mist and madness there is found a theology for the most part both intelligible and rational. Swedenborg professed to have visions and Emmanuel  
Swedenborg.

\* The interesting biography, published in 1867, by William White, may be described as Swedenborg *made easy*.

CHAP. XIV. revelations of the unseen world. He has described the heavens and the hells, the angels and the devils, their occupations and amusements, with a great and minute precision. The insight which he had into the spiritual world he did not regard as special. He had a special commission, and he had seen more than others, but all men, he said, are capable of this inward vision.

Established  
the Church of  
the New Jeru-  
salem.

Swedenborg's commission was to establish the Church of the New Jerusalem described in the Apocalypse. The last judgment took place in 1757, and this was followed by the second advent of Christ, which means the writings of Emmanuel Swedenborg. When these writings were published, nobody bought them. Copies were sent to all the English bishops, but they treated them as of no value. Some years after, Swedenborg had a conversation with these bishops in the spiritual world, where they still despised his writings; but the bishops were informed by some of the celestials that they were 'the unclean spirits like frogs that came out of the mouth of the dragon.' When Swedenborg said that the day of judgment was past, he meant that the whole business of judgment had been concluded in heaven. He did not connect with it any destruction of the elements or the annihilation of this earth. Heaven and earth, in his theology, were but different spheres in the same universe; all in substance eternal, and as like each other as the different members of the same body.

On the Nature  
and Essence  
of God.

In all Swedenborg's visions he never saw God. The Divine Presence is everywhere, but God, as He is, was never seen by any created intelligence. He is the spiritual Sun, the one substance of the universe, the source of all life. He is in all things, and without Him creation is nothing, but He is altogether incomprehensible both to angels and men. He is not an object either of thought or of love. There are other passages in Swedenborg which will contradict this if we take them literally. We are told, for instance, in plain words, that God is a man, that God is the only man, and that He has hands, eyes, nose, and all the other members of a human body. This is explained that God has attributes of which these members are symbols. This apparent contradiction, so strongly expressed, is only one of the necessities to

which the finite mind is reduced when it has to speak of the Infinite. We must first say that God is beyond the limits of our thought, and then, lest a Being so incomprehensible might appear to have no existence, we ascribe to Him human personality. In Swedenborg's theology there is in fact no real existence but God. The principle is plainly expressed, but the logical conclusion is avoided by affirming at the same time that there is a universe created and distinct from God.

This Being, who is infinite and invisible to all creation, manifests Himself under the form of an angel to the angels. He takes possession of an angelic existence, and the angel so possessed speaks in the name of God and as God. 'The Lord,' says Swedenborg, 'appeared as a Man, and talked face to face with the members of the most ancient Church. In like manner He was seen by Abraham, Hagar, Lot, Gideon, Joshua, the prophets, and others. They saw not Jehovah, but angels who were filled with His presence, who spoke from His inspiration, and who therefore called themselves Jehovah.'\* Jesus Christ was in this way so possessed by the Divine Presence that He was very God, in whom all the fulness of the Godhead dwelt bodily. Swedenborg sweeps away the whole doctrine of the Trinity, while retaining the perfect Divinity of Jesus Christ. In Jesus Christ, he says, we have the visible image of the invisible God, not another person, but the very person and being of the Infinite. The Word or Wisdom of God was Jehovah Himself, who was made flesh and dwelt among us. The Holy Spirit is the influence which Christ acquired over humanity. There is no trinity of persons, but the trinity of a Person. By His death Christ conquered 'the hells' and removed the disorders in heaven and earth. Man was in danger, not from the vindictiveness of God, but from the natural consequences of evil. Christ saved men, not by delivering them from the divine wrath, but from sin.

All the Scriptures in their inner sense speak of the Word or Wisdom of God, that is, they try to utter that word which was ultimately fulfilled or realised in Christ. In their literal sense they are subject to the same imperfections

\* Quoted by White, vol. i., p. 283.

On the Theophanies.

CHAP. XIV. as other books, but in their inner sense every syllable is  
 — Divine. The early books of the Old Testament were not  
 written by Moses, nor do they contain history, but only  
 figures and symbols of things celestial and spiritual. Noah,  
 for instance, means the ancient Church, and the flood was  
 the triumph of human wickedness. Balaam's ass seemed to  
 Balaam to speak in the same way that Swedenborg himself  
 had often seemed to hear words of wisdom from the lips of a  
 horse. On such subjects as the Church and the Sacraments,  
 Swedenborg's doctrine is perfectly rational. He denied the  
 resurrection of the body, maintaining that at death the soul  
 is immediately 'clothed upon' with a spiritual body fitted to  
 the sphere it is to inhabit in the unseen world. All that  
 which we commonly call the evidences of Christianity is set  
 aside. Faith is inward consciousness, or realisation of the  
 invisible. If our object had been to make Swedenborg  
 ridiculous, it would have been sufficient to quote some of his  
 descriptions of 'the heavens' and 'the hells,' or some of his  
 conversations with the angels, who generally show less  
 wisdom than we expect from the most ordinary human  
 beings. But we have tried to look at the best side of his  
 doctrines, and to give him that justice which is not always  
 due to men who see visions and write cumbrous books.

On the Scrip-  
 tures as the  
 Word of God.



## CHAPTER XV.

ARCHBISHOP HERRING.—ARCHBISHOP SECKER.—BISHOP WAR-  
 BURTON.—BISHOP PEARCE.—DR. JORTIN.—THE METHODISTS.  
 —WESLEY.—WHITEFIELD.—CALVINISTIC CONTROVERSY.—  
 JAMES HERVEY.—FLETCHER OF MADELEY.—SIR RICHARD  
 HILL.—AUGUSTUS TOPLADY.—SUBSCRIPTION CONTROVERSY.—  
 JONES OF ALCONBURY.—BISHOP CLAYTON'S 'ESSAY ON SPIRIT.'  
 —ARCHDEACON BLACKBURNE.—THE 'CONFESSIONAL.'—CON-  
 TROVERSY ON THE SLEEP OF THE SOUL.—HUTCHINSONIANS.  
 —JULIUS BATE.—BISHOP HORNE.—JONES OF NAYLAND.—  
 RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN SCOTLAND.—BOYLE, WARBURTONIAN,  
 AND BAMPTON LECTURES.—THE EVANGELICAL MOVEMENT.—  
 BISHOP HORSLEY.—BISHOP WATSON.—BISHOP TOMLINE.—  
 DR. PALEY.—DR. HEY.—DR. THOMAS BALGUY.—DR. PARR.

IN 1747 Archbishop Potter died. He was succeeded by <sup>Archbishop</sup> Thomas Herring. <sup>Herring.</sup> The primacy had been offered to Butler, but, taking a dark view of the future of the Church of England, he declined the responsibility of so high a station. It was then offered to Sherlock, but he too declined the office. Herring was an amiable man, and very liberal in his theology. He is generally supposed to have been an Arian, but this was a charge made against all the Latitudinarians. Herring had been Archbishop of York, and his services to Government during the rebellion of 1745 are said to have been the immediate cause of his being raised to the See of Canterbury. We have none of Herring's writings except a few sermons preached on public occasions, and two small volumes of letters. There is no special

CHAP. XV. 

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 theology in his sermons, but there is a manifest effort to steer a middle course between Deism and enthusiasm. The Gospel is chiefly regarded as a declaration of the forgiveness of sin, as giving certainty concerning a future life, and as setting forth the absolute necessity of morality and virtue. Some occasional passages in Herring's letters leave no doubt of his relations to the liberal theology which prevailed in his day. He called Hoadly's doctrine of the Lord's Supper very good doctrine, and he said that on this subject Hoadly was quite as orthodox as Archbishop Tillotson. In a letter to Dr. Doddridge, Herring expressed a wish for such changes in the Liturgy as would reconcile all the Nonconformists. He told Dr. Chandler that he could see no reason why the Articles of Religion should not be expressed entirely in the words of Scripture, and he is said to have lamented the darkness of the times that Dr. Clarke's reformed liturgy could not be used in the services of the Church.

Archbishop  
Secker.

Herring died in 1757, and was succeeded by Matthew Hutton, who was also transferred from York. Hutton was Archbishop of Canterbury for not more than a year. We know even less of him than we do of Herring, but he evidently belonged to the same class of liberal or Latitudinarian divines. The next primate was Thomas Secker, a very different man from either Herring or Hutton. When Pope described Secker, he could say nothing more appropriate than 'Secker is decent.' He was not great in anything, but he was prudent, and his wisdom was practical. His sermons show a well-sustained mediocrity, and his theology is sufficiently diluted to give offence to nobody. His episcopal administration too was prudent, sagacious, and eminently 'safe.' He had no special hatred to Nonconformists, but during his primacy there was no chance for liturgical revision or any schemes of comprehension.

Originally a  
Presbyterian.

Thomas Secker was originally a Presbyterian, and had his early education with Joseph Butler at a Dissenters' Academy in Tewkesbury. After studying medicine at Paris, he was induced by Butler to take orders in the Established Church. By the help of Bishop Talbot he soon rose to high preferment. After succeeding Samuel Clarke at St. James's, Westminster, he was promoted to the See of Bristol. In

1737 he was translated to Oxford, and in 1758 he accepted the primacy. CHAP. XV.

The theology of Secker's sermons, like the theology of all prudent men, is strong in platitudes. The doctrines of the Church of England are received as popularly understood in the most orthodox form. The Archbishop deprecates controversy about points of speculation, but he cannot admit that it is a small matter to depart from any of the commonly received doctrines of Christianity. He recommends examination with candour, without prejudice or partiality. But he refuses to allow that a good life is the sole end of the Christian revelation. It is not enough that Christians have good lives, they must also believe certain revealed doctrines. Some of these, though not discoverable by reason, may be of great importance to eternal salvation. The two sacraments, for instance, may have benefits connected with the observance of them beyond what reason sees. It is, however, admitted that no doctrines or precepts are of any value unless they make us like Christ. So that the requirements of the Gospel are really those of strict reason duly cultivated. His theology.

The subjects of Secker's Episcopal Charges are generally practical. In the primary charge at Oxford, in 1738, he gives one of the sad pictures of irreligion and immorality with which we are familiar as peculiar to that age. He speaks of the disregard of religion having brought in 'such dissoluteness and contempt of principle in the higher part of the world, and such profligate intemperance and fearlessness of committing crimes in the lower, as must, if the torrent of impiety stop not, become absolutely fatal.' He adds, that 'Christianity is now ridiculed and rallied at with very little reserve, and the teachers of it without any at all.' In the second charge he speaks of 'this unhappy age of irreligion and libertinism.' He denied that the clergy were so bad as they were generally represented, yet he admitted that there was great room for improvement. He exhorted them to take the blame to themselves, and to make renewed efforts against the tide of licentiousness and profanity. He warned them too, with characteristic moderation, not to run into any extremes of superstition, nor to show bitterness in controversy. They were to keep more strictly to the word His 'Charges.'

CHAP. XV. of God, avoiding, 'on the one hand fondness of novelty, and on the other over-great reverence of antiquity.'

On the Church  
Catechism.

In a series of lectures on the Church Catechism, we have Secker's general views of Christian doctrine. He follows Waterland on the supreme obligation of keeping positive precepts, though we know nothing of the reason why they are imposed. The benefits, however, conferred by the sacraments are described as merely privileges *conditionally* secured. In baptism we are made members of Christ, children of God, and inheritors of the kingdom of heaven; that is, if we fulfil the conditions on which we were admitted into the Christian Church. The Church is defined as comprehending all good men in all ages, under every dispensation, who have believed and served Him according to the degree of light which they had. It is the Catholic Church as distinguished from the Jewish Church, which embraced only one nation. It is the universal Church, which embraces all men in all nations. The Catholic faith is that form of doctrine which was delivered by the Apostles. It can be learned with certainty only in the writings of the New Testament. Every Church or society of Christians which preserves this Catholic or universal faith, is a part of the true or universal Church. In this sense, every individual Church which holds the essentials of Christianity is a Catholic Church. To 'hear the Church' is not to submit our faith to Church governors, nor to the decisions of a majority. The text plainly refers to a moral trespass, and not at all to matters of doctrine. The Church that is to judge is the particular Church to which the offender belongs, and if he does not make reparation, he is to be as 'a heathen man and a publican.' The sacraments are said to convey grace, but in the same way as reading, hearing, and meditating upon God's word. Sacraments are not absolutely necessary to salvation. Pious persons may have mistaken views about them. Like the Baptists, they may delay their baptism, or, like the Quakers, omit it altogether; but 'even of these,' Secker says, 'it belongs to Christian charity not to judge hardly, as excluded from the Gospel covenant if they die unbaptized, but to leave them to the equitable judgment of God.'

All Secker's contemporaries who had any reputation we have already met, with the exception of Dr. Jortin. Two of them, Bishops Warburton and Pearce, require to be briefly noticed again. CHAP. XV.

Notwithstanding Warburton's great reputation, it is now agreed that he showed but little originality, and that he had no permanent influence on theology. His first popular work was 'The Alliance of Church and State,' published in 1736. It followed the great Hoadly controversy concerning the kingdom of Christ, and was intended to vindicate the Corporation and Test Acts. The argument is expressed in the word 'alliance.' The State and the Church are two distinct bodies with separate duties, but an alliance is to the advantage of both parties. At the accession of the House of Hanover, Warburton says, the Jacobites were so powerful in the Church, that it was doubted if the clergy generally would be loyal to the throne. Hoadly and his party, on the other hand, virtually deprived the Church of all power and privilege, and delivered it up, gagged and bound, as the rebel creature of the State. Warburton refutes both these parties, and advocates the principle of alliance.

The duty of the civil magistrate is defined as extending only to the care of the bodies of men, and having nothing to do with their souls. When he punishes the evil-doer, it is not as one who sins against God, but as a transgressor against society. The object of religion is to procure the favour of God. The Church is a religious community designed to further the development of man's religious nature. It is independent of civil society. Its origin, too, is divine, while the State is only human. The advantage which the civil magistrate has by alliance with the Church is in the value of religion to society, and in the power it gives him to control assemblies which might be used for purposes of discord and rebellion. Hooker, Warburton says, lost sight of the alliance, and gave princes a natural right to ecclesiastical dominion. He was refuting the Puritans, who denied that the Church can give up its independence. The proper answer which Hooker should have made, was, that the Church may give up its inde-

Bishop Warburton's 'Alliance of Church and State.'

Asserts the natural independence of the Church.

CHAP. XV. — pendence by alliance with the State. But he even denied the original and natural independency of the two societies, making them only one society under two different aspects. The Puritans made the State the slave of the Church, and Hooker made the Church the slave of the State. Bolingbroke revived the Puritan doctrine, and Hobbes borrowed from Hooker the doctrine of the 'Leviathan,' that 'a commonwealth of Christian men and a Church are the same thing called by two names.' The Test Law is defended as necessary for the protection of the Established Church, and therefore one of the conditions of the Concordat between Church and State.

Against Dr. Middleton.

In 1750, Warburton took a share in the controversy that had been raised by Dr. Middleton's 'Free Inquiry.' When Julian the Apostate tried to rebuild the Temple at Jerusalem, he was said to have been defeated by an earthquake, and the eruption of balls of fire from the site of the Temple. This extraordinary story was believed even down to the eighteenth century of Christianity. Warburton regarded it as a miracle in defence of the Christians, and a sufficient refutation of Middleton's denial of miracles in the primitive Church. The defence of this miracle involved an inquiry into the value of the writings of the Fathers. These writings had ceased to have the authority which was once accorded to them. Daillé, Chillingworth, Taylor, Whitby, Barbeyrac, and others, had proved that the Fathers were worthless both as critics and as moralists. But Middleton, Warburton added, had taken away their authority even as vouchers for historical facts. This last character it was necessary to establish before they could be taken as witnesses to a miracle of the fourth century.

On the miracle of the balls of fire which prevented the rebuilding of the Temple.

Warburton's arguments in favour of this miracle rest on the importance to the enemies of Christianity of rebuilding the Temple. With its destruction God's reign over the Jews ceased, and the reign of Christ in spirit and in truth then began. Jesus had foretold the destruction of the Temple, and Julian would have crowned his triumph against Christianity if the project of rebuilding it had succeeded. In a letter to the Jews he had promised that if victorious in the Persian War he would rebuild Jerusalem,

and the Christian writers of this day are unanimous in ascribing to him this project. Ammianus Marcellinus, his companion in arms and a fellow Pagan, as well as other Pagan writers, testifies to Julian's design. And the same writers are witnesses to the truth of the miracle by which the rebuilding of the Temple was defeated. Warburton defended the miracle in all its plenitude as recorded by the Fathers, the storms and tempests, the lightning which melted the tools of the workmen and impressed shining crosses on the bodies and garments of the inhabitants, the earthquake which cast up the stones of the old foundation, the horrible balls of fire which maimed many of the workmen, and the lurid cross in the heavens circumscribed within a luminous circle. It may be difficult for us now to understand how the defence of this incredible story could ever be identified with the defence of Christianity. But Warburton wrote to Hurd:—'My Julian has had a great effect in France, where free-thinking holds its head as high as in England. This is a consolation to me, as my sole aim is to repress that infernal Spirit.'

Warburton's treatise on 'The Doctrine of Grace' was written to refute the 'infidels,' and the 'fanatics.' The representative man of the first class was Conyers Middleton, whom Warburton at last believed to be a Deist because he denied that Julian was refuted by the 'balls of fire.' The fanatics were represented by Wesley and Whitefield, the one a 'hypocrite,' and the other 'as mad as George Fox the Quaker.' Warburton followed the theory received by most of Middleton's opponents, that miraculous gifts were necessary until the establishment of Christianity. Without the gift of tongues and the power to work miracles, the heathen would never have been converted. But when the canon of Scripture was complete the office of the Spirit was in part transferred to the rule of faith. It may not be possible to fix the time when the miraculous operations of the Spirit ceased, but to talk of the Spirit being in the world now, and miraculously changing men's hearts, is called pure fanaticism. It was, however, admitted that the Holy Spirit occasionally assisted the faithful. But His constant abode and supreme illumination was in the Scriptures. Though the

On 'The Doctrine of Grace.'



CHAP. XV. activity of the Spirit was in this way confined to the Scriptures, Warburton did not maintain a plenary inspiration of the canonical books. The writers, he said, were kept free from error in all matters of faith and morals, but in matters of history their statements do not agree.

Bishop  
Pearce.

Zachary Pearce was made Bishop of Bangor in 1748, and in 1756 was translated to Rochester. In his youth he had taken an active part against the Deists, but he is now chiefly known for his commentary on the New Testament. There is no trace in his works of any tendency to depart from the views of Christian doctrine which are generally regarded as orthodox, but he was a man of a liberal spirit and much esteemed by all parties. In the sermons published after his death there are some discourses on the evidences of Christianity. The views are those we have often met, but they are worth repeating, as they represent the general views of the liberal but orthodox Churchmen of Pearce's day. The difficulties of natural religion prove the necessity of revelation. Jesus came to fulfil, that is to supply, the deficiencies both of the Jewish religion and of the religion of nature. It is not enough that men simply know their duty. They must feel that it is enforced by some authority. They must be persuaded as well as 'convinced.' But nature really left men in ignorance of many things necessary to be known. The chief of these was the doctrine of reconciliation by a Mediator.

On revelation. It is true that the heathen offered beasts in sacrifice, but the connection between pardon and sacrifice is so remote that it is probable the heathen derived the idea of sacrifice from some original revelation. Natural religion taught men to do the will of God, but revelation taught them how to obtain forgiveness. The one is the elder brother, but the other, like Jacob, has obtained the greater blessing. The doctrines revealed are part of the evidence, for they are such as man wanted, and such as were highly probable that God would reveal. To the objections that revelation came late, and that it has not come to all nations, the answer is, that those who never heard of Christ may yet be partakers of the benefits of His death.

Dr. Jortin.

Dr. John Jortin was the friend of Bishop Pearce and Archbishop Herring. In connection with Jortin we have

notices of the two bishops of London who succeeded Sherlock, Thomas Hayter and Thomas Osbaldiston, otherwise but little known. They were both Jortin's friends, and were evidently of the same liberal school to which he belonged. Hayter was scarcely more than a year Bishop of London, and had not time to do for Jortin what he intended. His successor, Osbaldiston, fulfilled his intentions. Jortin was made a Prebendary of St. Paul's, Vicar of Kensington, and Archdeacon of London, besides being chaplain and general adviser to his bishop. His first essay in theology was 'Four Sermons on the Truth of the Christian Religion.' These were afterwards expanded into a volume of discourses on the same subject. The reasoning is not close, and the author frequently goes off into long dissertations. The first subject is 'The Prejudices of the Jews and Gentiles.' There were many reasons why those to whom the Gospel was first preached should have received it at once. Christ's miracles were numerous and beneficial in their objects. His character was irreproachable. It seems strange that the Jews should have put Him to death. The miracles of the Apostles were also marvellous. They had certainly great success among the Gentiles, yet not what we should have expected. Few of the rich, the great, the learned were at first converted. We think that if we had seen the miracles which either the Jews or the Gentiles saw, we should have embraced Christianity at once.

On the unbelief of the Jews.

The first reason for the unbelief of the Jews was their wickedness. Vice disposes men to reject the most evident truths. That the Jews were very wicked in Christ's time, is evident from many passages in the New Testament. We have also the testimony of Josephus, who says, that 'if the Romans had delayed to destroy these wicked wretches, the city would either have been swallowed up by the earth, or overwhelmed by the waters, or struck with fire from Heaven as another Sodom, for it produced a far more impious generation than those who suffered punishment.' The multitude of Jews did not receive Christ because the rulers did not believe in Him. They refused to use their own judgment, and trusted to that of the governors of the Church. Our spiritual guides, they said, do not believe that Jesus is the

Their great wickedness.

CHAP. XV. Messiah, and it is not right for us to have a judgment contrary to theirs. The Jews were prejudiced against Jesus because He was poor and despised. He spoke of a kingdom in men's hearts, but they expected their Messiah to be a great conqueror. Their law had taught them that prosperity was a mark of God's favour. Moses, Joshua, David, the Maccabees, had all been victorious leaders. Many of the prophecies, too, seemed to promise that the Messiah would be a great king as well as a great prophet. They might, however, have learned in their long history that to be fortunate and to be virtuous were not the same thing. They might have known that the Messiah who was to be a great king, was also to be a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief. Jesus did not strictly observe the ceremonial of the Jews. He did not, for instance, keep their Sabbath with sufficient strictness. But the prophets could always set aside the ceremonial law. Jesus also gave offence by calling Himself God. But the Angel who appeared at different times to the old patriarchs did the same. He was the Word of God, the messenger of the covenant. In rejecting Jesus for calling Himself God, the Jews condemned themselves. Another cause of their not believing in Jesus, was the character of His Gospel. It was purely a spiritual religion. That of the Jews, as they at this time understood it, was carnal.

On the unbelief of the Gentiles.

The prejudices of the Gentiles were many of them the same as those of the Jews. The corruption of manners was great and universal, and the precepts of the Gospel entirely opposed to their vicious inclinations. They need not, however, have slighted Christ and His Apostles because of their sufferings, for their greatest philosopher lived all his days in poverty, and was exposed to slander and calumny. The chief cause of the Gentiles not receiving the Gospel was probably their great indifference to religion in general.

On 'The Propagation of the Gospel.'

Another dissertation is on 'The Propagation of the Gospel.' This was the fulfilment of many ancient prophecies, and is on that account an evidence of the truth of Christianity. The circumstances of the heathen world were such that Christianity could never have made its way without the aid of miracles. St. Paul writing to the Corinthian converts, speaks of the signs and mighty deeds that he had wrought

among them. It is incredible that he should have appealed to miracles in long letters to people who must have known whether or not he had wrought miracles among them. It is no easy matter to establish a new religion in a country. That persons of such mean capacities as the Apostles should have done so, is very marvellous. And when we consider the religion which they established, and the influence it had in reforming the lives of those who embraced it, we must conclude that it was divine. There were, however, some things which must have recommended Christianity to the Pagans. Besides miracles and the fulfilment of prophecies, there was a conformity between the theological doctrines of revealed religion, and the opinions of some of the wiser Gentiles in different ages and places. Its precepts, too, had so great a conformity to those of the philosophers, that a system of morality very like that of the Gospel might with some care be collected from the writings of the Pagans. Another dissertation is on 'The Kingdom of Christ,' which Jortin, following Hoadly, makes to be purely a kingdom in the hearts and the consciences of men. There is also a discourse on the fitness of the time when Christ came into the world. A long train of prophecies had led men to expect the Messiah, and the state of the world was such that it required a teacher.

In 1750, Jortin was Boyle lecturer. He did not publish his lectures, but the substance of what related to miracles and prophecies was incorporated in 'Remarks on Ecclesiastical History.' These 'Remarks' extend from the time of Christ to the Reformation. They are very sagacious and full of good common sense, but they have given unpardonable offence to High Churchmen. Jortin describes ecclesiastical history as a sort of enchanted land, where it is not easy to distinguish truth from falsehood, and where Ariadne's clue is required to unravel the maze. Spurious authors and forged records are very plentiful, yet each gets a patron to plead the exploded cause of his ragged clients. Jortin proposes as his object to excite in men's hearts a love for Christianity, and to lead them to reject 'trifles which persons of greater zeal than discernment would obtrude upon the world as golden relics of primitive Christianity.' The fountain

His 'Remarks  
on Ecclesiastical  
History.'

CHAP. XV. of the Gospel is clear and unpolluted, but a river that takes 'a long and winding course receives a tincture from the various soils through which it passes.' In later Christianity we may trace the genius of the loquacious and ever-wrangling Greeks, of the enthusiastic Africans whose imagination was sublimed by the heat of the sun, of the superstitious Egyptians, whose fertile soil and warm climate produced monks and hermits swarming like animals sprung from the impregnated mud of the Nile, and of the ambitious and political Romans who were resolved to rule over the world in one shape or other. To this we may add 'the Jewish zeal for trifles arising from a contracted, illiberal mind, the learned subtlety of the Gentile philosophers, and the pomp and ceremony of Paganism.' \*

On the unity  
of Christians.

To prevent differences of opinion among Christians, Jortin calls as vain a hope as that of the Roman magistrate who was sent to Greece as pro-consul, and expected to unite the different philosophers into one sect. On his arrival he assembled the philosophers of all the schools, and offered his authority and assistance to reconcile them. Cicero, who records the story, says that the philosophers only laughed at him for his pains. The Christians in the first centuries used to have such frequent councils that they might have been called Quarter Sessions. Gregory Nazianzen tells us that he chose to avoid all such assemblies, for they never did any good, but only increased dissensions and quarrels. Jortin says that the Council of Jerusalem was the first and the last council in which 'the Spirit of God presided.' † The object of Christianity was not to make all men of the same opinion. No sect has ever succeeded in this, however strict may have been the imposition of creeds and subscriptions. If Tillotson and Jeremy Taylor, Erasmus and Chillingworth, Hales and Locke, Episcopius and Grotius had been contemporaries, and had met to settle the question, what makes a man a Christian, notwithstanding their differences in smaller matters, they would probably all have agreed with very little difficulty. Jortin adds nothing new to the argument from miracles and prophecy. He gives the pre-eminence to prophecy on the ground that evil spirits might work miracles. Josephus' 'History of the Jewish War,' he calls a com-

\* Preface, p. xiii.

† Vol. ii., p. 567.

mentary on Christ's prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem. CHAP. XV.

The second great event in the religious history of the eighteenth century was the rise of the Methodists. At the very time when all the Christian forces of England, Conformist and Nonconformist, were engaged in conflict with the Deists, a few young students formed themselves into a society at Oxford. Their simple object was to do good to themselves and others, to cultivate piety, and to further the progress of the kingdom of God in the hearts of men. They had at first no fixed theology, and were only distinguished from other students by a rigid asceticism, and a more regular attendance on the ordinances of the Church. The Method-  
ists.

The subsequent history of the Methodists became connected solely with the names of Wesley and Whitefield.\* John Wesley. John Wesley belonged entirely to the eighteenth century. He was born in 1703 and died in 1790. His ancestors were all Puritans. Both his grandfathers were among the ejected ministers of 1662; and his great grandfather, by his mother's side, was the famous John White, of Dorchester, who was a member of the Westminster Assembly, and who wrote the 'Century of Scandalous Ministers.' Wesley's father and mother, however, had both conformed to the Church in their youth. At Oxford he was a zealous Churchman. His favourite authors were Thomas à Kempis, Jeremy Taylor, and William Law. He believed the sacraments necessary to salvation. He regarded the external ordinances of the Church as a sort of good works that

\* The first Methodists were 'four young gentlemen of Oxford; Mr. John Wesley, Fellow of Lincoln College; Mr. Charles Wesley, Student of Christ Church; Mr. Morgan, Commoner of Christ Church; and Mr. Kirkman, of Merton College.' In November, 1729, they formed themselves into a society to spend two or three evenings in the week reading together, chiefly in the Greek Testament. They were afterwards joined by John Clayton, Benjamin Ingham, John Gambold, John Whitelamb, Westley Hall, James Hervey, George Whitefield, and one or two others. Morgan seems to have been the leader,

in practical work, though John Wesley was the administrator of the society. The future history of these young men was wonderfully varied. John Clayton continued a zealous high churchman; Gambold became a bishop among the Moravians; James Hervey may be regarded as the first of the 'Evangelical clergy;' and Hall, Wesley's brother-in-law, became a reprobate, and renounced all religion. Whitelamb was also Wesley's brother-in-law, and 'fell from grace.' Dr. Adam Clarke says he was a Deist. Ingham had a good reputation, but was unfortunate in his connections, and died, Mr. Tyerman says, under a cloud.



CHAP. XV. went before justification. Full of these doctrines, he undertook a mission to Georgia to convert the Indians. This mission was a failure. On his return he wrote in his journals that he had gone to America to convert others and was not himself converted. After his return from America, great crowds of people filled the churches wherever he preached. He was very earnest, but very far from being satisfied with himself. He had great doubts if he really had faith. A Moravian preacher told him that his philosophy must be purged away, that he must cease to rely on sacraments, and trust only to the merits of Christ. He could not deny that this was the doctrine of the Homilies of the Church of England. He found faith there described as 'a sure trust and confidence which a man hath in God, that through the merits of Christ his sins are forgiven, and he reconciled to the favour of God.' This faith Wesley knew he did not possess. The Moravian told him that it was a gift, and that it was given to men in a moment. In a state of great mental depression one afternoon, he went to St. Paul's. His troubled spirit found an expression of its anguish in the words of the anthem for that day's service, 'Out of the deep have I cried unto thee, O Lord.' On the evening of the same day he went to a religious meeting in Aldersgate Street, and while one was reading Luther's preface to the Epistle to the Romans, he found that 'sure confidence' of which he had read in the Church Homilies. He felt that his sins were forgiven, and that he was free from the law of sin and death. He now began to preach faith alone without the necessity of good works, either moral or ceremonial.

His conver-  
sion.

On justifica-  
tion.

Wesley's early sermons are full of the doctrine of justification by faith alone. Good works, he says, could not atone for the least sin, even 'if men could do good works, but all their doings are unholy and sinful, so that every one of them needs a fresh atonement.'\* Saving faith was explained as faith in Christ, so that it could not be possessed by a heathen who had never heard of Christ. It was not a mere assent like the faith of devils, but a 'disposition of the heart'† It was a reliance on Christ's atonement, and therefore it differed from the faith which the Apostles had

\* Works, vol. v., p. 7.

† *Ib.*, p. 9.



during the lifetime of Christ. Justification included deliverance from sin and the consequences of sin. It was, therefore, salvation in the present life. It could not be opposed to good works, for its necessary fruit was holiness. In another sermon, faith is described as a divine 'evidence or conviction' of the love of God through His Son. Faith justifies, but does not make a man actually just or righteous.\* This is the work of sanctification, which, though following necessarily from being justified, is yet something distinct from justification. Actual righteousness is something personal. God will deal with men according to what they really are in themselves. 'It can never,' Wesley says, 'consist with His unerring wisdom to think that I am innocent, to judge that I am righteous or holy, because another is so. He can no more in this manner confound me with Christ than with David or Abraham.' †

And sanctification.

By the imputation of faith for righteousness, Wesley understood simply the removal of sin. He distinguished between present justification and the final justification in the day of judgment. For the latter, an actual inherent righteousness is necessary. We shall then be justified by our works as 'doers of the law.' To the objection that an unjustified man may feed the hungry and clothe the naked, the answer is, that in the sight of God these are not good works. They cannot be good if not done by one who has been justified. 'Truly good works, acceptable to God in Christ, can only spring out of a true and lively faith.' If they are not done as God hath willed and commanded them to be done, they have 'the nature of sin.' Whatever good a man has when he first believes, faith does not *find* but *bring*. ‡ Good works can only be done by Christians. The sincerity of the heathen, Wesley says plainly, is not godly sincerity.§ It may be said that this doctrine is unreasonable, but we have no right to ask God for the reason of His doings. He 'giveth account of none of His ways, and therefore we must not ask why He has made faith the only condition of justification.' || Wesley expressly condemns the

On good works.

\* *Ib.*, p. 56.

† *Ib.*, p. 57.

‡ *Ib.*, p. 61.

§ *Ib.*, p. 139.

|| *Ib.*, p. 63.

CHAP. XV. doctrine of Tillotson that 'not faith alone, but good works are necessary to justification;' and also of Bishop Bull, who says that 'good works are the condition of justification according to the covenant of the gospel.\*

On the new birth.

This instantaneous justification was also called the new birth. It is the beginning of sanctification. The spiritual life which then begins to exist is as much a reality as the physical life. On this point Wesley seemed to come into direct collision with the doctrine of the Church, which dates the beginning of the new life from the moment of baptism. It is true that the new life in baptism had been explained in many different ways, and most of the explanations made it to mean nothing at all. It was a germ, a seed, an initiation into the visible Church, and the ratification of a covenant. Wesley did not wish to set aside any ecclesiastical language that had the sanction of the Church of England, but he chose to date the new birth from the actual perception of spiritual life. He admitted that infants might be regenerated in baptism. The service, he says, evidently supposes that this is the case.† He argued indeed that baptism was not regeneration, but his argument was against a position which nobody maintains. All agree that baptism is only the outward and visible sign. The doctrine he had to oppose, is, that the new birth takes place in the act of baptism, that it is the means by which the Spirit of God regenerates men. The persons on whom Wesley urged the necessity of the new birth, were supposed to answer that they had already undergone that birth in baptism. He swept away the difficulty by telling them it mattered nothing what they were in their infancy. If they were the children of the devil now, they must be born again before they could see the kingdom of God.

A conversation with Bishop Butler on justification by faith.

Wesley may have found his doctrine of faith in the formularies of the Church of England, but it was a doctrine unknown to the clergy in his day. In a conversation with Bishop Butler, he explained the ground of justification as being faith alone. The bishop answered, 'Our faith itself is a good work, it is a virtuous temper of mind.' 'My lord,' Wesley answered, 'whatever our faith is, our Church

\* Works, vol. vii., p. 455.

† *Ib.*, vol. vi., p. 74.

asserts that we are justified by faith only. But how it can be called a good work, I see not. It is the gift of God, and a gift that pre-supposes nothing in us but sin and misery.' Butler saw at once that this position could only be defended on the principles of Calvin. If faith is a gift followed by justification, they have it to whom it is given, and they have it not to whom it is not given. Here the proceeding is arbitrary. God justifies some when all were in the same condition. Butler supposed that there must be moral goodness in those who were justified which distinguished them from others. Wesley's distinction was that some believed and others did not. But the very thing to be obtained was faith. 'Sir,' said the bishop, 'what do you mean by faith?' 'My lord,' Wesley answered, 'by justifying faith I mean a conviction wrought in a man by the Holy Ghost, that Christ hath loved him and given Himself for him, and that through Christ his sins are forgiven.' This in substance was a quotation from the Homilies. The bishop said he believed some good men might have that kind of faith, but not all Christians. 'Mr. Wesley,' said Butler, making short work of the matter, 'I will deal plainly with you; I once thought you and Mr. Whitefield well-meaning men, but I cannot think so now; for I have heard more of you—matters of fact, sir. And Mr. Whitefield says in his Journal, "There are promises still to be fulfilled in me." Sir, the pretending to extraordinary revelation and gifts of the Holy Ghost is a horrid thing, a very horrid thing.' And so it was in Butler's day, a very horrid thing.

In their views of faith and regeneration, Wesley and Whitefield entirely agreed. They were the chief subjects of their sermons during the first years of their triumph. Yet Wesley's theology differed from Whitefield's, even more than from Bishop Butler's. Whitefield was a Calvinist, Wesley an Arminian. So great was Wesley's hatred to the theology of Calvin, that, to avoid it, he took up positions verging on Rationalism. In his famous sermon on 'Free Grace,' preached in Bristol as early as 1740, he argued against predestination from the moral character of God, even denying the right of the Divine Being to make any decree of reprobation so long as He claimed to be either

Wesley's  
sermon on  
Free Grace.

CHAP. XV. good, just, or merciful. No such doctrine, he said, could be found in Scripture, and if it were, that would be a sure proof that we had mistaken the meaning of Scripture. This was written at the time when Wesley believed that to be saved from 'everlasting burnings,' a man must have that kind of faith which he learned from the Moravians. In the same sermon he says that he would rather be a Turk, a Deist, or an Atheist, than a believer in Calvinism. To deny the existence of God is better than to make Him an 'Almighty Tyrant.' Wesley wrote against Dr. Conyers Middleton and Dr. John Taylor of Norwich, but the man who preached the sermon on 'Free Grace' ought to have had more sympathy with both these authors.

On reason and  
conscience.

Wesley always wished to be guided by reason. The Moravians continually told him that his philosophy must be purged away. He sometimes surrendered his reason, but only for a time. It always regained its place. In a sermon on conscience he defines this faculty as a supernatural light within us—a gift beyond nature. He even calls it the Son of God in man, the Light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world. It is in the whole race of Adam, according to the words in the Psalm, 'He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good.' Conscience is the Spirit of Christ, which gives to all men 'prevenient grace.' Wesley, perhaps, spoiled this doctrine again by making conscience subject to the 'written word,' yet he admits that where the Scriptures are not known the essentials of religion are taught by the inward voice.\* Similar passages are more frequent in his later writings. Of Marcus Antoninus, he does not doubt but he will be one of those 'who shall come from the East, and the West, and sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob,' while the children of the kingdom, that is, nominal Christians, will be cast out. He extended this charity even to Roman Catholics and Socinians, whose express doctrines forbid them trusting to faith alone. He believed that Thomas Firmin was a really pious man, though he denied the Trinity. He had a word of hope and charity even for Pelagius, and he quoted with approbation the words of an author, who said, 'What the Heathens call

His Latitudi-  
narianism.

\* Works, vol. vii. p. 197.

reason, Solomon wisdom, St. Paul grace, St. John love, Luther faith, Fenelon virtue, is all one and the same thing, the light of Christ shining in different degrees under different dispensations.' CHAP. XV.

Wesley confesses to some changes in his views, but he changed more than he was willing to admit—probably more than he knew of. To the passage in his Journals where he says he was not converted when he went to Georgia, he afterwards added, 'I am not sure of this.' He made a distinction between being a servant of God and a son. Before the meeting in Aldersgate Street he was a servant, but the assurance of faith accompanied the sonship. He also advanced frequently a favourite doctrine concerning degrees of rewards and punishments in the future world, which went a long way to remove the sharp opposition usually made between 'lost' and 'saved.' He clearly adopted the views of Hoadly and Sykes concerning the innocency of error. Dr. John Erskine was able to raise against him the indignation of all Scotland, by quoting the remarkable words, 'Orthodoxy or right opinion is but a very slender part of religion, if any part at all.'

His earlier views modified.

Whitefield's theology does not require to be described. His great heresy was his zeal. The common texts on which the clergy preached in his day, were, 'Let your moderation be known unto all men,' and 'Be not righteous over-much.' Whitefield told the people that moderation would not save them. They must be born again. He understood the new birth in the same sense as Wesley explained it, an actual regeneration or perceptible beginning of a new life. High Churchmen told him that the outcasts to whom he preached had already been regenerated in baptism, and rational Churchmen told him that he was abusing a figure of speech. This doctrine of the new birth they both called enthusiasm. Whitefield answered that an enthusiast was 'a person in God,' and that was what every Christian ought to be. St. Peter described the believers in his day as 'partakers of the divine nature.' Whitefield told Bishop Gibson, that, at his ordination, he had professed to be 'moved by the Holy Ghost,' and that in the Church services all Christians were taught to pray for 'the inspiration' of the George Whitefield.

On the new birth.

CHAP. XV. Holy Spirit. He was willing to admit that his zeal had not always been tempered with judgment, and that sometimes he had followed his own spirit when he thought he was 'speaking entirely by the help of the Spirit of God.' It is generally believed that Whitefield was more a Dissenter than Wesley, but there is no real foundation for this belief. He is reported to have said that he would not again be ordained by a bishop for a thousand worlds. This rests solely on the testimony of a Scotch seceder, and is unsupported by anything in Whitefield's life or writings.

The Calvinistic controversy.

The only great doctrinal controversy among the Methodists was that which concerned Calvinism. On this subject Wesley and Whitefield separated, and formed distinct societies. Their friendly relations continued, but the Calvinists always feared that Wesley's tendency was to rationalism, and to Wesley Antinomianism was a continual terror. There had been a real revival of religion, which the Calvinists ascribed to the revival of their doctrines, and which Wesley said had taken place in spite of their doctrines. The controversy which followed was a very bitter one. The spirit in which it was conducted has been universally reprobated, but both parties believed that they were fighting for great truths and against great errors.

Hervey's 'Theron and Aspasia.'

We may date the beginning of this controversy from the publication of Hervey's 'Theron and Aspasia' in 1755. James Hervey had been one of the first Oxford Methodists, and, like Whitefield, his religious life had its deepest roots in the theology of Calvin. The most precious to him of all religious ideas was the imputation of Christ's righteousness. This gave him the blessed certainty that, whatever might be his own failures, he was complete in One who was All perfect. To Wesley this transfer of righteousness was a legal fiction, and of a very dangerous tendency. It might lead men to be indifferent as to personal righteousness on the plea that they were righteous in another. Hervey ascribed his conversion to the influence of Wesley at Oxford, and never renounced his friendship, notwithstanding their difference on some questions of doctrine. The manuscript of 'Theron and Aspasia' was submitted to Wesley for 'corrections and amendment.' He wrote a long letter to



Hervey, controverting his arguments, and setting forth his own views. We are forgiven, he said, for the merits of Christ's death, but the righteousness by which we shall be finally justified is not a righteousness put on us, but a righteousness wrought in us. Hervey took no notice of the corrections, but published his book as it had been written. Wesley also published his letter as part of a treatise called 'A Preservative against Unsettled Notions in Religion.' The only answer he could get to his letter, was, that Hervey was preparing something against him. In the meantime, Hervey died. Soon after his death, William Cudworth, a violent Calvinist, published 'Eleven Letters to Wesley.' The manuscript, he said, had been given him by Hervey, with permission 'to put out or in' what he liked. The subject of the 'Letters' was Christ's righteousness. Hervey reasserted his positions that Christ bore the actual punishment which would have fallen on the sinner, and that by His obedience we, that is, the elect, are literally made righteous.\*

In 1768 six students were expelled from the University of Oxford. The charges against them were frequenting religious meetings, and holding Evangelical or Calvinistical sentiments. Sir Richard Hill defended them in a book called 'Pietas Oxoniensis,' in which he showed that the doctrines of Calvin were really these of the Church of England. Wesley renewed the subject of Calvinism at the Conference of 1770. The minutes of that Conference contain a doctrine concerning faith and works, which, at the beginning of his career, would have saved him half the opposition he met from the bishops and the clergy. In these minutes, Wesley says, 'We have leaned too much to Calvinism. Wherein? Firstly, with regard to *man's faithfulness*. Our Lord Himself taught us to use the expression, and we ought never to be ashamed of it. We ought steadily to assert, on His authority, that, if a man is not faithful in the unrighteous mammon, God will not give him

Sir Richard Hill's 'Pietas Oxoniensis.'

Calvinism and the Conference of 1770.

\* Hervey's brother published a correct edition of the 'Letters to Wesley.' He said that his brother, on his death-bed, had begged that they should not be published, as they

had not been revised. Dr. John Erskine re-published them in Edinburgh with a preface, which is described as 'violent.'



CHAP. XV. the true riches. Secondly, with regard to *working for life*. This also our Lord has expressly commanded us—Labour, *εργάζεσθε*, literally work, for the meat that endureth to everlasting life. And, in fact, every believer, till he comes to glory, works *for* as well as *from* life. Thirdly, we have received it as a maxim, that a man is to do nothing in order to justification. Nothing can be more false. Whoever desires to find favour with God should cease from evil and learn to do well. Whoever repents should do works meet for repentance. And if this is not *in order* to find favour, what does he do them for? Review the whole affair. Firstly, who of us is *now* accepted of God? He that now believes in Christ with a loving and obedient heart. Secondly, but who among those who never heard of Christ? He that feareth God and worketh righteousness, according to the light he has. Thirdly, is this the same with he that is sincere? Nearly, if not quite. Fourthly, is not this salvation by works? Not by the *merit* of works, but by works as a *condition*. Fifthly, what have we been disputing about for these thirty years? I am afraid about words. Sixthly, as to *merit* itself, of which we have been so dreadfully afraid, we are rewarded according to our works. Yea, because of our works. How does this differ from *for the sake of our works*? And how does this differ from *secundum merita operum*, or as our works *deserve*? Can you split this hair? I doubt I cannot.'

Opposition  
from the Cal-  
vinists.

With the doctrine of these minutes, Bishop Butler would have been delighted. But they brought on Wesley's head as terrible a storm from the Calvinists as thirty years before his doctrine of justification by faith alone had raised among the orthodox clergy. The Countess of Huntingdon caused a circular letter to be sent to all the Calvinist ministers, both in the Church and among the Dissenters, calling upon them to go in a body to the next Conference, and demand a retractation of the doctrine of these minutes. A few of those to whom circulars were sent went to the Conference, and a declaration was put forth which satisfied the Calvinists, that they had misunderstood the minutes. It was admitted that they were not sufficiently guarded. The doctrine of justification by works was now declared 'perilous and abominable,' and

the merits of Christ set forth as our only trust for justification or salvation, either 'in life, death, or the day of judgment.' The matter might have ended here, but Wesley did not intend to retract what he had said in the minutes. He held that the doctrine of the minutes was perfectly consistent with the declaration that had just been made concerning justification by faith.

Wesley interfered but little with the controversy that followed. His side was defended by John Fletcher, Vicar of Madeley. Fletcher was a native of Switzerland, and had been employed as tutor to Rowland and Sir Richard Hill. He had taken orders in the Church, and was a regularly beneficed clergyman, but he also shared the itinerant work among the Methodists. He published a series of tracts which he called 'Checks to Antinomianism.' The minutes said that salvation is by works *as a condition*. The declaration made at the next Conference said that salvation is only through the merits of Christ. The Calvinists objected that these two statements could not be reconciled. Men, they said, are dead in trespasses and sins. As life must be given them before they can do any good works, it is a contradiction to speak of works as a condition of justification. Fletcher admitted the death in sin. Perhaps they both erred in abusing a figure. But while Fletcher admitted that men were dead by nature, he said that all had a new life in Christ. In virtue of this life they were able to do good works as a condition of justification. Lazarus was dead when Jesus called him to come forth. But with the command there was a gift of life. We are dead by nature, but we have a gift of 'preventing grace,' and by using this we work for eternal life. Christ's own words are, 'Work for the meat that endureth unto everlasting life.' In the last day justification is by works. Nobody in his senses, Fletcher says, will deny this. And for our present justification, which is that about which the minutes are concerned, something must be done as a condition. Repentance is in itself a work. Faith itself is not obtained without an exertion. It comes by hearing, and implies examination, inquiry, and consideration. Before God gives us faith we must obey His invitation—'Come, now, and let us reason together.' It is

Wesley  
defended by  
Fletcher, of  
Madeley.

CHAP. XV. admitted that the Church of Rome also makes good works a condition of justification. But the works prescribed by the Church of Rome are foolish works, not the deeds of the moral law, but mere ceremonies.

The minutes of Conference reconciled with the 'Articles of Religion.'

The darkest heresy of the minutes was the doctrine that those who never heard of Christ might be saved. It was this which aggravated the statement about being rewarded for the merit of our works. This made it clear that works might be good and acceptable, though done without reference to faith in Christ. There can be no doubt that this doctrine, whether right or wrong, is clearly condemned by the Articles of the Church of England. Article XIII. says expressly that works which 'spring not of faith in Christ' are 'not pleasant to God.' Article XVIII., which in ordinary fairness must be interpreted to agree with Article XIII., plainly confirms the same doctrine. Fletcher could quote the words of St. Peter, that those who fear God in every nation, and work righteousness, are accepted of Him. But whatever may be the doctrine of St. Peter, the Articles say that a man must believe in Christ before he can work righteousness. The words, 'according to the light he hath,' made the case of the minutes worse. An imperfect measure of righteousness became the conditional ground of acceptance. Fletcher, however, undertakes to make the minutes agree with the Articles. A good Heathen, he says, may be saved through the merits of Christ, though he has never heard of Christ. It is a beam from our sun of righteousness that has enlightened his darkness. He is not, therefore, saved by 'the sect or law which he professeth,' but by Christ. He does not frame his life according to the light of nature, for there is no such light. But all men have a gift of light supernatural. Christ shines in their hearts. The good works of a Heathen are not, therefore, done before justification. The grace and inspiration of the Spirit are in a sense justification, and these are given to all men. The Gospel is preached *in* every creature. There is no doubt that this is very rational theology, and if it could have been found in the 'Articles of Religion' would have been a sufficient answer to the most pressing arguments for the abolition of subscription.

The faith which justifies is identified, in the case of the heathen, with sincerity. A man who is sincere and walks by the light of his dispensation has true faith. Matthew Henry is quoted, saying that God will never reject an honest Gentile who is just and charitable. Men are accepted for their sincerity or good works, but the meritorious cause of acceptance is Christ's death. Wesley said in the minutes that, for the last thirty years, they had been disputing about words. Fletcher said this was true. They had been setting faith against works, when, in reality, they believed faith to be impossible without works.

CHAP. XV.  
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Faith and sincerity made identical.

The controversy which began with Sir Richard Hill's defence of the expelled students, went on at the same time as the controversy that followed the minutes of 1770. Sir Richard Hill was answered by Dr. Thomas Nowel, an Oxford Professor, who reproduced the Arminian arguments that the Church of England does not agree with Calvin. This brought into the field the great champion of the Calvinism of the Church of England, Augustus Toplady, Vicar of Broad Hembury.\* He wrote a 'Letter' to Dr. Nowel, which was answered by Walter Sellon, a clergyman who acted as one of Wesley's helpers. Sellon vindicated the Church of England from the charge of Calvinism. He even denied that there is any such doctrine in the Articles of Religion, as a personal or unconditional predestination. This doctrine, he says, began with Augustine, but was never the doctrine of the Catholic Church. The prevalence of Calvinism at Cambridge in the time of Queen Elizabeth, he attributed to the influence of Whitaker, but it was not the doctrine of the Church. Sellon rested mainly on the suppression of the Lambeth Articles by the Queen and their rejection by the bishops at the Hampton Court Conference. Toplady followed with his famous work called the 'Historical Proof of the Doctrinal Calvinism of the Church of England.' This work exhausted the subject. It was never answered, and it

Controversy concerning the Calvinism of the Church of England.

Toplady's 'Historical Proof.'

\* Toplady had been educated at Dublin, and while a student had been converted by one of Wesley's preachers, an illiterate man called James Morris. Toplady, however, would never admit that this man was one of

Wesley's preachers, but repudiated the whole story as a fabrication. The truth appears to be that Morris had retired from Wesley's connection in 1756, and Toplady's conversion was not till 1758.

CHAP. XV. never can be answered. It demonstrates by a chain of evidence, of which every link is sound, that Calvin's doctrine, in a clear and definite form, is the doctrine of the Articles and the Homilies, and that for many years after the Reformation everything opposed to it was immediately condemned by the authorities of the Church. The first Separatists from the Church of England were the Free-Willers who were prosecuted for denying predestination. Toplady maintains that Peter Martyr, Bucer, and Calvin had a share in compiling or revising our formularies. Ponet's Catechism which had Crammer's sanction, the notes appended to the two authorised translations of the Bible, and the general tone of the writings of all our divines, show the undisputed reign of Calvinism from the Reformation to the end of the reign of James I. Waterland had called Arian subscription, as advocated by Dr. Clarke, a dishonest subscription, but Toplady proved that it was not more dishonest than that of any Anti-Calvinist.

He translates  
Zanchy on  
Predestina-  
tion.

In 1769, Toplady had published a translation of Zanchy's treatise on Predestination. In this work the doctrines of Calvin are put forth in their unadorned simplicity. A certain number, Zanchy said, were to be saved. To them the necessary grace was given. But the rest of mankind were decreed to never-ending suffering. There was nothing in the world more likely to put Wesley out of temper than this doctrine of predestination. He took Zanchy's treatise, made a brief analysis of the argument, and published it as a little tract. To this tract he prefixed an advertisement of which the conclusion was, 'The sum of all is this, one in twenty (suppose) of mankind are elected, nineteen in twenty are reprobated. The elect shall be saved do what they will, the reprobate will be damned, do what they can. Reader, believe this or be damned. Witness my hand, A—— T——.'

His 'Letter  
to Wesley.'

Predestination was Toplady's idol. He immediately resented this irreverent treatment of his deity. He wrote a 'Letter to Wesley' charging him with misquotation and misrepresentation, and bidding him be thankful that he had escaped 'Virginia or Maryland for the audacious forgery.' Wesley wrote another tract called 'The Consequence

Proved,' and excused himself for want of time from going further into the controversy. CHAP. XV.

Toplady was now handed over to Thomas Olivers, an intelligent shoemaker, whom Wesley employed as a preacher. This treatment he regarded as an indignity, and answered Olivers mostly with ludicrous satire.\* His business, he said, was with the master, not with the man. His indignation was poured out in a violent treatise called 'More Work for John Wesley.'† The conclusion of this piece may illustrate the judgment which every consistent Calvinist must pronounce on the Wesleyan heresy. 'Time, sir, I am informed, has already whitened your locks, and the hour must shortly come which will transmit you to the tribunal of God, on whose sovereignty a great part of your life has been one continued assault. At that bar I, too, must shortly hold up my hand. Omniscience only can tell which of us shall first appear before the Judge of all. I shortly may. You shortly must. The part you have been permitted to act in the religious world, will sooner or later sit heavy on your mind. Mixed in the warm converse of life, we think with men; on a death-bed we think with God. Depend upon it a period will arrive, when the Father's electing mercy, and the Messiah's adorable righteousness, will appear in your eyes, even in yours, to be the only anchorage for a dying sinner. I mean, unless you are actually given over to final obduration, which I trust you are not, and to which I most ardently beseech God you never may. You have

Toplady and  
Thomas  
Olivers.

\* In the following verses, Toplady makes Wesley give an account of his helper:—

'I've Thomas Olivers, the cobbler,  
No stall in England holds a nobler,  
A wight of talents universal,  
Whereof I'll give a brief rehearsal.  
He wields, beyond most other men,  
His awl, his razor, and his pen;  
My beard he shaves, repairs my  
shoe,  
And writes my panegyric too;  
He, with one brandish of his quill,  
Can knock down Toplady and Hill;  
With equal ease, whene'er there's  
need,  
Can darn my stockings and my  
creed;

Can drive a nail, or ply the needle,  
Hem handkerchief, and scrape the  
fiddle;

Chop logic as an ass chews thistle,  
More skilfully than you can whistle;  
And then, when he philosophizes,  
No son of Crispin half so wise is.'

William Berridge, the eccentric vicar of Everton, came to Toplady's help in the poetry department. He wrote the amusing verses called 'The Serpent and the Fox, or an Interview between Old Nick and Old John.' This poem is quoted in full in Southey's 'Life of Wesley.'

† Did he borrow the title from Martin Marprelate's 'Hay any Work for Cooper?'



CHAP. XV. told us, *totidem verbis* that "Men's believing is the cause of their justification," that "Our obeying Christ is the cause of His giving us eternal life," and that "Our obedience to Christ is the cause of His becoming the Author of eternal salvation to us." You have affirmed, speaking of God, that it can never "consist with His unerring wisdom, to think that I am innocent, to judge that I am righteous, because another is so. He can no more, in this manner, confound me with Christ, than with David or Abraham." Such doctrine may pass well enough while life and health last, but it will leave us comfortless, hopeless, ruined, in that hour when heart and flesh fail. Woe be to you, to me, and to all the race of Adam, if the righteousness of Christ will not then stand us in any more stead than the righteousness of David or Abraham. Was that really to be the case, how could Mr. Wesley, in particular, hope for justification at the hands of that God, whom he has impiously compared to Tiberius and the grand Turk?

Agitation for the abolition of subscription to the Articles.

While the Methodists and the 'serious clergy,' as they were called, were fighting over the doctrines of Calvin, another party was busy advocating the entire abolition of subscription to the Articles and Liturgy. This subject had been discussed with some earnestness since the middle of the century. It was connected with the progress of Arian and Unitarian opinions among the clergy, but many of its promoters had no other object than the abolition of subscriptions which had ceased to serve the object for which they were intended. In 1749, John Jones, Vicar of Alconbury, in Huntingdonshire, published anonymously 'Free and Candid Disquisitions relating to the Church of England.' The changes proposed in this work were of a very moderate character, and in a great measure the same as in the scheme of comprehension in the reign of King William. Dr. Doddridge sent a copy of the 'Disquisitions' to Warburton, who answered, 'I wish success to them as much as you do.'

John Jones's 'Free Disquisitions.'

Our Reformers, Jones said, had done their best for their day. But their age was comparatively dark. Since their time many things have been brought to light. They so modelled the services of the Church that they left room for revision in after times. Some of the changes proposed were a



new translation of the Scriptures, shortening the morning service, a new lectionary, a less frequent use of the Lord's Prayer and the Gloria Patri, with the omission of some objectionable Psalms. The Athanasian Creed was to be retained, but not read in the public service. Some harsh expressions, especially in the communion office, were to be removed. The sign of the cross was not to be used in the office of baptism, and the custom of private baptism was to be discontinued. Bibles and Prayer Books were to be correctly printed, the Articles put into Scripture language, and subscription not to be imposed on youths at school. The proposed revision of 1689 was approved of generally, and it was recommended that many things be left to the discretion of the minister.

The 'Free Disquisitions' were answered by many writers of the High Church party, who have always strenuously opposed everything in the shape of revision. The most extravagant of these writers was Thomas Boswell, of Taunton, who represented the proposed changes as having a tendency 'to unsettle the minds and debauch the principles of the people.' The Liturgy was so beautiful, so perfect, so primitive, and so thoroughly purged from all superstition, that improvement was impossible. No heretics, Papists, or enthusiasts, Boswell said, ever made such complaints concerning the defects of our Liturgy as are now made by men who profess to be of our own communion. If the proposed changes were made, the Church could no longer be said to be established. They would deface the beauty of our service, and break down our defences, and the only object is 'to compliment schismatics.'

Answered by  
Thomas Boswell.

In answer to Boswell's treatise, Francis Blackburne wrote an 'Apology for the Authors of the Free and Candid Disquisitions.' This was Blackburne's first appearance in defence of revision—a subject which has become permanently associated with his name, and for which he had to endure more than the usual share of slander and misrepresentation.\* He wished some reformation in the Church,

Defended by  
Archdeacon  
Blackburne.

\* The account which Dr. Hook gives, in his 'Ecclesiastical Biography' of Archdeacon Blackburne, is a scandalous libel. Mr. Perry is no better than Dr. Hook. In his 'His-

tory of the Church of England,' he quotes Blackburne's words so as to give them a sense quite different from what they have when read with the context.

CHAP. XV. and his memory has been abused because he did not think that resigning his preferments was the proper way to effect the reformation he desired. It was not with him, as his enemies insinuated, a matter of gain. On the death of Dr. Chandler, the Presbyterian congregation in the Old Jewry offered him £600 a year if he would accept the office of their pastor. He declined the offer, though his income in the Church of England never at any time exceeded £150. Soon after the publication of the 'Apology,' the Archbishop of York made Blackburne Archdeacon of Cleveland. He was rallied by his friends that this would be a quiet settlement to his efforts for revision and reform. But it was only the beginning of Blackburne's labour for the accomplishment of the one great object of his life.

Blackburne's  
sermon  
against  
Church fes-  
tivals.

The 'Apology' was soon followed by the publication of a sermon, in which the archdeacon advocated the abolition of all Church festivals. The occasion of this sermon was the change of the style, when, by the omission of eleven days, Christmas fell on the 5th of January. Blackburne's parishioners, like many other people at that time, wished to keep the old style. They could not understand how Christ's birthday could be changed. The archdeacon invited them to church on the 5th of January, told them he could not by law read the Christmas service on that day, and that Christ's birthday was altogether a very uncertain matter. It was never mentioned in the Gospels. St. Luke speaks as if he did not know on what day Christ was born, and certainly there was no command for keeping this or any other day, except the weekly Sabbath, as a holy day. The great objection, however, was not against any day being spent in divine service, but against the superstition, drunkenness, and debauchery that had become connected with these Church festivals. 'Such revels and disorders,' said the preacher, 'as are practised at Easter, Whitsuntide, and, above all, at Christmas, are most expressly contrary to the purity of the Christian religion.' The 'liberties' in which the people indulged as soon as the service was over were not better than the practices of 'abominable idolaters.' He anticipated the objection that, by continuing in a Church which sanctioned these festivals, he was giving encouragement to

what he was now condemning. He did not, he said, entirely acquit himself of blame, yet he was doing what he judged to be best. 'There are,' he added, 'many things in the doctrine, discipline, and worship of the Church of England, which are very exceptionable, not to say grievous, to me,' and 'to many serious, considerate, and conscientious ministers who do not choose to speak their minds freely about them.' There had been a hope of some relief by a seasonable revision, but the prospect of this was every day becoming less. To the objection, 'Why then do you continue in your office?' Blackburne answered, first, by what he called 'the least and lowest of all considerations,' he had a wife and children. He could not dig, and to beg he was ashamed. There was next his age and infirmities, which unfitted him for entering on another sphere where he could be likely to do more good than among his present parishioners. But he had higher reasons than even these. He had a great affection for the Church of England, notwithstanding the faults of the Liturgy and Articles. He believed that the principle of the English Reformation was 'a noble foundation for the union of all reasonable and sincere Christians.' He believed a time would come when Protestants would see that some things retained in the Church of England made the transition to the Church of Rome so easy, that they would demand the extirpation of everything that had any affinity to Roman superstition. Considerations like these induced him to remain in the Church, though in circumstances which he called 'uneasy.'

The subject of the abolition of subscription to the Articles and Liturgy received another impulse, in 1751, from the publication of Bishop Clayton's 'Essay on Spirit.' Clayton was Bishop of Clogher, and dedicated his book to the Primate of Ireland, recommending such changes in the law of subscription as would leave Arianism an open question.

The argument of the 'Essay on Spirit' was founded on a modified form of Spinoza's doctrine of one substance. That one Being, Substance, or Subsistence, was God. Our highest conception of God is that of absolute existence. But we also exist, so that there are other existences besides God. The Self-Existent must be the First Cause, and there can be only

CHAP. XV. one First Cause. All other existences must be caused. We do not know the essence of either matter or spirit, but we know that these two existences have very different properties. One, for instance, has no motion in itself, and cannot be put in motion without the other. Whenever we see anything moved, we fairly conclude that the first author of that motion is spirit. The bishop also maintained that matter must be endowed with spirit to enable it to resist motion, and so he concludes that everything is animated by spirit. Stones, vegetables, animals, and men are but different manifestations of spirit in matter. God, probably, is the only unembodied Spirit in the universe. But He may have created exalted spirits, to whom He has communicated Divine perfections. The chain of being, which includes the least organized matter, may touch the very throne of the Eternal.

Makes the  
Logos,  
Michael.

This doctrine of spirit is found to have been received by all the ancients, Jews or Pagans, and it is made to explain the words of the New Testament, where the Word and the Spirit of God are called God. Eusebius says that the Jews made the Wisdom or Word of God, the chief of all beings, and next to God Himself. Philo Judæus called the Logos the second God, saying that it was in his image that man was created. He also calls the Logos the first-born, the most ancient of angels, and the Archangel subsisting with many names. Daniel speaks of the same archangel as Michael, the Great Prince that standeth for the Children of Israel. Moses also distinguishes between the Most High and the Lord, whose portion is His people Jacob. He was the Wisdom of God whom Jehovah possessed or created in the beginning of His ways. In Scripture He is frequently called by the name of God. All the theophanies in the Old Testament are explained as appearances of the Logos, for God Himself was invisible, and could not be seen by mortal eyes. That exalted Being, speaking in the name of God, called himself Jehovah, the God of Abraham and the God of Bethel. The third essence or the Spirit bestows on man what he receives from the Logos. Bishop Clayton thinks that the Spirit was the angel Gabriel, who was sent to Daniel to give him wisdom and understanding. The same

And the Holy  
Spirit, Ga-  
briel.

angel also appeared to Mary, announcing the advent of the Messiah. CHAP. XV.

In the dedication, Bishop Clayton said that he had now ceased to hold the opinions which he held when he subscribed to the Articles, and gave his assent and consent to all and everything in the Book of Common Prayer. He did not agree with the persons who drew up the Articles, or with the compilers of the Prayer-Book, and he specially objected to the Athanasian Creed. Dr. Conybeare, in a recent sermon before the University of Oxford, had maintained that persons subscribing the Articles, give their assent to everything contained in them in the sense of those who wrote them. They were not, he said, Articles of peace, but, as the very title declares, 'For the avoiding diversities of opinion, and for establishing consent touching true religion.' Referring to Dr. Conybeare's words, Bishop Clayton said, that any attempt to avoid diversities of opinion was useless and impracticable. No two thinking men, not even the very compilers of the Articles, ever agreed exactly in their opinions, not only with regard to all the Articles, but even with regard to any one of them. He says emphatically, 'thinking men,' for the 'unthinking herd,' remain orthodox 'from their infancy to their lives' end.

On subscrip-  
tion.

Bishop Clayton says that there must be some form of religion in every State, but the points of doctrine ought to be as plain, few, and fundamental as possible. The form ought to be such as a man might subscribe for prudential reasons, even though he does not agree to every point. Subscription first began at the Council of Nice. The majority decided in favour of the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. The Emperor required all the bishops to subscribe to the doctrine, but allowed them to put their own sense on the word consubstantial. Eusebius, Bishop of Cæsarea, was allowed to subscribe in the sense that 'the Son was not of the same substance with the creatures that were made by Him.' Arius also subscribed, taking the doctrine in his own sense. The Emperor wanted peace, and by this means his object was secured. But after the Church of Rome came into power, subscription meant implicit faith

Articles of Re-  
ligion should  
be articles of  
peace.

CHAP. XV. in what was imposed. This was consistent with the claims of an infallible Church. But subscription with us can only be of the kind necessary for peace and quietness. The Act of Parliament which requires 'assent and consent' to the Book of Common Prayer, expressly declares that this only means that the person subscribing is to use the book. It is difficult to account for the omission of this explanation from the form of words ordered to be read as the legal qualification. Bishop Clayton thinks it was done with design to exclude the Nonconformists of 1662, who might have availed themselves of the freedom of interpretation allowed by Act of Parliament. The imposition itself was a new one. It did not exist in Elizabeth's Act of Uniformity. The present subscriptions are too burdensome, and ought to be removed to meet the necessities of the times. We need not be afraid to make changes. The Christian religion is safe. Against it the gates of hell shall never prevail.

The 'Essay on Spirit' answered by Jones of Nayland.

The 'Essay on Spirit' revived for a time the Arian controversy, but this phase gave way to the question of Subscription, which was then the great subject of discussion. Clayton also wrote 'A Sequel to the Essay on Spirit,' which was dedicated to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and consisted of arguments from Scripture against the doctrines of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds.\* Many tracts were written against the 'Essay,' which Clayton noticed in a 'Defence of the Essay on Spirit.' The most important answer, however, was published after the 'Defence,' and was written by William Jones, afterwards of Nayland. Jones was then a young man, and was assisted by his friend, George Horne, afterwards Bishop of Norwich. The arguments were the easy ones which come direct home to the consciences of heretics. If, he said, Bishop Clayton has ceased to believe the creeds which the Church imposes, he ought at once to resign his preferments and retire into a private station. This argument rested on a suppressed premise, which Bishop Clayton did not admit, but which was everything to William Jones. That premise was, that

\* It is said that the 'Essay' was disowned it, but engaged in the written by a clergyman in Clayton's controversy as if he had been the diocese; the bishop, however, never author.



the Church was in some way infallible. The doctrine of the Trinity he supposed to have had always one form, and that form to have been always set forth by the Church with authority. He identifies 'true religion' with his own opinions about religion. He quoted St. Paul's words against divisions, and he denied that thinking men did not agree in their opinions. Deistical philosophers may have endless speculations, but Christians who take 'the Bible and primitive antiquity' for their guides, will agree in all the doctrines of Christianity. The 'unthinking herd,' of whom Bishop Clayton spoke so scornfully, are the body of the faithful. They derive their orthodox articles of faith from the successors of the Apostles. This 'unthinking herd' includes the great body of the clergy of the nation, who are men of education, while the sectaries, on the contrary, have sprung from such ignorant mechanics as George Fox the Quaker. Of the bishop's account of the subscription at Nice, Jones says that it does not contain one word of truth. Arius subscribed, 'but with his own doctrine, written on a piece of paper concealed in his bosom, taking an oath that he believed as he had written.' But God took vengeance on him, and the next day he met the awful fate of the apostate Judas. The Nonconformists of 1662 did not resign their livings merely because of objections to the Prayer-Book. They were required also 'to renounce the Solemn League and Covenant.' Bishop Clayton called them conscientious men, and Jones answered that they were a set of rebels sworn to a 'bloody engagement.'\* To open the Church for men of different sentiments was to make that a broad way which Christ had made a strait gate. On the special subject of the 'Essay,' Jones did little more than deny Bishop Clayton's statements. What the bishop called speculative doctrine, Jones called the essentials of Christianity. He repeated the old story about Spinoza being an atheist. He denied that Plato's Trinity was the Trinity of the Scriptures, and, on the personal authority of some Jews, he maintained that the Logos or Angel who appeared to

\* Jones was descended from Colonel Jones, one of Cromwell's officers. He always kept the 20th of January as a day of fasting and humiliation, to mourn for the iniquities of his ancestor.



CHAP. XV. the Patriarchs was regarded by the Hebrew divines as very God.\*

The 'Confessional.'

In 1766 Archdeacon Blackburne published anonymously the famous 'Confessional.' On renewing subscription at his institution to the Archdeaconry with which was connected a prebend in York Minster, he had some scruples about the Articles. These were overcome by reading Dr. Clarke's preface to his 'Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity.' In prospect of a higher preferment, Blackburne went over the subject again, and was convinced that Clarke's reasons were not sufficient to justify subscription in such a solemn form as that prescribed by the thirty-sixth canon. He began a systematic examination of the whole question of creeds and subscriptions. The result of his studies was 'The Confessional,' which he had completed several years before its publication.

Origin of Creeds in Protestant Churches.

The principle of the Reformation, Blackburne says, was freedom for faith and conscience. These were subject to the will of God revealed in the Scriptures, but not to man's authority. The Church of Rome was rejected because the dominion it claimed was not divine but human. The liberty, however, granted in principle by the Reformation, was soon denied in practice. The Reformers adopted as self-evident maxims that 'there could be no edification in religious society without uniformity of opinion,' and 'that the true sense of Scripture could be but one.' This one sense, they thought, must be that of the orthodox Fathers for a certain number of centuries. From these Fathers they took their interpretations of Scripture, and so bound the Reformed Churches to a system of theology. Those who would not be bound by articles of faith separated from the leaders, and some of them being extravagant brought discredit on the Reformation. The result was that the Reformers were compelled to publish explicit confessions of their faith and doctrine. The first was that of the Protestant princes at Augsburg. Their precedent was soon followed by other States and Churches. But these confessions which were intended to promote uniformity, had the contrary effect. In their zeal to condemn the sectaries, orthodox Churches condemned each other. They gave an advantage to their

\* Archdeacon Randolph and others answered the 'Essay on Spirit.'

enemies by determining points that had been left open in the Church of Rome. To refute the charge of diversity of opinion, the Belgic and Gallican Churches published a 'Harmony of Confessions,' but it was well known that every one of these Churches required a minister to subscribe to its own confession before he was allowed to exercise his ministry. CHAP. XV.

Blackburne denies the right of Protestant Churches, from their own principles, to require tests of orthodoxy. A Protestant creed must be agreeable to the word of God, but that any creed is so must be decided either by private judgment or by the authority of the Church. If by the first, the creed cannot be made without the consent of those who are to subscribe it. If by the second, the Church is vested with the very authority which Protestantism condemns. Private judgment and the authority of the Church will ever be more or less in collision. This is shown from the history of our own Articles. The clergy subscribe them, but not in one sense. If men think at all, they will differ on some points. The only uniform sense in which men subscribe the Articles, is 'the sense they have of wanting preferment,' if they do not subscribe them. Bishop Burnet wrote an exposition of the XXXIX Articles expressly to prove that they were capable of several senses. He said rightly that the original object of the Articles was a test to exclude Roman Catholics from the ministry of the Church. How ineffectual they proved for this was manifest in Queen Mary's days, and might have been a lesson to Elizabeth's bishops as well as to us, that enforced creeds are no barrier to men who have made shipwreck of a good conscience.

The Archdeacon objects to all the schemes by which liberal men have apologized for subscription. He calls the conduct of Tillotson and Burnet mere 'trimming.' They tried to make peace with men who would never be at peace. The same mistake was made by Chillingworth and by Hales, by Clarke and by Hoadly. Had men in their position and with their weight of character resolutely opposed subscription, they might have handed down to us a free and unfettered national Church. The practice of subscribing the Articles in a modified sense is traced as far back as 1572, when Parlia-

Inconsistent with the principles of Protestantism.

Origin of subscribing in a modified sense.

CHAP. XV. ment, contrary to the wishes of Archbishop Parker, allowed the Puritans to subscribe only what concerned 'the true faith and the sacraments.' The persecution which at this time some of the bishops inflicted on the Puritans was contrary to law. The State had provided for their freedom as to those things, of which they were 'not satisfied concerning their agreement with the word of God.' The standing objection to any repeal of subscription was the fact that those who sought it were Arians and Socinians. Blackburne answered that no subscription must be better than the casuistry by which the present subscription was defended. He was not himself either an Arian or a Socinian, yet he thought that the language of Scripture concerning the Trinity was much to be preferred to the scholastic subtleties of the schools.

The 'Confessional' answered by Dr. Rutherford.

The answers to the 'Confessional' were very numerous. Dr. Thomas Rutherford wrote a 'Vindication of the Right of Protestant Churches to require Subscription' to Articles of Religion. The Church, he said, was a society instituted by Christ. It had governors whose business it was to see that the people be instructed in right doctrine. Subscription is the only way by which they can be assured of this. That Scripture words are insufficient, is proved from the fact that the clergy are required in their sermons to make Scripture plain by their own words. The Church was established to preserve truth, and the governors are charged to see that all teachers and pastors be sound in the faith.

By Dr. Powell.

Dr. William Powell, in a sermon before the University of Cambridge, on Commencement Sunday in 1757, showed that subscription was no hardship. The Articles were capable of many senses, and the subscriber was at liberty to take his own. Subscription was never intended to be so stringent as to exclude progress in theology.

By Archdeacon Rotherham.

In 1767, John Rotherham, Archdeacon of Oxford, made some remarks on the 'Confessional' in 'An Essay on Establishments in Religion.' His idea of establishments was an alliance between Church and State for their mutual benefit. The civil magistrate's duty was to give toleration to all sects, but if he found it to the advantage of the State to form an alliance with any or all of them, it was his duty to do so. This implies in him a right to judge of the tendency,

beneficial or otherwise, of any religion. Some passages in the 'Confessional' seem to deny that the civil magistrate has anything to do with religion. But this, Rotherham says, cannot be their meaning. The State connection is both necessary and expedient, and the individual must allow some restrictions on his natural liberty for the common benefit of the religious community. CHAP. XV.

Dr. Thomas Randolph, in a charge to the clergy of the Archdeaconry of Oxford, in 1771, made some animadversions on the 'Confessional.' He denied that subscription was any interference with liberty, as no man was compelled to come into the ministry. It was not a question of 'subscribe or starve.' There were many other ways of living besides taking orders in the Church. Those who err concerning the faith he could not regard as 'worthy men.' The Church can easily dispense with their services. Articles are not made a rule of faith. They are only the means of discovering if candidates for the ministry be sound in the faith. This is an inquiry which every bishop would have to make, even if there were no Articles. Our case is not to be identified with that of the Church of Rome. We do not require subscription on pain of damnation, but as necessary to order and government. By Arch-  
deacon Ran-  
dolph.

'Remarks on the Confessional' were written by Jones of Nayland as a sequel to the second edition of his answer to Bishop Clayton. The reason for this conjunction was, that Jones regarded the 'Confessional' as a sequel to the 'Essay on Spirit.' It was not merely a repeal of the law of subscription at which Blackburne aimed. Jones thought he saw beyond this an ulterior object, which was to change the doctrine of the Church in reference to the Trinity. But the author astutely avoided saying what doctrines he wished changed, and confined himself to asking the removal of subscription. The concealed grievance was the doctrine which the Gospel has imposed on all Christians. The Church imposes nothing that is not already imposed by Scripture. If it is otherwise, by the very principle of Protestantism the Church is bound to attend to all remonstrances made in a proper manner and supported by proper evidence. It is admitted by the author of the 'Confessional' that the Church By Jones of  
Nayland.

CHAP. XV. — may secure its own peace by all lawful means. Creeds are lawful means when they are agreeable to the word of God. To submit them to private judgment is to submit the word of God to private judgment. All sects might subscribe to the Bible only, and then interpret it as they like. The Church, as a society, has authority to determine articles of faith so long as its determinations agree with the written word.

By Dean  
Tucker.

Josiah Tucker, Dean of Gloucester, wrote an 'Apology for the Present Church of England as by Law Established,' in which he answered most of Archdeacon Blackburne's arguments. Every society, he said, must have some rule by which it is governed; and all persons admitted to be members, and especially those who are candidates for offices, must be supposed to approve of this rule. This, he said, was not to be denied as to voluntary sects, but the plea for the abolition of subscription was specially urged on the ground that the Church of England was established. To answer this, Dean Tucker first shows that all sects owning property are established. The difference between them and the Church of England is only one of degree. They are all in their original, voluntary corporations. The Church of England is the oldest and the richest, but its first property, the tithes, that which really distinguished it from the other communities, was the gift of the landowners. The question of subscription is therefore the same in the Church of England as in any other Church. It is a question of a society being governed by some rule. To take the Scriptures only, is about as absurd as to require of every teacher that he will teach only what appears to him to be agreeable to right reason. An atheist might promise this. It is evident we must at least require one article of faith—that there is a God. This article, too, must be very explicit, so as to exclude many false and unworthy ideas that have been entertained concerning God. Here we come upon modes of worship and distinctions of good and evil, so that even in a Church founded on natural religion a creed is a necessity. There is nothing in Christianity to forbid a similar use of creeds. The first summaries of the Christian faith taught to converts were creeds. It is true they are fallible, and

written by fallible men. But is the argument against the truth of the creed, or against the principle of subscription? If the creed agree with the Scriptures there can be no objection. Its not being in Scripture language is nothing, for it might be in Scripture language, and yet that language be perverted. The plea for repeal may be on behalf of weak consciences, but there are weak brethren on the other side whose tender consciences might be injured by the change.\*

Archdeacon Blackburne was engaged in some other controversies besides this on subscription to creeds. One of his earliest tracts was occasioned by Bishop Butler's charge to the clergy of Durham. This tract was called 'A Serious Inquiry into the Use and Importance of External Religion.' It is possible Blackburne may have mistaken Butler's meaning, but he reckoned that the general tendency of his remarks was of a very dangerous character. In his charge Butler set before the clergy the great importance of keeping up the forms of religion. He lamented the decay of religious life, and, as the best means of restoring it, he recommended the restoration of churches, and the regular observance of external duties. The clergy were to 'keep up the

CHAP. XV.

Archdeacon  
Blackburne on  
'External  
Religion.'

\* In 1772 Archdeacon Blackburne and his friends presented a petition to parliament for the abolition of subscription. It was called the Feathers Tavern petition, from the place where they met. Parliament rejected it by a large majority. The controversy, however, went on. Blackburne was defended by Edmund Law, afterwards Bishop of Carlisle, and Law was defended by Paley, who wished success to the petition, but declined to subscribe it. After the rejection of the petition, Theophilus Lindsey, Dr. Jebb, and one or two who had entertained Unitarian sentiments, resigned their livings. This caused the anti-subscription movement to be associated with the progress of Unitarianism. It is common to remark, to Blackburne's disadvantage, that he was not so honest as his friends who resigned; but Blackburne did not object to the general doctrine of the Articles. He avowed himself a moderate Calvinist: what he wished was liberty for those who did not agree with him. It is curious that the most

zealous opponents of the abolition of subscription were the Methodists and the Evangelical clergy, who at the time were fighting about the meaning of the Articles. Among the tracts against Blackburne were 'Three Letters,' by Dr. Ridley, said to have been instigated by Archbishop Secker. George Harvest, Fellow of Magdalen, and Dr. Tottie, Archdeacon of Worcester, were also among his opponents. After the failure of Blackburne's petition, another was presented to the Archbishop of Canterbury, in 1773, for a revision of the doctrine of the Articles. This was signed by Beilby Porteus, afterwards Bishop of London, James Yorke, afterwards Bishop of Ely, and Thomas Percy, afterwards Bishop of Dromore. The Archbishop was Frederick Cornwallis, whose theological sentiments, if he had any, were supposed to be liberal. The Archbishop consulted the other bishops, and their advice was, that it would be better in their circumstances to let matters alone, at least for the present.



CHAP. XV. form and face of religion with decency and reverence.' It was expressly said that this was to be done in such a way as to make the form subservient to the power. The exhortation was enforced by the case of the Pagans, whose 'religion was prominent on all public occasions,' and by 'the short and frequent devotions of Mahometans and Roman Catholics.' Our Reformers, the bishop said, had left the machinery for keeping up the form of religion by the daily prayers and the services for saints' days. These were not only neglected, but the very churches were falling to decay. The picture which Butler gave of the state of religion was very dark. There was so little faith on the earth, that the advent of the Son of Man seemed to be at hand.

Christianity a spirit and not a form.

Archdeacon Blackburne did not deny the decay of religion, but he did not believe that it could be restored by the revival of saints' days, and an increase of external observances. He would not accuse the bishop of wishing to revive such customs as bowing towards the East, or reciting the creed towards the rising sun, but he believed that an increase of external observances without an increase of internal religion would only be the restoration of Romanism or Paganism. Butler had said 'that religion could not be preserved among mankind without the form.' This, Blackburne answered, might be true of such religions as the Pagan, the Mahometan, or the Roman Catholic, where the form was really the essence. But it was not true of Christianity, whose essence was a spirit and a power that were independent of form. A Christian, in the words of Archbishop Tillotson, is one 'who quietly, and without any noise and bustle, minds the substantial parts of religion.' Jesus has described the true worshippers as they that worship in spirit and in truth. We have a sect in England called Quakers, who even set aside the two forms instituted by Christ Himself, and, 'he would surely be a rash man, who would say that the Quakers had no religion.' The Gospel has left us free as to external observances, just that we should be more intent upon the spiritual and essential parts of religion. The multitude of men in all ages have made the forms of religion a substitute for repentance, and sometimes a composition for vice. The bishop, in giving examples of the benefit of



external religion, omitted the ceremonies of Judaism. Had he thought of them it would have occurred to him that it was just the ceremonial part of the law of Moses which Jesus abolished. The ceremonial religion of the Pagans was nothing else but what St. Peter describes as their revelings, banquetings, and abominable idolatries. The Pagans wondered when they heard of a religion which prohibited licentiousness. Blackburne denied that Butler's method of restoring religion by restoring the form was either Christian or Protestant.

CHAP. XV.

Another controversy in which Archdeacon Blackburne was the chief writer, concerned the sleep of the soul. This was begun by an Appendix which Edmund Law added to a book called 'Considerations on the Theory of Religion.' The subject of the Appendix was the use of the word soul in Holy Scripture, and the state of the dead between death and the resurrection. The meanings of the word soul in Scripture were found to be very many, and very indefinite. It is identical with spirit, life, breath. Sometimes it means a person, an affection, a quality of the mind or of the body. At death it is represented as in sleep or as deprived of all life. The grave is for the soul a place of rest, silence, oblivion, darkness, and corruption. It is not to awake till the resurrection, and the righteous are not to be separated from the wicked till the end of the world. The judgment is said to follow death because no account is taken of the intervening sleep of the soul. In the same way the coming of Christ is always near.

Archdeacon  
Blackburne  
on the sleep of  
the soul.

Law's doctrine was refuted by several writers, and especially in a sermon by Peter Goddard. This was answered by Archdeacon Blackburne. Another author, who wrote against Sherlock in defence of Warburton, added some remarks on what Law had said concerning 'the old exploded hypothesis of the sleep of the soul.' This led Blackburne into a digression concerning Warburton's doctrine. He afterwards published a large treatise called an 'Historical View of the Controversy.' The doctrine is that the souls of all men will sleep in death till the resurrection. Before the Council of Florence in 1439, the common doctrine was that the souls of the righteous after death were

His 'His-  
torical View  
of the Contro-  
versy.'

CHAP. XV. in hidden receptacles. They were happy, but not in the full enjoyment of the beatific vision. A canon was then made declaring that those who had not made sufficient satisfaction for their sins were in purgatory, but that those who had were received into the immediate presence of God. Protestants disliked purgatory, and on the authority of this canon said that all souls went immediately to heaven. The Lateran Council, in the time of Leo X., decreed that the soul was naturally immortal. The argument by which this doctrine was supported was the substantial forms of the schoolmen. Luther called this an absurdity, and afterwards maintained the sleep of the soul. In this Luther was opposed by Calvin, who was followed by the compilers of the English Articles. In King Edward's time there was an Article against those who say that the soul sleeps between death and the resurrection. The doctrine of Calvin and Beza, who agreed with the Church of Rome concerning the natural immortality of the soul, was generally received by all Protestant Churches.

The Hutchin-  
sonians.

About the middle of the century the doctrines of John Hutchinson were embraced by several eminent men, especially at the University of Oxford. One cause of this was the opposition to Newton's philosophy. Another was Hutchinson's exaltation of the Scriptures as a book of absolute perfection in all kinds of knowledge. Newton, Clarke, and the liberal Churchmen were believed to be in a conspiracy with Toland and Tindal to set aside Christianity, and to introduce a system of materialism.\* To frustrate this terrible conspiracy of science against religion, devout men had recourse to an extravagant theory of Bible inspiration. The controversy was carried on in pamphlets and sermons. The Hutchinsonians abused science and reason, denied that there was any knowledge of religion or morality except by external revelation, and proclaimed themselves the servants of the Most High, while the whole world was lying in Paganism.†

\* See *Life of Bishop Horne*, by Jones of Nayland, p. 30. Ed. 1801.

† See '*A Word to the Hutchinsonians*,' published in 1756. This was an answer, supposed to have been

written by Dr. Kennicott, to three sermons preached before the University by Dr. Patten, Mr. Wetherall, and Mr. Horne. The last was the famous *Bishop Horne*. This tract was an-

The writers whom we shall notice as representing the Hutchinsonians are Julius Bate, Rector of Sutton, in Sussex; George Horne, afterwards Bishop of Norwich; and William Jones, generally known as 'Jones of Nayland.' Julius Bate wrote many tracts on different subjects, but all from the stand-point of the Hutchinsonian theology. The apologists of Christianity, he said, had made too large concessions to the Deists. He charged on Sherlock the Deism of Tindal, and he denied that we can know anything of religion from nature or conscience. Alluding to what Conyers Middleton said of reason as a rule in religion, Bate called reason not a rule, but a faculty by which we are guided to a rule. Spiritual things depend entirely on the authority of the Scriptures. It is only through them that we can know anything of God, or of what God requires of us. Eve fell through seeking after knowledge, instead of obeying the Divine Will. This looking to reason, conscience, or 'the light within,' is the origin of all Deism. The text in St. Paul about the visible things manifesting the invisible, is interpreted to mean that the only knowledge which we can have of God is through figures and similitudes, taken from material things: By regarding the Bible as a book in which is shut up in recondite etymologies all knowledge, human and divine, we are to be saved from scepticism and unbelief. The orthodox Dr. Stebbing is said to have conceded too much to Warburton when he allowed that the future life was not directly taught under the Jewish dispensation. The whole of the Old Testament is regarded as a prefiguration of Christ, and so a direct revelation of a future life.

Horne and Jones modified many parts of the Hutchinsonian system. Horne altogether discarded the etymologies, but Hutchinson's general principles, both in philosophy and religion, pervade the whole of his writings. One treatise is specially on the subject. It is called 'A Fair, Candid, and Impartial State of the Case between Sir Isaac Newton and Mr. Hutchinson.' Newton's philosophy was founded on

answered and defended. Dr. Ralph Ellys, and Parkhurst, the Hebrew Heathcote also wrote in this controversy, defending the use of reason against Dr. Patten. Dr. Hodge, Dr. scholar, wrote on the Hutchinsonian side.

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Julius Bate.

Bishop Horne.

CHAP. XV. science, but Hutchinson's on the Bible. The errors, however, of the Newtonian philosophy were ascribed to Newton's followers, who, it is supposed, misunderstood his terms. Newton had used the word attraction conversely with impulse. He did not mean by attraction a cause. He was simply describing phenomena. But if attraction was really impulse, Newton, it was inferred, could not have believed in an absolute void. The vacuum between bodies must have been filled with a subtle fluid which made no resistance to matter. His followers did not understand this, and so they believed in a real vacuum. If bodies are moved by an impulse, Sir Isaac Newton's philosophy may be interpreted as admitting secondary causes. With this interpretation, the controversy ends. But if Newton's disciples do not admit it, they are refuted by Hutchinson, who has shown that gravitation may be explained by the laws of mechanism.

William  
Jones.

The works of William Jones are collected into twelve volumes. To the Hutchinsonian doctrines he added a peculiar High Churchism, an invidious suspicion of the Methodists, and a thorough hatred of everything like liberal theology. The religion of nature, Jones said, had done more mischief in the Church of England than the works of Porphyry, Celsus, Lucian, and all the blasphemies of heathenism did to Christianity. It was nothing but a disguised Deism, a traditional infidelity, the corruption of a revelation which began after the apostacy at Babel. The heathen did not worship the true God, for there was 'no God in all the earth but in Israel.' Pope might speak of the 'Father of all' as 'Jehovah, Jove, or Lord;' but St. Paul exhorted the priest of Jupiter to 'turn from these vanities unto the living God.' The modern Jews who deny that God is 'manifest in the flesh' are as much idolaters as their forefathers who danced before the golden calf. The Mahommedans are another 'set of infidels' who worship an idol of their own imagination—'a God in one person.' The Socinians and Arians are in the same condemnation. They do not worship the true God, who is a Trinity of Persons, but an imaginary personal Unity, denying both the Father and the Son. Dr. Samuel Clarke was clearly a Deist. The first proposition in his 'Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God,' proves a Deity

who is only 'one person.' This may be the first principle of natural religion, but it is not revelation. CHAP. XV.

The first volume of Jones's works is chiefly occupied with discussions on the Trinity. There is sometimes originality in the application of texts, and often a singular ingenuity in finding the divinity of Christ where it was never intended to be found. In Isaiah, for instance, the Lord of Hosts is called a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence. St. Peter applies the same words to Christ. Therefore Christ is the Lord of Hosts. The Trinity, or plurality of persons in the Godhead, is found in all the Hebrew names of Deity, which are plural. Besides Elohim and Adonai, there are the words which we translate the 'Holy Ones' and the 'Mighty Ones,' which all refer to the Godhead. The persons who dispute these arguments are said to have borrowed their notions from Socinus, and particularly from 'Chubb, the tallow-chandler.' They expect people to use their reason, while the Bible tells us that 'every imagination of the thoughts of man's heart is only evil continually.' Jones, however, with the help of the Hutchinsonian philosophy, turns the tables against the Unitarians, and finds them refuted by nature and reason. Air, fire, and light are the trinity of elements which constitute nature. Scripture says that 'our God is a consuming fire,' that Jesus Christ is 'the light of the world,' and the Holy Ghost is called the Spirit, after the name of the air or wind. Under the form of one of these three elements, God has always manifested Himself to man. There is then nothing in nature to support the Unitarian notion that God is only 'a single person.' Several other trinities are found in nature analogous to the Trinity of the Godhead. There are the three parts into which St. Paul divides a man—body, soul, and spirit. There are the blood-vessels, the organs of respiration, and the nerves. There is the heart, the head, and the organs of speech, with many other threes which are trinities in unity.

One of the largest tracts in Jones's volumes is called 'An Essay on the First Principles of Natural Philosophy.' The object of this treatise was to refute Sir Isaac Newton with his vacuum and his law of gravitation, and to prove that God never works in nature except by means of secondary

On the  
Trinity.

Jones refutes  
Sir Isaac  
Newton and  
Dr. Samuel  
Clarke.

CHAP. XV. causes. Descartes, Jones said, had done something for the overthrow of Newton by showing the absurdity of a vacuum. But Descartes' method is exceptionable in other respects. Dr. Clarke's arguments in his correspondence with Leibnitz are duly refuted. Ignorance of physical causes, Jones says, is the reason why some philosophers deny them. They put into their place some vague theory which they call 'laws.' But the physical cause of the motion of the heavenly bodies is not unknown. Light is diffused throughout the celestial spaces, and electricity tells us that the matter of light can impel and resist. The theory of incorporeal impulses, maintained by Newton and Clarke, resulted, as Leibnitz showed, in making God the Soul of the world. Newton called gravitation sometimes a cause, and sometimes an effect. It was, Leibnitz said, an occult cause, but not therefore incorporeal. To this Clarke answered that it was not a cause at all, but an effect—the tendency of one parcel of matter towards another. It is finally proved that Newton's doctrine of a vacuum is the doctrine of the old Atheists, and that it is clearly and decisively rejected in the Scriptures.

Religious  
Parties in  
Scotland.

The history of religious development in the Church of Scotland during the eighteenth century is parallel to what we have found in the Church of England and among the Nonconformists. Early in the century, John Simson, Professor of Divinity in the University of Glasgow, was charged before the General Assembly with teaching the heresies of Arminius and Pelagius. He described the light of nature as a kind of revelation, an obscure dispensation of the Gospel. He thought it probable that none would be excluded from the benefits of the remedy provided by God except those who excluded themselves by actual sin. The heathen had the Gospel preached to them by the works of creation, and if they diligently used the means they have, and seek from God the knowledge of reconciliation, they would be saved. Original sin was regarded as an invention of theologians. It could never consist with the goodness and justice of God to create a soul without original righteousness. The only censure which the Assembly passed on Professor Simson was that he had used unguarded expressions, and that in answering the objections of the Deists he had conceded too much to



the powers of reason. A few years later he was charged with Arianism, for which he was suspended by the Presbytery. This suspension was afterwards confirmed by the General Assembly.

It was during the trial of Professor Simson that the ministers of the Church of Scotland were first sharply divided into Moderates and Evangelicals. The latter were dissatisfied with the leniency that had been shown to the Professor of Divinity. Thomas Boston, of Etterick, one of their leaders, stood up in the Assembly after the judgment was passed, and pronounced the punishment inadequate for the condemnation of such a deadly heresy. To check the growing licentiousness of opinion, the Presbytery of Auchterarder resolved on a more strict examination of the candidates in matters of doctrine. One candidate refused to subscribe to a proposition laid down by the Presbytery, that it was not necessary to 'forsake sin in order to come to Christ.' The case was brought before the Assembly, which decreed that Presbyteries were not at liberty to demand from probationers any other pledges of doctrine than subscription to the regular formularies of the Church.

But the Moderates were not merely slow to avenge themselves on the promoters of heresy; they took aggressive action against the Evangelicals. A book called the 'Marrow of Modern Divinity,' written by Edward Fisher, an English Puritan in the time of the Commonwealth, had been republished in Scotland, with a preface by one of the Evangelical ministers. This book was condemned by the General Assembly as Antinomian, and as teaching the doctrine which the Auchterarder Presbytery wished to impose on the candidates. The Evangelicals met together for counsel to deliberate what they ought to do, in what they called that 'day of rebuke and blasphemy.' The 'Marrow of Modern Divinity' is a logical exposition of the theology of Calvin. The doctrine may be rigid, but it certainly does not exceed that of the standards of the Church of Scotland. The real question was the one which we have met in almost every controversy we have examined—the question of the extent of the use of reason in doctrines supposed to come by external revelation. The Moderates virtually said that whatever the Bible meant,

CHAP. XV.

Moderates and Evangelicals.

The 'Marrow of Modern Divinity.'



CHAP. XV. or whatever their standards meant, they could not regard as coming from God any doctrine which they knew to be unworthy of God. The Evangelicals said that however incomprehensible or apparently in contradiction to our natural reason or conscience, any dogma may be, it is to be received on the authority of external revelation. Thomas Boston, speaking of the 'Marrow of Modern Divinity,' says that the Gospel method of sanctification and justification lies so far beyond natural reason, that all the rationalists, philosophers, and divines in the world could never have discovered it. But, on the contrary, if proposed for their acceptance on the ground of reason, they would have rejected it as foolishness.\*

John Glas.

In 1730, John Glas, a minister of the Church of Scotland, of considerable ability and learning, was deprived by the Assembly with the concurrence of both parties, who are described as 'the moderate and the wild.' The Glas controversy might in some respects be compared to the Hoadly controversy in England. There was, however, this essential difference—that while Hoadly denied the Kingdom of Christ to be a visible Church, with rulers of divine appointment, Glas regarded the visible Church as the Kingdom of Christ, and as a corporate body with authority existing independently of the State. The idea may be found in some of the early Puritans, perhaps among the Brownists; but Glas set it forth in a clear and definite form. As the Church was not of this world, he denied absolutely that the civil magistrate could have any jurisdiction over it, or that its interests could be advanced by the help of secular powers. This involved the rejection of the principle of subscribing to 'Leagues and Covenants,' and employing the secular arm to repress heresy and schism, which lay at the root of the constitution of the National Church in Scotland. Glas agreed with the Evangelical party in adhering to the doctrines of Calvin. If he differed from them at all, it was in being more thorough, more clear, and more logical. He defined faith as a simple assent to divine revelation, and this assent was the

\* Preface to Boston's Edition, 1726.

The Moderates always had profane wit on their side. A satirical ballad on the Simson trial ends with the verse:—

'Ah learning false and reason weak,  
How ill you tune your fiddles!  
Could you teach Simson ere to make  
Ought like R(alph) E(rskin)'e's rid-  
dles?'

gift of God to the elect. He set aside all the mystical ideas of faith, as a conviction of the invisible or a sense of the divine, such as we find in St. Paul, in Luther, and in Wesley. For this also Glas was condemned by the Assembly. He was deprived of his benefice, but the Assembly afterwards, of their own accord, restored him to 'the status of a minister of Jesus Christ, but not to that of a minister of the Kirk of Scotland.'\*

The religious influence which has kept the people of Scotland attached to the ecclesiastical institutions of the country came from the Evangelical party. The household piety of the Scottish peasantry has been sustained and nourished by the writings of the Bostons, the Willisons, and the Erskines.† But it is to the Moderates that we must turn for the intellect and the religious thought of the Church of Scotland in the eighteenth century. A little band of theologians, mostly professors in the universities, inaugurated a great school of metaphysics, and first showed the example of treating unbelievers with the respect and courtesy due to their characters, instead of abusing them as men whose immoral lives had perverted their understanding. In 1756, the Evangelical party tried to pass a resolution to have David Hume brought before the bar of the General Assembly to

The leaders of the Moderates and the Evangelicals.

\* Glas's son-in-law, Robert Sandeman, wrote against Hervey's 'Theron and Aspasia.' On the subject of faith, Hervey, like many Calvinistic writers, not consistent with their own theory, seemed to make faith some act which a man was to perform in order to be saved. The sect founded by Glas, called Glasites in Scotland, and in England, Sandemanians, from Sandeman, might be described as a sect of Independents with some peculiarities. They have the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper every Sunday, they hold love-feasts, and practise the primitive custom of giving each other the kiss of charity. As far as practicable, they have their goods in common: they abstain from eating blood, and they do not allow the elders to marry a second time.

† The Erskines, who seceded in 1733, were among the 'Marrow' men. The cause of their secession was the exercise of patronage as an interference with the rights of the

Church, and some other measures of the Moderate party, which were supposed to tend to the corruption both of doctrine and discipline. The Seceders formed what was called the Secession Church. They were afterwards divided into Burghers and Anti-burghers, the cause of the division being the lawfulness of taking an oath required by the municipal institutions of the three burghs of Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Perth. Every burghess had to swear, 'I protest before God that I profess and allow with my heart the true religion professed within this realm and authorised by the laws thereof.' The Anti-burghers thought that this oath implied approbation of the Established Church. This schism was healed, and in 1847 Burghers and Anti-burghers united with the Relief Church, another body which had seceded on the question of patronage. This united community is called 'The United Presbyterian Church.'

CHAP. XV. receive judgment for opposing the faith of the Gospel. This was defeated by the wisdom of the Moderates. Dr. Thomas Reid, in the name of his brother professors, once wrote to the great sceptic, 'We are all good Christians; but your company would be more acceptable than that of St. Athanasius. . . . If you write no more on morals, politics, and metaphysics, I am afraid we shall be in want of subjects.'

The common-sense philosophy.

To refute Hume, and Berkeley who had prepared the way for Hume, was the object of the Scotch school of common-sense metaphysicians. The refutation consisted in showing the absurdity of the conclusions. Berkeley's arguments, and still more Hume's, might be unanswerable, but we have a certain cure for them in that common sense which was recognised as the foundation of all our reasoning. Reason and philosophy can never demonstrate our existence, and yet we know that we exist. On the other hand, 'Berkeley has proved by unanswerable arguments what no man in his senses can believe.\* Dr. James Beattie, in 'An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth,' adopted this same philosophy of common sense. Hume said that truth 'lay deep, and required the utmost efforts of the human mind to discover it.' Beattie answered that primary facts are obvious and easily known. Among these he included such propositions as that the sun rose to-day, that there is a God, and that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. There is something in the mind which indicates what is agreeable to the nature of things. The constitution of man's nature determines him to believe truth. Common sense is distinguished from reason. It is defined as a power in the mind which preserves truth, or commands belief not by progressive argumentation, but by an instantaneous instinctive and irresistible impulse.†

Dr. James Oswald's 'Appeal to Common Sense.'

The common-sense argument was specially applied to religion by Dr. James Oswald. He believed it to be the only cure for the prevailing scepticism. There were some things, Oswald said, which it was prudent to doubt, but there were others so certain that they could not be doubted without the imputation of folly or madness.‡ Dr. Oswald supposes

\* Works of Dr. Thomas Reid, p. 101. Ed. 1858.

† 'An Appeal to Common Sense on Behalf of Religion,' p. 4. Ed. 1768.

‡ P. 40. Ed. 1771.

that the human mind has a faculty of judging truth corresponding to that which the senses have in receiving information concerning external objects. This faculty is conversant with primary truths, especially those of religion. When the world was bewildered by the refinements that reasoning had made on these primary truths, God restored them by the light of revelation. These primary truths are not to be submitted to reason. Doubts may be raised about them just as doubts may be raised about the existence of anything we see. We may not be able to answer the objections, and yet it would be simply madness to deny the facts. Descartes and Locke did a great service in banishing the jargon of the schools, but they have not cured 'that intemperate love of reasoning which may be called the epidemical distemper of the human mind.\*' Geometric demonstrations have been offered of things which are not strictly demonstrable. It is only common sense which can save us from universal scepticism. Berkeley thought to refute the unbelievers by denying the existence of matter, but 'the good bishop was caught in his own trap.' God's existence is something so obvious that every attempt to reason about it only ends in making it doubtful and obscure.†

The great leader of the Moderates in the Church Courts was Dr. William Robertson, the historian. Of Dr. George Campbell, of Aberdeen, we have already spoken, as one who defended the probability of miracles against the objections of Hume. In Dr. Campbell we have one of the best specimens of the rational, temperate, and judicious theologian. Dr. James Macknight was probably the greatest Biblical scholar that ever belonged to the Church of Scotland. Dr. Hugh Blair was the most popular of the 'Moderate' preachers. His ethical sermons are now forgotten, and we hope they were not fair specimens of the preaching of his party. The leaders of the Evangelicals were Dr. John Witherspoon and Dr. John Erskine. Their theology has been often described. Dr. Witherspoon was perhaps the ablest of the Evangelical ministers. He went to America, and became president of Princetown College, where he distinguished himself both as a theologian and politician.

\* *Ib.*, p. 58.† *Ib.*, vol. ii. p. 51.

CHAP. XV. Before he left Scotland, he wrote a clever satire against the Moderates, which he called 'Ecclesiastical Characteristics ; or, A Plain Way of attaining to the Character of a Moderate Man.' The way was to have a fellow-feeling for heresy, and to defend all who are suspected of heresy. Moderation is described as simply indifference. The Moderates are represented as treating the Confession of Faith with a sneer, as preaching chiefly on moral duties, and as quoting Pagan authors more frequently than the Scriptures.

Dr. McGill, of Ayr. Towards the end of the century, especially in the west of Scotland, the Moderates seem to have been more decided in their avowal of heresy. They are celebrated in the poems of Robert Burns under the name of the New Lights. Burns says that they embraced the doctrines of Dr. John Taylor, of Norwich. The most eminent of them was Dr. William McGill, of Ayr, who wrote 'A Practical Essay on the Death of Jesus Christ.' The object which Dr. McGill proposed was the laudable one of setting the atonement in such a light as that it would not be repulsive to reason. This was really the idea which lay at the foundation of the great work of Bishop Butler. He sought in nature for analogies which would render credible and reasonable the sacrifice of Christ as part of a great plan of which the whole was not revealed. To make the atonement a reasonable doctrine was the object of almost every English writer who wrote on the subject during the whole of the eighteenth century. Tillotson once said that to 'the unbiassed and impartial reason of mankind the death of God's Son is such a stumbling-block as is very hard for human reason to get over.' He believed it could be got over, and every sensible apologist for Christianity has tried to get over it. Dr. McGill undertook to prove that it was no such stumbling-block as Tillotson imagined. The efficacy of Christ's death did not consist in its being a satisfaction for sin, a substitution for the sinner, or an appeasing of God's wrath, but in its being part of the plan of redemption which God Himself had appointed. God was pleased with the sacrifice of His Son, and because of His obedience mercy was offered to those who otherwise were not entitled to it. Dr. McGill said, as many orthodox divines had said before him, that it was quite possible for God to

have saved men without the death of Christ, and that all good men among the heathen would be saved, though they had never heard of Christ's death. The Evangelicals called their doctrine of the atonement 'the gospel,' and to human reason the gospel was 'foolishness.' The attempt, therefore, of Dr. McGill to make the atonement a reasonable doctrine bore on the face of it the marks of heresy and unbelief.\*

Of theological writers at this time among the laity in England, the first place belongs to Soame Jenyns. He was the

Soame  
Jenyns.

\* Burns took the side of the Moderates, which was the side of reason, and satirised the Evangelicals as fools, hypocrites, and persecutors. Here is a description of a Moderate from 'The Holy Fair':—

'Smith opens out his cauld harangues  
On practice and on morals,  
And aff the godly pour in thrangs  
To gie the jars and barrels  
A lift that day.

'What signifies his barren shine  
Of moral powers and reason?  
His English style and gesture fine  
Are a' clean out o' season.  
Like Socrates or Antonine  
Or some auld Pagan Heathen,  
The moral man he does define,  
But ne'er a word o' faith in  
That's right that day.'

Then follows an Evangelical:—

'In guid time comes an antidote  
Against sic poisoned nostrum,  
For Peebles, frae the Water-fit  
Ascends the holy rostrum.  
See, up he's got the Word o' God,  
An meek and mim has viewed it,  
While Common Sense has ta'en the  
road  
And aff and up the Cowgate  
Fast, fast that day.

'Wee Miller neist the guard relieves,  
An' orthodoxy raibles,  
Though in his heart he well believes,  
An thinks it auld wives' fables.'

In 'The Ordination,' Burns again describes the flight of reason and common sense. This poem was a satire on the ordination of an Evangelical minister:—

'See, see auld Orthodoxy's faes  
She's swingein' through the city;  
Hark how the nine-tailed cat she plays;  
I vow its unco pretty.  
There Learning, with his Greekish  
face,  
Grunts out some Latin ditty;  
And Common Sense is gane, she says,  
To mak' to Jamie Beattie a  
Her plaint that day.'

The scene is in a public-house where the supporters of the Evangelicals are discussing their Church differences, as the custom is in Scotland, over whiskey. The poem ends with this verse:—

'Come bring the tither mutchkin in,  
And here's for a conclusion,  
To every New Light mother's son  
From this time forth confusion.  
If mair they deave me wi' their din,  
Or Patronage intrusion,  
We'll light a spunk, and every skin  
We'll rin them off in fusion  
Like oil, some day.'

Another satire, called 'The Kirk's Alarm,' is entirely devoted to the case of Dr. McGill. It begins:—

'Orthodox, orthodox, wha believe i'  
John Knox,  
Let me sound an alarm to your  
conscience,  
There's a heretic blast has been blawn  
i' the Wast  
That what is not sense must be  
nonsense.  
'Dr. Mac, Dr. Mac, you should stretch  
on a rack  
To strike evil doers wi' terror,  
To join faith and sense upon any  
pretence,  
Is heretic, damnable error.'

(a) Dr. Beattie of Aberdeen.



CHAP. XV. author of the anonymous work on 'The Internal Evidences of Christianity,' to which Paley refers in his chapter on 'The Morality of the Gospel,' and from which he borrowed some of his best arguments. Jenyns lived through nearly the whole of the century, and is said to have been at one time an unbeliever in Christianity. His first work of a religious character was a 'Free Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil.' All religious knowledge, he said, must begin here, and in the examination of this question we shall find light shed on many difficulties in religion. The great problem is how the existence of evil is compatible with infinite goodness and infinite power. It is not to be solved, as many suppose, by the fact of free will in man. We cannot believe that an omnipotent and omniscient Being would allow His designs to be contingent on the doings of His creatures. His permissive will cannot be distinguished from His active will. The solution offered is that even Omnipotence can only do what is possible. We do not know the measure of possibilities; but since evil exists we may conclude that its existence is necessary. This is no limit to Divine Omnipotence. It only means that there are things in their own nature impossible to be performed without certain consequences attending them. This was the truth which the Pagans acknowledged when they spoke of a fate to which even the gods had to submit.

On the existence of evil.

Jenyns divides evils into five kinds: those of imperfection, natural, political, moral, and religious evils. The first kind is easily accounted for, as necessary to the subordination of parts. They are not really evils, at least, no more than a small estate which might have been greater is a real misfortune. The orders in creation are different, but the Almighty has so contrived the nature of things that happiness is distributed with a more equal hand. Natural evils are accounted for in nearly the same way. Poverty, labour, pain, and death are things from which it was, we may say, impossible that man could be excepted so long as he was man. But for all these we have compensation, and some of them become the means of giving us pleasure. We are but a link in the vast chain of being, yet our pride makes us fancy ourselves the final cause of creation. It is pride, too, which makes us reject the ancient doctrine of the transmigra-



tion of souls, which is a sufficient vindication of the Divine wisdom and goodness against all the objections taken from the inequalities of this present life. To account for moral evil is more difficult. Jenyns rejects such definitions of moral good as conformity to truth, to the fitness of things, or to the will of God. The sole measure of good or bad actions is their consequences. It is this which makes God command some actions and forbid others. Morality is really prudence, wisdom, and economy. The crigin of moral evil is found in the same cause as natural evil. In the constitution of such a world as ours it could not be avoided. It is as necessary as natural evil, and like it, too, it will ultimately be productive of greater good. Natural evil involved the expediency of moral evil. God is the author of both; that is, of the fewest evils possible to procure the greatest amount of possible good. Omnipotence contends with its difficulties and overcomes them at the end of the struggle. Jenyns finds here a rational explanation of original sin, predestination, and vicarious suffering. The Christian dispensation is erected on the foundation of the necessity of moral evil. Political and religious evils are also shown to be necessary, as it was impossible even for Omnipotence to give a perfect government and a perfect religion to an imperfect creature.

In the end of this treatise, and in some subsequent disquisitions, Jenyns enters into an examination of the nature of Christianity. He finds in its history the same characters which mark all the other works of God. It has something supernatural stamped on it, and yet it is far from answering the idea of perfection which we might expect from the Divine interposition. It has not the authenticity, the perspicuity, nor the universality, which we should have expected. It required time for growth and development. Here, too, Omnipotence is struggling with difficulties which finally will be overcome. In a disquisition on 'Rational Christianity,' Jenyns is severe on those Christians who reject all the doctrines of Christianity which they do not understand, in order to make Christianity rational. To prove the reasonableness of revelation is, he says, to destroy it, for revelation comes to tell us what reason could not discover. Revelation would be rational if we saw the whole of the Divine plan;

On the nature  
of Chris-  
tianity.

CHAP. XV. but as we do not, we must accept as mysteries doctrines which we do not understand.

On the internal evidence of Christianity.

In the treatise on 'The Internal Evidence of the Christian Religion,' Jenyns says that he does not undervalue the arguments from prophecy and miracles. The internal evidence, however, seemed to him to carry the greatest degree of conviction. The miracles were a convincing proof to those who saw them, but their credibility must now depend on the truth of the religion they were intended to support. When we are first convinced that there is something supernatural in Christianity we are disposed to admit the probability of the truth of miracles and prophecies. Jenyns's first proposition on which he builds his argument is 'that there is now extant a book entitled the New Testament.' This book contains a system of religion entirely new and totally unlike everything which had ever before entered the mind of man. Its object is to prepare us for the kingdom of heaven. It insists on purity of heart and a benevolent disposition as absolutely necessary to this end. This view of our present life as a probation for another may not be discoverable by reason, yet when revealed it is confirmed by everything which we see around us. The personal character of the Author of Christianity was new. He spoke as never man spoke. Before Christianity, nothing like religion existed in the world, excepting, of course, the religion of the Jews.

Christianity and morality.

Moral precepts founded on reason are carried to a higher degree of purity and perfection in Christianity than they were by any of the ancient philosophers. Those not founded on reason are entirely omitted. Many of the latter class have been much celebrated in the Pagan world though prejudicial to human happiness. Valour, for instance, was a great virtue with the heathen. Thus, gods were declared heroes, exalted to heaven as a reward for the evil they did on earth. Valour can have no place among Christian virtues; for if Christian nations were nations of Christians, war would be impossible and unknown. Christian courage is passive. It consists of patience and resignation. Patriotism was another virtue much praised in the ancient world. It has no place in Christianity. The Christian is of no country. He is a

citizen of the world. Christianity inculcates universal benevolence; while what is called patriotism is but self-interest under the mask of public spirit. Patriotism is but a larger copy of the mean partiality of a parish-officer, who thinks injustice and cruelty meritorious whenever they promote the interests of his own inconsiderable village. Friendship is a virtue more congenial to Christianity, yet it appropriates to a single object what should be extended to all. It is narrow and confined, advantageous to individuals, but it may exist with very little pretension to merit. Instead of these Pagan virtues the religion of Jesus teaches meekness, forgiveness, charity, repentance, and resignation. We cannot believe that such a system could be the work of men, much less of the ignorant men who were employed to publish it to the world.

After establishing these positions, Jenyns answered some common objections to Christianity. One is that the Scrip-  
 tures cannot be from God because they contain errors, inconsistencies, fabulous history, and false philosophy. The answer is, that the Scriptures are not revelations, but the history of revelations. The history is the work of man, but the truth of revelation is not affected by their fallibility. It bears internal evidence of its own supernatural excellence. The writer of the Book of Genesis may not have been inspired with a foreknowledge of the Copernican and Newtonian systems. But it does not follow that Christ was an impostor because Moses was not an astronomer. The temptation in the wilderness, or the devil's taking refuge in the herd of swine, may be stories accommodated to the ignorance and superstition of the times and countries in which they were written. But this does not impeach the excellence of Christianity, or the authority of its Founder. People are misled by the phrase that the Scriptures are the word of God. This is true in the sense that they are the repository of all the revelations God has made to man. But we are not to understand by this expression that every part of this voluminous collection of varied writings was dictated by the immediate influence of divine inspiration. The writers never claimed this immunity from error, and we have no right to claim it for them. Jesus said, 'He that believeth in me hath eternal life,' but He did not

The Scrip-  
 tures not in-  
 fallible.

CHAP. XV. say that it was necessary to believe every word of the Old or the New Testament. That God permitted errors to be mixed with Christianity in its beginning is no more an argument against its truth than that He permitted it to be corrupted in later times. A diamond found in a bed of mud is still a diamond. Its value is not depreciated, nor its lustre destroyed.

Bishop Newton's Boyle Lectures.

The lectures that had been established for the annual defence of Christianity caused the subject of evidences to be continued, as the special work of the learned clergy, long after every branch of it had been exhausted. The reading of these lectures is not to be described as profitable, but a knowledge of them is indispensable to an adequate apprehension of the state of the theological mind at this era. The only Boyle Lectures published during the eighteenth century after Jortin's, were those of Newton, Heathcote, Worthington, and Henry Owen. Thomas Newton, Bishop of Bristol, had some reputation in his life-time, both as a preacher and a scholar; but the only work for which he is now remembered is his 'Dissertations on the Prophecies.' The first volume was published in 1754, when the author was Rector of St. Mary-le-Bow, in Cheapside. To encourage the prosecution of the work, Newton was made Boyle Lecturer, and the rest of the 'Dissertations' is the substance of what he delivered as lectures. The object of the work, as expressed in the title-page, was to treat of the prophecies 'which have remarkably been fulfilled, and at this time are fulfilling in the world.' In the dedication of the first volume to Dr. Herring, Archbishop of Canterbury, Newton says that he is 'only to treat of such prophecies as relate more immediately to these later ages, and are, in some measure, receiving their accomplishment at this time,' and not to those which had their fulfilment in Christ. The ultimate object is to prove Christianity by the fulfilment of prophecy, especially of such prophecies as could not possibly have been written after the events to which they referred.

Prophecies fulfilled.

Prophecy is regarded as the greatest evidence of the truth of religion. It is called an evidence which grows, for the more prophecies are fulfilled, the greater the certainty of revelation. Miracles were the great proofs to the first ages,

which saw them performed, and prophecies to the last ages, which see them accomplished. The plan involved a general review of all the prophecies in the Bible. Newton begins with that of the woman's seed, notices those that referred to the deluge, but finds the first great and distinct prophecy in the words of Noah, concerning the character and history of the nations that were to descend from his three sons. Canaan was cursed, and has been the servant of his brethren. God has dwelt in the tents of Shem. He tabernacled among the Jews. The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us. Japheth has been enlarged, by the conquests of his descendants the Greeks and Romans. 'God will enlarge Japheth and dwell in the tents of Shem,' may be interpreted to mean either that God, or that Japheth, may dwell in the tents of Shem. But Bishop Newton shows, that whichever way it is translated, the prophecy, in either case, was fulfilled. We, the descendants of Japheth, are dwelling in the tents of Shem; that is, we are within the pale of the Christian Church. The curse on Ishmael we see verified to this day, in the character of the Arab. That on Esau was fulfilled on the Edomites, who were tributary to the Jews. Jacob, on his death-bed, predicted the future of the twelve tribes. All has been fulfilled, and especially the remarkable prophecy, that the sceptre should not depart from Judah until the coming of Shiloh. The same is true of the prophecies of Balaam. They may not be very definite, but whatever they mean they were fulfilled. It is said, for instance, 'Ships shall come from the coast of Chittim and shall afflict Asshur, and shall afflict Eber, and *he* also shall perish for ever.' If Asshur is meant, it was fulfilled in the destruction of Assyria; but if Chittim, it was fulfilled by the Romans, when they subverted the Grecian Empire. The prophecy concerning the Jews, that they should be 'oppressed and spoiled evermore,' is fulfilled to this day, by their sufferings in Bohemia and Spain. The predictions concerning Babylon, Nineveh, and Tyre, are all accomplished; and we have in the Bishop of Rome a living fulfilment of Daniel's prophecy, concerning the 'little horn' which was to rise up after the ten kings.

In the second volume, Bishop Newton treats of the Book of Daniel, and the prophecies contained in it, of Christ's Prophecies being fulfilled.

CHAP. XV. foretelling the destruction of Jerusalem, and of St. Paul's predictions concerning the apostacy of the latter day. The Pope is proved to be 'the man of sin,' and because of his idolatries, the 'son of perdition.' The Revelation of St. John is found to be an epitome of the history of Europe, from the time of Domitian to the end of the world. It traces the rise of Popery and the career of Mahomet, the struggles of the Waldenses, and the conflicts of the Reformation, with a complete history of the Turks, and the alternate victories of the Roman Pontiff and the English Deists.

Dr. Heathcote's Boyle Lectures.

Of Dr. Ralph Heathcote's Boyle Lectures, only two were published. The subject of these was the Being of God. They were directed against the Hutchinsonians, who denied that we could know anything of God without external revelation, and against those who reasoned for the existence of God by arguments that were not valid. The first thought to honour revelation by dishonouring reason. But God, as the old Stoics said, though invisible, may be known by His works, the same way as we know mind by its works. Some of the invalid arguments were those drawn from the simple idea of God, as set forth by Clarke and Descartes, which, according to Dr. Heathcote, are 'fallacious and sophistical.' Others, like that founded on universal consent, were 'precarious and inconclusive.' So, also, were some metaphysical reasonings, grounded on ideas of immensity and eternity. Theologians had begun to use metaphysics in defence of religion, because Hobbes and Spinoza had used metaphysics against religion. This was answering fools according to their folly. The arguments which Dr. Heathcote called 'right proofs,' were those drawn from our own existence or the existence of creation, to the fact of a Creator.\*

Worthington's Boyle Lectures.

William Worthington's Boyle Lectures were delivered in 1766-7-8. The title of them was, 'The Evidence of Christianity, deduced from Facts and the Testimony of Sense, throughout all Ages of the Church to the Present Time.' The argument was an appeal to facts, instead of abstract reasoning; and the Lecturer was to prove that the evidence of Christianity, since its first institution, had been growing,

\* Dr. Heathcote also answered Dr. University of Oxford against the use Patten's sermon preached before the of reason in religion.



instead of decaying. He was to show that Christianity could be established on Bacon's method of experience. It was not founded on reason, nor on argument, nor on men's speculative notions, but on facts. And these are facts of which all men may be judges. They are divided into two classes: those which constitute Christianity, and those which attest it. To the first class belong such facts as the Being of God, which has been submitted to our very senses; and also the life, death, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus Christ. The second class embraces Christ's miracles, which were a demonstration of His spiritual power. Worthington evidently intended his distinction between facts and arguments as something original; but he does not proceed far, when he has to show that the facts depend on evidence. The great fact is the existence of the Church; against which the gates of hell cannot prevail. Testimony to things which we have not ourselves seen, should be reckoned sufficient. Thomas was rebuked for not receiving testimony. We act on it in daily life, and why not in religion? Few of us have ever sailed round Great Britain, yet we believe, on the testimony of others, that it is an island. Worthington defends the authenticity and genuineness of the books of Moses from the Samaritan version agreeing with ours, and he adds supplementary evidence, from the fulfilment of the prophecies concerning Ham, Babylon, Tyre, and Nineveh. The apostacy of the latter day was fulfilled in the English Deists; and Bishop Lloyd so accurately interpreted the predictions concerning the 'two witnesses,' that he told a Waldensian pastor 'he might return to the Vaudois, for, by the end of three years and a half the persecution would have ceased.' Before the pastor reached his native country, he heard the joyful news of its deliverance.

The subject of Dr. Henry Owen's lectures was 'The Intent and Propriety of the Scripture Miracles.' In the first sermon the Lecturer applied Butler's principle of analogy to the miracles of the New Testament, showing that they manifest the same wisdom and goodness which are seen in nature. The natural world and the kingdom of grace being so closely united, it is inferred that they are derived from the same cause and have the same Author. If, then, revelation

Miracles.

Prophecies.

Dr. Henry Owen's Boyle Lectures.



CHAP. XV. comes from God, we may infer that all its parts, whether we understand them or not, are founded on reason. This is confirmed when we come to examine the internal character of revelation. Its reasonableness and importance make its truth evident. The evidence of miracles, the Lecturer says, must have been sufficient when so many persons have believed particular revelations on the strength of them. Miracles are now ceased, but what religion loses by the diminishing of this branch of external proof it gains by the daily fulfilment of prophecy. The possibility of miracles is proved, in answer to Hume, and their probability from necessities in the moral world, such as those which Sir Isaac Newton showed to be in the natural. The interposing hand of God is sometimes required to rectify the machinery of creation, and the general scheme of providence has to be interrupted when some great or extraordinary object is to be obtained.

In 1768, Bishop Warburton founded Lectures on Prophecy to be delivered at Lincoln's Inn. The object was to prove the truth of revealed religion in general, and of the Christian in particular, from the completion of the prophecies in the Old and New Testament which relate to the Christian Church, especially to the 'Apostacy of Papal Rome.' The first lecturer was Richard Hurd, afterwards Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry. Hurd's sermons were called 'An Introduction to the Study of the Prophecies.' He began by clearing away some popular mistakes about the nature of the prophetic spirit. It was not left under the control of the prophet, as some persons suppose, nor was it confined to the affairs of great empires. The prophets in all their predictions were overruled by the Spirit of God. Hurd says that instead of determining beforehand what a prophecy should be, we ought rather to inquire into the nature of prophecies as we find them in the Scriptures. They are to be interpreted according to the sense in which we find that they have been fulfilled. As we go to nature to discover the intention of its Author, so should we go to Scripture to find there the use and intent of prophecy. The great subject of the Old Testament is the Messiah. The testimony of Jesus is the Spirit of prophecy. The evidence from the fulfilment

Hurd's Warburton Lectures.

of one prediction may be small, but it becomes great when several are fulfilled, which all tend to the completion of one design. Hurd says that so many Old Testament prophecies referring to Christ have been fulfilled, that Christianity would be proved even if the fulfilments were only in a secondary sense.\* If this be true it would meet the objections supposed to have been made by Anthony Collins, and moreover it would liberate Collins from the charge of being a Deist. A great part of Hurd's lectures are devoted to the predictions concerning the destruction of Jerusalem, the dispersion of the Jews, the conversion of the Gentiles, and the reign of Antichrist, which is the reign of the Papacy.

In 1776, Samuel Hallifax, afterwards Bishop of Gloucester, went over the ground prescribed by Warburton. At the first publication of a new religion, there must, he said, be miracles. It is necessary that the doctrine be reasonable, and worthy of God, but this is not enough without external confirmation. After the first age when miracles ceased, prophecy fitly came to take their place. The evidence of miracles is transient, that of prophecy is permanent. Hallifax discusses the question of the genuineness of the Book of Daniel, and interprets the four kingdoms as the Babylonian, the Persian, the Grecian, and the Roman. He supposes that the 'little horn' of the seventh chapter is not the same as the 'little horn' of the eighth. The latter springs from one of the four families into which the Greek Empire is divided, and is evidently Antiochus Epiphanes. The former succeeds the ten kingdoms of the Roman Empire, and is the great Antichrist. This is the Papacy, which is also the man of sin, the apostacy of the latter days, and the Babylonish woman of the Apocalypse.

In 1780, Dr. Lewis Bagot, Dean of Christ Church, afterwards Bishop of St. Asaph, preached the sermons at Warburton's lecture. Dr. Bagot's twelve discourses were very ordinary dissertations on the most commonplace subjects of prophecy. They had no special object, and did not even convict the Pope of being Antichrist. Lord Monboddo was refuted for making reason and language progressive, and for intimating that monkeys might become logicians and orators.

Hallifax's  
Warburton  
Lectures.

Bagot's War-  
burton Lec-  
tures.

\* P. 117.

CHAP. XV. The Dean found in a 'very ancient history of man,' an account of the first inhabitants of the Earth, who had the faculties of speech and reason given them at once, and had not to wait for their development. He preferred, he said, the Bible records to modern discoveries.

East's War-  
burton Lec-  
tures.

The Warburton lecturer for 1786 was Althorp East, Rector of Sutton-le-Bow. His lectures were the last of the series published in the eighteenth century. The subject as limited by Warburton's will was really exhausted by the first lecturers. East's lectures were as feeble as Bishop Bagot's. He found that the Old Testament predicted the same events as the New. The 'wild beasts' in Isaiah were 'the Turks, the Huns, and the Tartars.' The Psalms were found to be full of direct prophecies concerning Christ, and the rule was laid down as inviolable, that whenever an Old Testament passage was quoted in the New, it was to be regarded as a direct and literal prophecy.

Bampton Lec-  
tures.

The Bampton Lectures began in 1780. They were not limited to the question of Christian evidences, but included such articles of faith as are comprehended in the Apostles' Creed, and the Nicene. The first lecturer was Dr. James Bandinel, Public Orator of the University. Dr. Bandinel did not take any particular subject, but interspersed his sermons with occasional remarks bearing on Christian evidences. Christianity claimed to be the truth. It was a religion worthy of God. It was necessary that we preach it; for how could the world hear without a preacher? The antiquity of the Scriptures was demonstrated. The account of creation given by Moses was, said Bandinel, so rational, that Tatian, a Pagan philosopher, was converted by it to Christianity. The Scriptures are not only ancient, but we have a universal and uninterrupted tradition concerning their truth. They have been 'judicially sanctioned by men of the greatest learning in different ages, solemnly assembled in more than a thousand *provincial*, and not less than twenty *general* councils.\*' In these Scriptures we have an account of the first religion that was in the world, and of all the declarations of God's will to man. Dr. Bandinel defended several Christian doctrines, refuted some heresies, and discussed the question of the comparative evidential value of miracles and prophecy.

James Ban-  
dinel.

Dr. Timothy Neve preached the eight sermons at the Bampton Lecture in 1781. Like his predecessor he only delivered 'plain discourses,' and apologized for their publication by the necessity of complying with the injunctions of the founder of the lecture. Dr. Neve vindicated the authority and inspiration of the Scriptures. He showed that Christianity was founded on facts, and that all its evidences were such as commended themselves to reason. The only reason why the whole world did not believe after such overwhelming evidence, was owing to the prevalence of an evil heart of unbelief.

CHAP. XV.  
 Timothy  
 Neve.

The lectures next year by Robert Holmes, Fellow of New College, were 'On the Prophecies and Testimony of John the Baptist, and the parallel Prophecies of Jesus Christ.' John the Baptist was admitted to be a prophet by the Jews, and yet he did no miracles like other prophets. The decisive evidence for the divine mission of the Baptist arose out of his relation to the Messiah. He preached the baptism of repentance as opposed to mere ceremonial obedience, and as preparatory to baptism for the remission of sins. He described by prophetic inspiration the character and work of the Messiah before he knew that Jesus was the Christ. After his interview with Jesus, John's office of forerunner ceased. Henceforth he had to declare that the Mighty One was come. Jesus predicted His resurrection, and His meeting the disciples on a mountain in Galilee, where He was probably seen of the five hundred mentioned by St. Paul. He also predicted the outpouring of the Holy Ghost, the destruction of the Jewish polity and temple, the wide propagation of the Gospel, and many other things which have all been fulfilled and are evidences of the truth of Christianity.

Robert  
 Holmes.

The Bampton lecturer in 1783 was Dr. John Cobb. His subject was the insufficiency of natural religion and the necessity of revealed. The first arguments were drawn from the necessities of human nature. We crave certainty. It cannot be found in abstract reasonings, which are beyond the capacity of the multitude, and which always leave an uncertainty even as to active duty. Dr. Cobb, however, advocates a natural religion which is common to all men

John Cobb.

CHAP. XV. and written in their hearts. He calls conscience a lamp lighted up in the human soul to show the will of God. But no man has ever followed the light. It is not so clear as a written law, and it can provide no remedy for sin. The Gospel has the necessary attributes which are wanting in natural religion. It is, as many divines had said, a restoration of natural religion, but it is also something quite different. It cannot be submitted to the bar of human judgment. In that part of it which is mysterious and different from natural religion it has no internal evidence, but depends solely on the external divine testimony. Bishop Bradford, in his Boyle Lectures, had said that the Gospel is credible, because agreeable to those notions which men naturally have, of God and of themselves. To this Dr. Cobb answers, that the economy of the divine dispensation is not within the reach of human comprehension, and cannot be tested by man's understanding. Right reason cannot be a ground either for believing or for rejecting Christianity. What is right reason to one is not right reason to another. The things on which men would universally agree are too few to be made the test of any moral system. God requires faith and obedience. In the daily providence of life we have intimations of God's will, but in the Scriptures what we are to believe and do are particularly declared. The faith required by Christianity is 'deference to the word of God.' Submission to prescription is necessary because of the inherent perverseness of the human will and the infatuation of the human understanding.

Joseph White. The Bampton lecturer for 1784 was Joseph White, Laudian Professor of Arabic. He made a comparison between the Christian religion and that of Mahomet, repeating the familiar remark, that Christianity, by its success, proved its divinity, while the success of Mahometanism was due to force. Christianity had to contend with many carnal powers leagued against it, but the corruptions of Christianity and other circumstances contributed to the rapid spread of the religion of the false prophet.\*

\* Though there is nothing original gantly written. White is said to in White's lectures, they are ele- have been assisted by Samuel Ead-

Next year the lecturer was Ralph Churton, who took for his subject 'The Prophecies respecting the Destruction of Jerusalem.' The lectures, however, embraced many other prophecies, as the time of Christ's advent before the destruction of the second temple, the spread of Christianity, the rise of false Christs and false prophets, and the future conversion of the Jews. All these were discussed in connection with the prophecies concerning the destruction of Jerusalem, which were shown from the facts of history to have had a literal and complete fulfilment.

In 1786 Dr. George Croft defended the Church of England, and refuted the Dissenters. This involved the discussion of such subjects as the use and abuse of reason, the inspiration of the Scriptures, and the authority of the Primitive Fathers. The connection between some of these subjects and the main object of the lectures, is not always very evident. Dr. Croft mentions several cases of the abuse of reason in doctrine. One is that of the Optimists, who say that all things are created so as to produce the greatest good. But surely, the lecturer argues, that Great Being who is to give us blessedness in a future life might have made us equal to the angels in this. Plenary inspiration is defended as indispensable to the defence of Christianity. The Fathers are not regarded as authorities, but as commentators and as witnesses to matters of fact. Dr. Croft defends the sacramental test on the ground that Dissenters are not proper judges of the rights of king and people. He also defends the damnatory clauses in the Athanasian Creed, calling them a declaration of the general will of God, which 'does not imply an absolute exclusion of every culpable individual from His mercy.'\*

The next lecturer was William Hawkins, who called his sermons 'Discourses on Scripture Mysteries.' What are called mysteries he regarded as constituting the Gospel. To live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world was mere philosophy; † but to believe what God had revealed, that is, articles of faith, was Christianity. It is written, 'He

CHAP. XV.

Ralph Churton.

George Croft.

William Hawkins.

cock, a Dissenting preacher in Exeter, who afterwards conformed to the Church. The authorship has been a subject of controversy. See the 'Life of Dr. Parr,' by Dr. Johnstone.

\* P. 123.

† P. 10.



CHAP. XV. that believeth shall be saved.' Good works are certainly necessary to salvation. But faith is required as well as good works, and the things to be believed are the Trinity, which the Fathers called a standing doctrine of the Christian Church, and the resurrection of the body in the sense of a literal resurrection of the flesh.

Richard Shep-  
herd.

In 1788, Dr. Richard Shepherd, Archdeacon of Bedford, discoursed of 'The Ground and Credibility of the Christian Religion.' His lectures did not profess to contain anything new, but were meant as a substitute for 'the folios of the last century,' which 'desultory readers' of Dr. Shepherd's day had not time to read. The religion of nature was proved not to be the wisdom which Solomon commends, for in all countries where it prevails the people are idolaters. The lectures were mostly against the Unitarians, especially Priestley and Lindsey. The tendency of Priestley's philosophy, the lecturer said, was to make the Deity material.

Edward  
Tatham.

In 1789, Dr. Edward Tatham preached a very extraordinary course of sermons, which he afterwards made into a treatise called 'The Chart and Scale of Truth by which to find the Cause of Error.' This was an elaborate analysis of the whole science of reasoning, in which Aristotle was confounded and Bacon exalted. After intricate disquisitions on every conceivable branch both of physics and metaphysics, the lecturer came at last to prove that the source of theology was the will of God, that its evidence was neither by sense nor reason, but by inspiration. The outcome of the whole argument is the ordinary doctrine that Christianity is an external revelation, containing matter worthy of God, but confirmed by miracles and the fulfilment of prophecies.

Henry Kett.

In 1790, Henry Kett, Fellow of Trinity College, preached on the necessity of studying the Fathers, and walking in the 'old paths.' Ecclesiastical learning, he said, was neglected, though that age was one of large investigation. The Fathers, however, were only to be used as witnesses to facts and doctrines. They were not to be followed when they differed from the plain sense of Scripture. The moderns were much superior to them, and had many advantages which the old



Fathers had not. Gibbon had been unjust to them, and Priestley had elevated the earliest heretics to the rank of orthodox believers. Conyers Middleton was refuted by testimonies from Clement of Rome, and other Fathers. Clement says of the Corinthian Christians, that they were 'all endued with a plentiful effusion of the Holy Spirit.' This was interpreted to mean that they had miraculous gifts. CHAP. XV.

Robert Morres, 'late Fellow of Brasenose,' was the next Bampton lecturer. He discoursed of the grounds and nature of faith, which he called an assent of the understanding to propositions on the testimony of others. This was the primary meaning of faith, but it also included a conviction of the reality of things not seen, according to the description in the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is shown that faith is at the foundation of all knowledge. We cannot make a calculation in astronomy without relying on the testimony of other persons. The same is true in matters of history. Divine faith is to believe that the Scriptures were dictated by the Holy Ghost. Whatever is probable should be believed, and it is probable that the Apostles, being sent by God, were inspired at all times. Internal evidence is regarded as only secondary, but it gives credibility. Some other subjects are introduced, as the necessity of subscribing Articles of Religion. There is also a defence of the anathemas in the Athanasian Creed. It is maintained that they do not apply to the explanations of the Trinity, but only to the doctrine, and that not as imposed by the Church, but as taught in the word of God. Robert Morres.

Morres was succeeded by Dr. John Eveleigh, Provost of Oriel. Eveleigh's sermons were on the substance of Christianity, its history, with arguments for its truth, and answers to objections. After a statement of the chief doctrines of the Gospel, it was shown that the success of Christianity was different in kind from the success of other institutions. It did not triumph by human means, but by supernatural help given to the weakest instruments. The rise of the Papacy was found to be delineated by the prophets and the Apostles. Gibbon and Hume were refuted, and so also was Lord Kames on the origin of man. It was concluded that revelation must be true because there are so many counterfeit revelations. John Eveleigh.

## CHAP. XV.

James William-  
son.

James Williamson, Prebendary of Lincoln, was the next lecturer. His subject was 'The Truth, Inspiration, Authority, and End of the Scriptures.' The authority of the Scriptures was made to depend on 'the numerous and stupendous miracles' which attended 'the publication both of the Old and New Testament.'\* This passage occurs where the preacher is speaking of the Scriptures, but he seems, from the context, to mean by 'Old and New Testament,' the old and new dispensations. It is said that Christ confirmed the inspiration of the Old Testament, and it is argued that it would be absurd not to suppose the New inspired when the writers were commissioned by God. Faith is defined as believing the authority of the Old and the New Testament. In the course of the lectures, Dr. Priestley, the Pope, and many other hereties, are refuted.

Thomas  
Wintle.

James Williamson was succeeded by Thomas Wintle, 'of Pembroke College,' who 'illustrated' 'The Expediency, Prediction, and Accomplishment of the Christian Redemption.' This was a series of good ordinary sermons on the nature and influence of Christianity. The whole Christian scheme of redemption is explained and vindicated, beginning with the fall of man, and tracing the promise of a Redeemer through the Old Testament, till Christ came and made the expiation for sin which man required.

Daniel Veyesie.

Nearly of the same nature were the sermons in 1795, by Daniel Veyesie, Fellow of Oriel College. They were chiefly intended as an answer to Priestley. The atonement was taken in the literal sense of satisfaction, but as something provided by God, and not as something which made God merciful. Dr. Priestley's arguments all suppose that the latter view is the one generally held by orthodox Christians. His own doctrine is that Christ saved man by His example and His teaching, but that the sacrificial language applied to the death of Christ was only figurative. Veyesie denied that it was merely figurative. It set forth by analogy a real fact. Something was done by Christ in reference to God for us, and this is properly redemption.

Robert Gray.

In 1796, Robert Gray, Vicar of Faringdon, was Bampton lecturer. His subject was 'The Principles upon which the

Reformation of the Church of England was established.' CHAP. XV.  
 This was a defence of the Church of England against the Roman Catholics and the Puritans. Authority was given to bishops; but this authority rested on the will of the Christian people. It was not what would be called a divine commission; but such authority as must exist in every well-regulated society. Hoadly was refuted under the supposition that he denied this. The corruptions of Christianity through the Papacy were shown to be the grounds of the Reformation. The duty of the State to promote Christianity was maintained, but not the right to impose it, nor any special form of it, if not acceptable to the people.

In the following year, Dr. William Finch, Rector of Avington, 'considered' 'The Objections of Infidel and other Writers against Christianity.' This was an answer to Gibbon, Priestley, Voltaire, Condorcet, and some other unbelievers. The first two were answered by arguments avowedly taken from Watson and Horsley. Priestley, to prove his Socinian heresy, changed the very Scriptures, and for Christ is come 'in the flesh,' read 'of the flesh.' Gibbon wrote his history to gratify the depraved taste of the time. In speaking of Roman laws, he omitted to show how their rigour had been softened by the influence of Christianity; and how the Gospel had changed or abolished the savage and unmerciful customs of the Roman people. The refutation of Voltaire related chiefly to what he had said in his 'Jewish Letters,' about the cruelty of the Mosaic laws; and that of Condorcet, to the principle of human progress through the advance of science and natural knowledge. The Pope was also refuted, and the connection of Church and State defended.

The next Bampton lecturer was Charles Henry Hill, Chaplain to the Lord Bishop of Exeter. His sermons were on the gradual development of revelation. The Gospel came in the fulness of time, when the world was prepared for it. Man's great want was the knowledge of a future life. This is called by the lecturer the only ground of piety towards God, and of benevolence towards man. The patriarchs had distant hopes of it; and to the Jews it was prefigured in types and shadows. To the objections from want of universality, and the late advent of the full light of the Gospel,

CHAP. XV. it is answered that God will make allowance for involuntary ignorance. The method of gradual revelation was both suited to the nature of man and agreeable to the ways of God.

William  
Barrow.

Dr. William Barrow, 'of Queen's College,' was Bampton lecturer in 1799; and George Richards, Vicar of Bampton, in 1800. The first answered 'Popular Objections against the Necessity or Credibility of the Christian Revelation.' He proved the necessity of revelation from the insufficiency of reason to discover the existence of God, or to know human duty. Wilkins, Wollaston, Clarke, and all that generation, had confounded human reason, which is very dark, with their own reason after it had been enlightened by revelation. All knowledge came by revelation. Eusebius is quoted, bearing witness that the Egyptians first learned astronomy from Abraham. Richards's lectures were on the 'Divine Origin of Prophecy.' Infidelity, the lecturer said, was so prevalent that all subjects yielded to the importance of setting forth the fundamental arguments for the truth of Christianity. Paley had erred in making prophecy only 'auxiliary' evidence. The prophecies of the Scriptures were said to be unlike other prophecies. They were direct and minute, even sometimes naming the persons to whom they referred, and they often foretold things which were not desired by the prophets employed to utter them.

George  
Richards.

The Evan-  
gelical move-  
ment.

The great Evangelical movement in the end of the last century comes only in part within the scope of the present work. It was a revival of religion, and not a development of theological opinions. It took its stand on the theology of the Reformation, and it gave its entire 'assent and consent' to the 'Articles of Religion,' in their natural and grammatical sense, as intended by the compilers. The Evangelical clergy were related to the Methodists, though not identical with them. Hervey came under Wesley's influence at Oxford, and Toplady ascribed his conversion to a man who had been employed as one of Wesley's preachers. The other leaders, however, of the Evangelical movement were independent of the influence of the Methodists. William Romaine was originally a Hutchinsonian, and probably never renounced his opposition to Sir Isaac Newton and human reason. Henry

Venn was brought up a High Churchman of the old school, which believed that all persons, if baptized, however reprobate, were truly regenerate. He ascribed his change of sentiments entirely to reading the Scriptures. The same is true of Grimshaw, Walker of Truro, and some others, who were contemporary with Venn, and might be called the first of the Evangelical clergy. Romaine says that when he began his ministry they did not number more than six or seven, but before he died, which was in 1795, he could number about five hundred.

By the end of the century the Evangelical party had become a great power in the Church. Its bishop was Beilby Porteus, its great apostle was Charles Simeon, and its earnest laity were represented in literature by William Wilberforce and Hannah More. The first of the Evangelicals were mostly strict Calvinists, but by the end of the century the Calvinism was modified, and in some cases abandoned. If our object had been to portray characters and to give the histories of earnest and genuine men, the Evangelical party would supply abundant and varied material. But for a history of theology, we should only have to repeat opinions which are sufficiently known. One book, however, which may be regarded as the representative book of the party, cannot be omitted. This is Wilberforce's 'Practical View of the Prevailing Religious Systems of Professed Christians in the Higher and Middle Classes in this Country.'

Wilberforce's object was to set forth as a corrective to the prevailing views of religion what he regarded as 'real Christianity.' A 'view,' that is, a set of opinions, was at the root of the argument. The author regarded these as something wherein our everlasting interests are involved, and rebuked Soame Jenyns for treating them as matters of mere speculation. The philosophical mind regards Christian doctrine as a means to an end. The end is an upright life. Such a life may exist where Christian doctrine is unknown, and where the views of it are very incorrect. But Wilberforce regarded Christianity as a system of doctrine to be believed, and that system he regarded as what is called the Evangelical, and not to believe it was, he said, to imperil 'the immortal soul.' A sincere mind, a religious or moral life, were insufficient with-

Its leaders.

Wilberforce's  
'Practical  
View.'

CHAP. XV. out the articles of faith which were supposed to constitute revelation. The first of these articles was the corruption of human nature. Man is represented as desperately wicked, always and everywhere. Those who do not recognise the natural corruption of the human race do not see the necessity of redemption and regeneration, and are in consequence deficient in gratitude for what Christ has done. The Socinian, who is the supposed adversary, insists on the superiority of moral precepts to mysterious doctrines, but he is answered with 'Vain wisdom all and false philosophy.' The essence of Christianity is to believe, according to the words, 'This is the work of God that ye *believe* in Him whom He hath sent.' The creed is reckoned of more importance than the life, and yet the great value of Wilberforce's 'Practical View' is not that it was a protest against the beliefs of that age, but that it was an earnest and a noble summons to the Christian life.\*

Theological writers at the end of the eighteenth century.

We are now bordering on the close of the eighteenth century. The only writers yet to be noticed are those who lived on either almost or altogether into the present century. Some of them are remembered by old men still living, as they in their turn remembered the Sherlocks and the Hoadlys of other days. A man's life is but short, yet a few lives stretch far back into the faded and forgotten centuries. In looking over the bishops of the last two decades of the eighteenth century, we can find but few whose names are known in the world of letters, or whose deeds are in any way remembered. The two Archbishops of Canterbury, Cornwallis and Moore, are unknown.† The Archbishop of York, Dr. Markham, is mentioned by Dr. Parr, along with Cyril Jackson, as men who did a great work as scholars and tutors, but who left nothing for

\* Wilberforce, in his youth, often went to hear Theophilus Lindsey, in Essex Street. Lindsey's preaching is described as quite of the same kind as was common in the Church of England, with only a little more earnestness. The Evangelicals were the only earnest preachers among the clergy; and Wilberforce was naturally led to identify earnest religion with their doctrines. He separated Evan-

gelical theology from Calvinism, but the separation was not logically admissible. He took Calvin's theology without Calvin's logic.

† Cornwallis is chiefly remembered for a letter written by George III., rebuking him for the 'routs' he held at Lambeth Palace. Moore interfered in politics, and is said to have had undue influence over the king when in his dotage.



posterity to remember them. John Douglas, Bishop of Salisbury, is known for his 'Criterion of Miracles,' Thomas Newton, Samuel Hallifax, and Richard Hurd, for their lectures on prophecy, and the last perhaps more for his relation to Warburton. The name of Lewis Bagot, Bishop of Norwich, and afterwards of St. Asaph, will be found among the Bampton lecturers. Robert Lowth had a great reputation as a Hebrew scholar, Beilby Porteus as a diligent and pious bishop, while Shute Barrington earned a great name by his patronage of learning and learned men. Samuel Horsley, Richard Watson, and George Tomline are the only other bishops of this period who are known as theological writers. With them we shall also notice William Paley, John Hey, Thomas Balguy, and Samuel Parr.

The most important of Bishop Horsley's theological works are his controversies with Priestley. The Unitarian met at the hands of the bishop much the same treatment as Collins had received from Bentley. Priestley had a great name for his discoveries in science, and this reputation might seem to give authority to his religious opinions. To destroy Priestley's credit as a scholar and a theologian was the immediate object which Horsley set before him. The extraordinary theories which Priestley undertook to maintain we have already noticed. He was to prove that all antiquity was Unitarian until the rise of Arianism. This involved the discussion of texts of Scripture, the meaning of the Platonic words in the New Testament, of passages from the Fathers, and many questions concerning the genuineness of writings ascribed to the Fathers. The texts, especially in St. John's Gospel, which Priestley had tried to explain, were shown to be incapable of the meaning which he wished to fasten upon them. The Logos, which was in the beginning with God, Horsley maintained to be a person, and not merely a divine attribute. The Fathers, he said, continually called this Logos Jesus Christ the Son of God, and proved, in opposition to the heretics, that this Word was spoken eternally, and was not preceded by a time of silence. The Jews, of whom St. Athanasius speaks as believing that Jesus Christ was a mere man, were really unbelieving Jews, and not, as Dr. Priestley interprets the passage, Jewish Christians. The Nazarenes are

Bishop  
Horsley.



CHAP. XV. described by Epiphanius as half Jews and half Christians, and a doubt is expressed as to their belief in Christ's divinity. They may have believed that Christ was a mere man, or they may have believed that He was begotten of Mary by the Holy Ghost. The latter belief Horsley reckoned the same as believing Christ's divinity. But the opinion of these Nazarenes is worth nothing; they were only heretics. St. Jerome says that from a desire of being Jews and Christians at once, they were neither Jews nor Christians. Until the days of Zuicker a distinction was always made between the primitive Church of Jerusalem and its heretic offspring, the Nazarenes.

His answer to  
Priestley.

Dr. Priestley thought that he was refuting Christ's divinity by showing that the Christian Trinity was the counterpart of the Trinity of the Platonists. It was supposed that the philosophy of Plato had been introduced into the Christian Church, and had become the means of its corruption. Horsley answers, that even could it be proved that the Christian Trinity is identical with that of the Platonists, it would not follow that it was not a doctrine of inspiration. Even, he says, were every iota of the Gospel to be found in the writings of the Greek philosophers, that would not be sufficient to set aside revelation. God might make discoveries by revelation, to which only a few could attain by abstract reasoning. Horsley, however, refuses to admit that the Platonists reached this doctrine through the exercise of reason. He finds it in all antiquity, and believes it to have been handed down from Noah. It was therefore only a part of an earlier revelation. It is admitted that the Platonists who were converted to Christianity continued to use the language of Plato, but it is maintained from many passages in the Fathers that by the Word and Wisdom of God they meant the persons of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.

Christ's  
divinity  
taught by the  
Fathers.

Priestley was plainly convicted of many mistakes in matters of history and criticism. Horsley charged him with taking his material second hand from Zuicker, Episcopius, Petavius, and Huctius. All this, however, was false, for Priestley was not acquainted with the modern controversies on the subject, and confessed that he had never even read Bishop Bull. Passages in abundance were quoted from the Fathers to

prove that in the early ages of Christianity Jesus Christ was regarded as more than a man. St. Barnabas calls Him 'the Lord of the whole earth,' and speaks of His divinity as an article of the common faith of Christians. Tertullian speaks of 'a plurality of persons in the unity of the Godhead,' and describes the followers of Unitarian preachers as ignorant persons. Justin Martyr alludes to Unitarians under the character of 'blasphemers of Christ.' The passage which Dr. Priestley had quoted from Athanasius, that the Apostles kept the divinity of Christ as a secret, Horsley interpreted to mean that they preached of the resurrection of Christ, but did not enter upon higher subjects with their first converts.

Richard Watson, Bishop of Llandaff, was the representative bishop of the liberal party in the Church at the end of the last century and the beginning of this. From every point, whether as a Christian or as a citizen, he advocated freedom for all opinions, and the utmost liberty in examination and inquiry. This was a liberality which did not proceed from indifference to truth, but 'from a total dislike of dogmatism and intolerance.'\* He was thankful for the progress which the spirit of toleration had made during the century that was closing, and he prayed that ere long throughout Christendom intolerance might give place to the spirit of Christianity, which is the spirit of meekness, peace, and love. He made no scruple, even in that age, to call Unitarians Christians; and though he was far from thinking it an indifferent matter to have correct views on subjects of doctrine, he yet knew that a righteous life was a more important part of the Christian religion than an orthodox creed. The question, he said, at the last day will not be if we are Catholics or Protestants, Calvinists or Arminians, but if we have put off the old man, and adorned our minds with Christian virtues.†

Bishop Watson's own views of theology were in the main orthodox. He rejected the notions of Augustine and Calvin on the consequences of Adam's sin, but he defended the atonement as required by the moral government of God. At the time of the agitation for the abolition of subscription to Articles, he took the side of Archdeacon Blackburne, and repeated many of the arguments which Blackburne had used.

\* Miscellaneous Tracts, vol. i. p. 95.

† *Ib.*, p. 394.

CHAP. XV. He did not deny the value of confessions of faith, but he denied the right of one man to impose upon another his interpretation of Christianity. He showed, too, that practically Articles of Religion were worthless. They had no effect in restraining the clergy, who set them aside as naturally as teachers in the universities set aside exploded systems of philosophy, though bound to teach them by college statutes. The chief value of the Articles was their condemnation of the heresies of the Church of Rome. But the whole of the Liturgy required revision. Doctrines, the bishop said, merely speculative, were set forth in the Prayer Book as necessary to salvation; and this was one of the main causes of the prevalence of Deism. The plea for the Athanasian anathemas is that the same condemnation is found in the Scriptures against those who do not believe the Gospel. But Bishop Watson denies that the exposition of the Trinity in the Athanasian Creed is identical with the Gospel. It is at best but a fallible interpretation, and they ought to blush for their want of humility and charity who erect it into 'an idol which all men must either worship or perish without doubt everlastingly.\*' If we are to have creeds at all, let us have them from Locke or Clarke or Tillotson, rather than from either Athanasius or Arius.

On subscrip-  
tion to arti-  
cles of reli-  
gion.

His answer  
to Gibbon.

Bishop Watson will be chiefly remembered as a writer on the great subject which occupied his century—the evidences of Christianity. His answers to Gibbon and Paine are classical works of their kind. In his 'History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,' Gibbon accounted for the first successes of Christianity by secondary or natural causes. One was the intolerant zeal of the Christians, which they inherited from the Jewish religion. Another was the doctrine of a future life, improved by circumstances which gave it weight and efficacy. The third was the miraculous powers ascribed to the Church. The fourth was the virtues of the first Christians, who, after the example of their Divine Master, addressed themselves to men and especially to women oppressed with the consciousness, and very often with the effects, of their vices; and the fifth was the union and discipline of the Christian Church. Gibbon did not deny the excellence of

\* *Ib.*, p. 112.

Christian doctrine, nor the fact of an overruling Providence. CHAP. XV.  
 But it was inferred that if the success of Christianity was not due to the immediate action of Deity, Christianity was not a miraculous revelation. Watson answered that the inflexible zeal of the first preachers of Christianity was due to their strong and full persuasion of its truth. They did not humour the prejudices of those to whom they preached, which was the course that would have presented itself to ordinary men. But, on the contrary, they proclaimed their doctrines without compromise. The future life set forth in the Gospel was not of that kind which would win the attention of the Greeks or Romans. The Pagan philosophers had abandoned the doctrine of rewards and punishments, and had it not been for supernatural evidence that preached by the Apostles would never have been believed. It was the sense of supernatural authority which made Felix tremble. St. Paul was ridiculed at Athens as soon as he spoke of the Resurrection. The immediate coming of Christ and the end of the world were not, as Gibbon supposed, believed by the Apostles to be evidently at hand. St. Paul discourses of the man of sin, the great apostacy, and some other things which were to take place before the end. So that this could not be one of the causes of the spread of Christianity. The miracles, if not genuine, would have hindered rather than furthered the cause of the Gospel. Roman Catholic miracles drove many from the Roman Catholic Church, and made them either Protestants or unbelievers. It is said that the Gospel was first preached to the poor, and that among its adherents were many women; but there were also some of the rich, the noble, and the learned. The union and discipline of the Christian Church are admitted to have had some influence, but this was not sufficient to make Pagans forsake their idols and subject themselves to the severities of persecution. It was denied that the Roman emperors were as tolerant as Gibbon had pictured them, and it was shown that Christians had many virtues which were unknown to Pagans.

The 'Age of Reason,' by Thomas Paine, was an undiscriminating attack on the Scriptures. Bishop Watson answered it in 'An Apology for the Bible,' taking the orthodox ground that the Bible is the word of God. Paine

His answer to Paine.

CHAP. XV. said that it was repugnant to the moral justice of God that crying or smiling infants should be doomed to destruction as they were in the case of the Canaanites. Bishop Watson answered that the Canaanites were very wicked, and their destruction as a race was no more contrary to the justice of God than what we see frequently in nature. Earthquakes, floods, and famines often destroy whole cities, with every class of people, of every age and condition. Whatever happens is part of a great plan of which we do not see the whole. The things recorded in the Bible are the counterparts of what we see daily in the natural world. The appearances of God in the Old Testament seem strange to us, but the circumstances of the people may have required a mode of teaching different from what is necessary for us. The genuineness of the Books of Moses was defended, but even supposing that they had been amended by Ezra, they are still, Bishop Watson says, authentic. The principal facts recorded in Genesis, as the Creation, the Fall, the Flood, are confirmed out of profane writers. The tenth chapter of Genesis is one of the most valuable records of antiquity, for it explains that of which all historians are ignorant—the origin of nations. It is, however, afterwards admitted that the inspiration of the Scriptures is not plenary. The writers were sometimes left to their own knowledge, so that we need not be surprised to find errors in chronology, geography, and genealogy, and even ‘contradictions as to historical facts.’\*

Bishop Tomline's 'Refutation of Calvinism.'

Bishop Tomline's chief controversial work was his 'Refutation of Calvinism.' He was to refute the doctrines of Calvin from the Scriptures, the early Fathers, and the formularies of the Church of England. The arguments from the last were some expressions in the Prayer Book concerning the universality of the atonement, which are not necessarily incompatible with Calvinism, at least, in its modified forms. All the Articles which are generally understood to be Calvinistical, are interpreted in an Arminian sense. Original sin is explained as a real corruption in the nature of man; but it is denied that this corruption is so complete as to destroy man's natural capacity for keeping God's laws. Christ Himself admitted there were some righteous persons

when He said that He had not come to call the righteous but sinners to repentance. It is clear, Tomline says, from the parable of the sower, as well as from other parables, that there is some natural goodness in the heart of man. To believe in Jesus Christ is not enough for salvation. That belief must be followed by works, which are the thing really needful. Those who hear and obey are made children of God by baptism. If the baptismal grace is improved, inward strength is increased by the Holy Ghost. A good deal is made of the refusal by the Hampton Court Conference to insert the words 'but not finally,' in Art. XVI., after 'fall into sin;' and also of the Westminster Assembly changing the words, in Art. XI., 'very far gone from original righteousness,' into 'totally gone.' The regeneration in baptism, Bishop Tomline says, cannot be succeeded by another regeneration, for there cannot be two entrances into the spiritual life any more than into the natural life.

Dr. William Paley was by a long way the ablest Churchman who belonged to the second half of the last century. Both for good and evil, he was the genuine product, as well as the highest representative, of the school of Bishop Law and Archdeacon Blackburne. His first effort in literature was a pamphlet in defence of Bishop Law, on subscription to Articles. He entirely sympathized with the object of 'The Feathers Tavern Petition;' but when asked to subscribe to it he answered facetiously that he could not afford to keep a conscience.

Paley's pamphlet in defence of Bishop Law, was an answer to Dr. Randolph, who founded his argument for subscription on the necessity of the rulers of the Church having some assurance that those whom they ordained as teachers were sound in the faith. Paley answered, that in nine cases out of ten to which the test is now extended, it was not necessary for a Christian teacher to be sound in the faith. And if it were, the means are defective. The determinations of a set of men whose good fortune has advanced them to high stations in the Church are not more likely to be right than the conclusions of private inquirers. Moreover, by Dr. Randolph's own confession, they are not a rule of faith, do not interfere with private judgment, and, consequently, are



CHAP. XV. not effectual either for producing or securing soundness in the faith.

Says that those who impose the Articles do not believe them.

It has come to pass that the bishops who impose the Articles do not themselves believe the Articles which they impose. If they had any authority, they would be able to change the test so as to suit the changing opinions of different ages. But it now happens that the men who keep most faithfully to the standard doctrines of the Church are 'persecuted for their singularity, excluded from orders, driven from the universities, and compelled to preach the established religion in fields and conventicles.'

Advocates a broad Church.

Paley repeated the arguments of Archdeacon Blackburne, that a Protestant Church, not being infallible, could not consistently impose articles of faith except so far as they agreed with Scripture. He advocated the same liberty which in former times had been advocated by Hales and Chillingworth, by Clarke and by Hoadly. Let the Church, he says, 'discharge from her liturgy controversies unconnected with devotion; let her try what may be done for all sides, by worshipping God in that generality of expression in which He Himself has left some points; let her dismiss many of her articles, and convert those which she retains into terms of peace; let her recall the terrors she suspended over freedom of inquiry; let the toleration she allows to Dissenters be made *absolute*; let her invite men to search the Scriptures; let her governors encourage the studious and learned of all persuasions; let her do this, and she will be secure of the thanks of her own clergy, and, what is more, of their sincerity. A greater consent may grow out of inquiry than many are at present aware of.'

His 'Moral Philosophy.'

Paley's reputation began with the publication of his 'Moral and Political Philosophy.' The subject was not new, nor was there anything original in this treatise. Its great value was the vigour and clearness with which it was written. The doctrine of morals which it set forth was a modified form of the old sensuous system of Hobbes, against which English philosophers and divines had been protesting ever since Hobbes's day. Paley's moral philosophy can scarcely be called philosophy, and its morality is doubtful. It was an improvement on Mandeville. It denied that vice had any



advantage over virtue, even in regard to present happiness, and it did make happiness something higher than the mere pleasures of sense. But it found no surer foundation for morality than prudence, and no higher reward than personal self-interest. Paley denied the existence of a moral sense in man, and reduced all moral instincts to prejudice or habit. Obligation is derived from the will of God as our rule, and from our interest as a motive. The will of God is known by revelation or what we can learn of God's designs in nature.

What has been said of Paley's 'Moral Philosophy' is true of his treatise on 'Evidences.' Its value lies in the clearness of the arrangement, and not in the originality of the arguments. To Paley revelation is something altogether external, and the proofs of its divine origin only begin to appear after the assumption of many probabilities. Some of these are that it is likely God would give us a revelation because of our natural darkness; that if there be a future life it is likely we should have some knowledge of it, and if there be a revelation it is likely that it would be attested by miracles. At this stage, the proper argument begins. The persons who saw the miracles of Jesus laid down their lives as witnesses to the truth of what they saw. If the founders of any other sects had undergone similar labours and hardships to attest the truth of miracles which they had seen, Paley would have believed their mission divine. But there is no satisfactory evidence of the original witnesses of other miracles having acted in a similar manner to that of the Apostles of Christianity.

His 'Evidences of Christianity.'

The first proposition required an examination of the evidence that the first preachers of the Gospel had endured the hardships to which they were subjected, under a conviction of the truth of the miracles they had seen. This was established by the testimony of history, both sacred and profane. The proof involved questions concerning the genuineness and authenticity of the New Testament writings, though the genuineness of one Gospel was sufficient for the argument. Under the second proposition, it is shown that the accounts which we have of other miracles are not from original witnesses. They are found in histories written long after the

Miracles the great argument.

CHAP. XV. events recorded, or they are accounts published in one country of what was done in another. Some were only transient rumours, and in all the cases there are doubts if a miracle was really wrought. Those mentioned by Hume; the cures wrought by Vespasian, the Spanish miracles recorded by the Cardinal de Metz, and the miracles at the tomb of the Abbé Paris; are found deficient in some of the criteria of a true miracle. Paley adds some 'Auxiliary Arguments.' The first is fulfilled prophecy. He quotes Isaiah lii. and liii. as the clearest of the Old Testament prophecies, and he refers to Bishop Chandler for the others. From the New Testament there is Christ's prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem. Other arguments are derived from the morality of the Gospel, Christ's personal character, and the character of His doctrine. All these are shown to be peculiar and without parallel in the histories of other doctrines and other teachers.

Objections  
answered.

The third part of this treatise is a consideration of some popular objections. In this department Paley's special talent had ample scope. He kept himself free from every theory of inspiration, and rested his arguments on that practical common sense which is our guide in daily life. He was not indisposed to admit discrepancies in the Gospels. It was better, he said, to do this than to stake the truth of Christianity on some forced harmonies. The argument did not require that the Evangelists were infallible in their narratives. The general facts were sufficient. Yet the discrepancies of the Gospels are just of that kind that we would expect from memoirs where many things are omitted that would probably explain all our difficulties. The objections of the Deists fell hardest on those who burdened themselves with the theory that the Scriptures must be in everything infallible. Paley admitted that the Old Testament quotations made by the Evangelists and Apostles were mostly mere accommodations. This might not be the case where they quoted precisely, and solemnly affirmed that the event they recorded was the fulfilment of the prophecy. But even supposing they were wrong in the critical application of texts, this does not affect their credit as historians. The Apostles' testimony is enough for the defence of Christianity. If we can be sure of the

facts, we need not be troubled that their opinions were not always correct. The object of the Apostolic mission is to be separated from things that are only incidentally connected with it, and the doctrines of the Apostles are not to be confounded with the arguments which they used to uphold them. This rejection of the theory of New Testament infallibility saves Christianity from being saddled with the defence of Judaism. Christ and his Apostles assumed the divine origin of the Mosaic institutions, but they did not profess to be answerable for the genuineness of every book or the accuracy of every statement in the Old Testament.

A formidable objection to Paley's argument from miracles was the general unbelief of those to whom the Gospel was first preached. This is considered as it relates to the Jews and to the Gentiles. It is shown that the Jews did not doubt the truth and reality of Christ's miracles. The cause of their unbelief was their mistaken notions concerning the character of the Messiah. They believed the miracles, and yet they believed not that Jesus was the Christ. The cause of the unbelief of the Gentiles, especially those of rank and education, is found in their contempt for a new religion. They had already concluded that all religions were fables, and when Christianity came it was rejected without examination. Another objection is, that the Apostles and first Apologists of Christianity do not appeal to miracles so frequently as might have been expected. The answer to this is that the Apostles always assume the miracles, but that the character of their epistles did not require formal arguments. Some of the apologists did appeal to the miracles, and others gave reasons why they rather urged other evidences. Justin Martyr, for instance, says that he has recourse to prophecy for proof because miracles would be ascribed to magic.

Causes of the unbelief of Jews and Gentiles.

The final objection was the want of universality in the knowledge and reception of Christianity, and of greater clearness in the evidence. The admission of this objection in its full force distinguishes Butler and Paley from all the other apologists of Christianity. The want of universality is obviously connected with the want of clearness in the evidence. Paley suggests many ways by which God might have revealed Himself to man, and he admits that Chris-

Insufficiency of external evidence admitted by Paley.

## CHAP. XV.

tianity is far from having the highest possible evidence. The only question to be discussed is whether our not having more evidence be a sufficient reason for rejecting that which we have. The answer which Paley makes is taken from Butler. It rests on the analogy between God's works in nature and revelation. Perfect goodness is visible in neither. Both have appearances of irregularity and defect. The most valuable things in nature are only found out by labour, and the same process of inquiry is necessary to discover what is revealed. It is possible that no other arrangement may have been compatible with the free agency of man, or with the circumstances in which he is placed in this world. If the evidence had been irresistible, there would have been no scope for probation; and if the display of the invisible had been transcendent, there would have been an interruption of the duties of daily life. It was so with the first disciples when they sold their possessions, and were daily, with one accord, in the temple. But this state could not continue. St. Paul found it necessary to recall his converts to the ordinary labours and domestic duties of their condition.

Paley's 'Natural Theology.'

Paley's 'Natural Theology' was the last treatise which he wrote. He regarded it as completing his works by constituting the whole into a system, though inversely to the order in which they were written. This treatise scarcely requires to be noticed here. It has but one argument, that which is derived from manifestations of design in nature. The rest is an accumulation of illustrations of this one argument. Paley's judicial wisdom is nowhere more manifest than in his sermons. His clear common sense led him to see at a glance the causes of popular errors. In the sermon, for example, on the use of Scripture language, he shows how the words 'baptism' and 'regeneration' came to be convertible terms. It was not from any connection between two things which were and are altogether different in their very nature. But in primitive times it was the converted or regenerated who were baptized. To believe and to be baptized were the same in the sense that those who believed were also the baptized. In the same way we have the explanation of such words as 'called' and 'elect.' The first Christians formed a society which was entirely separated from the world. Its members

His sermons.

were therefore called the elect, the chosen, the saints. It was natural, too, in those times that persons who had been converted from Paganism should be called new creatures. Their conversion from an impure religion to the purity of the Gospel, from the darkness of heathenism to the light of Christianity, was really a new birth. In our time all these expressions should be used with caution, and in a qualified sense. Our circumstances are not the same as those of the persons to whom they were first applied. In the government of the Church, Paley saw the wisdom of the Apostles in adopting measures suitable to their times, and leaving the same liberty to their successors to adapt themselves to the requirements of other circumstances.

Dr. John Hey was Norrisian Professor at Cambridge, and is now known only by his 'Lectures in Divinity.' In these lectures all questions connected with divinity are fully discussed, and a great mass of information given on every subject. They embrace an exposition of the Articles of Religion which is chiefly valuable for the history of the controversies on the questions to which the articles relate. The only point we need notice is Hey's view of subscription. The object to be obtained was not, he said, unity of opinion, but of action. All creeds should be liberal, and an ambiguity in the words is often an advantage.\* The English clergy are sometimes charged with a want of honesty in subscribing articles which they do not believe. Dr. Hey defends them on the ground that the clergy are both the imposers and the subscribers, and that both agree as to the sense in which the articles are to be subscribed. The real dishonesty would be to subscribe articles in a sense different from what the imposers gave them, or to teach doctrines which the Church had abandoned under the pretext of following a literal meaning. In this way a Roman Catholic might read mass in a college founded before the Reformation according to old statutes. The only thing in his way would be the tests now imposed. Those, however, who follow the literal sense of the Articles are not condemned, but those who do not are justified. Their case is illustrated by a parallel case from the canons which require the clergy to wear certain habits. No one now wears the

Dr. Hey.  
On subscrip-  
tion.

\* Vol. ii. p. 30. Ed. 1822.

CHAP. XV. habits which the clergy were expected to wear when the canons were made. The end of the injunction is served when the apparel of the clergy accords with our present ideas of decency and gravity. General principles are of eternal obligation, but particulars of an indifferent nature may continually change.

Says Articles  
should only be  
Articles of  
peace.

The object of Articles is peace. They are a remedy for errors which occasion disturbance, and frustrate the end of social religion. The meaning of them must be considered in reference to the times. The compilers made them with a view to prevalent errors, and we have now to judge how far they are suitable to our changed circumstances. To use this liberty is a less evil than to be continually making schisms. Of course all this reasoning proceeds on the supposition that the Church is not a community endowed with infallibility. It is not an institution in which God has appointed rulers, whose decrees or dogmas are to be received as unfailing truth. The Church is rather a number of Christians forming themselves into a community, and constituting a government in the same way as a number of men form themselves into a civil state. Dr. Hey defies any one to find in the New Testament as much concerning Church government as would keep any community together. They could not stir a step without having to make laws and rules to suit their particular circumstances. A Church is a corporation, or society, using human means to answer a good end.\*

Dr. Thomas  
Balguy.

Dr. Thomas Balguy, Archdeacon of Winchester, was the son of the famous John Balguy, the friend and defender of Bishop Hoadly. On the death of Warburton, George III. offered him the see of Gloucester, which he declined on account of age and infirmity. It is said that Dr. Balguy, to some extent, dissented from his father's views; but of this there is little or no trace in his writings. These consist of a volume of 'Discourses and Charges,' which show the author to have been a man of very enlightened and liberal sentiments on all subjects that concern the Church and the clergy. In a sermon on the anniversary of the restoration of King Charles, he describes the joy of the people as a

\* *Ib.*, p. 114.



species of folly, of which they afterwards had cause to repent. The re-establishment of the Church of England was a blessing; but not, Dr. Balguy says, because it is a Church 'formed on the model of primitive antiquity,' nor because it is 'the purest Church in Christendom,' nor because 'its governors derive their authority by an uninterrupted succession from the Apostles;' but because the nation was delivered from 'the nonsense of Calvinism, and the madness of enthusiasm.' The religion of the Church of England is founded on reason. It teaches that 'a life of virtue is the most acceptable tribute we can pay to the Deity, and the most necessary condition of our eternal happiness.'

In a sermon on 'Church Authority,' Dr. Balguy adopts the same principles which his father advocated in the Bangorian controversy. The same delusion, he says, which long prevailed as to civil authority, prevails still as to the authority of the Church. Men look for it in prescriptions instead of finding it in the reason of things. A number of persons agreeing to unite for public worship is a Church. It is expedient that the offices of religion be committed to certain persons, and regulated in a certain manner. Without this there would be confusion, competition, and many other undesirable evils. Here we have the origin of the ministerial office, which no man can take upon him without lawful appointment. And this rests with the community, not with individuals. The ordinary administration of government is committed to the ministers, just as in a civil state the people commit the government to a prince or a senate. The State in itself has nothing to do with the Church. But public safety requires that Church authority should be under the control of the civil magistrate. The surest way to effect this is to rest the supreme power, both ecclesiastical and civil, in one person. Those who claim for the ministers of religion a commission from God, should remember that the ministers of the State also receive their commission from God. It is agreeable to His will that all offices, both civil and ecclesiastical, be properly discharged. But, in both cases, the persons who prescribe, as well as those who execute, the laws, are of human appointment. Dr. Balguy followed the rational divines on such subjects as original sin, the nature of the sacraments, the

On Church  
authority.



CHAP. XV. meaning of mysteries, and the necessity for a revision of the Liturgy. He opposed, however, the petition for the abolition of subscription. In this he followed Hoadly, who maintained that the abolition of the Articles would be the abolition of the present constitution of the Church.

Dr. Parr.

In Samuel Parr we have a distinct member of the liberal party. There are not in his works any theological speculations that require special notice. His sermons are orthodox without being evangelical. He follows Butler in some of his chief arguments, and his favourite authors were the old latitudinarian divines. He lamented the spirit of intolerance and exclusiveness that had come over many of the clergy, compared with the moderation and charity that were common in his youth. He could see nothing of the spirit that was manifested by Herring, Hoadly, and Butler, when they cultivated the friendship of Doddridge, Watts, and Lardner. Dr. Parr had never any sympathy with the Evangelicals and Methodists. He spoke of them all with a severity which shows the antipathy of the old English churchman to every appearance of enthusiasm. He records, however, that he once went to hear Wesley, of whose character he had so great an admiration, that he says if ever he left the Church of England it would be to follow John Wesley.

## CONCLUSION.

OUR history properly ends with the last chapter. It has extended from the Reformation to the close of the eighteenth century. An effort has been made to avoid passing any judgment on the controversies that have been examined, or expressing either approbation or disapprobation of the views of any writer or party. It was scarcely possible, in this effort, to have perfect success; and the only reason for making it, was to try to give all sides a fair opportunity of speaking for themselves. Now that the history is ended, a general review of the whole may be of some interest.

The immediate cause of the Reformation in England, was King Henry's quarrel with the Pope. The Church and the State came in collision, and to secure the kingdom from the interference of the Pope, the king was declared head of the Church. This was done without any renunciation of Roman Catholic doctrines; but it involved the separation of the Church of England from the visible Catholic Church. The English bishops and clergy withdrew their allegiance from the Roman Pontiff, took the oath of royal supremacy, and resigned every claim to ecclesiastical independence. This separation took place before any question about doctrine was raised. It happened when all Europe was disturbed with the throes of the Reformation, and it made easy the introduction into England of the Reformed doctrines. If the separation under Henry did not constitute the Church of England, a distinct Church from that over which the Bishop of Rome presided, this was clearly done in the next reign.

The English  
Reformation.

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The adoption of the 'Articles of Religion,' and the substitution of the English liturgy for the mass, made a complete revolution in the doctrine and service of the Church of England. But its distinct position was even more definite; when, under Elizabeth, bishops were consecrated without the usual sanction of the Roman See.

A separation  
from the  
visible  
Catholic  
Church.

The position which the Church of England assumed by this step, was that of separation from the whole visible Catholic Church throughout the world. The theory of the Catholic Church, as maintained by all who maintain it consistently, is that which identifies one visible society with the household established by Christ. This society is regarded as endowed with authority of such a kind as to exclude the exercise of private judgment, and thereby to prevent the possibility of schism. There cannot, consistently with this idea, be two Catholic Churches, or two separate branches of one Catholic Church. The Reformed Churches, by appealing to the Scriptures, to the Fathers, and to reason, departed from this theory. They set up the right of private judgment against the authority of the visible Church. They claimed to be of the Catholic Church, on the ground of believing the same doctrines as they found in the Scriptures, or having the same ecclesiastical government which existed in the early ages of Christianity.\* The true Church was invisible,† and the Catholic visible Church consisted of all who held the essential doctrines of revelation. It was not a church in the sense of one society, but of many different societies having different forms of government, but agreeing as to the essentials of faith.

National  
Churches sub-  
stituted for  
one Catholic  
Church.

Instead of a Catholic Church, the Reformers adopted the principle of National Churches. They claimed, for the civil rulers, the right of making reforms in the Churches established in their kingdoms. The supremacy of the Prince, as set forth by Cranmer, was absolute.‡ In him was vested the sole right of making bishops and priests. The external constitution—that is, the government of the visible Church—proceeded from the civil ruler. After the accession of Elizabeth, Archbishop Parker was consecrated by command of the

\* See vol. i. pp. 27, 35, and 36.

† See vol. i. p. 13

‡ See vol. i. p. 14.

Queen. The old customs were followed, as far as they could be followed, independently of the Pope and the Catholic bishops. The Episcopal succession was not broken, though neither the consecrators of Archbishop Parker, nor the bishops afterwards consecrated by him, regarded it as of any importance.

Two parties are distinctly marked among the Elizabethan Reformers. The first are those who agreed with Cranmer on the right of the civil ruler to govern the Church. They also preferred, as a matter of order, to retain the old form of government by bishops. The second party were those who would have preferred many changes, both in discipline and ceremonies, but who complied either for the sake of peace, or with the hope that the changes they expected would eventually be made.\* Among the consecrators of Parker, Barlow, and, perhaps, Hodgskins, represented the first party; Coverdale and Scory clearly represented the second. Hooker's 'Ecclesiastical Polity' is a defence of the Church of England, on the principles of Cranmer and Barlow. It is also a defence of the order established in the Church on the ground of its antiquity, and its having the sanction of the universal or Catholic reason of the Christian community. A national Church is the civil community on its ecclesiastical side. The real meaning of the identity of Church and State, as set forth both by Cranmer and Hooker, is, that the true Church is invisible, while visible Churches, or communities of Christian men, are governed by the State. The invisible Church is Christ's kingdom, which is not of this world. We have interpreted Hobbes's 'Leviathan' as grounded on the principles of Hooker's 'Polity,' but Hobbes is exaggerated and contradictory.† Bishop Hoadly, as we have understood him, followed Hooker and the first Reformers of the Church of England.‡ There was a difference only in the application of the principles. Hooker defended the established Ecclesiastical order against the Puritans; while Hoadly defended the independency of the invisible Church, which is properly the kingdom of Christ. The visible community or National Church was governed by the king and the bishops; but

Two parties  
under Eliza-  
beth.

Erastians.

\* See vol. i. pp. 40, 41, 42, and 43. † See vol. i. pp. 387 and 389.

‡ See vol. iii. p. 33.

CONCLUSION. in the real Church, Christ alone was both Bishop and King.

And Puritans. The second party in the Church of England, whom we have supposed to be represented by Coverdale and Scory, were the Puritans. We have remarked, in different places, the inadequacy of this term to describe the different classes of men to whom it was applied. The bishops consecrated by Parker were mostly Puritans.\* They would have preferred that the Church had been re-established without bishops, and that the services had been more in agreement with the worship sanctioned by the Reformed Churches on the Continent. Nevertheless, they conformed. They complied with the order established, and so far they approached the party represented by Cranmer, Barlow, and Hooker. Another class of Puritans partly conformed, and were allowed to hold livings in the Church; but they expected to be able in time to change the established government, and to substitute equality of ministers. This party was properly the Presbyterians, and is best represented by Thomas Cartwright.† They believed that they had found in the New Testament a church discipline which they were bound to receive, and that the government by bishops was antichristian. They objected also to the supremacy of the king as interfering with the rights bestowed on the divinely appointed governors of the visible Church. A third party of Puritans was the Brownists or Independents‡ who separated altogether from the Established Church. They set up what they called gathered churches, which consisted of a few persons meeting together by common consent for social worship. The name Puritan got a new meaning in the time of the Commonwealth. All who were not Royalists were called Puritans. This comprehended those who opposed the arbitrary measures of the king, and the innovations of Archbishop Laud, as well as the Presbyterians and the sectaries of all kinds. Another use of the word Puritan was to designate all clergymen who held the views of Calvin. In this sense, Whitgift and Hooker came to be called Puritans.§ After the Restoration of Charles II., many of the moderate Puritans

\* See vol. i. p. 43.

† See vol. i. pp. 47 and 48.

‡ See vol. i. p. 84.

§ See vol. i. p. 152.

conformed.\* Those who did not were called Nonconformists. CONCLUSION.

The High Church party does not seem to have existed at the Reformation. The germ of it might be traced to the troubles at Frankfort concerning the use of the Prayer-Book, or it might be found in what Hooker wrote concerning the antiquity of Episcopal government. But its real origin was opposition to the class of Puritans represented by Cartwright.† The conveniency of Episcopacy passed into the divine right of Episcopacy, and this ended legitimately in disparagement of the Reformation.‡ The supremacy of the State over the Church was not felt in the time of James and Charles because of the freedom which these monarchs gave to the bishops. But when the State, in the time of William, came in collision with the bishops, the independence of the Church was asserted and the action of the State condemned. The doctrine of a visible Church with authority, rejected by the Reformers, was resumed by the first decided advocates of the High Church theory. We do not mean that Bancroft, Andrewes, or Laud, had any intention of undoing the work of the Reformers. We only mean that they introduced the germ of a doctrine concerning the Church, which carried in its bosom destruction to the principles of the English Reformation. The theory of a visible Church with authority was not tenable by those who rejected the authority of the only Church which has anything like a claim to be the one society which Christ Himself established. The High Churchman is illogical, and that alone has saved him from the Church of Rome. He inverted the Catholic theory. Instead of accepting a Church which presented itself as a united society, he went in search of a succession of bishops; which, even if proved, did not give the unity nor the certainty of faith for preserving which, according to Irenæus and Tertullian, that succession was appointed. The true Church could secure a succession of bishops; but a succession of bishops could not make a true Church. The High Churchmen fell into the solecism of Catholic Churches, instead of one Catholic Church.

The position which the Church of England occupied in

\* See vol. i. p. 410. † See vol. i. p. 86. ‡ See vol. ii. p. 86.

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The Church  
of England  
the natural  
protector of  
all Protestant  
Churches.

the time of Elizabeth was the highest that had ever fallen to a national Church. It stood at the head of the whole movement of progress and reform throughout Europe. The very circumstance that in England the Reformation had been carried on by bishops, made it the natural protector and helper of all the Protestant Churches. To this high mission Cranmer felt that it was called, when he corresponded with Calvin and Beza, and invited the Swiss Reformers to England. Archbishop Parker recognised the same work as the special calling of the Church of England, when he renewed the correspondence with Calvin, begun by Cranmer, about uniting all Protestant Churches into one communion.\* Calvin died before anything was accomplished. The strife with the Puritans turned the attention of the Church in another direction. It was not long till foreign orders were set aside, first as not legitimate in England, and ultimately as not valid.

Innovations  
in ceremonies.

The history of the Church of England during the reign of Charles I. is the history of the innovations of the High Church party on the Protestant doctrines and customs established at the Reformation. A great deal of this was doubtless due to the spirit of opposition. The Puritans were dissatisfied with the ceremonies retained by Elizabeth, and their opponents tried to vex them by increasing instead of diminishing their number. The first step of the great revolution which Laud introduced, was the removal of the Communion Tables.† This was not done on the plea of convenience, but expressly to make the tables look like altars. It was these innovations which put the great body of the English people on the side of the Puritans, and which ended during the Long Parliament in the abolition of the Liturgy and the bishops.‡

And doctrines.

The revolution in doctrine was even greater than the innovations in worship. The doctrines of Calvin pervade the Articles of Religion. They were the doctrines of every Churchman of any eminence from the Reformation till towards the end of the reign of King James I. All the Puritans were satisfied with the doctrinal teaching of the Church of England.§ King James sent theologians to the

\* See vol. i. p. 42.

† See vol. i. p. 157.

‡ See vol. i. p. 196.

§ See vol. i. p. 90.



Synod of Dort to represent the Church of England, and to unite with the Dutch Calvinists to condemn the heresies of Arminius.\* The growth of Arminianism in England was distinctly marked, and every possible effort made to arrest its progress.†

The period of the Commonwealth dating from the Long Parliament to the restoration of the monarchy, has become the special battle-ground for partisan writers of the Ecclesiastical history of England. To some it was the golden age of liberty and religion. To others it was worse than the age of iron, a time of rebellion and anarchy, days of blackness and darkness, rebuke and blasphemy. The revolution, so far as the Church was concerned, was evoked by the extravagance of Laud's party, but it overwhelmed with calamity the moderate Churchmen who had been zealous in resisting the innovations of that party. The leaders of the Church of England as distinct from those who were either High Churchmen or Puritans, had met at Westminster to try to avert the calamities which were coming on the Church and the nation.‡ Some of these men were members of the Assembly of Divines, which was afterwards summoned by the Long Parliament, and only ceased attending the meetings when, instead of revising the Articles, the Assembly made a Directory of Worship, and sanctioned the Presbyterian polity. It does not appear that either the Westminster Assembly or the Parliament believed in the divine right of Presbyterianism. It was only a Church polity to which they could in the main agree. Parliament, in fact, was Erastian, and had not the will, even if it had had the power, to establish the Presbyterian discipline. The Independents came in with Cromwell, and by his death their efforts to make Independency the national religion were frustrated.§ The Presbyterians, though taking the side of Parliament, were not favourable to Cromwell. As the collision between the King and the Parliament caused the moderate Church party to cast in their lot with the Royalists, so at the accession of Cromwell the Presbyterians began to think of the restoration of the King.

The Church  
during the  
Common-  
wealth.

\* See vol. i. p. 147.

‡ See vol. i. p. 196.

† See vol. i. pp. 92, 149, and 152.

§ See vol. i. p. 216.

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SION.

The Westmin-  
ster Assembly  
of Divines.

The history of the individual members of the Westminster Assembly cannot now be known with any approach to accuracy. Their worth as to character and learning we have already tried to estimate.\* A small number of them were Independents who had been separated from the Church before the Assembly was summoned, and some were avowedly Erastians. How many of them died before the Restoration cannot be determined, nor do we know how many conformed. Among the Nonconformists only twenty-seven are mentioned by Calamy, and these include the Independents. Four of the most learned men of the Assembly, Reynolds, Lightfoot, Wallis, and Conant, conformed after the Restoration, but of the rest there is no record. The cause of the Presbyterians was thoroughly wrecked, partly through the treachery of the King, partly through their own mismanagement, and perhaps chiefly through the astute policy of the restored Churchmen.

The Episcopal  
succession.

It is vain to speculate what might have happened if the Episcopal succession had been set aside on the accession of Queen Elizabeth. Though nothing was made of it by the bishops of that day, who would have preferred another form of Ecclesiastical polity, yet it was left an instrument for good or evil in after times. The succession preserved the form of an authoritative visible Church, after the substance was gone. The body was there while the spirit had vanished, or rather the ghost remained when the vital organism was no more. The desire for a visible Church with authority seems to be a craving which no logic can annihilate. It posits itself in the face of facts, and sets consistency at defiance. It might have found a place in the Church of England even if the Protestant bishops had received no consecration, but had been appointed to their office by the King in accordance with the known doctrine of Cranmer and Barlow. It made its first appearance as we have seen among the Puritans, and it was asserted as strongly in the Church of Scotland as it had ever been by English High Churchmen.† Its existence in the Church of England is mainly due to the antagonism of the sects, and these have been able to throw it off chiefly through seeing how un-

\* See vol. i. p. 205.

† See vol. i. p. 355.

tenable it is in the Church of England, and through the consciousness that with themselves it would be less tenable still.

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SION.

The origin of the present Church of England was a revolt against authority. It appealed to the Scriptures, and that is essentially an appeal to reason. The addition commonly made that it appealed to the Scriptures as interpreted by the Fathers, is a pure invention.\* But even if true, the appeal would still be to reason to determine what is the interpretation of the Fathers. The Reformers used their private judgment, as against the judgment of the visible Catholic Church. They appealed to an agreement with the Scriptures and the early Church, but of this agreement they were themselves the judges. The moral obligation to do what was obviously right, irrespective of theories or prescriptions, was implied in the whole conduct of the English Reformation. The practical rational element has always been of the very essence of the English Church.† We do not say that the ideal has ever been realised. This may be the work of centuries to come. The conflicts of High Churchism and Puritanism constitute the greater part of our Ecclesiastical history, but there have always been men in the Church of England who have felt that Christianity was wider and deeper than either High Churchism or Puritanism. They have even gone farther and declared, some with more some with less distinctness, that if either of these were Christianity they must reject its claims to be a divine revelation. We have seen the rational element largely manifested in Hooker, the first and greatest interpreter of the constitution of the Church of England. It was more freely developed in the most thoughtful Churchmen of Laud's day—such as Hales, and Chillingworth, and Jeremy Taylor. During the Commonwealth when religious factions were at the climax of their contention, the Church of England found its truest home with the Platonists of Cambridge. It was not with their will that the bishops had been displaced by the Long Parliament, and it was not with their will that the Nonconformists were ejected in 1662. There were men both among the ejected bishops and the ejected Nonconformists, who had the true spirit of the Church of England.

The English  
Reformation  
rested on  
Scripture and  
reason.

The importance which the High Church party attached to

\* See vol. i. pp. 27 and 45.

† See vol. ii. p. 177.

## CONCLUSION.

The efficacy  
of sacraments.

the sacraments, was connected with their conception of the functions of the visible Church. As a divinely instituted society it was the mechanism through which supernatural grace was given to the world. To be initiated into this society was literally to be engrafted into the body of Christ, to be re-born, washed, justified, and sanctified. This way of speaking concerning baptism, common in the Church of Rome where it is understood in its literal sense, was retained in the English Liturgy. It is somewhat remarkable that the subject of the conveyance of grace by an external rite, was not a question discussed between our Reformers and the Roman Catholics. It is even more remarkable that with the great preponderance of Puritan influence in the time of Elizabeth, no one seems to have taken exception to regeneration by baptism. The first controversy on the subject which we have met is in the time of the Commonwealth. This controversy arose among Puritans, and even with them the question was not whether baptized persons are regenerated, but only if all baptized persons are regenerated.\* As Calvinists they were unable to say that all were regenerated, without allowing that regenerate persons might be among the reprobate. But as they regarded every person who did not give evidence to the contrary as among the elect, so they regarded every baptized person who did not give evidence to the contrary as a child of God. This is the explanation of baptismal regeneration given by a Puritan,† and it is the only one really tenable by those who like our Reformers received the theology of Calvin.‡

The meaning  
of baptismal  
regeneration.

The service follows the language of antiquity. There is not a Christian Father who scruples to call baptism regeneration. It would help to end the controversy if those who oppose baptismal regeneration, would admit at once that the same language is clearly found in the New Testament. Such texts as 'except a man be born of water,' 'the washing of regeneration,' and 'baptism doth also now save us,' should not be violently explained. The regeneration is either something different from what the word now commonly means, or we shall find its true explanation in the nature of

\* See vol. i. p. 231.

† See vol. i. p. 209.

‡ See vol. i. pp. 203 and 286.

that symbolical language which is common among Eastern nations. If it merely means the entrance into the visible Church, the external beginning of the Christian life, the whole controversy is about the use of a word. But if it means an actual change, not only justification but sanctification, the only sensible inference would be that regeneration in baptism is a figure of speech whereby the thing signified is ascribed to the sign. And this would correspond with the general language of the New Testament, where all professing Christians are described as 'saints,' and the attributes which belong only to the Church invisible are ascribed to a visible community of professing Christians. The consistent High Churchman makes baptism regeneration in the proper sense of an actual spiritual birth or change in the nature of the person baptized. To be able to effect this change is one of the powers he inherits as a minister of that one society, which Christ Himself is supposed to have instituted. We never expect any religious party to be convinced, however exhaustively they may be refuted. Experience itself might have told the clergy in the last century that the people of England were no better, either religiously or morally, for all the baptism that had been bestowed upon them. They had been 'regenerated' to no purpose. The common sense of John Wesley and George Whitefield told them that the baptized people of England were practically heathen, and that to enter the kingdom of God they must be born again, not by any rite of the Church, but by an actual new life.\*

The history of the other sacrament is different from that of baptism. The nature of the Supper which Christ instituted was the chief question of controversy between the Reformers and the Church of Rome. The doctrine of transubstantiation had been developed out of the figures and rhetoric of the old Fathers, and defended by a misapplication of New Testament words, which obviously were never meant to be taken in a literal sense. Our Reformers rejected the doctrine, yet clung to the extravagant language on which it rested.† The same was done by the continental Reformers, and by the English Puritans.‡ The presence of Christ's body, they all

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And a real  
presence in  
the Lord's  
Supper.

\* See vol. iii. pp. 288 and 291.

† See vol. i. p. 20.

‡ See vol. i. pp. 25, 204, and 370.

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said, was real but spiritual. The contradiction in terms did not disturb them. They meant the presence of an influence, and deliberately explained that they wished to use the language of the old Fathers, though that language had given rise to the most irrational superstition that had infested the Christian Church.

Christ present  
to faith.

But the Puritans and the foreign Reformers, as well as the compilers of the Church of England formularies, believed that an actual spiritual benefit was conveyed in the celebration of the Lord's Supper. The benefit, however, was limited to the worthy receivers, so that faith was necessary to realise a 'real presence.' The High Churchmen, that is some of them, not only took the figure for a literal statement, but they made the Sacrament the means of conveying grace irrespective of faith in those to whom it was administered. This was consistent with their theory of a visible Church. They were priests appointed to convey grace to men, not through the instrumentality of faith, but by the performance of ecclesiastical ordinances.

The Lord's  
Supper again  
made a sacri-  
fice.

As 'priests,' too, they must have a sacrifice to offer, like the priests under the law. But what could they offer? The Church of England had set aside what Cranmer called the sacrifice of the 'Romish Antichrist,' and acknowledged no sacrifice but the one offering once for all. The history of the invention of a sacrifice for the High Church 'priest' is very curious. The pious conceits of Bishop Andrewes, and Joseph Mede,\* might have been called innocent, had they not been the germs of 'pernicious nonsense.' The next stage we have seen in Johnson and Brett,† where the Communion bread and wine were the pure offering which the priest was to offer for an everlasting sacrifice. In this case for once we have the strong intellect of Dr. Waterland on the side of reason and common sense. The last stage of the history of the offering which the 'Anglican Priest' is to offer, is the identification of the English Communion with the Roman Mass. Transubstantiation is not so absurd as we supposed. Our Reformers have been quite misunderstood. They did not condemn the 'Romish doctrine' of transubstantiation, or a change in the substance of the bread and wine,

\* See vol. i. pp. 125 and 167.

† See vol. iii. pp. 57 and 58.



but only the doctrine of the schoolmen that there was a change of the 'accidents.'\*

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In evoking religious thought we have given a prominent place to the writers who were called Deists. The attempt to ignore their influence, and to pass them by with a few words of reproach, has continued even to our day. The success of this has been so far complete that it is quite a marvel to find a modern author who is not content to take his knowledge of them from Leland. But to ignore the Deists is to ignore the arguments which the evidence writers had to answer. It is to ignore one side of the history of English theology, without a knowledge of which the other side is scarcely intelligible. The questions raised by Lord Herbert, of Cherbury, were sure to be raised by some of the successors of the Reformers, unless the spirit of progress and inquiry had died with them. What is the nature of the Scriptures to which the Reformers appealed? what is the certainty that they are a revelation from God? were questions that could not fail to be asked after the authority of the Church had been set aside. Lord Herbert lived through the whole age that witnessed the persecution of the Puritans, and a great part of the time of the Commonwealth. He had seen Laud's party in the day of their power, exalting the importance of sacraments and ceremonies. After they had met their terrible retribution he saw another party in triumph, more rational perhaps than Laud's party, but still persecuting those who differed from their views of Christianity. It was natural for a contemplative man like Lord Herbert to ask if the things for which either of these parties contended were so certain as those which the natural bonds of society dictated. There might be a flood of grace in baptism or the Eucharist, there might be truth in the dogma of predestination, but far more certain than any of these was the duty of love to God and man. Practical religion is plain. Its chief doctrines are so obvious that they are found in every nation. They are written in men's hearts. External or traditional revelation may be true, but it can never have the certainty of this revelation which is inscribed in the very inmost parts of the human soul.

The Deists.

\* See vol. i. p. 2, note.



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Their relation  
to Chris-  
tianity.

This was Lord Herbert's great argument. His innate ideas, the number and character of the dogmas of natural religion, and the state of the Gentile world, were all ancillary questions. It was these chiefly that his opponents discussed. Some of them denied the sufficiency of the light of nature; but the duties of morality and good-will from man to man, no one could deny to be very plain. And if such doctrines as the necessity of repentance, and the certainty of a future life, are not known by natural religion, this adds nothing to the certainty of traditional revelation. Locke was as clear for the light of reason, as Lord Herbert; but he added that Christianity was 'reasonable.' It was not identical with the doctrines of either of the two parties, that had kept the Church of England in strife during the whole of the seventeenth century. The positive evidence for its truth might not be equal to what we desired; but the reasonableness of its contents was sufficient to remove all objections drawn from the supposed antagonism between it and the religion of nature. Richard Baxter, in his later years, weary with the strife of tongues, and lamenting the lack of practical religion as compared with endless contentions about doctrine, had a heart wide with human sympathy for the difficulties set forth by Lord Herbert. Baxter gave the best answer that could be given. It was, in substance, that Christianity is a spiritual operation in the human soul, and that its truth is rather to be felt than proved.

Hobbes.

Thomas Hobbes, who was a contemporary of Lord Herbert, was also called a Deist, and sometimes an Atheist. But Hobbes's system is entirely the antithesis of Lord Herbert's. It was impossible that both of them, when reasoned to their ultimate conclusion, could have been hostile to Christianity; for, on all that concerned religion, the one affirmed whatever the other denied. The morality and religion which Herbert found in the constitution of man, Hobbes found in positive precepts, and in external revelation witnessed by miracles and prophecies. In its political aspect, Hobbes's position was only an intensified form of the doctrine on which the Church of England was established under Henry and Elizabeth. The State was the great 'Leviathan,' founded on might; but in itself, it was the foundation of right. The civil monster

must be nourished and protected, before it can nourish and protect its members. In many places, Hobbes seems to confound the commonwealth with the hereditary monarch; but we have given him credit for a wider vision.\* He had no sympathy with the men of Cromwell's time. They were all rebels against the commonwealth. They promoted the reign of anarchy, and multiplied sects that dissented from the religion of the State. The High Church party came under the same condemnation as the Roman Catholic. They set up a visible Church as a kingdom of this world, distinct from the State, and in this ecclesiastical kingdom they claimed a right to rule. The kingdom of Christ is spiritual, not of this world. The visible Church, on the other hand, is a mere creation of the State; and whatever office or authority its rulers have, is derived from the king.

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His doctrine  
of Church and  
State.

We have been unable to find Hobbes always consistent with himself; but his system, in its great outlines, represents a mode of thinking which belongs to one class of Christian apologists; while that of Lord Herbert belongs to another. Through all the history of the Deist controversy, we shall find the Deists and the Christian advocates continually changing places, as to the grounds of attack and defence. The whole school of Cambridge Platonists had Hobbes before them in all their discussions; and the ground of their opposition is essentially identical with the system of Lord Herbert. Morality, they said, does not depend on the State, nor on any positive precepts. It is not even created by the will of God, but exists eternally and immutably in itself independent of all positive commands.† The great doctrines of the Christian religion were shown to have a firm and solid foundation in the nature and the reason of man.‡ Christianity was a life, rather than a science. By the communion of the human soul with the Eternal Spirit, the faith of the Christian becomes an 'open vision.'§ The revelation of the Gospel does not depend on external authority and external circumstances. It speaks for itself. The people said of Jesus, when they heard His words, 'Never man spake like this man.'||

Two corre-  
sponding  
forms of  
Deism and  
Christianity.

\* See vol. i. p. 387.

† See vol. i. p. 413.

‡ See vol. i. p. 421.

§ See vol. i. p. 428.

|| See vol. i. p. 435.

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Toland.

We have not classed Toland with the Deists, and we have given his writings a more important place in the history of theology than has been given them before. The failings of the man ought not to be allowed to lessen the significance of what he did. His habit of flinging his heresies in the face of the orthodox world, and his delight in trying the temper of the clerical mind, are not to be commended. But we can give as little commendation to the spirit of most of those who undertook to answer him. Locke repudiated Toland, but Toland really drew from Locke's system legitimate conclusions which Locke himself refused to draw. If Christianity was 'reasonable,' it could not be 'mysterious,' that is, so far as the argument was concerned. It might be true that a revelation containing 'mysteries,' or things above reason, might be perfectly agreeable to reason. The external evidence might be sufficient to satisfy the reason, that those things in the revelation which it did not now understand, it might understand hereafter; or even if never comprehensible by created reason, they might yet be agreeable to the reason of God. This was the answer of Toland's adversaries; and no doubt they were right. But Locke advocated the 'reasonableness' of Christianity, as part of the evidence of Christianity. Of this evidence, reason, as implied in the very terms, was to be judge. Everything, therefore, mysterious, or above reason, was without internal evidence. It depended on external testimony, and this was insufficient to authorise anything not within the province of reason. We take the Scriptures as divine, because of their contents, and not because of external evidence.\* The answer made by Bishop Browne, and some others who wrote against Toland, assumes the sufficiency of the external testimony, independent of all internal evidence. Bishop Browne's theory, as elaborated in his subsequent writings,† crushes the reason, denies the capacity of man to know God at all, or to judge of the contents of a revelation. This turned the controversy to the question of the authority of the Scriptures. Toland defied his adversaries to give an intelligible account of the origin of the Scripture canon. They were in absolute ignorance why some books were made canonical, and others written at the

Locke.

And Bishop  
Browne.

\* See vol. ii. p. 237.

† See vol. iii. pp. 126 and 127.

same time and with the same object were not canonical. The most learned of those who defended the canon could say nothing better than that the books of the New Testament were canonical because they were genuine.\*

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Toland's position was the natural result of the controversies that were going on when he began the study of theology. The Puritan had been beaten out of the field, or rather he had been converted into a rational theologian. His defence had been taken up by Conformists, who were weary of strife. Subjects on which the wisest men differed had been the ground of persecution and hatred, while the plainest precepts of Christianity were neglected. Bishop Croft, Daniel Whitby, and Dr. Bury, as well as John Locke, had longed for a return to simple and practical Christianity, instead of being entangled in the cobwebs of Fathers and Schoolmen. Toland's position was also in some measure due to the great Trinitarian controversy which had scarcely closed when 'Christianity not Mysterious' was published. The expositions of the Trinity put forth by orthodox Trinitarians were so different from each other, that the question naturally arose if the Trinity could be a revealed doctrine, when it was understood in so many different ways. So far as it was a 'mystery' it depended on external testimony, and that being inferior to internal evidence, it must be of less importance than practical duties. If the Trinity was still a mystery, it was not revealed. If revealed, it would be 'reasonable,' like the rest of Christianity. The Unitarians supposed that they found their doctrine in the Scriptures, and they had no difficulty in receiving the Scriptures as rational. Sherlock and South, in their efforts to explain the Trinity, were working in the same direction. They acknowledged the 'mystery,' and yet, in accordance with the spirit of the age, they were proving it 'reasonable.' Toland's place is probably with the Socinians, but instead of classing him with a sect we prefer leaving him as the result of a conflux of opinions, and so the representative of one tendency of his age.

The desire for  
simple Chris-  
tianity.

We have hesitated to include among Deists the Earl of Shaftesbury. It is true that many of the passages in his writings, where he professes his faith in Christianity and the

The Earl of  
Shaftesbury.

\* See vol. ii, p. 256.

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religion established by law, are written ironically, and the irony is of the most offensive kind. But anything in Shaftesbury's writings that might be construed as Antichristian is due to a recoil from the irrational theology taught by many of the clergy in his time. He professes himself a Christian with all sincerity,\* and explains his Christianity as a rational system of faith, agreeing with the principles of natural reason. What he rejected was the magic of sacraments and the metaphysics of the Schoolmen. It is possible, too, that he misunderstood some of the doctrines of Christianity, or saw them only through a distorted medium, and therefore rejected them. The zeal with which he defended eternal and immutable morality is sometimes enthusiastic, and he was one-sided in his advocacy of virtue for its own sake. But in neither of these is there anything necessarily opposed to Christianity. Shaftesbury's theology was a philosophy. The distinguishing part of it, which is the system of optimism, has been held by many whose Christianity was never doubted. The system has difficulties, and Pope, who followed Shaftesbury, has been called a Deist and a Pantheist, but with the general vagueness which belongs to all such names.

Anthony Col-  
lins.

Anthony Collins was properly a sceptic. We are willing to use this word as applied to him in a good sense. He really wished, as a disciple of Locke, to test the proofs of authoritative, that is, external revelation, which his master believed were valid when taken along with the contents of revelation. If theologians rest Christianity entirely on external evidences, and these evidences are not sufficient to bear the burden, it can do no harm to deprive these theologians of their arguments. If Christianity is true, it will be safest to defend it on its own foundation. One of these arguments was derived from the fulfilment of prophecy. Collins made this subject his special study. It was altogether beside the question to say that there were other arguments for the truth of Christianity besides prophecy. Collins did not say anything to the contrary. For all that we know he may have believed that it was proved by miracles. He examined the prophecies quoted in the New Testament, and he found that they were quoted as prophecies fulfilled only in a secondary or typical sense.

\* See vol. ii. p. 342.

There was evidently a custom prevalent among the Jews of applying or accommodating words and phrases in a loose and indefinite way, which could not be tolerated by the more exact or logical methods of composition followed in the present day. This was not a discovery made by Collins. It was admitted by divines generally, and for the prophecies examined he was frequently able to quote some eminent theologian who had taken the same view. In the answers to Collins, the things for which he contended were for the most part allowed. No attention need be paid to the argument of William Whiston, that the Jews in later times had corrupted the Old Testament; but even Sherlock gives up the argument from prophecy except in conjunction with that of miracles.\* Bishop Chandler had twelve prophecies which he thought were direct, and had but one fulfilment. Some of these are certainly remarkable, but Chandler gave up so many others that he was reproached with interpreting the prophecies as if they had been cunningly devised fables.† Whatever errors Collins may have made in detail, his great principle was fairly established, that the evidence for the truth of Christianity from prophecy, rests on secondary or typical fulfilments.

Thomas Woolston, who followed as an adversary of Collins, and who is usually said to have attacked the New Testament miracles as Collins did the prophecies, was simply a man whose intellect was disordered. It is not necessary to impute to him any ultimate design of wishing to overthrow Christianity, by pretending that the miracles were only true as allegories. It is quite probable that he really believed all he said. He had devoted himself for many years to the study of the Fathers, and this is an atmosphere generally injurious to the practical English intellect. Exclusive study of the Fathers made Woolston a maniac. In a less degree it had the same effect on Dodwell and Whiston.

Thomas  
Woolston.

Matthew Tindal exhibits a new phase of the position occupied by Lord Herbert and the Earl of Shaftesbury. He made use of all the books written in defence of natural religion, such as those of Wilkins, Cumberland, Clarke, and Wollaston. He also pressed the theologians who were con-

Matthew  
Tindal.

\* See vol. ii. p. 395.

† See vol. ii. p. 395.



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tinually discoursing of the supremacy of reason, to come to what he regarded as the direct and proper result of their own arguments. Sherlock was certainly inconsistent in making Christianity a republication of the religion of nature, and again making the substance of the Gospel to be those doctrines which were revealed in addition to the religion of nature.\* Christianity might consist of both, but it could not be defined first as the one and then as the other. So far as it was identical with the religion of nature it was as old as creation, but if the additional doctrines were its essence it was not as old as creation. Tindal fastened on Sherlock's words, turned his arguments against him, and then, as Warburton said,

‘It was sport to see  
The engineer hoist with his own petar.’

His view of  
revelation.

Whatever is according to reason, that is, agreeable to the religion of nature, Tindal was willing to receive as revelation. But whatever was above reason must require great external evidence, and whatever is contrary to reason ought not to be received on any evidence. In the Scriptures God is represented doing, or commanding to be done, things which our reason tells us are not worthy of His character. The evidence for the divine authority of Scripture is not sufficient to warrant us in believing things that our reason, which is God's internal revelation, tells us God could not do. This principle was applied to what were reckoned the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, such, for instance, as the atonement. The punishment of sin, Tindal said, was good for the individual, and God could not require satisfaction by the death of His Son. Tindal does not deny that God has made an external or authoritative revelation to man, but he denies that it enjoins any duties beyond those of natural religion, or that it contains the doctrines which are generally regarded as the special subject of Gospel revelation. Sherlock, in the very sermon from which Tindal quoted, had gone so far as to say that ‘there are some institutions in the Gospel which in their own nature are no constituent parts of religion.’

The resurrec-  
tion of the  
Arian heresy.

The resurrection of the Arian heresy in the Church of

\* See vol. iii. p. 81.



England in the beginning of the last century, and its subsequent development among the Dissenters, can only be explained as another phase of the effort to regard Christianity as 'reasonable.' The Triad of being which in the first conception of the Trinity was an obvious doctrine of reason and philosophy, had become a mere contradiction which Christians were to believe on external authority. The Unitarians in Thomas Firmin's day had tried to set aside the Trinity as not being a doctrine of revelation. But the whole language of the New Testament was against them. Jesus Christ was called God, and was everywhere said to have existed before He came into this world. The Arian supposed he could settle the question by making Jesus Christ the highest of created intelligences, leaving His origin in the depths of eternity, admitting the nearest conceivable relation to the Eternal, but denying that He was Himself the Supreme Divinity. This theory was not without a sanction from some passages in the New Testament. Whiston was right in finding it certainly in many of the Fathers. Jesus was the Word or Wisdom of God, who according to the reading of the Septuagint was 'created' by God. But the Arian had no standing ground in reason. The Word or Wisdom of God must have been eternal, for God could never be without His Word or Wisdom. It was not an intelligence distinct from God, and created as the medium of world creation. It was God. The doctrine of Christ's simple humanity was the only tenable position for those who could not see the Trinity in a rational light. The Arians mostly developed into Socinians, or as they called themselves, Unitarians.

We have noticed that the whole proceeding of the English Reformation implied the rejection of the visible Church hypothesis. Of course this does not mean that Christians or Christian communities are not visible. One of our Articles defines the 'visible Church' as a congregation of faithful men. What the Reformers set aside was the claim of a hierarchy or a clergy to constitute the Church. It was rejected by the very fact of separation from the Roman hierarchy. If an order of clergy constituted the Church, separation from them could not possibly be justified. It was rejected, too, by the transfer of allegiance from the Pope to

The Church  
in what sense  
visible.

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SION.

the civil ruler, and by the submission of the clergy to the State. The true Church was the Church invisible. But as Christians meet in communities, in this aspect they form a visible Church or visible Churches. The relation of the visible Church to the State was discussed by Hooker, and its relation to the invisible by Archbishop Abbot.\*

The Pro-  
testantism of  
the Church of  
England.

The Revolution of 1688 helped to bring the Church of England back to its original constitution. During the reign of the Stuarts many things had been introduced that were contrary to the doctrine and discipline established by the Reformers. These things were thrust out with a violent hand by the Long Parliament, but they returned at the Restoration. There was a check kept on the extreme section of Laud's party, but the new bishops were consecrated on the principles that they were the essence of the Church, and that special divine favours would accompany their office.† During the reign of the second James the Church of England was on the verge of destruction. The Roman Catholic controversy, however, proved that the really able men of the Church were true to the principles of the Reformation. The High Church party cannot be reproached with indifference to Protestantism in this great crisis. They were even driven to talk of schemes of comprehension for the Non-conformists. The majority, however, of the writers in this controversy took the true ground of the Church of England against the Church of Rome, denying that under the Gospel there is any proper priesthood, or that the Church is constituted by either bishops or clergy.

Bishop  
Hoadly.

When Bishop Hoadly explained the kingdom of Christ as the invisible Church, and not as the hierarchy, he simply stated what had always been the doctrine of the Reformed Church of England. It was not wonderful that his sermon should have raised the howlings of the Lower House of Convocation, but it was strange that it did not meet the approbation of Sherlock, Hare, and Gibson, who had the word reason everlastingly on their lips. There was nothing in Hoadly's sermon which denied the necessity of order in the visible Church. There was nothing in it

\* See vol. i. p. 129.]

† See vol. ii. p. 69.

inimical to the office of a bishop, as that office had been understood by our Reformers. It contained nothing opposed to the connection of Church and State. It was against the claims of a hierarchy, and it was against penal statutes for religious opinions, but neither of these belongs essentially to the constitution of the Church of England. The answers to Hoadly were founded either on the visible Church theory or on the necessity of penal laws, but the greater part of what was written against him went on the supposition that he altogether denied the existence of a visible Church in any sense.

It was a true instinct which led Dr. Waterland to find the germs of Deism in Dr. Clarke's estimate of the relative importance of moral and positive duties.\* Clarke said, that to keep the moral law was of more importance than to receive the sacraments of the Church. This principle was founded in the reason of man, which said that to do justly and to love mercy were of more importance than to be baptized or to commemorate Christ's death. But the sacraments are Christ's ordinances. We are positively commanded to keep them. If, it is said, we make them of less importance than the duties of the moral law, we prefer our own reason to God's revelation. Reason may err, but God cannot err. Dr. Waterland added that the benefits conferred by the sacraments are so great, that the neglect of them is the neglect of something greater than the moral laws. The positive duties which arise out of the relations which revelation makes known, are as obligatory as any duties known by natural reason. This last idea was borrowed avowedly from Collier. We shall meet it again in Butler. It must be admitted that Waterland has stated his argument with great force and clearness. He saw something of the issue which was raised, and he did not shrink from the conclusion. Clarke gave the supremacy to moral duties, because he was more certain of what was a part of his moral constitution than he could be of any external revelation. Waterland, on the contrary, was more certain of the authority of external revelation than of anything which belonged to his moral constitution. Clarke said that God requires of us, first

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Clarke and  
Waterland on  
moral and  
positive  
duties.

\* See vol. iii. p. 54.

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of all, that we do our duty to each other ; in Christ's words, to show mercy. Waterland said that God requires first our duty to Himself, that is, to offer sacrifice.\* Another answer to Waterland was found in the Scriptures. The benefit of sacraments was something very uncertain, and throughout the Scriptures moral duties have the preference over positive.

The outcome  
of the Deist  
controversy.

In the answers to the Deists, where they rise above details, the main point contended for is an external authority which enforces some doctrines not within the reach of reason. Those who were called Deists generally admitted that all which is agreeable to reason has a sanction in external revelation. The benefit, therefore, of external revelation was to confirm what they already knew by reason. But as the confirmation was not sufficient to authorise their believing anything irrational, they would not go beyond reason. Their opponents had to prove that the external evidence was sufficient to authorise belief in whatever the Scriptures taught, and the chief of these was the necessity of satisfaction for sin. This became the burden of external revelation, and according as men believed or disbelieved this they were classed as Christians or Deists. But the boundary was continually crossed. Christian apologists like Dr. Sykes denied that the doctrine of satisfaction for sin was in the Scriptures at all.† John Locke believed that an atonement had been made, but that the nature of it was not revealed. It was enough for us to know that if we repent we shall be forgiven.‡ Dr. Outram explained the atonement as the means of man's salvation, yet denied that Christ made satisfaction by His blood.§ Nearly all the Christian apologists who made the work of Christ and the necessity of its being known the essence of the Gospel, yet believed that the heathen who had never heard of Christ might be saved by the merits of His death. The Gospel, then, as explained by these apologists, was practically reduced to what those who were called Deists maintained, that if we repent and amend our lives we shall be forgiven. If we take the Deists as sincere in the profession of their belief that Christianity is an authoritative

\* See vol. iii. p. 56.

† See vol. iii. p. 52.

‡ See vol. i. p. 455, and vol. ii. p. 188.

§ See vol. ii. p. 160.

republication of natural religion, there will be in many cases but little to choose between them and the Christian apologists.

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The authority of external revelation can be of but little value if the evidence for it is insufficient to warrant us in believing anything which is not already revealed to reason. The arguments of the apologists mainly proceed on the supposition that the Deists altogether denied the external authority, and they themselves, with only a few exceptions, admit that the external evidence without the internal is not sufficient for proof. It is not necessary again to follow every evidence writer individually. Many of their arguments are the same, and most of them spend their strength in details. The best view of the whole subject will be had from an examination of Butler's 'Analogy.'

Insufficiency  
of external  
evidence.

In the inscription which Southey wrote for Butler's tombstone in Bristol Cathedral, Butler is said to have developed the analogy of the Christian religion to 'the constitution and course of nature,' to have constructed an 'irrefragable proof' of its truth, to have made 'philosophy subservient to faith,' and to have found 'in outward and visible things the type of those WITHIN THE VEIL.' It is not often that tombstones speak the truth. The inscriptions on them must all be interpreted with some allowance for the exercise of the imagination, and the natural tendency to exaggeration inseparable from panegyric. Butler never did give, and never professed to give, an 'irrefragable proof' of the truth of Christianity. He was far too conscious of human ignorance and of the imperfection of human faculties ever to attempt anything so vast. It was enough for him to show that Christianity was not so evidently false as many in that age supposed it to be. The contrast is great between the object which he set before him and that of the thousand noisy boasters who rushed to arms against the Deists.

What Butler  
did not do.

By Christianity we are to suppose that Butler meant the orthodox system of doctrine and practice generally taught in Protestant Churches. The evidences of it, as we have seen, were assailed by many writers. It was regarded as obsolete by men of the world, and it had become the jest of the illiterate and the profane. Lively wits had refuted it

Christianity in  
his day.

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in the coffee-houses to their own satisfaction a hundred times. To be an unbeliever, or as the popular term was, a free-thinker, was the fashionable mode of acquiring on easy terms a reputation for superior capacity. Mr. Tinsel, in Addison's comedy of 'The Drummer,' when disappointed in his object, wishes it to be understood that he had professed to be an unbeliever merely 'to show his parts.' Butler's own account is that 'it was taken for granted by many persons that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry; but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious.' Swift, writing in the reign of Queen Anne, says that scarcely more than two or three persons, either in the army or navy, believe in religion, and that 'of people of quality great numbers openly avow their disbelief in all revelation.' Testimonies to the same effect are plentiful in most of the theological writers of that age. To these indifferent irreligious people Butler addressed his arguments, as well as to the literary Deists who impugned what were called the evidences of Christianity.

The nature  
and force of  
analogy.

The arguments from analogy are not intended for more than suggestions which may obviate difficulties, and raise probabilities in favour of Christianity. They show that the difficulties in the Scriptures are of the same kind as the difficulties in nature. If the Deist believes that God is the Author of nature, the corresponding difficulties should not only remove his objections, but should predispose him to believe Christianity. In this way Origen pressed his arguments upon Celsus. The Pagan objected to Christ's death as a sacrifice for sin. Origen answered, that it was common for persons to lay down their lives to avert pestilences, barren seasons, or tempests of the sea. Celsus objected the treachery of the disciples and Judas. But it was nothing uncommon for disciples to desert their master; Aristotle left Plato, and Chrysippus forsook Cleanthes. Celsus objected the variety of sects and opinions among Christians. But Origen could answer that it was the same with the philosophers and with the physicians. Of course the Deists might turn Atheists, and in that case Butler's arguments would have no weight. But they mean something as addressed to Deists.



The first part of the 'Analogy' is on natural religion. Many of the analogies are mere resemblances from which no conclusion could be drawn beyond that of showing possibilities. The bird coming from the egg, or the butterfly from the chrysalis, are but faint emblems of the resurrection of the body; yet they show, at least, the possibility of another life succeeding this present. In the natural government of the world, our actions have consequences for good or evil. It is a great inference from this that our actions will have results in a future world. Yet this is possible. The moral government of God is not perfect in this life; but there are some intimations that the balance is on the side of virtue. The analogy, therefore, was of some value. The same irregularity might continue in a future life. But there was a small probability that it would not.

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SION.

Natural reli-  
gion.

In the first part of the 'Analogy,' Butler is only stating principles of natural religion, in which, for the most part, the Deists agreed with him. In the second he comes to the analogy between nature and revealed religion. If, as some divines said, Christianity is only a republication of natural religion, there is no controversy. It was this for which the Deists contended. The analogy in that case is perfect, for revealed religion then becomes the exact counterpart of natural. Butler so far agrees with Sherlock and the Deists that he repeats the statement about revelation being the republication of natural religion, which he calls 'the foundation and principal part of Christianity.' Here we have a distinct declaration that Deists and Christians are agreed in believing the 'principal part' of Christianity. Butler describes a class of Deists, who said that Christianity was not necessary. He refutes them by pointing to the state of the Heathen world. But it is doubtful, if, in the writings of any of the Deists, the position is maintained that Christianity, in this sense, is not necessary. Most of them say, very emphatically, that it is of great service in clearing up the light of nature. Butler describes a second class of Deists, whose principles he resolves finally into the same as the first class. They regarded a life of piety and virtue as the chief thing, reckoning it a matter indifferent whether the motives were from nature or revelation. This description better suits the

Revealed.



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The principal  
part of re-  
vealed reli-  
gion.

Deists. It is this class that he has before him in the rest of his arguments.

From what we know from other sources of Butler's principles, we should have expected that he would have agreed to the position of these Deists in respect to virtue. If the same good results are produced by any other religion as by Christianity, it is an internal evidence for the truth of that religion. But it is just here that Butler joins issue with the Deists. He admits that Christianity in its 'principal part' is a republication of natural religion with authority, but he finds in Christianity something more. There is a distinct dispensation, with new duties and new commands, the neglect of which may be very serious. And Butler writes about this additional dispensation in a way that if it means anything it must mean that this, and not natural religion, is the principal part of Christianity. He even supposes that a disregard of the positive duties of this special dispensation may be followed in a future world with consequences following in the same natural way as in this world they follow vice. A reference is made, apparently with approbation, to what Waterland said concerning the efficacy of sacraments\* as confirming this view of the necessity of keeping positive commands. The chapter, indeed, ends by showing the superior claims of moral over positive precepts; but it is argued that some of the positive duties of revelation really become moral. The character of a duty is not determined by the manner of its being made known to us. This argument supposes Christianity to be proved, and the whole scheme of the special dispensation, including the efficacy of sacraments, to be as certain as natural religion.

Reason the  
judge of reve-  
lation.

Butler uses Waterland's argument, but avoids accepting what seem to be its necessary consequences. In this very chapter occur the remarkable words which are often quoted, 'If in revelation there be found any passages the seeming meaning of which is contrary to natural religion, we may most certainly conclude such seeming meaning not to be the real one.' In another place Butler says that reason is 'the only faculty we have, wherewith to judge concerning anything even revelation itself.' It is to be the judge not only

\* Bishop Fitzgerald says that Butler disapproves Waterland's doctrine.

of the meaning and the evidence, but also of the morality, of revelation. Precepts in the Scriptures which seem to be immoral would be found, it is supposed, not to be immoral, if we knew the whole of the reasons why they are commanded. It is here that Butler plainly departs from the whole system of his own moral teaching, and sets up a defence of precepts which cannot be defended. If they are immoral, as we understand morality, and yet not immoral, it is useless to speak of our having a moral sense. Butler could never get over this difficulty, which was really the difficulty presented by the Deists. To turn to nature for similar immoralities was only to enlighten darkness by darkness more profound. Analogies on the side where all is dark would justify the worst practices of the Pagan religions. Calvinists have used Butler's argument to support the theology of Calvin; and by it John Henry Newman has defended the worship of saints, and of the Virgin Mary, with the doctrine of the real presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist. If revelation depended solely on external evidence, and that evidence were overwhelming, we should be bound to accept all its teaching, however immoral or vicious in our judgment it might be. But if, as Butler maintains, the contents of a revelation are to be part of the evidence, it follows that so far as it is either a scheme not comprehended by us or contrary to our ideas of morality, so far it is deficient in evidence.

The chief doctrine, of the 'particular dispensation,' is that of redemption by a Mediator. Christ by His propitiatory sacrifice made atonement for the sins of the world. The words sacrifice and atonement Butler does not attempt to define. He is content with believing that Christ is our Redeemer, though the mode of the redemption be not revealed. Christ's death had efficacy to prevail for the forgiveness of sin, and it gave value to repentance. It was an interposition to prevent the consequences of the violation of law, which, so far as we know, could not otherwise have been prevented. It had relation solely to the divine economy, so that the knowledge of it is not absolutely necessary to salvation.\* Here Butler approached the Deists in

The atone-  
ment a ratio-  
nal doctrine.

\* See vol. iii. p. 138.

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the same way as the other apologists. The Deists said that God's mercy was sufficient without any propitiatory sacrifice. Those who repented of their sins, and amended their lives, would be forgiven. Butler added that the ground of their forgiveness was the vicarious suffering of Christ, and that in this doctrine of vicarious suffering, there was nothing irrational, but rather something analogous to what we see every day in the natural world.

External  
evidences.

The object of the 'Analogy' was not to 'prove' revelation, but only to remove objections, supposing Christianity to be proved. The external evidences, however, are noticed, and an estimate made of their value. Assuming the general trustworthiness of human testimony, they amount to a high probability. They might produce conviction as a work of art produces effect, but they were not 'proof' sufficient to establish a revelation of which we are not 'competent judges.' The probability, however, is the same as that on which we act in daily life. We should, therefore, take the 'safe' side and act upon it in religion. The older apologists of Christianity added to this probability the inward witness of the Spirit, but of this Butler says nothing. The argument from mere probability would be valid if urged only for a moral life; but probability can never be a sufficient foundation for Christian faith.

Analogy  
points to a  
view of reve-  
lation differ-  
ent from the  
common one.

The revelation which will suit Butler's reasoning, is not a revelation made with external evidence sufficient to enforce all its contents whatever they may be. It is not a revelation on which we can depend for anything beyond what approves itself to reason. It is a revelation which in its great outlines corresponds to the religion of nature, is revealed in the same way, and is compassed with the same difficulties. Its evidence is not external, but appeals to the moral nature of man. In its principal part it is a republication of the religion of nature; and its other part, which is the special dispensation, relates to the divine economy; so that good Pagans who had never heard of Christ, may yet be saved by the merits of His death. Butler's words, said Professor Maurice, 'often become feeble and contradictory because he cannot write what is struggling within him;' \* but 'like every great

\* 'What is Revelation?' p. 184.

and generative thinker, he has the power of adapting himself to circumstances and conditions which he did not contemplate, and which did not exist in his day.\* He wished to defend an old view of revelation, but his arguments are instinct with a new life.

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The orthodox champions of Christianity, returning from the slaughter of the Arians and the Deists, encountered a new foe in the Methodists. The last echoes of the Deist controversy had not ceased, when it was rumoured that Wesley and Whitefield were attracting to the churches crowds of people, who professed to realise in themselves the truth of that religion which the Deists were said to have assailed. Dr. Waterland was the first to see the danger of the rising sect. He did not condescend to name them, but wrote against them as the 'new enthusiasts.' The Methodists really told the people that they must be born again before they could enter the Kingdom of God, and Dr. Waterland proved that they had all been born again in baptism, and were already members of Christ and inheritors of His Kingdom. Bishop Butler told Wesley that belief in the immediate guidance of God's Spirit, was 'a horrid thing, a very horrid thing.' Bishop Warburton convicted Conyers Middleton of infidelity, and Wesley of fanaticism, because Middleton did not believe that the Apostate Julian was refuted by balls of fire bursting out of the earth, and because Wesley believed that God's Spirit was still in the world miraculously renewing the hearts of men. Warburton denied that the rural population of England were sitting in darkness and the shadow of death, because they were not Pagans, but baptized Christians. He described Wesley's followers as fanatics, and he proved it from Wesley's own words, that they were saints without understanding orthodox doctrines or being able to give a reasonable account of what they believed. Bishop Gibson made the Methodists the subject of one of his famous Pastorals, classing them with Papists, Deists, and other disturbers of the Kingdom of God. They were Antimonians, who believed that Christ had done all for them, and, therefore, they had to do nothing in order to be saved. They were not guided by the 'Word of God,' but by inward

The Method-  
ists.

\* *Ib.*, p. 168.

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impulses, which they called the work of God's Spirit; and they came in such crowds to receive the Sacrament that the minister in many parishes had not time to take his dinner between the services.\* They 'preached to the rabble' and drew multitudes of common people after them, like the 'old Puritans who drove the clergy from their livings.'

And the  
Deists.

It may seem arbitrary to connect the Methodists with the Deists, but there was a real connection which was noticed at the time. Henry Dodwell wrote in victorious irony that Christianity was 'not founded on argument.' Men did not believe it because it was proved. Faith, that is, Christian faith, was not founded on an intellectual process. The Deists, if they really had no other object than a sincere desire to give the evidence a fair examination, may have thought this a sufficient reason for rejecting Christianity. The evidence writers certainly believed that if Christianity was not founded on argument, its last days were come. The Methodists were living witnesses that Christianity did not depend on external evidences, but on inward feelings, and on convictions of which no logical account could be given. Thomas Chubb, after quoting the text that no man calleth Jesus Lord but by the Holy Ghost, adds as a comment, 'All external evidence, all reasoning and argumentation is excluded, and thus Christianity is not founded on argument and evidence, as a late author has attempted to prove, but on divine impulsation or internal revelation. This, I apprehend, is the principle the Methodists go upon, for the proof of which they appeal to such parts of Scripture as the above.' † In another place, Chubb says, 'The Methodists pretend to be under the guidance of God in the exercise of their ministry, and are called Enthusiasts, yet the guidance of God's Spirit is what our Church prays for, and, therefore, surely the terms enthusiasm and enthusiast should be cautiously applied by Christians, lest they should be found to terminate, not in Methodism but in Christianity.' ‡

\* 'John Wesley,' by Julia Wedgwood, p. 303.

† Author's Farewell to his Readers, vol. ii. p. 53.

‡ 'Remarks on the Scriptures,' p. 31.

With the Methodists on one side and the Deists on the other, the Christian apologists were hard pressed. Caleb Fleming, the Socinian minister of the Independent congregation meeting at Pinners' Hall, republished John Scott's 'Essay on Enthusiasm,' which he accompanied with a tract on the new sect of Enthusiasts. He dedicated the whole to Bishop Gibson, and pointed out that the real danger lay in 'the great resemblance of their doctrines to those of the Articles of the Church of England.' He added triumphantly that the Methodists had no chance of ever receiving favour from those who held the ministerial office among Non-conformists.\* That the Spirit of God had virtually departed from the world, was a doctrine universally received both by Churchmen and Dissenters. The theory was that in the first ages of Christianity the Spirit had gone with the Apostles working miracles, and that in virtue of these miracles Christianity was believed. After a time the Spirit withdrew from the Church, and miracles ceased. The Bible, or according to another theory the Church, took the place of the Spirit. There were many things said and done by the first Methodists which no one will now care to defend. Wesley and Whitefield distinctly believed that they were under the immediate and supernatural guidance of the Holy Ghost. In several places in his journals Wesley recorded cases of healing and casting out of devils that had happened in answer to his prayers. But in his reply to Warburton, he denied that he had ever believed that he was endowed with the power of working miracles. The devil, he said, still fights for his kingdom, and God still works wonders in the conversion of men. God's power was not limited to the first ages of Christianity. He still works miracles of healing in answer to prayer, and this 'beyond the ordinary course of nature.' The simple facts in the history of the first Methodists supplied the Deists with fresh arguments against the Christian apologists. Here were reports of miracles and actual faith in a supernatural working in the sphere of nature. Thomas Chubb used the case of the Methodists to illustrate the first propagation of Christianity. It was not necessary, he said, to suppose external miracles. The Spirit

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evidence  
writers.

\* This was written in 1744.



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‘ working through the Scriptures, or what is judged to be so, ’ is sufficient for the propagation of Methodism. Why, then he asked, may not the letter of the Scriptures together with ‘ the operation of the Spirit upon the mind, or what was then judged to be so, have been sufficient for the introduction and propagation of Christianity ? ’ \*

The Method-  
ists and the  
bishops.

The treatment which the Methodists met will ever be a reproach to the orthodox Christians of the eighteenth century. The bishops, however, must have felt some real difficulties when such men as Bishop Butler and Bishop Berkeley could inhibit Wesley from preaching in their dioceses. Secker, too, who was Wesley’s personal friend, and when Bishop of Oxford corresponded with him on the steps he was taking, † at last deplored in a ‘ Charge ’ to his clergy the irregularities of the Methodists. ‡ But the difficulties of the bishops mainly arose from their maintaining a theory of the Church set aside at the Reformation, which they themselves only vaguely believed and which the Methodists practically refuted. There was no liberty of prophesying, and most of the clergy acted on the belief that no man could do any good except according to the order of the Church. The two Wesleys waited on the pious William Law to ask his advice. Still full of extravagant ideas of Church authority, Law intimated that any departure from the order of the Church would be like taking out a new commission to preach the Gospel and go forth in the spirit and power of an Apostle. If the Wesleys did this, Law warned them that their scheme would end in Bedlam. The bishop who treated the Methodists with most wisdom was the venerable Primate Potter. ‘ These gentlemen, ’ he said, ‘ have been

\* ‘ The Author’s Farewell to his Readers, ’ vol. ii. p. 46.

† Secker wrote many letters to Wesley under the name of John Smith.

‡ ‘ But I mean to speak of persons risen up in our own times, and professing the strictest piety, who vehemently charge us with departing from the doctrines and slighting the precepts of our Religion, but have, indeed themselves, advanced unjustifiable notions as necessary truths; giving good people groundless fears, and bad ones groundless hopes; dis-

turbed the understandings of some, impaired the circumstances of others; prejudiced multitudes against their proper ministers, and prevented their edification by them; produced, first, disorders in our churches, then partial or total separation from them; and set up unauthorised teachers in their assemblies. Where these irregularities will end, God only knows; but it behoves us to be very careful, that they may make no progress through our fault.’—*The Second Charge delivered in Canterbury in 1758.*



irregular, but they have done good, and I pray God to bless them.\*

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The movement for the abolition of subscription to the Articles of Religion was one of the last efforts to secure greater freedom in the Church, and to do something for the reconciliation of Nonconformists. Its most vigorous opponents were the Methodists and the Evangelical clergy. Top-lady might fight with Wesley's followers over the meaning of the Articles, but all were resolved that there should be no repeal of subscription. The Nonconformists to be conciliated were the old Dissenters, the lineal descendants of the Puritans of the Commonwealth, and a great body of the clergy were quite willing for the change, though they refused to subscribe the Feathers Tavern petition. The movement was certain to fail. Justice has never been done to Arch-deacon Blackburne, whose intentions were of the purest kind, and whose love for the Church of England was equal to his zeal for its reformation. We ought to be done with the fallacy that a man is not sincerely attached to a church because he wishes some things in it to be changed. But the time was not a proper one for so great a movement as the abolition of subscription. The Church was too feeble, and the soundest policy both of statesmen and bishops was to let matters stand till a more convenient season. The abolition of subscription to articles was too great a change to be made at once, even supposing it possible for a church to exist without its teaching being defined. The argument which Arch-deacon Blackburne borrowed from the old Presbyterians, that the Bible might be substituted for the creeds, was founded on the old doctrine of the infallible inspiration of the Scriptures. It assumed that there was a difference between the

Movement for  
the repeal of  
subscription.

\* The address which David Hartley gave to both sides was worthy of a philosopher. 'There are,' he said, 'great complaints made of the irregularities of the Methodists, and, I believe, not without reason. The surest means to check these irregularities is for the clergy to learn from the Methodists what is good in them, to adopt their zeal and concern for lost souls. This would soon unite all that are truly good amongst the Methodists to the clergy, and disarm such

as are otherwise. And if the Methodists will hearken to one who means sincerely well to all parties, let me entreat them to reverence their superiors, to avoid spiritual selfishness and zeal for particular phrases and tenets, and not to sow divisions in parishes and families, but to be peace-makers, as they hope to be called the children of God. The whole world will never be converted but by those of a truly Catholic spirit.' — *Observations on Man*, vol. ii. p. 548.

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language of the Bible, and that of other books. The words, they said, being God's words, must be more definite than those of men.

The eigh-  
teenth cen-  
tury.

It has long been the fashion to decry the eighteenth century. We have certainly met a great deal that deserves condemnation. The tone of the public mind was often frivolous and superficial. The common people were ignorant and profane. The philosophy of the century was not deep, and religion was more defended than practised. But the eighteenth century was not entirely the reign of death. Our obligations to it are greater than we commonly suppose. It was the golden age of English practical common sense. To it we owe the cultivation of the spirit of inquiry and the exercise of the faculty of reasoning. It was something to have fanaticism and superstition chased out of the world. A wave of reaction indeed came with the extravagances of the first Methodists; but this was only in accordance with the known laws of progress. Most of the great religious institutions which now flourish in the fulness of their strength were begun in the eighteenth century. No era is perfect, but each has a place to fill in the historic development of the education of the race.

Retrospect of  
the whole  
history.

And this also will be found true of parties, if we take a final retrospect over the whole ground which we have traversed since the Reformation. In our complex religious history, we have inherited many things which we should either not have inherited or not have appreciated if they had not come to us through the fires of conflict and strife. To the old Erastian Reformers we owe that reverence for the State which is necessary to the well-being of a great nation. To them, too, we owe that devout impulse to follow reason, which in union with veneration for the Scriptures is the first attribute of the English Church. To the Puritans we owe that deep religious earnestness which has made the spiritual world a real world, and has been the vital power of English Christianity. To them, too, we owe the quiet and rest of the English Sunday, which, but for their efforts, the Stuarts and the Stuart bishops would have made a day of feasts and sports. To the High Church party we owe many of the proprieties of outward worship, sometimes objectionable from

associations, but generally manifesting a reverence for the service of God, and making the Divine Presence accessible to the consciousness of souls whose vision is obscured by the veil of mortal flesh. And from the struggles of all these parties, for each has had its martyrs and sufferers, we have obtained religious freedom, learned mutual toleration, and by the price that others have paid we sit under our own vine and our own fig-tree. It is true we have been threatened with a revival of superstitions, which, it was hoped, we had been done with for ever. The doctrine of the magic of sacraments and some other doctrines tenable only by Roman Catholics, if tenable at all, have risen again. The Church of Rome, too, even though crowned with the absurdity of papal infallibility, gets, as in the nature of things it must do, a temporary advantage from our differences. But we need not be alarmed at the presence of any opposing forces. A nation with a religious history such as that which we have traversed cannot again come under the power of superstition till its reason has been demented, and its glory has departed.

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Good results.

## APPENDIX (A).

IN the previous volumes I have added in appendices notices of some writers that had been omitted by accident, or for whom I had not convenient places in the body of the work. The plan did not require that every writer or every theological work should be noticed, but for a secondary object I have wished to omit as few as possible.

Daniel Brevint might have been noticed among the eminent Churchmen of the period of the Restoration. He was a native of the Isle of Jersey, and had studied at the French Protestant College of Saumur, according to the custom then prevailing with Church of England students who were natives of the Channel Islands. Brevint was incorporated at Oxford, and made a Fellow of Jesus College. He took the side of the Royalists in the differences between the king and the people, and lost his fellowship. After ministering to a Protestant congregation in Normandy, he returned to England, and was made a Prebendary of Durham. His works are only remarkable for a decided opposition to the Church of Rome, and for some peculiar views on the Sacrament of the Supper, which seem to approach those of John Johnson and Thomas Brett.

In 1707, William Wall, Vicar of Shoreham, in Kent, published his famous 'History of Infant Baptism,' collecting all the passages for or against infant baptism in the writers of the first four centuries. The testimonies, he said, for its antiquity are so many, that scarcely a learned man could be named who held that it was not practised from the beginning. Walafridus Strabo, and Ludovicus Vives, who were quoted by Tombes, are not allowed to have been learned either in history or divinity. Among learned men who oppose infant baptism, few go farther than to maintain that though infant baptism was practised from the beginning, it was not universal. Wall admits that there is no mention of infant baptism in the New Testament, but he finds also that there is no mention of the baptism of any adult children of believers. The cases of baptism mentioned are all those of converts from Judaism or Heathenism. It is then no marvel that those who are guided solely by the Scriptures might take either side. But it is, Wall says, a great wonder and a great shame, that those who profess to have studied the ancient records should have given such different accounts. When, he adds, a command is

given, and the method how it is to be performed is not given, we may safely conclude that there was in the minds of those who received the command no doubt as to its meaning. The Apostles when told to baptize Jews would follow the Jewish custom of baptism, which was to baptize proselytes and their children. That this was the custom of the Jews, we have ample evidence from many sources, and we find the same terms in use which are common in the writings of the early Fathers. The baptism of a proselyte was called his new birth or regeneration. So the first Christians said of one that was baptized, that he was 'born of water,' sanctified or illuminated. The baptized were the clean, and the unbaptized the unclean. It is true that some of the passages which Wall quotes from the earliest writers are testimonies only by inference. The argument is, all children inherited original sin, and as baptism was reckoned necessary to salvation, we may fairly infer the baptism of children. The first quotation is from the Roman Clement, who proves the doctrine of original sin by a wrong translation of a passage in Job. But Clement's error does not affect his testimony, which is, that no one is free from pollution, though his life be but the length of one day.

Several eminent writers, on Church subjects, of the last century have been scarcely noticed, if noticed at all. The works of such men as Bingham, Cave, and Grabe, come only incidentally within the scope of this work. Bingham's 'Antiquities' touch theological controversies at different points, but not with a controversial spirit. His theology is that of the old High Churchman who revered antiquity, but was not servilely bound by it. The fundamental articles of Christianity he found in the Apostles' Creed. The chief of these was the divinity of Christ. Heresies on this subject were the first heresies that disturbed the Church. The Athanasian bishops are commended for having consecrated opposition bishops in the time of the Arians. This is the grand fact in defence of Anglican ordination and separation from Rome. It shows that the Church depended on the true faith, and not, as the Roman Catholics hold, the true faith on the Church.

The works of Dr. William Cave are mostly connected with the study of the Fathers. His reverence for these ancient writers was almost a weakness. But like many great Patristic scholars, Dr. Cave was a decided Protestant. Dr. Grabe may also be classed with those who made antiquity their chief study. But we have also an interest in him as a writer against Whiston. An Arabic MS. in the Bodleian, Whiston supposed to be a treatise known as 'The Doctrine of the Apostles.' He had looked through it with the

help of Professor Ockley, and promised a version of it along with his translation of the Apostolic Constitutions. Dr. Grabe wrote an essay to show that the Arabic MS. consisted of the first four books of the Constitutions with part of the sixth, but transposed with many alterations and interpolations, and, moreover, that it was not Arian. Dr. Grabe also wrote 'Some Instances of the Defect and Omission, in Mr. Whiston's Collections of Testimonies from the Scriptures and the Fathers against the true Deity of the Holy Ghost, and of misapplying and misinterpreting divers of them.' He was also very learned in liturgies, and wished the introduction of baptism by immersion, mixing water with the Communion wine, and some other peculiar ceremonies.

Matthew Horbery might have been noticed for his excellent sermons. He also wrote against John Jackson in the Arian controversy. In this he is said to have been assisted by Dr. Waterland.

Dr. John Rogers ought to have been noticed in the account of the Bangorian controversy. He was one of the first who came forward to defend the authority of the clergy in their government of the visible Church. He was answered by Sykes, and wrote in defence, 'A Review of the Discourse of the Visible and Invisible Church.' He also wrote against Collins on prophecy; and against Dr. Chandler on the civil establishment of religion.

Thomas Pyle was the author of some tracts in the Bangorian controversy in defence of Hoadly. He was an eminent man, and of a liberal spirit in theology. His chief works are paraphrases on the Scriptures.

Thomas Staekhouse is still known for his history of the Bible, but a far more valuable work is his account of the 'Miseries and great Hardships of the Inferior Clergy in and about London.' The most unfortunate curate of the present day, who happens to have read this treatise, will find his heart glowing with thankfulness that the lines have fallen to him in pleasant places. When *John Robinson* was enjoying the dignities and emoluments of the Diocese of London, the 'inferior' clergy were 'objects of extreme wretchedness.' They lived in garrets, and it is intimated that they appeared in the streets with tattered cassocks; while Hooker and Stillingfleet, the substance of their library were often sent to the sign of the three balls. All presents, even a scarf or a pair of gloves, had to be given up to the rector, who was generally a pluralist, and spent his time hunting for more preferment. The common fee for a sermon was a shilling and a dinner, for reading prayers twopence and a cup of coffee. A curate's salary by law was not less than £20 a year, and not more than £50, but it was

generally nearer the former than the latter. The incumbents avoided having licensed curates, and the bishop was always too busy to have time to know anything of what was doing among the 'inferior' clergy. Their salaries were 'less than the sextons', and not so punctually paid.' The rectors made 'jests upon their poverty,' and were 'merry at their misfortunes, turning them among the herd of their servants into the kitchen till dinner comes in, and then showing them what a mighty favour it is that they are permitted to sit down at the lower end of the table among their betters.' When the poor curate had laid out his £20 per annum in board, lodging, books, and charity, should he happen to meet a brother curate in Cheapside, he had scarcely a coin left to treat him to a little of something 'for his stomach's sake.'

'The Reasonableness and Certainty of the Christian Religion,' by Robert Jenkin, is a good book, though it contains nothing which we have not met in other writers on the same subject. The general histories and doctrines in the Scriptures are shown to be reasonable. Jenkin also wrote a 'Confutation of the Pretences against Natural and Revealed Religion.' He was a Nonjuror, and about as rational as any of that race.

William Lowth, father of the celebrated Bishop Lowth, published, in 1693, a work of some interest, called 'A Vindication of the Divine Authority and Inspiration of the Old and New Testament.' This was an answer to 'Five Letters on Inspiration,' translated from the French, and ascribed to Le Clerc, though published without his name. This William Lowth seems to have been a very learned man. He furnished notes to Dr. Potter for his edition of 'Clemens Alexandrinus,' and Bishop Chandler consulted him continually when writing his answers to Collins.

Dr. Patrick Delany, Dean of Down, was also a writer on evidences. Delany was a friend of Swift's. His book is called 'Revelation examined with Candour.' Every interposition of the Deity is called a revelation. The argument is that the things revealed in the Scriptures could only have been known by divine revelation. Such, for instance, was Adam's knowledge of the brute creation, and the law of marriage. The flood is proved by marl deposits, and coins with ships on them.

Philip Skelton, author of 'Deism Revealed,' was a pupil of Delany's. Skelton's book contains all the arguments against the Deists. It is clearly written, and is as interesting as might be expected from a long dialogue, where the speakers who represent the author's views are made to have the best of the argument. The book also suffers from the prevailing tone of ridicule and con-



tempt, with which the Christian apologists treated the Deists, and it is not free from levity and affected wit.

'The Centaur, not Fabulous,' by Dr. Edward Young the poet, was meant chiefly as a warning against the life of pleasure then 'in vogue.' It followed, however, the popular argument of that day, that infidelity and immorality mutually generate each other. It was published in 1755, just after the publication of the works of Bolingbroke, to which it has several references. Immorality and infidelity were described as two national distempers, one of which seizes the body, and the other the mind; two fiery darts, which were not only poisoned but barbed arrows in the British heart. The two tables of the law are broken in another sense than they were by Moses, and men worship as their golden calf the sufficiency of reason. Dr. Young says that faith is necessary on its own account. The greatest sacrifice we can offer is 'a submission of our understandings, an oblation of our idolised reason to God.' Faith is necessary to salvation; without it, 'a virtuous life is as an angel of light, supported by a cloven foot.\* This faith is explained as faith in the most abstruse articles of our religion, which is an honour due to divine testimony. The more incredible the matter we believe, the more respect we show to the author.† A mystery explained is a mystery destroyed. The prevalence of unbelief and immorality was so fearful, that almost 'every cottage can afford us one that has corrupted, and every palace one that has renounced, the faith.' ‡

'The Light of Nature displayed,' by Abraham Tucker, is an extensive work in seven volumes. It treats diffusively of all subjects connected with religion and morals. Paley acknowledges his obligations to it. But the work really contains little that is original.

The unfortunate Dr. William Dodd was a voluminous author, and wrote many things of great value, especially sermons and poems, with a large commentary on the Scriptures. Dodd was originally a Hutchinsonian, and one of the set to which Bishop Horne and Jones of Nayland belonged. It was to his interest to forsake this party and take to the Evangelicals, who were then rising in public favour.

Martin Madan, one of the first of the Evangelical clergy, wrote a remarkable book in defence of polygamy, which caused some controversy on its first publication. It was called 'Thelyphthora, or a Treatise on Female Ruin.' The author's object was to prevent 'the alarming increase of female prostitution.' The argument was

\* P. 18.

† P. 24.

‡ P. 27.

derived from the Old Testament, from such passages, for instance, as Deuteronomy xxii. 28-9, where, after paying fifty shekels, the man was not to put away the damsel all her days. The prostitute, on the other hand, was to be stoned to death. The reprobation of polygamy by Christianity, Madan ascribed to the disparagement of marriage by the early Christians. The Gnostics said it was *of the devil*.

The account of 'Mr. Locke's Religion,' mentioned vol. ii. p. 190, was written by John Milner, Vicar of Leeds, afterwards a Nonjuror.

Archdeacon Randolph, who has been mentioned in the controversy on subscription to Articles, also wrote a tract in answer to 'Christianity not founded on Argument,' and an answer to Bishop Clayton's 'Essay on Spirit.'

John Rotherham, who appeared in the same controversy, wrote an apology for the 'Athanasian Creed.' He addressed his arguments only to those who objected to the phraseology of the creed, not to the doctrine. He denied that the anathemas extended to those who could not receive the metaphysical explanations of the Trinity. He also excluded those who had no opportunities of knowing the truth taught in the creed. The declaration of condemnation was but another form of Christ's words, 'He that believeth not shall be damned.' It embraced only such as were unbelievers from the perverseness of their wills and the prevalence of a bad heart. The Trinity is a part of the Catholic faith, but it is not contended that every argument in this creed is also a part of the Catholic faith. Nor can this be said of any particular explanation of the Trinity; so that the creed really declares nothing more than that, in order to be saved, we must hold the common faith of Christians.

A controversy concerning conformity was carried on with some spirit in the later part of the eighteenth century between John White, a clergyman, and Micaiah Towgood, one of the Presbyterian Arians. White's arguments were the old ones of submitting to indifferent ceremonies for the sake of order, and out of respect for government and governors. Towgood's answers were equally old. He would be glad, he said, to take the benefits of the Establishment if he could do it with a good conscience. He objects to the article which ascribes to the Church authority in matters of faith as well as ceremonies, especially as the Church of England is not under the hierarchy but under the civil ruler.

Humphrey Prideaux, the author of a still standard book on the 'Connection of the History of the Old and New Testaments,' has

also been unnoticed. This was his chief work. He was a decided Protestant and a judicious Churchman; but his studies lay more in sacred literature than in theological controversy.

The 'Discourses' of Dr. John Abernethy, an Irish Presbyterian and probably an Arian, are excellent. They were much admired by Archbishop Herring.

Thomas Bott, originally a Presbyterian preacher, had some reputation as a controversialist in the last century. He was a Latitudinarian in theology, but wrote against Middleton and Warburton. He also wrote 'Remarks on the Sixth Chapter of Bishop Butler's Analogy.'

Thomas Broughton, Rector of Stibbington, in Huntingdonshire, was a considerable writer on theological subjects, but without any remarkable views. He was employed on the 'Great Historical Dictionary,' and wrote a large 'Dictionary of all Religions.' His most important controversial work was an answer to Tindal, called 'Christianity distinct from the Religion of Nature.'

Anthony Ellys, Bishop of St. David's, and afterwards of Gloucester, wrote 'Remarks on Hume's Essay on Miracles.' This treatise might have been noticed under Hume.

Dr. Richard Fiddes's 'Body of Divinity,' in two folio volumes, published in 1720, contains elaborate discussions on some questions in theology.

John Evelyn's 'History of Religion' belongs to the seventeenth century, though it was not published until 1850. It consists of two parts: the first dealing chiefly with natural religion; and the second with Christianity, its history and its doctrines. The arguments are of the ordinary and most orthodox kind. The chapter which concerns the Church of England is the only one which has a special interest. Evelyn was confessedly a strong Churchman, and had a thorough hatred of the Puritans. His editor, who was evidently a modern 'Anglo-Catholic,' calls this chapter an impartial interpretation of the Articles and Liturgy of the Church of England, conveyed in a manner which shows he was not propounding new views, but merely stating them as understood by her members in his time. In Evelyn's time the Articles of Religion were understood by the members of the Church of England in very different ways; but most sensible people in the present day would be satisfied with Evelyn's interpretation. The Catholic Church is described as consisting of 'all who profess to believe in Jesus Christ to be the true Messiah and Redeemer of the world, albeit this body be divided into never so many sects; but among which there are remaining a considerable part of true

and faithful persons, professing in general the same faith, and participating of the same sacraments under the ministry of lawful pastors with that body of believers.' It is possible to interpret the last part of this passage as contradicting the first. 'Lawful' ministers may be made to mean only ministers ordained by bishops. The rest of the context, however, shows clearly that Evelyn really included in the Catholic Church all who professed and called themselves Christians. The true Church, however, was the invisible, consisting only of those who really had faith and godliness. The holy Catholic Church is now more an object of faith than of sight. If it were entirely visible it would be improper to say 'I believe in the Holy Catholic Church;' for what a man sees he has ceased to believe; to hold the right faith is to be of the true Church. There will always be men holding the right faith; and, therefore, there will always be a true Church more or less visible. In the Middle Ages the true Church was found among the disciples of Berengarius, the Albigenses, the Vaudois, the poor men of Lyons, the Taborists of Bohemia, and others, down to Luther. Evelyn explains the Articles in their proper Protestant sense, which he calls also Catholic, on the ground that the right faith makes a man a Catholic, to whatever sect he belongs. Predestination is taken in a mild sense as inseparable from foreknowledge. It is first said that God foresaw all who would take hold of grace, and He predestinated them; but this is Arminianism. It is said immediately after that what God foreknew He must at the same time have predestinated; which is Calvinism. It is, however, added, that none are totally reprobated, but have sufficient means afforded them for salvation; which is Baxterianism.

Another layman who wrote a great deal on ecclesiastical and theological subjects was Sir Peter, afterwards Lord Chancellor, King. He belonged originally to the Presbyterians, but afterwards conformed to the Established Church. Lord King was among Whiston's early friends, and, like him, was a devoted student of Christian antiquity. His book on the 'Primitive Church' has some historical interest. To it Wesley ascribed his conversion from High Churchism to the theory of the Church which regards bishops and presbyters as of the same order. The Church is defined by Lord King as Catholic or universal: that is, including all Christians. A particular Church is the company of believers in one place. Sometimes the building is called the Church. The only case of the churches of a country or province being called the Church is in Cyprian, where he speaks of 'the Church in Africa

and Numidia. A very frequent use of the word Church in the Fathers is in the sense of the invisible Church, which embraces only those who are Christians in reality. It is this Church which is the spouse of Christ. The word is also used to signify the true faith and doctrine. Some Fathers speak of many bishops in one Church; and others as distinctly declare that there was but one bishop to one church. The latter is probably the more correct. Every congregation had its own bishop or pastor. Hence we read of the bishop of the parish of Ephesus, of Alexandria, of Corinth, and so on. All the people of a diocese met every Sunday for worship in one congregation. They had but one altar, and from it all the people received the sacrament at the hands of the bishop. In the diocese of Smyrna the bishop alone baptized or administered the Eucharist; and wherever he was his whole flock followed him. For three hundred years after Christ, the dioceses of Antioch, Carthage, and Rome had but single Churches or congregations. The evidence which Lord King adduces for this is certainly strong; but the thing itself is perfectly incredible. The diocese of Alexandria had divided itself into several congregations in the third century; yet even in the fourth it is evident from the writings of St. Athanasius that the Christians could all meet in one place. A presbyter was described as a person in holy orders, with the inherent right to perform the whole office of a bishop, but without a fixed parish, and so requiring, for the exercise of his functions, the consent of a bishop with a parish.

Thomas Rymer, Chaplain to the Bishop of Norwich, wrote 'A General Representation of Revealed Religion,' in which he answered many objections to Christianity, and made a defence and exposition of its doctrines. This work is orthodox, creditably written, and not without originality. It was dedicated to the bishop, who was informed that the dedication was to be no 'fulsome panegyric;' yet, added the chaplain, 'I do not presume to imagine that any one will look into this book, to whom your lordship is a stranger; nor can I entertain a thought of its outliving your lordship's memory.' The bishop's name was Green.

Thomas Bradbury, who has been mentioned as one of the leading orthodox Nonconformists in the beginning of the eighteenth century, is said to have been an eccentric preacher. His sermons show a great deal of common sense. In one of them he gives the clergy a receipt for making a 30th of January sermon. 'Take,' he says, 'a few rattling words, such as schismatics, atheists, rebels, traitors, miscreants, monsters, enthusiasts, hypocrites, Lord's

anointed, sacred majesty, God's vicegerent, impious, blasphemous, damnation. Stir them together in a warm head; and, after a little shaking, bring them out, scum and all; distribute them with several periods, and your work is half-done.'

Some more notice might have been taken of Bishop Clayton's works. Besides his 'Essay on Spirit,' he wrote a vindication of the Old and New Testament histories in answer to Lord Bolingbroke. Bishop Clayton admitted the truth of Bolingbroke's distinction between the inspiration of prophecies, doctrines, &c., and the inspiration of histories. Bolingbroke made the distinction, but he did not hold it sincerely. It was only an artifice to allow him to disparage the Scriptures without seeming to deny revelation. Bishop Clayton said this distinction was necessary to answer the objections made by the Deists. The inspired writers are not and do not profess to be infallible in everything. The histories in the Bible are, however, as authentic as any other histories, and this is sufficient for the defence of revelation.

Jeremiah Seed has only been mentioned in a note. His sermons and lectures have great merits, and are written in a clear and lively style. Seed was curate to Dr. Waterland at Twickenham for the greater part of his life, and wrote on the same subjects. He had not Waterland's learning, but he had more originality. The sermons at Lady Moyer's Lectures are mostly occupied with the evidences of Christianity. He first treats of the argument from miracles, which are shown to be decisive proofs of divine power. That they are not the work of evil spirits is concluded from the premise that God would not suffer men to be deceived. Besides the miracles of power wrought in evidence of revelation, there were also miracles of knowledge, that is, prophecies. The conversion of the old world from paganism to Christianity is supposed to have been impossible without miracles. The multitudes put to death in Nero's reign had conversed with the apostles, and must have known whether or not they wrought miracles. 'We have not,' Seed says, 'a scientific infallible certainty of the truth of Christianity, but we have an infallible certainty that we ought to be determined by such evidences as Christianity is surrounded with. Because either we must act upon such evidence in the daily course of life, or remain in a state of utter inaction.' In the third sermon he applies Butler's argument from our incompetency to judge *how*, and with what degree of clearness, God should make a revelation. But one plain argument that He has done it should outweigh a thousand plausible objections. The rest of the sermons are on the corrup-

tion of human nature, redemption, and the doctrine of the Trinity. In Seed's 'Posthumous Works' there is a sermon of considerable originality, called 'The Christian Life a Progressive State.' There is also a series of 'Letters' on the doctrines of Christianity, satisfaction for sin, with some occasional discussions on God's infinity, eternity, and prescience, in which Dr. Clarke and all *à priori* reasoners are duly refuted.

Thomas Belsham, the successor of Theophilus Lindsey in Essex Street Chapel, wrote an answer to Wilberforce's 'Practical View of Christianity.' He undertook to point out the inconsistency of Wilberforce's 'Extravagant opinions, with sound reason, with genuine Christianity, and good morals.' Wilberforce did not lay down any definite doctrine concerning the mode of Christ's satisfaction; but Belsham infers that it must be the theory which represents redemption coming through satisfaction or reparation being made to God, and not arising from a pure, disinterested benevolence. Belsham summed up the essential doctrines of Christianity as those which inculcated love to God and man, setting aside Wilberforce's peculiar doctrines of the Gospel as not being doctrines of the Gospel. It is denied that man is wholly corrupt by nature. It is admitted that there is great wickedness in the world; but we hear more of the vices of men than of their virtues, because virtue is the ordinary state of things, and no notice is taken of it. Vice is a deviation from the accustomed order, and therefore it is remarked and recorded. Where St. Paul says that 'we were by nature children of wrath,' he is speaking of the Gentile converts, who, before their conversion, were slaves to idolatry and vice. According to Wilberforce, men are accepted of God, because they believe certain doctrines. According to Belsham, men are acceptable to God because of the purity and uprightness of their lives. To Wilberforce's lament that orthodox Christians themselves forgot the 'peculiar doctrines' of their religion, Belsham answers that the reason was not, as commonly said, a reaction against Puritanism, but that men of understanding beginning to suspect the truth of the doctrines, and not thinking it prudent, or even decent, to preach against the tenets of a Church of which they were members, and from which they derived subsistence, regarded it as the best and safest course to be silent upon these topics, and to confine themselves wholly to practical subjects.' Ample justice is done to the excellent spirit of Wilberforce's 'Practical View;' but Belsham, as a Unitarian, had to protest against the importance ascribed to the doctrinal system of orthodox Christianity.



## APPENDIX (B.)

*Bishops from 1720 to 1800.*

CANTERBURY.		CHICHESTER.	
John Potter . . . . .	1737	Thomas Bowers . . . . .	1722
Thomas Herring . . . . .	1747	Edward Waddington . . . . .	1724
Matthew Hutton . . . . .	1757	Francis Hare . . . . .	1731
Thomas Secker . . . . .	1758	Matthias Mawson . . . . .	1740
Frederick Cornwallis . . . . .	1768	Sir William Ashburnham . . . . .	1754
John Moore . . . . .	1783	John Buckner . . . . .	1797
ST. ASAPH.		ST. DAVID'S.	
Francis Hare . . . . .	1728	Richard Smalbroke . . . . .	1723
Thomas Farmer . . . . .	1731	Elias Sydall . . . . .	1730
Isaac Madox . . . . .	1736	Nicholas Claget . . . . .	1731
John Thomas . . . . .	1743	Edward Willis . . . . .	1743
Robert H. Drummond . . . . .	1748	Richard Trevor . . . . .	1744
Richard Newcombe . . . . .	1761	Anthony Ellys . . . . .	1752
Jonathan Shipley . . . . .	1769	Samuel Squire . . . . .	1761
Samuel Halifax . . . . .	1789	Robert Lowth . . . . .	1760
Lewis Bagot . . . . .	1790	Charles Moss . . . . .	1766
BANGOR.		James York . . . . .	1774
William Baker . . . . .	1723	John Warren . . . . .	1779
Thomas Sherlock . . . . .	1728	Edward Smallwell . . . . .	1783
Charles Cecil . . . . .	1734	Samuel Horsley . . . . .	1788
Thomas Herring . . . . .	1737	William Stuart . . . . .	1793
Matthew Hutton . . . . .	1743	ELY.	
Zachary Pearce . . . . .	1748	Thomas Green . . . . .	1723
John Egerton . . . . .	1756	Robert Butts . . . . .	1738
John Ewer . . . . .	1769	Thomas Gooch . . . . .	1748
John Moore . . . . .	1774	Matthias Mawson . . . . .	1754
John Warren . . . . .	1783	Edmund Keene . . . . .	1770
BATH AND WELLS.		James York . . . . .	1781
John Wynne . . . . .	1727	EXETER.	
Edward Willis . . . . .	1743	Stephen Weston . . . . .	1724
Charles Moss . . . . .	1774	Nicholas Claget . . . . .	1743
BRISTOL.		George Lavington . . . . .	1746
William Bradshaw . . . . .	1724	Frederick Keppel . . . . .	1762
Charles Cecil . . . . .	1732	John Ross . . . . .	1778
Thomas Secker . . . . .	1734	William Butler . . . . .	1792
Thomas Gooch . . . . .	1737	Henry Reginald Courtenay . . . . .	1797
Joseph Butler . . . . .	1738	GLOUCESTER.	
John Conybeare . . . . .	1750	Joseph Wilcocks . . . . .	1721
John Hume . . . . .	1758	Elias Sydall . . . . .	1731
Philip Yonge . . . . .	1758	Martin Benson . . . . .	1734
Thomas Newton . . . . .	1761	James Johnson . . . . .	1752
Lewis Bagot . . . . .	1782	William Warburton . . . . .	1760
Christopher Wilson . . . . .	1785	James York . . . . .	1769
Spencer Madan . . . . .	1792	Samuel Halifax . . . . .	1781
Henry Reginald Courtenay . . . . .	1794	Richard Beadon . . . . .	1789
Folliot H. W. Cornwall . . . . .	1797		

HEREFORD.	
Benjamin Hoadly . . . . .	1721
Henry Egerton . . . . .	1723
James Beauclerk . . . . .	1746
John Harley . . . . .	1788
John Butler . . . . .	1788

LLANDAFF.	
Robert Clavering . . . . .	1724
John Harris . . . . .	1728
Matthias Mawson . . . . .	1738
John Gilbert . . . . .	1740
Edward Cresset . . . . .	1748
Richard Newcombe . . . . .	1755
John Ewer . . . . .	1761
Jonathan Shipley . . . . .	1769
Shute Barrington . . . . .	1769
Richard Watson . . . . .	1782

LINCOLN.	
Richard Reynolds . . . . .	1723
John Thomas . . . . .	1743
John Green . . . . .	1761
Thomas Thurlow . . . . .	1779
George Prettyman Tomline . . . . .	1787

LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY.	
Richard Smalbroke . . . . .	1730
Frederick Cornwallis . . . . .	1749
John Egerton . . . . .	1768
Brownlow North . . . . .	1771
Richard Hurd . . . . .	1774
John Cornwallis . . . . .	1781

LONDON.	
Edmund Gibson . . . . .	1723
Thomas Sherlock . . . . .	1748
Thomas Hayter . . . . .	1761
Thomas Osbaldiston . . . . .	1762
Richard Terrick . . . . .	1764
Robert Lowth . . . . .	1777
Beilby Porteus . . . . .	1787

NORWICH.	
Thomas Green . . . . .	1721
John Leng . . . . .	1723
William Baker . . . . .	1727
Robert Butts . . . . .	1732
Thomas Gooch . . . . .	1738
Samuel Lisle . . . . .	1748
Thomas Hayter . . . . .	1749
Philip Yonge . . . . .	1761
Lewis Bagot . . . . .	1783
George Horne . . . . .	1790
Charles Manners Sutton . . . . .	1792

OXFORD.	
Thomas Secker . . . . .	1738
John Hume . . . . .	1756
Robert Lowth . . . . .	1767

John Butler . . . . .	1777
Edward Smallwell . . . . .	1788
John Randolph . . . . .	1799

PETERBOROUGH.	
Robert Clavering . . . . .	1728
John Thomas . . . . .	1748
Richard Terrick . . . . .	1757
Robert Lamb . . . . .	1764
John Hinchcliffe . . . . .	1769
Spencer Madan . . . . .	1794

ROCHESTER.	
Samuel Bradford . . . . .	1723
Joseph Wilcocks . . . . .	1731
Zachary Pearce . . . . .	1756
John Thomas . . . . .	1774
Samuel Horsley . . . . .	1793

SALISBURY.	
Richard Willis . . . . .	1722
Benjamin Hoadly . . . . .	1723
Thomas Sherlock . . . . .	1734
John Gilbert . . . . .	1748
John Thomas . . . . .	1757
Robert Drummond . . . . .	1761
John Thomas . . . . .	1761
John Hume . . . . .	1766
Shute Barrington . . . . .	1782
John Douglas . . . . .	1791

WINCHESTER.	
Charles Trimmell . . . . .	1721
Richard Willis . . . . .	1723
Benjamin Hoadly . . . . .	1734
John Thomas . . . . .	1761
Brownlow North . . . . .	1781

WORCESTER.	
Isaac Madox . . . . .	1743
James Johnson . . . . .	1759
Brownlow North . . . . .	1774
Richard Hurd . . . . .	1781

YORK.	
Lancelot Blackburne . . . . .	1724
Thomas Herring . . . . .	1743
Matthew Hutton . . . . .	1747
John Gilbert . . . . .	1757
Robert Drummond . . . . .	1761
William Markham . . . . .	1776

CARLISLE.	
John Waugh . . . . .	1723
George Fleming . . . . .	1734
Richard Osbaldiston . . . . .	1747
Charles Lyttleton . . . . .	1762
Edmund Law . . . . .	1769
John Douglas . . . . .	1787
Edward Venables Vernon . . . . .	1791

CHESTER.		Joseph Butler . . . . .	1750
Samuel Peploe . . . . .	1725	Richard Trevor . . . . .	1752
Edmund Keene . . . . .	1752	John Egerton . . . . .	1771
William Markham . . . . .	1771	Thomas Thurlow . . . . .	1787
Beilby Porteus . . . . .	1777	Shute Barrington . . . . .	1791
William Cleaver . . . . .	1787	SODOR AND MAN.	
DURHAM.		Mark Hiddersley . . . . .	1755
William Talbot . . . . .	1722	Richard Richmond . . . . .	1773
Edward Chandler . . . . .	1730	George Mason . . . . .	1786
		Claudius Crigan . . . . .	1784

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Errata in VOL. II. The last three names under Llandaff should be under Oxford: and the last three under Oxford should have been under Worcester.

## CORRIGENDA.

A FEW mistakes have been discovered, some of which are due to the author, and some to the printer. In Vol. I., p. 61, it is said that the mastership of the Temple was in the gift of Archbishop Whitgift. It appears from Isaac Walton that it was in the gift of the benchers, and that Hooker was recommended to it by Archbishop Sandys. On p. 256, John Howe is called an Independent. He is generally described as a Presbyterian, but as he did not believe in the divine authority of any ecclesiastical polity, the difference is not important. In Vol. II., p. 386, it is said that Bishop Chandler explained the Hebrew of the words translated 'Desire of nations,' making desire plural. A writer in the *Scotsman* pointed out that in this case the bishop must have mistaken the construct-state of a Hebrew noun for the plural. It appears that in recopying I have ascribed to the bishop a criticism which he did not make. As the verb is plural it is supposed by some grammarians that the *vau* has been dropped by a transcriber, and so the plural became a genitive singular. On p. 395, it is said that the subject of Archdeacon Gurdon's Boyle Lectures was prophecy. The Lectures treat of prophecy, but the proper subject is described in Vol. III., p. 120. In Vol. I., p. 307, it is said that we only know Bishop Pearson's theology from his Exposition of the Creed. I was not then aware that his minor works had been published. In some of the early parts I find that there is a real ground for a complaint which has been several times made, that the reader cannot always tell whether I am giving my own opinions or only analyzing the views of others. The most noticeable case of this kind is on p. 351, where the illustrations are my own, and not Shaftesbury's, as might be inferred. The mistakes due to the printer are, Vol. I., p. 38, l. 5, *Elijah* instead of *Elisha*; p. 126, l. 12 from the bottom, *person* instead of *prison*; p. 204, l. 13 from the bottom, *ministers* instead of *members*; p. 235, *Roman* instead of *German*; Vol. II., p. 195, Arthur Bury was Master of Exeter College, not of Lincoln; p. 334, l. 8, *conclusive evidence* should be *conclusion*; pp. 380 and 381, *Phileutherus* should be *Phileleutherus*, and on p. 417, *Cum* should be *Quæ*. In Vol. III., p. 124 (*n*), *dele* Williamson; p. 130, the motto from Quintilian is not in Butler; I was misled by the edition which I had before me when I was writing.

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